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ABSTRACT
In this thesis I contribute to the sociological 
discussion on the impact of geopolitical 
constellations on the class and cleavage structure of 
societies. The main concern is to analyse how the 
capacity of collective social actors to pursue their 
interests against other antagonistic collective actors 
can be impeded, or increased, by relations of violence 
between the state in which they operate and foreign 
states. This problem is developed in a first step by a 
review of the sociological literature on the formation 
of the modern state in Western Europe. A close 
scrutiny of the explanatory strengths and weaknesses 
of both the 'society-centred' and the 'state-centred' 
approaches leads to the conclusion that an adequate 
analysis of political structural change in Western 
Europe has to emphasize the dynamic interplay of 
political, cultural, economic and geopolitical 
structures of social action.
In the two case studies on Austria and Ireland in 
the 18th century, I discuss the interaction between 
class, political, regional/colonial, and ideological 
power groupings and economic, ideological, political 
and geopolitical interests. I show how the conflict 
structures of both Austria and Ireland gained momentum 
due to geopolitical constellations. I analyse how the 
attempts of the Austrian and the Irish state to 
establish police forces under their own exclusive 
control and to maintain public order were related to 
geopolitics. In order to explain the power capacity of 
these two states I analyse the effect of geopolitics 
on the distribution of power within the respective 
society.
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I. State systems and at Ate fnrm^. A review of some
regent sociological analyses of the state and state
formation in Western Europe.
In this thesis I endeavour to contribute to the 
sociological discussion on the impact of geopolitical 
constellations on the class and cleavage structure of 
societies. The main concern is to analyse how the 
capacity of collective actors to pursue their 
interests against other collective actors can be 
impeded or increased by relations of violence between 
the state in which they operate and foreign states. In 
the two case studies on absolutist Austria and 
colonial Ireland in the 18th century I will discuss 
the interaction between class, political,
regional/colonial, and ideological power groupings and 
economic, ideological, political and geopolitical 
interests. One of the major empirical tasks of this 
thesis is the analysis of the attempts of the Austrian 
and the Irish state to establish organizations under 
their own exclusive control for the maintenance of 
public order, i.e., to establish a monopoly of 
violence through the formation of state police forces. 
This process is often taken for granted in the 
analysis of the state, but has rarely been documented. 
In so far as police forces must be considered as part 
of the state apparatus, the analysis of the 
development of state agencies of internal security 
sheds light on one major aspect of state formation. 
Attempts to establish a monopolistic command over the 
means of violence, however, are likely to be
contested by those (groups of) individuals who are- 
either expropriated from the means of violence they 
hitherto possessed or excluded from the group of 
people who are to gain control over these means. It is
-  18 -
the contention of this thesis that both the attempts 
to appropriate the means of violence and the form and 
outcome of the struggle over the monopolization of the 
use of the means of violence are intricately linked to 
the power and conflict structure of society. It will 
therefore be the task of the substantive, empirical 
analyses in this thesis to describe the linkages 
between police formation, geopolitics and internal 
power structure in Austria and Ireland in the 18th 
century.
In this introductory chapter I want to situate 
the theoretical problematique of this thesis within 
the current sociological discussion on the state and 
state formation in the West. I shall outline the 
debate which led to the rediscovery of a geopolitical 
approach to the analysis of political structural 
change. I will argue that an adequate analysis of the 
formation of the modern state in Western Europe has to 
emphasize the relations between political, cultural, 
economic and geopolitical structures of social action, 
The formation of the modern state was not determined 
by any single one of these structures but resulted 
from their dynamic interplay. This argument will be 
developed by reconstructing Max Weber's analysis on 
the formation of the modern state.
According to Weber's well-known definition, the 
state is a centralized, differentiated set of 
institutions enjoying a monopoly of the means of 
legitimate violence over a territorially demarcated 
area. But one searches Weber's writings in vain for a 
sustained discussion of the processes that led to that 
monopolization. In the two case studies on police 
formation in Austria and Ireland I want to offer an 
empirical documentation of this process of
-  19 -
monopolization and the conflicts it generated while, 
it is hoped, remaining within a Weberian framework.
A) The state and state formation in recent 
sociological debate.
How best to analyse the modern state in Western 
societies is still a hotly contested issue in
sociology. In marxist and pluralist analyses it is 
argued that it is necessary to inquire into societal 
processes in order to understand and explain the
activities of the state. It is maintained that the
modern state is best understood as an arena in which 
contending social groups - or antagonistic social 
classes - attempt to achieve their objectives. The 
modern state is thought to be a functional unit 
coordinating and resolving divergent and conflicting 
social interests as a systemic output that would
outreach the capacity of individual (and groups of) 
social actors. In stark contrast to this 'society- 
centred' approach it is argued in the 'state-centred' 
approach that the modern state is best characterized 
as an autonomous organization with institutional 
structures and goals of its own - independent from 
social constellations of interests. The state is 
analysed as a sovereign actor pursuing preferences of 
its own when formulating and implementing policies. 
Furthermore, the state is thought to structure social 
interests and the organizational forms in which these 
interests are articulated. In this perspective, 
society can only be understood when the formative 
potential of the state is taken into consideration.
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This discussion about the adequate analysis of 
the modern state has fai— reaching consequences for our 
understanding of modern society in general. To address 
the question of the 'autonomy' of the modern state 
means to enter into the discussion about the 
identification of the structural principle of the 
society as a whole at the same time. Let us assume, 
for the moment, that autonomy of the state means its 
capability or power to shape its social and interstate 
environment according to its own objectives. If 
autonomy is accepted, it is not possible to argue for 
this society and this interstate system to be, e.g., 
formed or determined exclusively by the dynamic of the 
capitalist mode of production. To argue otherwise, it 
would have to be demonstrated that the autonomy of the 
state is, 'in reality', an autonomy of the 'dependent' 
state - conceded, until revoked, by capitalism (or, 
rather, capitalists) at a specific conjuncture in its 
history in order to maintain itself. To argue for the 
modern state to have a logic of its own, independent 
from economics, and a transformative capability for 
acting on its own, implies the assertion of a 
reversible relation of causality between economy and 
polity. It thus challenges the claim that modern 
society is best understood as a capitalist society. A 
theory of the state contains therefore necessarily a 
theory of society. The following sections are meant to 
sketch the framework within which recent discussions 
about the state and state formation have taken place.
Marx's Analysis of the State
In bourgeois-capitalist society private producers 
exchange their labour products on the basis of their 
values as measured in the form of money. It is through 
this exchange that individuals constitute social
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relations. It is with regard to this basic exchange 
relationship that the 'doubling' of bourgeois society 
in society and state must be explained. For Marx, 
this bifurcation is manifest in the distinction 
between the spheres of private interests and general 
interests, between the 'private' bourgeois, the 
selfish individual, and the 'public' citoyen, the 
abstract citizen. Contrary to Hegel, Marx maintains 
that this distinction is a real, essential 
contradiction which cannot be reconciled by 
intermediary institutional mechanisms such as the 
'Stande' (estates). Marx asserts that it is false to 
conceive of civil society as the difference between 
state and family (as Hegel does in the 'Philosophy of 
Right'). Rather civil society and family are to be 
understood as the empirical preconditions of the 
state; they turn themselves into the state, they are 
the driving force behind the state [ MEW 1; 2073. In
his preface to the Critique of Political Economy CMEW 
13: 83 , Marx summarizes the result of his analysis of
Hegel's theory of the state:
[ T3 he conclusion Cwas3 that legal relations as 
well as forms of the state could be neither 
understood by themselves nor explained by the so-
called general progress of the human mind, but
that they are rooted in the material conditions 
of life, which are summed up by Hegel . . . under 
the name 'civil society'.
In capitalism, the exchange between capital and
labour, as indeed the selling and buying of any other 
commodity, appears as if it were an exchange of 
equivalents C MEW 23: 189-90, 563; Grundrisse: 152
ff.3. In exchanging commodities (including labour 
power), individuals enter into social relationships as 
apparently formally free and equal owners of these 
commodities. The very notion of ownership, however, 
presupposes a legal concept of property, a legally
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formulated right to acquire and dispose of commodities 
according to one's own choosing. This is one instance 
in which the importance of legality for capitalism 
becomes apparent. The centrality of state-enforced 
legality for capitalism becomes also manifest when 
labourers enter into exploitative wage-labour 
relationships while the appearance of their 
independence is maintained by the 'fictio juris' of 
the labour contract C MEV 23: 5993.
Given the specific structure of the capitalist 
mode of production, the necessity of developing and 
safeguarding the law as the prerequisite of social 
relations among individuals gives rise to the 
function of coercive power and thus to the basis of 
the state. Guaranteeing the structural conditions for 
the continuity of the 'exchange of equivalents' - the 
structurally produced ideological distortion of the 
material reality of substantive inequality within 
capitalism - is the main objective as well as the 
specific constraints of politics. According to Marx, 
the law and the state have a function for the economy 
without which it could not work in the way it does. 
Cohen [1978: 231 ff.3 correctly argues that -
according to Marx - "bases need superstructures": 
"CT3he property relations are as they are because 
their being so is conducive to the initiation or 
maintenance of the production relations . . . The 
content of the legal system is dictated by its 
function, which is to help sustain an economy of a 
particular type."
So far I have sketched the framework of Marx' s 
analysis of the state as it is derived from his 
conceptualization of the capitalist mode of 
production. But in his political writings, too, Marx
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aims at an understanding of the state. In his analyses 
of the political and economic developments in France 
in the 19th century, Marx conceives the state as a 
coercive apparatus which results from class 
divisions. The state is seen as instrumental in both 
oppressing the working class and reconciling the 
conflicting interests of factions within the 
capitalist class. These internal class factions 
reflect the objective individualization of human 
beings who pursue contradictory private economic 
interests in capitalist society. In this analysis the 
state emerges as a unity-bestowing mechanism. It is a 
capitalist state exactly because it functions as a 
safeguard of the economic relations of exploitation 
in a structure of conflicting capitalist interests.
In arguing the case for a connection between 
specific state structures and distinct forms of unity 
amongst several dominant capitalist groups, Marx's 
analyses pose the question about the 'relative 
autonomy' of the state about the structural conditions 
in which the 'executive' can become 'independent'. 
This relative autonomy arises, in Marx's argument, 
from the separation between general class interests 
and economic self-interest that becomes manifest in 
concrete historical situations. 'Bonapartism', e.g., 
is explained by Marx not only in terms of the specific 
position of the bourgeoisie in times of crisis, but 
also by means of a more general, complex class 
analysis. This class analysis considers specifically 
the class alliances which are structurally possible 
and those which have been actually realized. Thus, 
these inquiries into the social and political order in 
19th century France refer to the necessity for a 
historical analysis of concrete class relations in 
order to understand state forms Ccf. Class Struggles
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in France, in: MEW 7; The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis 
Bonaparte, in: MEW 8; Civil War in France, in: MEW
173 .
A similarly historically sensitive argument is 
called for to explain the structural variations of the 
modern state. In his Critique of the Gotha Programme, 
Marx asserts forcefully that "tt]he 'present-day 
state' is ... a fiction"; it "changes with a country's 
frontier. It is different in the Prusso-German Empire 
from what it is in Switzerland, it is different in 
England from what it is in the United States" [ in: 
Feuer <ed. > 1978: 168] . The reason for these
structural variations in political forms is to be 
found in the variable relationship between wage labour 
and capital:
The specific economic form in which unpaid 
surplus labour is pumped out of the direct 
producers, determines the relation of domination 
and servitude, as it emerges directly out of
production itself and in its turn reacts 
determinant ly upon production. Upon this basis,
however, is founded the entire structure of the 
economic community, which grows up out of the 
conditions of production itself, and consequently 
its specific political form. It is always the 
direct relation between the masters of the
conditions of production and the direct producers 
. . . which reveals the innermost secret, the 
hidden foundation of the entire social edifice, 
and therefore also of the political form of the 
relation between sovereignty and dependence, in 
short, of the particular form of the State" CMew 
25/Das Kapital III: 799-800; cf. the English
translation in: Bottomore/Rubel <eds.> 1978:
112; this translation has been slightly altered 
by adding 'determinantly' in the emphasized 
sentence; emphasis added).
To reiterate, relations of domination react upon 
production in a determining way ("bestimmend ...
zuriickwirkt"). Thus, Marx draws our attention to the 
interaction, or rather reciprocity, between economics
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and politics. This reciprocity operates, however, 
within the structural constraints of the capitalist 
mode of production. It is, after all, a functional 
reciprocity.
These few paragraphs are obviously not meant to 
gauge the subtleties of Marx' s analyses of the modern 
capitalist state. They should have adumbrated, 
however, the framework within which the neo-marxist 
debates about the character of the capitalist state 
take place. Both the instrumentalist approach & la 
Miliband and the functionalist approach, either in its 
political or economic version represented by, e.g., 
the early Poulantzas and the German derivationists 
respectively, could call on Marx as their witness Ccf. 
Carnoy 1984 for summary of the neo-marxist debates] . 
All neo-marxist approaches share, however, the view 
that the form of the state and its policies are 
fundamentally related to the mode of production and 
the specific requirements of class rule. They argue 
firmly within a society-centred perspective and do not 
grant the state any substantive autonomy.
-  26 -
The ".pluralist* approach
Pluralist and marxist analyses share the view 
that a state independent from society is a fiction. 
For pluralists, society is an atomistic universe of 
contending social groups. It is shaped by continuous 
contention between different social groups and 
political actors with different objectives and 
different resources at their disposal with which they 
pursue those interests. While pluralists like Truman 
[ 19523 and Dahl C 19613 maintain that there are no 
limitations on the number of social groups that can 
effectively articulate their demands, neopluralists 
like McConnell [19673 and Lowi C19693 emphasize the 
predominance and overpowering effectiveness of those 
groups that direct their organizational strength and 
their financial resources to well-defined interests in 
narrow bonds of public policy.
Pluralists argue strongly in favour of a concept 
of factual, visible power. They are opposed to a 
notion of power as rooted in developed structures that 
pervade a social system in all its articulations and 
shape all relationships between classes or social 
groups. Instead they argue, firstly, that power is the 
visible capacity of (groups of) individuals to put 
their objectives through even against resistance. They 
maintain, secondly, that "iv3irtually no one, and 
certainly no group of more than a few individuals, is 
entirely lacking in some influence resources" C Dahl 
1961: 2283. For Dahl [1971: 106-73 religion, race,
ethnic group and regional identities are as 
significant as class in the division of society into 
"subcultures" of interests. In pluralist thinking, all 
social groupings are given equal theoretical status as 
it is assumed that power in society is fragmented and
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non-hierarchically and comptetively arranged: "there
are many determinants of the distribution of power 
other than class and, therefore, many power centres" 
[Held 1989: 443.
Dahl C 1961: 2003 assumes that the best test of
power are publicly visible political issues which are 
subject to legislative control. For pluralists, public 
policy results from competition among organized 
interests; it is the contingent outcome of pluralist 
interest representation and modes of negotiation. 
Social groups have manifested their power if they
could successfully influence contested public 
policies. In most pluralist analyses, the state is not 
considered to play a decisive part in formulating
public policy. As Alford and Friedland [1985: 35-1583
show the pluralist perspective has never made the 
state, qua state, a central object of theoretical
inquiry. Nevertheless, pluralists do have a notion of 
the state - or the political system, the polity, the 
political community as they would prefer to call it. 
At their theoretical best, pluralists analyse the 
state as a specific type of interest group competing 
for resources and influence with other groups. But for 
most pluralists, the range of action and the degree of 
activity of the state are defined by the public weal 
that emanates from pluralist modes of negotiating
divergent interests. Social forces and their specific 
demands compel the state to act in certain ways. It is 
within these limits that the state is sometimes seen 
as the arena in which conflicting social interests 
are balanced; and sometimes as the arbitrator and 
producer of the equality of resources to be employed 
in social competition between contentious social 
forces.
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Pluralists claim to explain only modern 
democratic states. But many studies on political 
modernization and political development have been
undertaken from within a pluralist framework. A 
particularly fine example of this literature is Samuel 
P. Huntington's book on 'Political Order in Changing 
Societies' [19683, a classic pluralist study of 
macropolitics, i.e., political institution-building. 
The fundamental issue conferring a thematic coherence 
on his study is the question of how to avoid political 
violence and instability in societies undergoing 
economic, social, and cultural modernization. He
contends that political instability and disorder 
result from high rates of social mobilization and the 
expansion of political participation while rates of 
political organization and institutionalization are 
low [Huntington 1968: 53. For political order to exist 
mobilized new social groups who demand political 
participation have to be accommodated by political
institutions. It is to institution-building that 
Huntington [1968: 85-63 gives primacy:
The effect of the expansion of political
participation ... is usually to undermine the 
traditional political institutions and to 
obstruct the development of modern political
ones. Modernization and social mobilization, in 
particular, thus tend to produce political decay 
unless steps are taken to moderate or restrict 
its impact on political consciousness and
political involvement.
The importance of political institutions results 
from their systemic performance they render for the 
society as a whole: "maintaining order, resolving
disputes, selecting authoritative leaders, and
promoting community among two or more social forces" 
[Huntington 1968: 8-93. This essentially functional
argument is extended in two directions. First, it is 
argued that the dependence of society upon political
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institutions increases with the heterogeneity and 
complexity of the society: "As societies become larger 
in membership, more complicated in structure, and more 
diverse in activities, the achievement or maintenance 
of a high level of community becomes increasingly 
dependent upon political institutions" [Huntington 
1968: 103. Second, he asserts that, "Ca3s social
forces became more variegated, political institutions 
had to become more complex and authoritative" 
[Huntington 1968: 113. This increase in authority is
best understood as increased independence of political 
institutions from the interests and values of other 
institutions and social forces. Huntington [1968: 203
thus propounds the thesis that the autonomy of 
political institutions is a feature of modern polities 
and therefore an instance of political development.
It is now instructive to see how Huntington 
[1968: chap, 23 vacillates between a functional and a
historically contingent argumentation in his 
comparative analysis of political modernization in the 
United States and Europe. Discussing the historical 
processes that led to the emergence of the particular 
sets of political institutions, Huntington [1968: 122-
1343 stresses the decisive importance of war, civil 
strife, and resistance to social change for the 
centralization of power. He identifies concrete social 
actors who form temporary coalitions while pursuing 
their own interests. Thus, Huntington maintains that 
u[w3ar was the great stimulus to state building": 
"Competition forced the monarchs to build their 
military strength. The creation of military strength 
required national unity, the suppression of regional 
and religious dissidents, the expansion of armies and 
bureaucracies, and a major increase in state revenues" 
[Huntington 1968: 122 & 1233.
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Huntington expands on this line of analysis 
asserting that "C i]n modernizing societies, the 
centralization of power varies with the resistance to 
social change" [Huntington 1968: 1263. Religious,
aristocratic, regional, and local 'traditional' 
interests had to be overcome in Europe if 
modernization were to occur: "The centralization of
power was necessary to smash the old order, break down 
the privileges and restraints of feudalism, and free 
the way for the rise of new social groups and the 
development of new economic activities. In some 
degree a coincidence of interest did exist between the 
absolute monarchs and the rising middle classes" 
[Huntington 1968: 1263.
From a methodological point of view it is 
important to notice the anti-functional twist in the 
argument that political processes were set in motion 
by an alliance of social actors in their attempt to 
overcome resistance to their interests by social 
classes with a vested interest in the social and 
economic status quo [Huntington 1968: 1263. In the
same analysis, however, one will find ahistorical and 
functional arguments as well. According to Huntington 
[1968: 1253, "[d3ivided societies cannot exist without
centralized power; consensual societies cannot exist 
with it". Huntington also asserts that the breakdown 
of unity in society gives rise to irrestible forces to 
reestablish that unity through government - his 
historical examples being France and England in the 
16th and 17th century respectively [Huntington 1968: 
123. Here we find the hypothesized sequence of 
order/unity - change/conf1ict; breakdown/disorder - 
reestablishment of equilibrium, a sequence familiar 
from systems analysis. Identifiable social actors
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with identifiable interests play no part in this 
process.
This fundamental ambivalence in Huntington's 
analysis can be shown from a different angle as well. 
Huntington C1968: 140 ff. ] argues that social
modernization poses a challenge to be met by the 
political system. To cope successfully with this 
challenge, social and economic reforms have to be 
promoted by state action. For policy innovation to 
occur it is necessary for power to be concentrated and 
centralized within the polity. Both social 
modernization and successful policy reforms, however, 
foster new social groups who pose a further challenge 
to the political system in so far as they demand 
political participation. To master this challenge, the 
political system must assimilate these groups. It thus 
brings about the expansion of the power of the polity 
by increasing its receptivity to new types of 
political groups and political resources:
In an early stage, modernization requires changes 
in traditional social, economic, and cultural 
beliefs and behavior, hence policy innovations, 
and hence the concentration of power. The gap 
between the powerful and the weak becomes 
greater. At the same time, the social and 
economic change encouraged by the policy 
innovation leads new groups to demand entry into 
the political system and requires the expansion 
of the system. In a third phase, much later, the 
expansion of the system may make possible a new 
dispersion of power within the system [Huntington 
1968: 1453.
This argument, couched strongly in functional 
terms, asserts political change to be essentially 
determined by challenges and demands emanating from 
society. But in his analysis of the 'traditional 
monarchies in the twentieth century', Huntington
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[1968: 155] identifies a concrete political actor who
endeavours to bring about social and political change:
The principal threat to the stability of a 
traditional society comes not from invasion by 
foreign armies but from invasion by foreign ideas 
. . . The stability of twentieth-century 
traditional monarchies is endangered from within 
rather than from without. The monarch is forced 
to modernize and to attempt to change his society 
by the fear that if he does not, someone else 
will . . . twentieth-century monarchs modernize to 
thwart revolution.
The ambivalences of Huntington's analysis is 
mainly due to his quantitative view of society. 
Huntington does not identify the 'bearers' of 
modernization and their specific interests. 
Modernization thus appears to be neutral, uncontested 
social development. The result of modernization is 
also seen in terms of quantity: new, and thus more,
social groups are now populating the political and 
social arena pursuing interests that remain as much in 
the dark as those of the 'modernizers'. In sum, 
modernization is not seen as a restructuring of power 
relationships within society as a whole that 
influences in different ways the chances of different 
groups of social actors to come to an understanding of 
their own interests and to pursue them successfully 
in collective action. Huntington depicts the 
incremental growth of the state as resulting from a 
response of public leaders to political demands of 
ever more diversified social groups. At the same time, 
however, but still within the pluralist perspective, 
he analyses 'the state' as an interest group of its 
own, a social actor with distinct objectives of its 
own.
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This brief discussion of the marxist and 
pluralist analyses has shown that they share a 
reductionist approach: the state itself is credited
with no significant autonomous power. In order to 
understand and explain the structure and the 
activities of the state, one must analyse society. 
Notwithstanding whether this society is conceptualized 
as class-structured or group-based, it is society that 
determines politics and policies. Furthermore, as I 
attempted to show, in both marxist and pluralist 
theories there is also a tendency towards analysing 
the state and political institutional arrangements by 
inquiring into the (social) function they serve. But 
these two theoretical approaches share a further 
characteristic. Both of them conceive society as a 
self-contained entity. Their unit of analysis is the 
territorially-bounded nation-state. The methodological 
and theoretical assumption which underlies their 
analyses maintains that the causes for political, 
economic and cultural change are situated within the 
internal structures and processes of the self- 
contained nation-state/society.
In the the remainder of this chapter I want to 
qualify this statement about the territorially-bounded 
society as the unit of analysis. Over the last fifteen 
years or so, the sociological debate about state- 
formation and the modern state has increasingly 
addressed the theoretical significance of the 
empirical fact that states are not self-contained 
entities but are located and operate within an 
interstate system. It has been emphasized "how the 
very nature of the state crystallizes at the 
intersection of international and national conditions 
and pressures" [Held 1989: 463. I want to discuss two
such approaches: Immanuel Vallerstein's theory of the
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modern world system and the geopolitical approach in 
the tradition of Otto Hintze. I will show how these 
two distinct approaches conceptualize the state.
Immanuel Wallerstein; The capitalist world economy
The most sustained attempt to conceptualize the 
modern world-system as a system of structured
inequality has been undertaken by Immanuel Wallerstein 
[1974]. In this discussion I want to sketch his theory 
and empirical arguments in so far as they pertain to 
the question of how best to analyse political 
structural change.
According to Wallerstein, the structure and 
development of the political-administrative
institutions of societies are determined by the
position of the respective countries within the 
international division of labour and by their
function for the world market. If a country
experiences a change in its economic position in the 
capitalist world-economy, then its internal political 
institutional structure changes as well. Wallerstein 
analyses this problem by means of a 'personalistic' 
argument, referring to class interests of the
capitalist class, on the one hand, and a
'structuralist' argument, applying a functionalist 
thesis of systems maintenance and survival, on the 
other hand.
Wallerstein argues that in capitalism economic
production is determined and geared to the realization 
of profit on the market. On this market actors with
different objectives and wants meet. All buyers want
to buy at a low price - they are therefore interested
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in efficient production and unimpeded market 
procedures; all sellers, on the other hand, want to 
sell as dearly as possible - they have therefore a 
vital interest that their competitors' efficiency 
should not reduce their profits. In this situation 
the producers endeavour to exert political power to 
eliminate competition. Oriented in its activities 
towards the world-economy, the capitalist class thus 
turns to the national state apparatus and demands the 
establishment of market-constraints by state 
intervention. The capitalists' objective is to enhance 
their economic advantages with the help of the state. 
They demand that the state should protect them from 
the dynamics of the market with its risks and 
uncertainties and, in particular, safeguard the
supply of raw material and markets:
The state is the most convenient institutional 
intermediary in the establishment of market- 
constraints ... in favour of particular groups 
... The states are created institutions 
reflecting the needs of class forces operating in 
the world-economy [Wallerstein 1980b: 745 & 7473.
For state intervention on the world market to be 
successful the chances of the states for exerting 
decisive influence must be differentially great, i.e., 
the state apparatuses must have different strength. 
Wallerstein [1974a] argues that the higher the 
convergence of interests within the capitalist class 
from early on in its development, the stronger the 
state apparatuses. This different strength allows for 
a coerced transfer of the economic surplus from 
'peripheral' economies to the 'core' of the world- 
economy through political-military might.
The appropriation and realization of the economic 
surplus by the owners of the means of production is 
the conditio sine qua non of the existence of the
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capitalist system. To secure its survival, the 
capitalist world-economy requires, of necessity, the 
unequal distribution of state-constituted political- 
military institutions. Only this unequal structuration 
of the international system allows for capitalist 
accumulation on a world scale:
C I] f there is to be a multitude of political 
entities . . . then it cannot be the case that all 
these entities be equally strong. For if they 
were, they would be in a position of blocking the 
effective operation of transnational economic 
entities whose locus were in another state. It 
would then follow that the world division of 
labor would be impeded, the world-economy 
decline, and eventually the world-system fall 
apart. It also cannot be that no state machinery 
is strong. For in such a case, the capitalist 
strata would have no mechanisms to protect their 
interests, guaranteeing property rights, assuring 
various monopolies, spreading losses among larger 
population, etc. [Wallerstein 1974: 3543.
The conditio sine qua non of the existence of the 
modern world-system is therefore the development of 
relatively strong state apparatuses in the core of the 
world-economy, and relatively weak ones in the 
periphery. According to Wallerstein [1980a: 2843, " a 
state is strong to the extent that those who govern 
can make their will prevail against the will of others 
outside or inside the realm".
Presenting a historical argument, Wallerstein 
shows that the attempts to develop strong national 
state apparatuses were intensified in Europe after 
both Spain's and France's imperial policies had run 
aground and resulted in their bankruptcy in 1557. In 
the ensuing cyclical economic crisis the 'absolutist 
monarchy' became the predominant form of a strong 
state [Wallerstein 1974: 265 ff.3. Monarchs
strengthened the state apparatuses through the 
bureaucratization of the administration, the
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establishment of the monopoly of violence, the 
creation of legitimacy by means of the concept of 
'absolutism', and the homogenization of the population 
C Vallerstein 1974: 133—1623. According to Wallerstein 
C1974: 1363 this secular process of increased
centralization and internal control, at least within 
the core states, had been required and facilitated by 
the capitalist world-economy.
Functionalism and economic reductionism cannot 
substitute a theory of political structural change and 
the state. Politics, in general, is an un-theorized 
aspect in Wallerstein's analysis. When analysing the 
English Court in the decades before the English 
Revolution, Wallerstein [1974: 257-83 asserts that
Ct3he state-machinery, the Court, was at one and 
the same time a protagonist of the drama and a 
mediating agency, a vector of different forces. 
This was true of all so-called absolute 
monarchies. They balanced forces; they served as 
power brokers; they effected compromises. But one 
of the outcomes they hoped for was to strengthen 
themselves ....
But the 'ambiguity' of the role and objectives of the 
Court, or the absolute monarchies in general, is 
precisely the theoretically important aspect that 
would deserve particular attention, had it not been 
decided beforehand that whatever the 'state' does will 
be beneficial to the world-economy.
Wallerstein encounters serious explanatory 
problems within his own analytical framework due to 
his understanding of state form and state activity as 
reflecting the profit interests of the capitalist 
classes acting on the world market. To start with, 
Wallerstein gets entangled in two circular arguments.
(1) He cannot solve the contradiction within his
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argumentation that, on the one hand, a 'strong' state 
is required for capitalism to be developed at all, and 
that, on the other hand, the formation of a strong, 
absolutist state presupposes economic growth. Not only 
did the setting up of a standing army require material 
and financial resources, but the venality of office 
presupposed financially well-to-do private buyers.
(2) Wallerstein C1974: 3553 asserts the necessity for
strong state-machineries to exist in the core of the 
world-economy so that the capitalist classes can 
conquer markets and pursue their interests such as the 
safeguarding of their monopolies and property rights 
vis-^-vis their competitors. But then it would seem 
that the position of a country in the core of the 
world-economy does not lead to a strong state 
apparatus, but rather that political strength and 
military might of a country render the economic 
predominance of a society possible. Both circular 
arguments point to the need for incorporating further 
variables in addition to economic factors into the 
explanatory model of political structural change.
Furthermore, in 1550, the Netherlands, Northern 
Italy, and parts of Southern Germany were situated in 
the core of the European world-economy; but they did 
not have a strong state-machinery. In 1700, Prussia, 
Austria, and Sweden had strong state apparatuses, but 
did not belong to the centre of the world-economy Ccf. 
Gourevitch 1978a: 423-43. These historical facts are
even somewhat puzzling for Wallerstein. How does he 
take them into account when, for example, analysing 
the Eastern European periphery?
According to Wallerstein, the typical form of 
labour control in the periphery is 'coerced cash-crop 
production'. The state and its juridical apparatus is
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required to enforce this labour [Wallerstein 1974: 
100] .
[The landowner] was maintained in power by the 
strength rather than the weakness of the central 
authority, at least its strength vis-a-vis the 
farm laborer ... 'Coerced cash-crop labor' is a 
system of agricultural labor control wherein the 
peasants are required by some legal process 
enforced by the state to labor at least part of 
the time on a large domain producing some product 
for sale on the world market [Wallerstein 1974: 
91] .
Prussia and Russia are examples of such strong 
states in the periphery. The strong state-machinery 
was necessary, on the one hand, to hinder the peasants 
from fleeing exploitation - a possibility given the 
spaciousness of the borderland - and thus endangering 
the profitable grain trade with the core economy. On 
the other hand, a strong state was necessary to 
prevent in-fighting within the aristocratic elite for 
scarce labour. On the theoretical level, this 
explanation reduces the thesis of a necessarily 
unequal distribution of state power within the world 
system to absurdity. On the historical level, we are 
faced with the further problem that what may perhaps 
apply to Prussia is not valid for Poland. There 
'coerced cash-crop production' existed despite a 
notoriously weak state-machinery. The political system 
and particularly the strength of the state apparatus 
are supposedly determined by the specific forms of 
labour control [Wallerstein 1974: 87]: Which country
is then the exception - Prussia or Poland?
These explanatory shortcomings are not confined 
to the 'periphery'. Wallerstein argues [1974: 263-4],
for example, that France in the 'long 16th century' 
was partly core, partly semi periphery, and partly 
periphery. Despite of these internal structural
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differences France had established a strong monarchy 
because of the necessity for the national system to 
resist and tame the centrifugal forces - both 
geographical and socio-structural - in order to secure 
its own survival. To do so a strong state was required 
[Wallerstein 1974: 2963. Even if one does not take
issue with the functionalist argument itself, one 
should inquire critically how this 'relative autonomy 
of the state' in France could come about - again 
contrary to Wallerstein's own theory.
Finally, Wallerstein cannot offer any explanation 
why the Netherlands, England, and France - each of 
them a 'strong' state - developed different internal 
institutional political structures. He asserts [1980a: 
333 that it is decisive how strong the state is and 
not how absolute the form of government is. But this 
leads to posing the question about the structural 
conditions that enable differently organized political 
systems to be nevertheless 'strong' enough to 
'function' according to the interests of the 
capitalist class.
Wallerstein argues that genesis, structure, and 
operation of the modern world system are exclusively 
determined by economic processes. In the world-system 
approach, political-military interactions between the 
constituent units of this system are functionally 
related to the developmental logic of the capitalist 
world economy. Against this theoretical assumption it 
has been argued by Zolberg [1980; 1981; 19833 that the
modern world system of the 16th century was a complex 
unit whose parts had never been exclusively connected 
by economic mechanisms. He maintained that the system 
of modern states formed the identifiable political 
structure which had decisive effects on the system as
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a whole. Instead of conceptualizing the modern world 
system as a network of relationships between economic 
actors endowed with a differential degree of economic 
power, it was now conceived as constituted by a 
network of relationships between political-strategic 
actors endowed with a differential degree of military 
power [Zolberg 1981: 258-93. Whereas Wallerstein's
theory of the capitalist world economy can arguably be 
placed within a Marxist discussion of imperialism, 
Zolberg's argument is indebted to the geopolitical 
approach which had been influential in Prussian 
historiography at the turn of this century. In the 
following section I will adumbrate some of the core 
arguments of this approach.
Geopolitics and the state
The leading exponent of this approach was Otto 
Hintze. He maintained that the formation of states 
and the development of their institutional orders are 
not determined by socioeconomic conditions; it is the 
external situation of the state which determines its 
internal political institutional structure. The 
political institutional arrangements, as well as the 
social structure in general, are formed and confined 
by the geopolitical position of the country, its 
position within a state system, and the tasks of its 
external politics [Hintze 1970: 34 ff. , 55, 833.
Hintze contends that the specificities of the European 
state system and the specific external position of the 
respective countries posed different institutional 
demands. In all cases, war operated as "the flywheel 
of the whole political enterprise of the modern state” 
by enforcing rationalization and intensification of 
the state organization in general and of the financial 
and military systems in particular [Hintze 1970: 4803.
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The European state system, that had been developing 
since the Italian Wars in 1494, was fundamentally 
shaped by the strife for hegemony by some continental 
powers and the balance-of-power politics set against 
these claims to supremacy by other contending European 
powers Ccf. also Dehio 1962 and Mattingly 19553. The 
16th century was characterized by the power struggle 
between Habsburg and France and the denominational 
antagonisms of the post-Reformation era. Either of 
these conflicts increased the military requirements of 
all continental states. The necessity of continuous 
readiness for war made it paramount for the ruler to 
push back the particularistic forces within the 
countries in favour of the centralized monarchical 
power:
Absolutism can be considered as a concomitant 
phenomenon of that process of state formation by 
which an aggregation of territories is melted 
down to a unified polity . . . But the historical 
necessity of such larger state formations 
resulted from the condition of the European state 
system ... The system of militarism with all its 
political consequences has emerged from the 
power struggle and rivalry of the continental 
states since the end of the Middle Ages C Hintze 
1970: 48-93.
Hintze analysed the interlocking of the 
political-administrative system of domination, the 
military, and the economy. This interlocking was 
formative in so far as the development of the army and 
its striking power depended on the efficiency of the 
state institutions to mobilize the required resources. 
Increased economic growth by means of economic and 
commercial policies of the state and/or the excessive 
exploitation of the population and the development of 
military and administrative institutions were 
complementary phenomena. Preparation for war was the 
great activity of state formation in Western and
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Central European countries. Absolutism was the 
appropriate organizational structure given the 
European state system with its international pressure. 
After military absolutism with <semi-> bureaucratic 
administration had been fully developed in France by 
Louis XIV, it was a "duty of survival" (Hintze) for 
all the other continental states to imitate that 
model. But how, then, does Hintze explain England's 
political institutional structure that differed from 
the continental type?
Parliamentarianism and aristocratic self- 
government in England had their main foundation in the 
geographical position of the country. Due to her 
insular separation and security, England was not 
directly involved in the struggles on the Continent. 
Furthermore, after the defeat against France in the 
Hundred Years' War, England turned away from the 
Continent and, at the end of the 16th century, saw 
her future in a maritime orientation. On the one hand, 
therefore, the geographical-political situation spared 
her the necessity of a strong military build-up. Since 
the 16th century, on the other hand, England's 
interests were not any longer directed towards 
conquering continental territories. Since then her 
ambitions turned to the domination of maritime trade 
and the foundation of colonies and factories in 
overseas countries. These maritime and commercial 
interests did not make it imperative to establish a 
militaristic system in an absolutist form. Instead of 
large land forces, naval forces were required for the 
pursuit of these ambitions. But a navy being afloat on 
the oceans cannot influence and change the internal 
structure of a polity in as decisive a way as an army 
being stationed in the country itself [Hintze 1970: 
428] .
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England, without too great a degree of 
compulsion, could develop internally according to the 
purposes of bourgeois society because the external 
military and political pressure on her was missing 
CHintze 1970: 434]. In pointed contrast to the
Continent, there was no social antagonism between the 
aristocracy ('gentry'), the city dwellers and non- 
aristocratic landowners. To explain this fact, Hintze 
takes again account of the geographical position of 
England. The overseas dominions of the English kings 
meant that war had to be conducted, above all, on the 
Continent. Since the conditions of the military 
services to be rendered in a feudal relationship were 
laid down precisely with regard to the length of time 
and material contributions, this kind of warfare was 
highly unfavourable for such campaigns. Feudal 
military services were, therefore, very early replaced 
by 'mercenary troops' financed by 'scutage'. This 
decline in the importance of the aristocracy in 
military terms was reflected in the transformation of 
the feudal aristocratic warrior into the land- 
cultivating noble farmer that took place two hundred 
years earlier than on the Continent. In so far as this 
change brought about an assimilation of aristocratic 
interests to those of bourgeois and landowning non- 
aristocratic strata, it was possible for a relatively 
coherent coalition against the Crown and its retainers 
to be built which secured the constitutional
confinement of the Crown CHintze 1970: 437-83.
Hintze does not develop a theory of geopolitics
in its effects on internal power structures. A
critique of Hintze would therefore have to scrutinize 
the explanatory validity of his approach in each 
individual case. The thrust of such a critique can be 
indicated for the English case by asking the following
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question: Why were the commercial and naval pressures, 
as they were manifested in the competition with 
Holland, not a 'substitute' for the absence of 
military pressure and cause a special alliance 
between state and wealthy classes ? In order to answer 
this question a thorough analysis of the power 
structure of English society would have to be 
undertaken, linking geopolitical factors with the 
internal distribution of power. But this presupposes a 
theory of society which is, however, never spelled out 
by Hintze.
But sociological analysis can usefully draw on 
geopolitical arguments. The explanatory validity of 
geopolitical arguments has been proven in writings of 
Theda Skocpol and Charles Tilly. Both sociologists 
have analysed rebellions and revolutions linking them 
to geopolitical relations and internal power 
structures.
A widely discussed attempt to link geopolitics 
with the development and change of state forms and 
social structures has been Theda Skocpol's comparative 
analysis of the causes and outcomes of the social 
revolutions in Bourbon France, Romanov Russia, and 
Manchu China in her 'States and Social Revolutions' 
CSkocpol 19793. Skocpol's theory of the state is 
central to her analysis of revolutions. For her, 
states are organizations whose autonomy results from 
their operating within an interstate system. The state 
is not a
mere arena in which socioeconomic struggles are 
fought out. It is, rather, a set of- 
administrative, policing, and military
organizations headed, and more or less 
coordinated by, an executive authority. Any state 
first and fundamentally extracts resources from 
society and deploys these to create and support 
coercive and administrative organizations ... the
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administrative and coercive organizations are the 
basis of state power as such [Skocpol 1979: 293. 
[Furthermore] a state's involvement in an
international network of states is a basis for 
potential autonomy of action over and against 
groups and economic arrangements within its 
jurisdiction - even including the dominant class 
and existing relations of production [Skocpol 
1979: 313.
The state possesses a potential of autonomy viv-^-vis
civil society because it operates in an interstate
system whose demands and challenges can only be 
successfully met on the basis of such independence.
On the basis of this theoretical position, 
Skocpol develops her analysis of social revolutions. 
Three relations are important as explanatory variables 
for the causes and outcomes of social revolutions in 
Skocpol's structural analysis: relations of states to
one another; relations of states to dominant and 
subordinate classes; relations between classes 
[Skocpol 1979: 31, 284, 2923. She argues that France,
Russia, and China were states with 'Great Power' 
ambitions. Their position within the international 
arena was challenged, however, by economically more
developed powers. Interstate competition increased and 
intensified as uneven economic, viz. capitalist, 
development allowed for an unequal distribution of 
material resources to be mobilized for international 
ambitions. As a consequence of the restructuring of 
the interstate environment the autocratic, imperial 
states ran into severe fiscal crises as they strove to 
maintain their international position. Whether these 
crises could be overcome and the challenges be ‘met 
depended on whether the institutionalized 
relationships of the autocratic state organizations 
and the landed upper classes enabled or constrained
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reform policies that would allow for the mobilization 
and coordination of material resources.
Monarchs and landed upper classes did not 
entirely share the same interests. Although partners 
in the exploitation of the peasantry, they disagreed 
with one another on the use of the extracted agrarian 
surplus. Whereas the monarchy was more interested in 
military aggrandizement and state-controlled economic 
development, the landed upper classes were more 
concerned with the perpetuation of the domestic 
socioeconomic status quo. Therefore, the position of 
these classes within the structure of the autocratic 
organization became important:
To the extent that dominant-class members gained 
a capacity for self-conscious collective 
organization within the higher levels of the
existing ipmerial state structure, they might be 
in a position to obstruct monarchical 
undertakings that ran counter to their economic 
interests [Skocpol 1979: 493.
The landed upper classes in France, Russia, and China 
were in a position to constrain or check the state's 
response to the international challenge by preventing 
or retarding the settling of the fiscal crises. In
France and China the landed upper classes had gained a 
foothold in the administrative organizations of the
autocratic state that allowed them to block reform
policies right from the start, while the position of 
the Russian nobility at the local level within a 
stagnant agrarian economy enabled it to delay or 
protract the implementation of reform policies despite 
it's weak position vis-A-vis the imperial state. Within 
this structural setting the breaking apart of the 
state organizations was the result of political 
factional struggles within the administrative state
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machinery. These political crises were transformed 
into revolutionary crises through peasant revolts.
In her analysis of the outcomes of social 
revolutions, Skocpol concentrates on the changes in 
state structure. The rise and demise of political 
leaderships, their power and their impotence hinges on 
their ability to cope with the exigencies of waging 
wars and coping with their domestic political 
repercussions [Skocpol 1979: 286]. According to
Skocpol [ 1979: 1783, state building in France, for
example, was more powerfully shaped by these abilities 
of the political leadership than by the class 
interests of conflicting social groups. The upshot of 
this analytical approach is the argument that, in the 
last instance, political contradictions and political 
factional struggle within state organizations are more 
important for social and political development than 
class contradictions.
This theoretical approach has been reinforced by 
Skocpol ever since the publication of 'States and 
Social Revolutions'. Skocpol [1980: 2003 very clearly
states the essence of her approach:
Capitalism in general has no politics, only 
(extremely flexible) outer limits for the kinds 
of supports for property ownership and controls 
of the labor force that it can tolerate. States 
and political parties within capitalism have 
cross-nationally and historically varying 
structures. These structures powerfully shape and 
limit state interventions in the economy, and 
they determine the way in which class interests 
and conflicts get organized into (or out of) 
politics in a given time and place. More than 
this, state structures and party organizations 
have (to a very significant degree) independent 
histories. They are shaped and reshaped not 
simply in response to socioeconomic changes or 
dominant-class interests, nor as a side-effect of 
class struggles. Rather they are shaped and 
reshaped through the struggles of politicians
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among "themselves, struggles that sometimes prompt 
politicians to mobilize social support or to act 
upon the society or economy in pursuit of 
political advantages in relation to other 
politicians. In short, states and parties have 
their own structures and histories, which in turn 
have their own impact upon society.
Since 'States and Social Revolutions', Skocpol 
has been trying to demonstrate in a number of articles 
how state structures affect the possibilities for 
policy outcomes [Skocpol/Finegold 1982;
Skocpol/Ikenberry 1983; Finegold/Skocpol 1984; 
Veir/Skocpol 1985]. However, in these more recent
articles on the politics of the welfare state
geopolitical considerations are not put forward
anymore. The position of a state in the interstate 
system has ceased to be an important explanatory 
variable. This tacit, but swift, removal of 
geopolitics from the list of explanatory variables 
would appear to be closely bound up with the 
preponderance of methodology over theory in Skocpol's 
analyses - the 'comparative method' as the substitute 
for theory building. It would seem that Skocpol 
attaches significance only to those variables whose 
presence or absence in comparable cases can be
convincingly shown. The research design, rather than a 
set of theoretical prepositions, decides upon the 
independent variables. As Carnoy [1984: 2203 points
out: ''[Skocpol] calls for analyses that consider each
historical case in its own right, with historically 
specific political institutions as key explanatory 
variables". This does not allow for theoretically 
based prediction. Rather, it is an "ex post facto 
empiricism" (Carnoy) propped up by methodological 
considerations.
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One of Skocpol's emphases lies on the 
organizational aspect of the state and the importance 
of political factional contention within the state 
organization. Geopolitical constellations are only one 
factor that might, at certain times and at certain 
places, influence this political in-fighting. If this 
is to be so in more than one of the cases under 
investigation, Skocpol will judiciously take the 
position of a state in the interstate environment into 
serious consideration as an important explanatory 
variable. Skocpol does not offer, however, a
sustained theoretical discussion about the
distribution of power chances within a society and its 
links to geopolitics.
Another attempt to analyse linkage between 
political structural change, socio-economic
development and geopolitical relations of violence has 
been Tilly's writings on statemaking and collective 
violent action. In so far as some of Tilly's major 
analyses are centrally concerned with the formation of 
the modern state in Western Europe, his arguments are 
of particular relevance for this study.
Charles Tilly states categorically: "War makes
states" CTilly 1985: 1701. To conduct a war any power
holder has to deploy means of coercion which, in the 
past, meant above all the levy of troops. To do so 
resources had to be mobilized to provide for the 
financial and material logistic infrastructure - 
supplies and wages for the military. In Europe raising 
taxes became the typical way of extracting resources. 
And to make raising taxes easier the commercialization 
of the economy was often promoted by governments:
Power holders' pursuit of war involved them 
willy-nilly in the extraction of resources for 
war making from the populations over which they
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had control and in the promotion of capital 
accumulation by those who could help them barrow 
and buy. War making, extraction, and capital 
accumulation interacted to shape European state 
making CTilly 1985: 1723.
In absolutist France forced loans, sale of 
offices, and tax farming established the great 
capitalists as the major source of royal credit and as 
an important 'intermediary power' possessing 
sovereignty rights in their function as collectors of 
royal taxes. This dependence on major creditors and 
the organization of the financial administration in 
general brought about the structural decentralization 
of the absolutist monarchy. This systemic curtailment 
and circumscription of the power of the absolutist 
ruler was complemented by the functional 
interdependence between the absolutist monarch and 
parts of the 'estate society'. After all, the 
absolutist ruler could strike a bargain with his 
creditors since he controlled the avenues for social 
mobility and the political means to help bring about 
the much desired nationalization of the markets via 
mercantilist policies. It must suffice here to point 
to the interlocking of social actors who pursue 
distinct and different goals in their attempt to 
mobilize resources. It is the specific needs of the 
political power holder as a geopolitical actor who 
make him enter into this relationship out of 
necessity.
But while some win, others lose. The building of 
armies; taxation and tax gathering; bureaucratization 
and commercialization: all are likely to infringe upon 
established rights and interests. In France in the 
seventeenth century, for example, tax rebellions were 
the most important and effective form of popular 
resistance to the making of the state [Tilly 1986: 79-
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161]. More specifically, Tilly [1981b: 1241 lists a
number of contentious collective actions of the 
population in response to military exigencies:
Battles between regular armies and armed 
civilians . . . Resistance to direct exactions by 
the military: impressment and the commandeering
of meat, wine, bread, sex, and lodging ... 
Resistance to official efforts to raise the means 
of support for armies: especially taxation, but
also the commandeering of corv6e labor, wagons, 
horses, food, and housing ... Resistance to 
efforts .., to divert resources - especially food 
- to armies ... Conflicts emerging as by-products 
of the presence of troops: soldier-civilian
brawls, clashes over military smuggling and 
poaching ...
' In the last instance' , however, those rebellions and 
forms of resistance were crushed successfully and in 
the course of the repression the state apparatus was 
enlarged. Thus, "CtDhere's the complex: warmaking,
taxation, bureaucratization, resistance, repression, 
statemaking" [Tilly 1981a: 114],
In Tilly's analysis statemaking is presented as 
a struggle over the appropriation of power resources 
that results in the restructuring of the distribution 
of power chances within a territorial and social 
space. This restructuring does not only pertain to the 
institutional complex we are used to associate with 
the state: bureaucracy, centralized coercive
organizations, national financial administration and 
budgets etc. . To prepare efficiently and effectively 
for war, social and economic power configurations had 
to be transformed. For example, financiers and bankers 
forwarding credit to the state made their way into the 
power elite, while resistance by local or regional 
traditional power holders as well as popular 
resistance had to be overcome. While some segments 
within a population acquire new rights in the process
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of state formation, other segments stand to lose. In 
this perspective, state-building is necessarily a 
conflict-ridden, contested political process that 
affects the social structure of a society as much as 
its political structure.
Tilly's analyses show convincingly that the 
distribution of power within a society has to be 
related to the geopolitical relations of violence in 
which it participates. This is not an original 
theoretical position, though, as I have shown above, 
it has only recently been rediscovered. In the 
remainder of this chapter I want to present one 
analysis of the formation of the modern state to whose 
analytical logic Tilly's arguments could be traced 
back. I shall reconstruct Max Weber's discussion of 
the formation of the modern state and argue that, 
according to Weber, an adequate analysis of these 
formation processes has to emphasize the relations 
between political, cultural, economic and geopolitical 
structures of social action. I will show that for 
Weber the formation of the modern state was not 
determined by any single one of these structures but 
resulted from their dynamic interplay. The empirical 
studies in the following chapters will take heed of 
this theoretical position. In these studies I try not 
to give prime causal importance to geopolitics but 
attempt to focus on the interactions between class, 
political, regional/colonial, and ideological power 
groupings and economic, ideological, political and 
geopolitical interests.
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B) Geopolitics and internal power structure: A
reconstruction of Max Weber's analysis of the 
formation of the modern state.
The following explication of Weber's analysis of 
political structural change in Western Europe is 
informed by a methodological observation which bears 
upon the problem of causation. Weber forcefully 
maintains that structures of social action follow 
' laws of their own* C ' Elgengesetzl ichkelt* ] [ Weber
1978: 341; hereafter, all figures in brackets refer to
Weber 1978 unless otherwise stated] . This is said to 
be true for the major political, economic, legal and 
religious forms of association as well as for
structures such as the household, the kin group and 
the ethnic group. While Weber concedes that 'groups 
that are not somehow economically determined are 
extremely rare' [341], his insistence on the 
independent developmental logic of different 
structures directs us to an investigation into the 
internal dynamic of the different structural forms of 
social action.
This analysis has to be complemented, however, by
inquiring into the relationship between these
different structures. Following Weber, it has to be 
established whether there exists an 'elective 
affinity' between structures. That is to say, whether 
there is a relation of structural adequacy which 
determines the degree to which structures further or 
impede or exclude each other [341]. These distinctive 
structures of social action constitute each others' 
environment, forming constraints and opening up 
opportunities for each other. To account for 
structural change it has to be shown how social groups
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as collective actors exercise pressure upon existent 
constraints and, through acting upon interests of 
their own and by mobilizing distinctive resources, 
make use of the enabling aspects of the environment 
Ccf. Poggi 1983: 36-9].
According to Weber, the political structure of 
the European feudal polity after the break-up of the 
Carolingian Empire enabled the formation of the 
hierocratic organization of the Catholic church and 
the development of the medieval cities. The unfolding 
dynamics of these distinctive social organizations 
undermined the feudal system of domination. Their 
respective structural principles proved incompatible 
with the political structure. The bureaucratization of 
the system of political domination as a result of 
military conflicts between states, and the development 
of capitalism brought about new constellations of 
interests and offered possibilities for new coalitions 
and alliances between well-entrenched and new social 
actors. Given these constellations of interests and 
the degree of formal rationality of the emerging 
social and economic organizations, the formation of 
the modern state was an 'objective possibility' to be 
realized through concrete social action.
The Feudal System of Domination
For Weber, 'every domination both expresses 
itself and functions through administration' [9483. He 
maintains that historical reality involves the 
continuous, though for the most part latent, conflict 
between rulers, or chiefs, and their staffs for the 
appropriation and expropriation of the means of 
administration C2643. Taking this power struggle as 
his analytical starting point, Weber distinguishes
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different types of administration with regard to the 
concentration of the means of physical coercion in the 
hands of the administrative staff. Furthermore, it is 
through an analysis of the relationship between the 
ruler and his administrative staff and their specific 
division of labour that Weber develops subtypes within 
his types of legitimate domination.
The purest type of traditional domination is 
patriarchal domination. It is characterized by the 
patriarch's rule over those people who live within his 
household. Paternal authority as well as obedience of 
the personal dependents are based on tradition and 
piety. Once a patriarchal ruler extends his power 
beyond his household, however, he is faced with the 
necessity of delegating authority to individuals 
recruited from outside his domestic sphere of 
domination. This delegation entails, in turn, chances 
for the ruler's functionaries to strive for autonomy, 
i.e., to aim at appropriating the administrative means 
of domination at the ruler's expense. Weber 
distinguishes analytically between two principal
types of organizing this extra-domestic domination: 
'patriarchal patrimonialism' and 'estate
patrimonialism' . Sultanism, with its seemingly
tradition-free arbitrariness of the ruler and the
total dependence of the staff, is the epitome of 
'patriarchal patrimonialism'. Occidental feudalism 
CLehensfeudalismus) % with its contractual relationship 
between ruler and his staff who are independent due 
to their social standing, is the purest type of 
'estate patrimonialism'. While patriarchal
patrimonialism is mass domination by one individual,
feudalism is always domination by the few who have 
military skills C11063.
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Weber's terminology is sometimes confusing. I 
will use the following definitions: Patrimonialism
means the extension and decentralization of domestic 
authority through assignment of land and sometimes of 
equipment to sons of the house or other dependents 
while the ruler remains in possession of the means of 
administration C10113. Hence, in principle, the 
patrimonial prince organizes his political power over 
extradominial areas and political subjects in the same 
way in which he also exercises his patriarchal 
domestic power C10133. I will speak of feudalism, on 
the other hand, wherever the paternalistic
relationship is replaced by a contractually fixed 
fealty between social equals on the basis of knightly 
militarism and where the staff have appropriated the 
means of administration. This 'system of relations of 
purely personal loyalty between the lord and his 
vassals and between these in turn and their own sub­
vassals <sub-infeudation)' [2563 is premissed on the
ascription of charismatic qualities to the lord by his 
followers. Hence, whereas occidental feudalism is an 
example of traditional domination with regard to the 
structure of administration, it is at the same time an 
example of charismatic domination as far as the 
quality of the social relation between the feudal 
lords is concerned [250, 2553.
In contrast to the wide realm of discretionary 
power which the ruler yields under pure patrimonialism 
under feudalism the lord's powers are severely 
circumscribed. The vassal's obligations towards the 
lord are based on a contract of fealty. Such a 
contract presupposes the vassal to be a free man and, 
at the same time, involves reciprocal obligations of 
loyalty [255 f.3. The obligations are stereotyped and
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contractually fixed on the basis of personal fealty 
and shared status honour: The contractual character
of the feudal relationship compares with the 
•juxtaposition [under pure patrimonialism, R.A.3 of 
traditional prescription and appropriated rights, on 
the one hand, and arbitrariness and discretion on the 
other' [10823. As the fief-bolder's position was 
guaranteed through a bilateral contract, which 
constituted and maintained 'subjective' rights, 
feudalism was an approximation of the Fechtsstaat [a 
state under the rule of law] [1082, 1099], It is
precisely because of the strict legal autonomy of the 
individual vassal that Weber can characterize fully 
developed feudalism as 'the most extreme type of 
systematically decentralized domination' [1079]. From 
this contractually secured legal autonomy results an 
inelastic, stereotyped division of labour:
Type and distribution of powers are fixed through 
this contract, but there is no general r£glement 
and no rational differentiation of individual 
jurisdiction. For the powers of the office are 
personal rights . . . their extent is determined 
positively by the official's personal grant and 
negatively by the subject's exemptions, 
immunities and privileges, whether they be 
granted or sanctified by tradition [1082],
Given the vassal's legal autonomy which is
safeguarded, in the last instance, by his independent 
military might, and, in light of the vassal's chance 
of evading feudal duties on the basis of multilateral 
obligations and the financial inelasticity of the 
feudal apparatus (which is, in turn, due to
traditional regulation of the tributes and services to 
be rendered), the whole system, and above all the 
overlord's authority within it, is manifestly 
precarious. A chronic struggle for authority is
characteristic of the feudal system in which the 
ruler depends ' on the voluntary obedience ... of the
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administrative staff, who . . . are themselves in 
possession of the means of administration* [257], Why 
is it that this struggle resulted in the ruler's 
victory [2591 ? Let me first turn to the Catholic
church as an important institutional structure which 
contributed to the erosion of the feudal system of 
domination.
The. Catholic Church and the Feudal Polity
The Investiture Conflict in the 11th century was 
the manifestation of the conflict between sacred and 
secular power which had been latent even in earlier 
periods. The papal conception of the subordination of 
the secular ruler to divine law as it had been 
preached by the church was confronted with the 
imperial theory emphasizing God's direct mandate to
the emperor to rule. This mandate was seen as the
ultimate Justification of imperial authority and of
the imperial right to appoint a successor to the 
emperor without undue interference by the church. When 
lay investiture was forbidden by Pope Nicholas II at 
the Synod of Pome in 1059, open conflict between 
political and hierocratic power commenced. It was a 
struggle between two types of authority and 
legitimacy - each of which raised universalist demands 
with regard to the extent of their respective spheres 
of influence [1193, 12071. This conflict was brought
to a head when Gregory VII in 1075 in his Dictatus 
Fapae declared the papacy to be politically and
legally supreme over the entire church, the clergy to 
be independent from secular control and the emperor to 
be subordinated to ultimate papal supremacy even in 
secular affairs.
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Seizing on the emperor's defeat in this
confrontation, many a ruler in the various
principalities within the empire succeeded in building 
territorial states which were to become politically 
independent from imperial authority. In this respect, 
the Investiture Conflict contributed to the political 
plurality of Western Europe and to an interstate 
system which proved to be the decisive barrier for any 
attempt to build an overarching patrimonial empire. 
But the changes within the church itself were, at the 
very least, to be equally important. The elimination 
first of the feudal and then of all independent local 
intermediary powers, which was begun by Gregory VII, 
brought a further advance of bureaucracy within the 
Church as a professional court, a professional 
treasury, a chancery, papal legates as representatives 
of the Holy See etc, were established C985-61. The 
head of this rational bureaucratic organization was 
the pope who was supreme legislator, supreme 
administrator, and supreme judge. The church's laws 
were executed through an administrative hierarchy and 
its laws interpreted and applied through a judicial 
hierarchy. Furthermore, between 1050 and 1250, the 
church developed a rational system of jurisprudence 
with the Canon Law C828 ff. 1 .
This body of ecclesiastical law, whose
fundamental principles can be found in the Decretum 
Gratiani in 1140 and the Decretals of Gregory IX in 
1234, was clearly set apart from liturgy and theology 
and thus constituted an autonomous legal sphere. 
Internally, this law had the function of securing the 
organizational and legal unity of the church under the 
papacy; whereas externally, it had to maintain the 
church's relations with the secular authorities. Weber 
argues that Canon law became one of the guides for
-  61 -
secular law on the road to rationality C 8293 . In this 
respect, he points above all to the procedural 
aspect of Canon law with its formal rationality:
Canonical procedure was written; testimony was 
required to be under oath; parties were permitted to 
be represented by counsel; judges were to interrogate 
parties and witnesses according to principles of 
reason and conscience and, finally, this judicial
investigation was to be guided by rules concerning the 
establishment of probable truth and the appreciation 
of the relevancy and materiality of evidence CBerman 
1983: 250 ff.3. This procedural rationality was
complemented by the rationality of lawmaking as it was 
achieved through the Councils, the bureaucracies of 
the dioceses, the Curia, and , in particular, through 
the papal powers of jurisdiction and infallible
exposition of doctrine [7923.
It is thus not to the material Canon law of 
marriage, of inheritance, of property and of contracts 
that Weber draws our attention when he argues that 
'the direct practical significance of Canon law for 
secular law, as far as substantive private, and 
especially commercial, law was concerned, varied a 
great deal in the course of time' C8293 and, 
furthermore, that it was circumscribed by both 
political and economic-bourgeois countervailing
interests. Instead, it is the formal rationality of 
lawmaking and of procedure which figures prominently 
in his discussion. Here lies one element of the 
corrosive potential of the Catholic church for the 
feudal system of domination with its network of 
personal relationships based on concern for material 
equity and on the disregard for formal rationality.
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Furthermore, the church after Gregory VII claimed 
to be an independent, hierarchical, public authority, 
and the ecclesiastical corporation law within the
Canon law was meant to maintain this new, independent 
and visible corporate legal unity. In a legal sense, 
the church was the first 'institution' i Anstaltl t 'and 
it was here that the legal construction of public 
organizations as corporations had its point of 
departure' C8293. On the most general legal level, 
corporation law established organizations as juristic 
persons. According to Weber, 'the most rational 
actualization of the idea of the legal personality of 
organizations consists in the complete separation of 
the legal spheres of the members from the constituted 
legal sphere of the organization . . . certain persons 
designated according to rules are regarded from the
legal point of view as alone authorized to assume 
obligations and acquire rights for the organization' 
17073. Amongst other things, corporate law addresses 
the relation between the organization as a legal 
entity and its individual members and the issue of the
rights and duties of the corporation vis-A-vis those
of its officers.
The canonists argued that 'the church as a 
corporate legal entity ... conferred jurisdiction upon 
individual ecclesiastical officers (pope, bishops, 
abbots), and [that 3 it was the law of corporations 
that determined the nature and limits of the 
jurisdiction thus conferred' [Berman 1983: 2153. Thus,
jurisdiction could not be absolute but was confined by 
law. The church was established as a ' Rechtsstaat' 
(Berman). The conciliary movement in the 14th and 15th 
century based its arguments on this legal 
interpretation: The pope as executive authority can
take certain actions only after the ' advice and
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consent' of the General Council as the supreme
consultative body. This consultation is warranted 
because those who are directly affected by a decision 
should have the right to participate in making it.
The legal consequence of the 'papal revolution' 
(Berman) was thus twofold: It was through legal
institutions that ecclesiastical rulers had to pursue 
their policies; and the rulers were bound by the very 
institutions through which they governed. It was above 
all in these two regards that ecclesiastical corporate 
law 'influenced the development of the secular
corporation concept of the Middle Ages' C 714-53. The 
papal notion that the secular ruler had to keep the 
peace by controlling violence and had to establish 
justice under the law, that he was guarantor and 
trustee of the law, bestowed preeminence both on the 
law and on the secular ruler as lawmaker. It was 
possible to link this notion up with the early
medieval idea that the emperor had to show ' pi etas*
and to guarantee ' justitia* . Secular rule was to be 
rule of law and rule by law. Furthermore, the 
ecclesiastical conciliary theory was used by local and 
regional notables to confront the doctrine of the 
royal officials - ' quod principi placuit, legis habet
vigorenf - with their idea that ' quod omnes tangit, 
ab omnibus appro be t u r* . The struggle of the
territorial notables with the king or overlord for 
establishing parliamentary bodies or estate
assemblies was couched ideologically in these terms. 
The rationally structured hierarchical order of the 
church as a corporate legal entity became the model of 
all secular corporate bodies.
As the Concordat of Worms of 1122 demonstrated, 
in the West (despite or because of the Investiture
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Conflict), the distribution of power resources did not 
allow for the unification of political and hierocratic 
power either in a caesaropapist or a theocratic system 
of domination. Typically, therefore, a compromise was 
concluded delimiting their respective spheres of 
influence C1193, 12073. This compromise between
political and hierocratic power was, according to 
Weber, beneficial to both of them. The political power 
could provide the hierocratic power with the coercive 
means of maintaining its power position in general and 
the annihilation of heretics and the collection of 
church taxes and other contributions in particular. 
The church as a 'hierocratic organization', in turn, 
could offer its religious sanctions in support of the 
ruler's legitimacy and as a means of domesticating the 
subjects 'in things great and small* C1175-6, 1161-23.
One form which this domestication could take was 
the education of the political subjects towards a 
methodical conduct of life. Weber maintains that, 
initially, the monk was strategically best suited for 
fulfilling this task:
The monk was the first professional . . . The monk 
lived in a methodical fashion, he scheduled his 
time, practiced continuous self-control, rejected 
all spontaneous enjoyments and all personal 
obligations that did not serve the purposes of 
his vocation. Thus he was predestined to serve as 
the principal tool of bureaucratic centralization 
and rationalization in the church and, through 
his influence as priest and educator, to spread 
corresponding attitudes among the religious 
laymen C1172-33.
The monk was disposed towards a methodical conduct of 
life because of his belief that only if he achieved 
complete control over his self and his natural drives 
could he prove himself before God. And it was this 
belief that led him to treating work as an ascetic
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instrument, to be deployed in pursuit of 'certitudo 
salutis' C 11703. The rational achievements of 
occidental monasticism, such as the first rationally 
administered manors and the first rational work 
communities in agriculture and the crafts, rested on 
this belief and attitude [11693.
To the degree in which the monastic movements 
were incorporated into the hierocratic structure of 
the Catholic church, the monks would become 'the 
disciplined army of a rational bureaucracy of office' 
C5553. But this relationship between hierocracy and 
monasticism was inherently fragile: the personal
charisma of the monk, who sought to achieve individual 
salvation through finding a personal, direct path to 
God by means of an ascetic conduct of life was 
frequently in conflict with the hierocratic claims of 
the Catholic church. As an institution of grace the 
church sought to monopolize the way to God and, as an 
organization, it had to compromise with the economic 
and other mundane power interests [1166-673. Many of 
the reform movements within the church emanated from 
this tension between personal charisma and office 
charisma. Only under specific conditions, therefore, 
would the monks be a compliant tool of bureaucratic 
centralization and rationalization in the church.
The monk's capacity for influencing the conduct 
of life of the laiety at large was structurally 
limited by the character of the Catholic church as an 
institution of grace. The disciplining influence of 
the church, with the monk as its main bearer, rested 
on its capability to enforce 'its order through 
psychic coercion by distributing or denying religious 
benefits' [543. The command over the means of 
hierocratic coercion - such as confession, admission
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to Holy Communion or dispensation of sacraments in 
general, or excommunication - could then 'form the 
basis of a system of spiritual domination over human 
beings' [563. The power position of the Catholic 
church was linked to its successful monopolization of 
these means of psychic coercion. But by using these 
means, the church inevitably restricted the scope and 
impact of its spiritual domination. Through the 
confessional or the purveyance of institutional grace, 
Catholicism provided an opportunity for the individual 
sinner to gain release from sins, not through the 
sinner's own methodical ethical action, but through 
pure obedience to the institution:
Every type of actual dispensation of grace by a 
person . . . has the net effect of weakening the 
demands of morality upon the individual . . . The 
vouchsafing of grace always entails an inner 
release of the person in need of salvation; it 
consequently facilitates his capacity to bear 
guilt and, other things being equal, it largely 
spares him the necessity of developing an 
individual pattern of life based on ethical 
foundations [5613.
In Catholicism, therefore, the content of the pattern 
of life is not apt to be pushed in the direction of 
ethical systematization. Hence, the sole principle 
integrating the life pattern is a formal humility of 
obedience, not concrete, substantive ethical 
obligations which would compel the believer from 
'within' to lead a rational, disciplined life C562-33.
It was the great historical achievement of 
ascetic Protestantism, not only to have transferred 
rational asceticism from the cloisters into the life 
of the world, but also to have favoured the evolution 
of an ethically rationalized pattern of life of the 
individual believers by cutting them off from 
institutional grace, thus doing away with the means to
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a periodical discharge of the emotional sense of sin 
[Weber 1967: 117-223:
[Q3nly in the Protestant ethic of vocation does 
the world, despite all its creaturely 
imperfections, possess unique and religious 
significance as the object through which one 
fulfills his duties by rational behavior 
according to the will of an absolutely 
transcendental god. When success crowns rational, 
sober, purposive behavior of the sort not 
oriented to worldly acquisition, such success is 
construed as a sign that god's blessing rests 
upon such behavior . . . This religion demanded of 
the believer . . . the avoidance of all surrender 
to the beauty of the world, to art, or to one's 
own moods and emotions. The clear and uniform 
goal of this asceticism was the disciplining and 
methodical organization of conduct. Its typical 
representative was the 'man of a vocation" or 
"professional" (Berufsmensch) , and its unique 
result was the rational organization of social 
relationships [5563.
This ethic was structurally adequate, not only 
for modern rational capitalism but also for 
bureaucratic organizations as the materialization of 
objectified power structures [601, 9753. The ethic of
ascetic Protestantism led to the rejection of the 
world as an incomplete and contingent place. The form 
taken by the Puritans' world-rejection was, however, 
one of active rational world-domination since it was 
within the world that the religious believers had to 
prove their worth. This notion promoted bureaucracy 
as the tool of an all-encompassing rationalism of 
world-domination.
But there is also a limit to the compatibility of 
this religious ethic with objectified secular power 
structures. Weber maintains that public political 
activity leads to the surrender of rigorous ethical 
requirements 'since political activity is oriented to 
average human qualities, to compromises, to craft, and
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to the employment of other ethically suspect devices 
and people, and thereby oriented to the relativization 
of all goals' [593]. A conflict between non-ethical 
mattei— of-fact considerations in the sphere of 
politics and the personal ethic of religion is 
inevitable:
The use of force within the political community 
increasingly assumes the form of the Rechtsstaat. 
But from the point of view of religion, this is 
merely the most effective mimicry of brutality. 
All politics is oriented to raison d'dtat, to 
realism, and to the autonomous end of maintaining 
the external and internal distribution of power. 
These goals , . . must necessarily seem senseless 
from the religious point of view [6003.
The very existence of Protestantism shows that, 
in the long term, the compromise between the political 
power and the hierocratic power was detrimental to the 
Catholic church. As Weber points out, the reform 
movements within the church were provoked by ' the 
unavoidable compromise of the hierocracy with the 
secular powers and with sin' C1197]. For the reformers 
the religious penetration of worldly life through the 
hierocracy had not gone far enough. This was
especially believed by bourgeois groups. The economic 
rationalism of these bourgeois groups corresponded 
with particular types of rigoristic ethical religion 
[4803 which came into conflict with the politically 
circumspect religiosity of the office charisma of the 
Catholic church:
It was the peculiar piety of the intensely 
religious bourgeois strata that made them side 
with the reformist preachers against the
traditional ecclesiastical apparatus, just as
they had sided earlier with the hierocracy 
against the Empire and with mendicant orders 
against the secular clergy; their piety was 
characterized by a relatively rational ethics, by 
the nature of bourgeois occupations and by a
relatively strong preoccupation with self- 
justification before God ... [11973.
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These (urban) bourgeois strata, which helped 
undermine the hegemony of the Catholic church, owed 
their political and economic power to the position of 
the medieval cities within the feudal system. Their 
effect on the political structure will now be
discussed.
Medieval Cities and the Urban Economy
The cities in medieval Europe were everywhere to 
some degree 'communes' with autonomous political 
rights and an autonomous economic policy. The 
'political association of the burghers' of the
medieval cities, which was directed against the 
'legitimate' powers and took the form of 'sworn 
confraternizations', was aimed at shaking off the 
bonds of seigneurial domination and at the 
appropriation of the means of domination by the urban
citizenry. This process is described by Weber as
'revolutionary usurpation' which - 'formal-
juridically' - calls into question the 'validity of 
the legitimate order' and breaks down the 'continuity 
of legitimacy' [1250, 12393.
This revolutionary innovation had a number of 
prerequisites. The urban confraternizations were 
confederations of individual burghers whose personal 
affiliation with the urban association was guaranteed 
by their legal position as burghers. Their loyalty 
was to the city, not to the sib or tribe. 
Christianity, with its universalistic notion of 
membership through faith and its demand for conformity 
to its rituals, had destroyed the importance of sib or 
tribe for political loyalty: 'The Christian
congregation was a religious association of individual
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believers, not a ritual association of clans' [1247, 
1244]. Furthermore,
Ct3he elimination of all ritual barriers of birth 
for the community of the eucharists, as realized 
in Antioch, was, in connection with the religious 
preconditions, the hour of conception for the 
Occidental 'citizenry'. This is the case even 
though its birth occurred more than a thousand 
years later in the revolutionary conjurationesof 
the medieval cities. For without commensalism - 
in Christian terms, without the Lord's Supper in 
common - no oath-bound fraternity and no medieval 
urban citizenry would have been possible C in: 
Gerth/Mills (eds.) 1967: 403-43.
In the medieval city, fraternization was not impeded 
by any magical or religious barriers. But, on the 
other hand, in so far as 'every foundation of the 
Occidental city, during Antiquity and the Middle Ages, 
went hand in hand with the establishment of a cultic 
community of the [productive] citizens', only 
membership of the parish community bestowed the legal 
status of citizen on the individual [in: Gerth/Mills
(eds.) 1967: 4023.
Another prerequisite for this revolutionary 
innovation was the capability of the cities to put a 
military check on the coercive power of the city 
lord: All coniuratlones and city unions in the
Occident were coalitions of the armed strata of the 
cities [12623. The dispersion of military power that 
was founded on the principle of self-equipment of the 
armies had severe political consequences in so far as 
it opened up room for manoeuvre for the bearers of 
arms. This argument ties in with Weber's emphasis on 
the beneficial effect which the competitive political 
structure had on the development of the cities. The 
less unitary the organization of the larger political 
association, the more the political autonomy of the 
urban community could develop: 'The competition
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between the nan-urban powers, in particular the 
conflict of the central power with the great vassals 
and the hierocratic power of the church, came to the 
aid of the cities, especially since an alliance of any 
one of the contending powers with the money power of 
the burghers could provide it with a decisive 
advantage' I 1351-2].
Since they were granted 'city' status initially 
for purely economic reasons, and not because of 
political or military motives of the founder, the 
cities could develop and maintain their autonomous 
position only in so far 'as the non-urban power- 
holders did not yet possess a trained apparatus of 
officials able to meet the need for an urban 
administration even to the limited extent required by 
their own interest in the economic development of the 
city' C 1351] . The extent of urban autonomy was thus 
inherently unstable and a question of power. Scanning 
the history of the city after the fall of the Roman
Empire in the Vest, Weber argues that in the
Carolingian period, the cities had been nothing - or
almost nothing - but administrative districts, 
differentiated from other administrative units only by 
certain peculiarities of their status structure. In 
the modern patrimonial state, they were again very
close to this position, distinguished only by certain 
corporate privileges. Only in the intermediate period 
had they been everywhere to some degree ' communes' 
with autonomous political rights and an autonomous 
economic policy C1322-3, 1325]. The autonomy of the
medieval city was therefore a 'historical interlude' 
C1352; also Veber 1976: 344-73.
The political setting made the medieval townsman 
a homo oeconomicus L1354]. And it was the political
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and legal autonomy which made possible the formation 
of a bourgeois class interested in a rationally 
organized profit-making economy. Urban autonomy meant 
the chance of consociation through exchange in the 
market [6353. A precondition for the success of this 
new type of consociation was the rationalization of 
economic, legal, and political relationships. The 
feudal system of domination, however, is structurally 
inadequate for the development of a 'capitalist' 
economy [1099 ff.3: Freedom of acquisition is impeded
by congeries of acquired rights; opportunity for 
capitalist acquisition is provided only through the 
granting of concrete privileges; commercialization of 
land is obstructed by the legal institution of the 
fief which normally makes land inalienable and 
indivisible; the siphoning off of mass purchasing 
power through feudal tributary and service demands 
does not allow for the development of a market for 
industrial products; and finally, the nouveaux riches 
are motivated by the social prestige of the manorial 
lords to invest their acquired wealth in land rather 
than in capitalist ventures in order to rise into the 
nobility.
The continuity of the legal order, on the other 
hand, may facilitate capitalist development. And so 
may the social closure of the feudal stratum against 
the nouveaux riches, thus directing their wealth to 
purely bourgeois-capitalist use. But there is clearly 
no 'elective affinity' between the feudal system of 
domination and capitalism. The ethic of the market is 
an abomination to every system of fraternal ethics. 
With its exploitation of constellations of interests 
and monopoly positions and its 'dickering', 'the 
market is fundamentally alien to any type of fraternal 
relationship', including the feudal type [6373.
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Weber argues that the urban market economy had 
the tendency to undermine and dissolve feudal
structures [1331]. The existence of a 'money economy' 
itself, however, did not create an immediate clash of 
economic interests between the political and manorial 
lords and the cities. The city provided the peasants 
with a local market for their products and hence with 
the possibility of paying their dues to their manorial 
and judicial lords in money rather than in services or 
products. To the lords, the city provided the
opportunity to turn their in-kind income into money:
instead of consuming the appropriated agrarian surplus 
themselves, they could realize its value through sale 
either on the local market or abroad via the 
increasingly capitalistic long-distance trade:
the lordly political and manorial revenues in the 
territories of intensive city development could 
increasingly be fed from the market sale of 
peasant products or of peasant deliveries in 
kind, and beyond this from sources of the market 
economy, all of which replaced the direct
exploitation of personal service obligations of 
the subjects or the allocation of delivery 
obligations for household wants in the manner of 
the ancient olkos economy [1332].
The knightly militarism of occidental feudalism 
which barred, and spared, the peasants from military 
service had been crucial to the development of the 
medieval peasantry as an increasingly economically- 
oriented, unwarlike class. The development of the 
medieval city and the urban economy, which owed its 
form to the structure of the feudal system, 
transformed the landlord-peasant relationship in that 
it allowed the conversion of personal and material 
claims of the manorial and judicial lords into rent 
claims. This resulted in far-reaching economic freedom 
of the peasantry and the dissolution of the old 
manorial association and of peasant bondage C1332,
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13333. This freedom, however, one should hasten to 
add, was soon to be curtailed in the process of the 
rigorous commercialization of agriculture [Weber 1976: 
347-523.
Military Conflicts. Bureaucratization, and Capitalist
Development .in Western Europe,, and England
Undermining the political and economic feudal 
relationship between landlord and peasant, however, 
was insufficient in itself to establish the market 
economy as the dominant economic structure. Bourgeois 
interests had to 'demand an unambiguous and clear 
legal system that would be free of irrational 
administrative arbitrariness as well as of irrational 
disturbance by concrete privileges, that would also 
offer firm guaranties of the legally binding character 
of contracts, and that, in consequence of all these 
features, would function in a calculable way' [8473. 
In continental Western Europe, the alliance of 
bourgeois and monarchical interests was one of the 
major factors which led towards establishing such a 
legal system [8473.
This alliance materialized within the 
configuration of the polity of Estates C Standestaatl . 
For Weber, feudalism was a cosmos or, according to 
circumstances, also a chaos of concrete subjective 
rights and duties of the lord, the vassals and the 
ruled. These rights and duties, which were 
contractually guaranteed, overlapped and limited one 
another in such a way that it was necessary for the 
various power-holders to enter into temporary 
alliances between one another for the purpose of a 
concrete action which would not have been possible 
without this collaboration. In the Standestaat, the
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mere agreed-upon action of the various powei— holders 
and the temporary associations were transformed into a 
permanent political structure. Extraordinary needs of 
the ruler which were centred on his political, and 
especially his military administration, could not be 
met within the stereotyped feudal relationship. First, 
feudalism was based on the principle that all powei—  
holders had to pay the cost of their, and only their, 
administration out of their own pocket. There were no 
provisions for raising any required special, or new, 
revenues. Secondly, 'the changing economic structure, 
in particular the advancing money economy, exerted its 
influence by making it possible, and hence mandatory 
in view of the struggle and competion with other 
polities, to satisfy these tnew] needs in a manner 
superior to the normal means of stereotyped feudal- 
patrimonial administration; this involved especially 
the raising of considerable amounts of money all at 
once' C 10863. As the lord had to approach his 
militarily independent subjects with new economic 
demands, and in particular money demands, a new power 
configuration developed which took on the form of the 
Standestaat C1261-23. The polity of estates signified 
the consociation of the individual power-holders who 
now exerted their power vis-A-vis the ruler in a 
corporative assembly C1085 ff. 3 .
In continental Europe, the rulers struggled to 
eliminate the supremacy of estate privileges and the 
'estate' character of the legal and administrative 
system. They 'desired "order" as well as "unity" and 
cohesion' of their realm C8483. At the expense of the 
feudal law with its profusion of 'subjective* rights, 
the monarchs pursued a policy of promoting the 
predominance of formal legal equality and objective 
formal laws C8463. The rulers' interest in extending
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the scope and quality of their political power was 
shared by their staff who were concerned with their 
career prospects. These were furthered by the ever 
more thorough administrative penetration of society: 
legal uniformity rendered possible employment of every 
offical throughout the entire area of the realm, in 
which case career chances were ' better than where 
every official is bound to the area of his origin by 
his ignorance of the law of any other part of the 
realm' [8483. These officials were the true systematic 
codifiers of the law, since they had a special 
interest in a 'comprehensive' legal system as such 
[8503. The bourgeois economic interests were thus 
compatible with the powei— political interests of the 
patrimonial rulers, particularly those ruling in an 
absolutist state, and the interests of their staff. 
All these forces were 'structurally' inclined towards 
overcoming substantive rationality and bringing 
forward formal rationality and, in particular, the 
formal rationalization of the law.
This alliance of monarchical and bourgeois 
interests was fostered by the competitive political 
and military struggle between the states in the 
European interstate system. Bureaucratization of the 
political structure was a consequence of this military 
rivalry. Standing armies had to be created and the 
infrastructure of public finances had to be developed 
by states which were locked into the interstate 
competition lest they should be defeated C9723. For 
this power-political reason, and because of the 
expanding money economy, all political competitors 
needed ever more capital: 'This resulted in the
memorable alliance between the rising states and the 
sought-after and privileged capitalist powers that was 
a major factor in creating capitalism' [3533. A
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plurality of political communities competing with each 
other provided capitalists with an important 
bargaining position vis-^-vis the state. They could 
threaten to move their property to another country and 
thus erode the tax base. In addition, they had the 
opportunity of denying to give loans to the state 
unless they received preferential political treatment 
C 352] .
But the capitalists could not only demand 
economic privileges but also demand a political 
infrastructure compatible with the organization of 
their economic activities. In this respect, Weber 
argues the case for the structural adequacy of 
bureaucracy and capitalism. He maintains that the 
technical and economic basis of 'modern culture' 
'demands' [975] the calculability of results which 
bureaucracy can provide. Furthermore,
when fully developed, bureaucracy also stands, in 
a specific sense, under the principle of sine Ira 
ac studio. Bureaucracy develops the more 
perfectly, the more it is "dehumanized", the more 
completely it succeeds in eliminating from 
official business love, hatred, and all personal, 
irrational, and emotional elements which escape 
calculation. This is appraised as its special 
virtue by capitalism. The more complicated and 
specialized modern culture becomes, the more its 
external supporting apparatus demands the 
personally detached and strictly objective expert 
. . . Bureaucracy offers the attitudes demanded by 
the external apparatus of modern culture in the 
most favorable combination [975].
Capitalism could not continue without 'stable, 
strict, intensive, and calculable administration' . 
Bureaucratic administration, on the other hand, could 
only develop in its most rational form because 
capitalism, as its most rational economic basis, 
supplied the necessary money resources [224]. Thus 
bureaucratic organization of the political structure
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was in the interest of both economic and - given the 
geopolitical power struggle - political actors. The 
support by the capitalists for the political 
communities was forthcoming because of the benefits 
that accrued to them from doing so. This 'demand' of 
the capitalists was, in turn, met by the state 
because of its self-interest in doing so. The fact 
that there was within the state apparatus a group of 
professional administrators, the university-trained 
experts in Roman law, with an interest of their own in 
a qualitative and quantitative increase in public 
bureaucracy through the formalization and 
systematization of law in a logically impeccable way, 
enhanced considerably this trend towards rationally 
organized, bureaucratic administration C852 ff. ] .
According to Weber, law and formal legality 
became a political force via the Canon law of the 
Catholic church and the reception of Roman law by the 
medieval lawyers/administrators. The 'formal natural 
law* of the 17th and 18th century, however, 
articulated the structural principle of the modern 
state for the first time:
All legitimate law rests upon enactment, and all 
enactment, in turn, rests upon rational 
agreement. This agreement is either, first, real, 
i.e., derived from an actual original contract of 
free individuals, which also regulates the form 
in which new law is to be enacted in the future; 
or, second, ideal, in the sense that only that 
law is legitimate whose content does not 
contradict the conception of a reasonable order 
enacted by free agreement. The essential elements 
in such a natural law are the ''freedoms", and 
above all, "freedom of contract". The voluntary 
rational contract became one of the universal 
formal principles of natural law construction, 
either as the assumed real historical basis of 
all rational consociations Including the state, 
or, at least, as the regulative standard of 
evaluation C868-9; emphasis added].
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Weber points out that the basis of this legal
construction lies in the economy: 'CClonceived as a
system of rights legitimately acquired by purposive 
contract', formal natural law, as far as economic
goods are concerned, 'rests upon the basis of a
community of economic agreement . . . created by the 
full development of property' C869; emphasis added].
And Weber specifies the class character of this type 
of formal natural law even more poignantly: 'Freedom
of contract and the propositions regarding legitimate
property derived therefrom obviously belong to the 
natural law of the groups interested in market
transactions, i.e., those interested in the ultimate 
appropriation of the means of production' C8713. In 
Weber's analysis, the importance of capitalism for the 
formation of the modern state is therefore not limited 
to the impact of concrete historical alliances between 
monarchical rulers and sections of the bourgeois 
class. The structural principle of the market economy 
in the phase of the full development of property 
becomes also the structural principle of the modern 
state via the formal natural law.
Weber sees quite clearly that, whereas his 
explanation is applicable to processes in continental 
(Western) Europe, the English development has to be
explained in a different way. After the Norman 
conquest, the power of the royal administration in 
England was much greater than on the continent. But 
even here, the local patrimonial interests challenged 
the power of the central administration. In order to 
prevent the appropriation of the whole local state 
administration by the local patrimonial lords, the-
English monarchs put the administration into the hands 
of the Justices of the peace. Their rise in the 14th 
century during the wars with France was due to the
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fact that 'the patrimonial administration of the 
manorial lords and their judicial powers, but also the 
local offices - the sheriff - dominated by the feudal 
nobility could not cope with purely administrative 
tasks because economic developments dissolved the 
servility relationship' C1059]. In its attempt at 
pushing aside the patrimonial and feudal authorities, 
the Crown was vigorously supported by the Commons. The 
justices of the peace were recruited from private 
groups economically interested in the functions of 
these positions. Appointments by the Crown were made 
from among the local notables of the district who 
qualified by virtue of their ground rent and who 
maintained a knightly style of life. Attempts at 
making the appointment of justices of the peace 
directly dependent upon election of the local 
honoratiores were frequently defeated by the Crown 
C1059-603.
As a consequence of the financial needs of the 
English state during the French wars in the 14th 
century, the knights and burgesses, who were 
'represented' in the Commons, used their economic 
power to secure their participation in national 
politics. Parliament became the central, national 
meeting-ground for the political nation, juxtaposed 
to, and at the same time mingled with, the central 
administration. The unity of contradiction of this 
political nation is succinctly captured by Weber - and 
it is well worth quoting him at length:
It is true that the royal administration was 
always strictly supervised by the Estates, and 
that it had to rely on the collaboration of the 
honoratiores. But this very fact had the 
consequence that the economic and political 
interests were oriented not to the individual 
closed urban commune, but rather to the central 
administration whence they expected economic 
opportunities and social advantages, guaranteed
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monopolies and aid against violators of their own 
privileges. The crown, which was financially and 
administratively utterly dependent upon the 
privileged strata, feared these groups. But the 
political strategy of the English kings was 
essentially one of rule through central 
parliament. In the main they tried to influence 
the urban constitutions and the composition of 
the city councils only in the interest of their 
parliamentary election politics; hence they 
supported the oligarchy of notables. The urban 
notables, for their part, could find a guarantee 
for their monopoly position vis-ci-vis the nor- 
privileged strata in the central administration, 
and only there. In the absence of a bureaucratic 
apparatus of their own, and in fact precisely 
because of the centralization of administration, 
the kings were dependent on the cooperation of 
the notables . . . The financial power of the 
townsmen . . . was considerable. But it was exerted 
collectively - within the status union of the 
commons represented in Parliament - as the power 
of an estate of privileged urban interests. It 
was around this grouping that all interests 
transcending the utilization of purely local 
monopolies revolved. Here we thus find for the 
first time an interlocal, national bourgeoisie 
[1279-80].
This configuration was not so much a network of 
voluntary alliances but a structured system of mutual 
dependencies. The economic interests of the 
bourgeoisie were an integral part of national politics 
which was not negotiable. The interests of the state 
were the interests of the ‘political' nation and vice 
versa. As England could dispense with a large standing 
army because of her geographical location, she could 
also resist the advance of the bureaucratic state 
structure which characterized the political 
development on the continent [970, 9873.
The early national unification of England also 
brought about 'a national body of law' whose bearers 
were the English lawyers. They enjoyed a 'nation-wide 
organization which was made possible ... by the
concentration of the administration of justice in the 
royal courts' C793D. The political centralization 
conditioned the power position of the lawyers C977]. 
Centrally organized like a guild in the Inns of Court 
with an exclusive control over the teaching of law, 
these carriers of the administration of a national law 
succeeded in stifling all efforts at a rational 
codification of law and at introducing the Roman law. 
The guildlike English method of having law taught by 
the lawyers C785] 'naturally produced a formalistic 
treatment of the law, bound by precedent and analogies 
drawn from precedent. Not only was systematic and 
comprehensive treatment of the whole body of the law 
prevented by the craftlike specialization of the 
lawyers, but legal practice did not aim at all at a 
rational system but rather at a practically useful 
scheme of contracts and actions, oriented towards the 
interests of clients in typically recurrent 
situations' C787]. In the continental legal tradition, 
legal concepts were formed by abstraction from 
concrete instances, by logical interpretation of 
meaning, or by generalization and subsumption. These 
concepts were apt to be used in syllogistically 
applicable norms. But in England, no such 'general 
concepts' were formed. Rather, here they were 
constructed in relation to concrete events of everyday 
life, open to pragmatic modifications [787]. The 
degree of legal rationality in England, therefore, was 
essentially lower than, and of a different type from, 
that of continental Europe C890, 977].
The fight of the common law advocates against 
Roman and ecclesiastical law was to a considerable 
degree conditioned by their material economic 
interests in fees [976-7, 785-6]. But this opposition
was also compatible with the interests of their
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property-owning clients who benefited from the English 
legal system in a number of ways. As a result of this 
practical compatibility English law and the English 
legal administration did not obstruct capitalist 
development despite the lower degree of formal 
rationality. Apart from the flexibility of English law 
and its pragmatic adaptability to changing 
circumstances precisely because of its lower formal 
rationality, there are two more reasons given by Weber 
for the compatibility of the English legal system with 
capitalism: (1) 'Legal training has primarily been in
the hands of the lawyers from among whom also judges 
are recruited, i.e., in the hands of a group which is 
active in the service of the propertied, and 
particularly capitalistic, private interests and which 
has to gain its livelihood from them* C892, 1395]; (2)
'The concentration of the administration of justice at 
the central courts in London and its extreme 
costliness have amounted almost to a denial of access 
to the courts for those with inadequate means' [892, 
9773. In addition, Weber argues that the English legal 
system was typically dualistic. On the one hand, the 
courts of justices of the peace, which dealt with the 
daily troubles and misdemeanors of the masses, were 
informal and representative of 'khadi-justice'. On the 
other hand, all cases coming before the central courts 
were adjudicated in a strictly formalistic way thus 
ensuring the calculability of the law which the 
economically privileged demanded [814], The English 
state thus being an instrument of the 'political' 
nation and the legal system being geared towards the 
needs of the economically privileged classes, England 
would become the hegemonic power of the European 
interstate and economic (world) system without having 
developed a bureaucratized political structure.
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To sum up, in his analysis of political 
structural change in Western Europe, Weber emphasizes 
the relations between political, cultural, economic 
and geopolitical structures of social action. The 
formation of the modern state was not determined by 
any single one of these structures but resulted from 
their dynamic interplay. The interlocking of these 
(analytically distinct) structures was mediated 
through collective actors in pursuit of their material 
and ideal interests. The historically specific 
relations between these collective actors promoted 
constellations of interest which made the emergence of 
the modern state possible.
The preceding reconstruction of Weber's arguments 
on the formation of the modern state may have 
surprised the reader in that it did not pay attention 
to one element in Weber's definition of the (modern) 
state which is normally considered of utmost 
importance: the modern state as that set of
institutions that enjoys a monopoly of the means of 
legitimate violence. Charting the social and political 
processes that led to this monopolization would 
therefore have to be considered as explaining a major 
aspect of state formation. But Weber himself did not 
address this empirical issue. In this thesis, I want 
to offer a modest empirical contribution to an 
understanding of this contested process of 
monopolization. Taking my lead from Weber, in the 
following two case studies I will analyse the attempts 
of the Austrian and Irish state to establish 
organizations under their own exclusive control for 
the maintenance of public order, i.e., to establish a 
monopoly of violence through the formation of state 
police forces. I will show that these attempts by the 
state can only be adequately understood when they are
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placed firmly within the totality of the internal 
power structure of the respective country.
When writing the two case studies I endeavoured 
to avoid interlacing the historical narrative with 
theoretical reflections. But theoretical concerns did 
initially lead me to address the empirical topic. One 
theoretical concern has already been mentioned. In 
asking about the impact of geopolitical constellations 
on the class and cleavage structure of societies I 
question the assumption that societies are best 
described as territorially-bounded, closed systems and 
that the causes for structural social change are 
situated 'within* these societies. A second 
theoretical concern has to do with the question of how 
best to conceptualize the pre-industrial state in 
Europe. It is this concern that led me to choose my 
two case studies.
As I have shown above in the section on 'Military 
conflicts, bureaucratization and capitalist
development' , Weber distinguished very clearly between 
a continental path and that taken by England. In 
continental Europe, the rulers struggled to eliminate 
the supremacy of the Estates and to abolish their 
formative involvement in the legal and administrative 
system. The continental rulers "desired 'order* as 
well as 'unity' and cohesion" of their realm [Weber 
1978: 848] . They fought for the establishment of an
'absolutist' state. In England, on the other hand, a 
political nation had been formed since the 14th 
century whose central, national meeting-ground was 
Parliament. It was here that the interests of the 
state and the interests of the political nation were 
negotiated and reconciled on the basis of a system of 
mutual dependencies. Whereas on the continent there
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were attempts by the monarchical rulers to 
disenfranchise the hitherto politically privileged
groups, in England there was a movement (though not
necessarily wished for by the ruler) towards a
cooperation between the state and the political 
nation.
In 'Sources of Social Power' C1986a: 450-499],
Michael Mann also addresses this issue of state forms 
in pre-industrial Europe. He distinguishes between 
absolutist and constitutional regimes. According to 
Mann [1986a: 4813 these regimes were subtypes of a
single form of state: "a weak state in relation to the
powerful groups of civil society, but a state that
increasingly coordinated those groups' activities". 
Both regime types shared two principal 
characteristics: "Their power was limited by their
largely military functions and did not include a share 
in property rights, and they extracted fiscal revenues 
and coordinated their dominant classes primarily for 
military purposes. Their differences concerned merely 
the forms of coordination - one approaching organic 
unity, the other backing away from it ..." [ Mann
1986a: 4823.
In distinguishing between two forms of state 
power, Mann is able to highlight the specific 
characteristics of the pre-industrial state more 
clearly. The first kind of state power is 'despotic 
power' . It refers to the range of actions that the 
ruler and his staff are empowered to undertake without 
routine, institutionalized negotiation with civil 
society groups. Where despotic state power is high, 
representation of civil society groups and their 
voluntary participation in the activities of the 
state are low. Despotic power is 'power over' civil
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society. 'Infrastructural power1 is the second kind of 
state power. It is the capacity of central states, 
whether despotic or not, to actually penetrate the 
territory of civil society, and to implement 
logistically political decisions throughout the realm. 
The state has 'power through' society, coordinating 
much of social life with its own infrastructures [Mann 
1986b] . The pre-industrial state was infrastructurally 
weak, but whereas in absolutist regimes despotic power 
was high, in constitutional regimes it was low.
These distinctions between absolutist and 
constitutional regimes, and between despotic and
infrastructural power underlie the following 
discussion in two ways. First, I take Austria in the 
18th century to approximate to the absolutist regime 
type, and Ireland in the 18th century to the
constitutional type. In both cases, the relationship 
between the state and civil society groups/local
notables will be especially scrutinized. Second, the 
formation of state police forces must be seen as an 
increase in the infrastructural power of the state. At 
the same time, police forces are means par excellence 
of increasing, and intensifying, the despotic power of 
the state. This Janus-faced quality of the police in 
itself is likely to make the development of state 
agencies of internal security a much contested policy. 
This conflict over the appropriation and the exercise 
of the means of violence is likely to be extremely 
fierce in societies, such as those of pre-industrial 
Europe, in which the appropriation of the economic 
surplus is closely linked with extra-economic 
coercion. Any attempt to undermine the (economic and 
political) position of the economically dominant class 
by expropriating it from the means of coercion is 
likely to encounter strong resistance.
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The following analyses rest # on a methodological 
stance which will be developed in greater detail in 
the concluding chapter. Each particular state is a 
complex and unique sociohistorical configuration. 
Though social scientists analyse each configuration 
with general concepts, it can be a legitimate task for 
social scientists to interpret the historical 
particularity of each case. Comparative studies of 
macropolitical and macrosocial constellations can help 
to increase the 'visibility' of one structure by 
contrasting it with another. As Reinhard Bendix C1978: 
15] put it: "In order to preserve a sense of
historical particularity while comparing different 
countries, I ask the same or at least similar
questions of different contexts and thus allow for 
divergent answers" . In my two case studies I ask about 
the impact of geopolitics on internal power structures 
and, in particular, on the relationship between 
central state and local power holders.
My two selected cases are similar in that they 
are examples of the political regime type of pre­
industrial Europe. But the differences between them
overwhelm their similarities. Austria is a 
representative of the absolutist regime type, whereas 
Ireland represents the constitutional type. Given this 
methodological research design, the aim of the 
following studies is not to arrive at empirical
generalizations about the connection between 
geopolitics, internal power structures and police
formation in the state of pre-industrial Europe, or 
even within the absolutist and constitutional 
subtypes. The aim of the following studies is to tell 
as comprehensively as possible in a historical 
narrative whether and how this connection took shape 
in Austria and in Ireland in the 18th century.
Part One:
The state, police and public order: 
the Habsburg Monarchy in the late 18th century.
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II. Monarchical .ruler and Estates; Qn the distribution 
of power in pre-absolh.tist-Aua.tr.iaL-
A) The political functions of the Estates
In the discussion of Max Weber's analysis of the 
formation of the modern state I paid attention to his 
arguments concerning the relationship between 
monarchical ruler and Estates in continental Europe. 
The particular type of distribution of political power 
which the polity of Estates represented can be 
summarized as follows. In pre-industrial societies 
economic wealth was mainly achieved by agricultural 
production. The financial needs of the state could 
only be satisfied on a regular basis if part of the 
agrarian production, be it in kind or realized in 
money, could be transferred into the coffers of the 
state. But the state did not have direct access to the 
agrarian producers. This access was mediated by 
(mainly) noble landlords who possessed property rights 
over the lands the peasants farmed and sometimes also 
over the peasants themselves. Even if the state had 
been prepared to overrule these property rights, it 
did not have the infrastructural means which would 
have allowed it to appropriate the agrarian surplus 
without the involvement of the local landholders. Of 
necessity, local government lay in the hands of local 
landlords.
Given the fiscal dependence of the territorial 
ruler on the Estates, it was highly unlikely that he 
could afford a complete overhaul of local government. 
And even if he had wanted to, the power position of 
the local aristocracy was entrenched to such a degree, 
and their interest in maintaining this position was so
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strong, that any attempt by the territorial prince was 
likely to be rebuffed. Only if the ruler succeeded in 
undermining the patrimonial authority of the 
aristocracy and their hold over local government, 
could he enhance his own power position. To do so, the 
ruler had to wean the peasantry away from their 
landlords; he had to establish an immediate 
relationship with the peasants. But this strategy 
would have to be pursued with two considerations 
clearly in mind. First, dislodging the aristocracy
from their entrenched local power position could under 
no circumstances be allowed to lead to a breakdown of 
authority which would result in disorder and
disobedience amongst the peasantry. Second, agrarian 
production could not be allowed to suffer as this
would undermine the fiscal interests of the state. It 
will be a main task of the following analysis to show 
that the policy of 'enlightened absolutism' under
Maria Theresia and Joseph II in Austria failed to 
overcome these contradictions and constraints.
Before the institutional reforms of Maria
Theresia in the middle of the 18th century, the
Estates in the territories of the Habsburg Empire were 
closely involved in the government of the monarchy. In 
fact, Estates government was parallel to royal
government, and partly overlapped with it. In the 
various Austrian provinces - the family lands of the 
Habsburgs - as well as in the Lands of the Bohemian 
Crown (Bohemia, Moravia, Silesia) and in the Kingdom 
of Hungary (including Transsylvania) there existed 
territorial Estates which met on a regular basis in 
diets and participated in the government and 
administration of the territory. The Estates always
included clergy, nobility and towns. In the Tyrol, 
Vorarlberg, and parts of Further Austria, communities
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of peasants also elected representatives to the diets. 
But everywhere the nobles were dominant, either as a 
single, consolidated Estate, or more often as separate 
Estates of lords and knights CHintze 1962; Dickson I: 
297-8; Evans 1979: 166; Klingenstein 1983: 374-5;
Schulze 19833.
The rights and functions of the Estates were 
manifold. They had the right of jurisdiction as well 
as the task of maintaining law and order and, more 
generally, stability, security and public welfare in 
their territories. Furthermore, everywhere in the 
Monarchy, the Estate assemblies had the right to 
approve the taxes demanded by the territorial prince. 
But not only did the Estates vote the Contribution, 
the direct tax earmarked for the maintenance of the 
army, they were also in charge of collecting it: the
financial administration lay in the hands, not of 
central government, but of the Estates. Only indirect 
taxes could be administered by the royal government. 
The revenue from the prince's own possessions and the 
regalia were administered by the Court Chamber of the 
prince.
The Estates were also involved in military
matters. The recruitment of soldiers for the prince's 
army as well as their provisioning was, in part, the
responsibility of the Estates. It was during the 
almost continuous warfare of the Habsburg monarchy
against the Ottoman Empire in the 16th century that 
the political importance of the Bstates had been 
enhanced. It had been necessary for the Habsburg
rulers to ask the Estates for new grants of taxation 
at regular intervals. The Estates normally agreed to 
raise the required money and collect them through 
their financial administration. Faced with the Turkish
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threat, the Estates in Styrja, Carinthia, and Carniola 
also raised their own troops to defend the frontier 
between the Turkish and the Habsburg parts of Hungary. 
But while this contribution of the Estates to the war 
effort could be translated into securing the 
concession of the Catholic raonarchs to tolerate the 
Protestant religion of the Estates, the Estates, at 
the same time, also became more entrenched in the 
existing political structure. They had taken over so 
many financial and military responsibilities that a 
fundamental opposition to the policies of the Habsburg 
monarchs that would have led to a breakdown of 
government in a situation of Turkish military might 
would have affected them nearly as much as their 
rulers CAsch 1989: 117-8; Schulze 1983: 266-73.
The financial and military administration by the 
Estates as well as their concern for 'policing' their 
territories made it necessary for the diets to 
establish bodies for the continuous management of 
their affairs [Hassinger 1969: 268-93. As a rule, the
Estates assembled once a year but only for a rather 
short period. Between the diets a standing committee 
under the chairmanship of a member of the nobility 
acted as a 'small-size' diet. The main task of thjs 
standing committee was a preliminary discussion and 
appraisal of all items which would come before the 
general assembly. In addition to these permanent 
standing committees, the diets elected well-paid 
delegates CVerordnete^, responsible to themselves, who 
collected taxes, met the needs of defence, raised 
military levies, and carried out the other decisions 
taken by the Estates: "all kinds of experts
(especially jurists), servants and concessionaries, 
customs and excise officials, teachers, doctors, 
printers and architects, even pajnters and cooks, were
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overseen and paid by the estates. As administration 
grew more complex and taxation more ingenious, their 
share of government actually increased" [Evans 1979: 
1673 .
The political power the Estates, however, was not 
confined to the running of their own administration. 
They were also closely involved in the government
apparatus which the prince installed for the 
administration of each province. Each province within 
the Empire had its own lord-1 ieutenant who was 
appointed by the prince to transmit decrees, preside 
over courts, and maintain order with the help of a 
deputy, a number of counsellors, and the 
administrators of local regalia, who mainly managed
crown estates. Though appointed by the prince,
candidates for the post of lord-lieutenant were 
nominated by the Estates. As a rule, these candidates 
were members of the Herrenst.and [i.e. knights]. Only 
since Maria Theresia was this right of the Estates to 
propose the head of the provincial government
disregarded by the monarch. In effect, the lord- 
lieutenants were answerable to both the Estates and 
the ruler; local loyalties to the Estates often were 
in conflict with loyalities towards the monarch 
[ Hassinger 1969: 265; Evans 1979: 165, 1673. In the
case of the government of Lower Austria, the influence 
of the Estates went even further. There, in 1508, the 
Estates threatened to withhold financial resources 
which the Emperor desperately needed for the war wjtb 
Venice. The intransigence of the Estates led the 
Emperor to appointing mombers of the Estates to the 
government in 1510 [Hellbling 1956: 144-53.
Since Emperor Maximilian I in the late 15th and 
early 16th these collegiate governmental bodies
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C Regimente ] were in charge of matters concerning 
internal/political administration and jurisdiction. 
The financial affairs of the territorial ruler - 
excluding, though, the main financial resource: the
Contribution - were concentrated in the royal 
treasury. This separation had a far-reaching effect. 
On the one hand, as the legitimation and justification 
of the privileged position of the Estates was derived 
from the traditional ' law of the land' C Landrecht ] , 
the Estates vigorously fought for having officials 
appointed for government positions who would uphold 
the Landrecht in their judicial judgements. Such was 
the concern of the Estates for the perpetuation of the 
traditional law that they even sometimes gave money to 
the counsellors as an incentive to uphold it [Brunner 
1973: 4493, On the other hand, however, the
appointments to the treasury were by and large left 
uncontested to the ruler's discretion. As the main 
bulk of the financial resources, the direct taxes, 
remained under the control of the financial 
administration of the Estates, the power of treasury 
officials was considered by the Estates to be 
negligible.
It was for this reason that from very early on in 
the development of central bureaucratic government 
organization the financial offices were particularly 
closely linked with the ruler's interests CTezner 
1898: 165-83. As long as there remained a separation
between the ruler's financial administration of the 
' Camerale ' and the Estates' financial administration 
of the ' Contributionale ', the political consequences 
of the Estates' indifference towards the organization 
of the treasury could not be precisely determined. As 
we shall see later, the reforms of the state under 
Maria Theresia centred on a breakdown of this
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separation and thus altered fundamentally the 
relationship between Estates and monarch in financial 
matters.
Ideologically, the power position of the Estates 
was founded in the traditional "law of the land". In 
the following chapter, I shall discuss in some detail 
the role of the law in constraining, as well as 
enabling, the monarchical ruler to extend his (or her) 
political power to the disadvantage of the Estates. 
But it was the political, judicial, economic and 
social domination of the aristocracy as a class, and 
of the aristocrats as individuals, over the peasants 
which was the decisive power resource which could be 
mobilized in the power struggles with the ruler.
B) The system of local government in the Austrian 
lands of the Habsburg monarchy.
The dominant unit within the structure of local 
government in the Austrian lands of the Habsburg 
monarchy was the Grundherrschaft. A Grundherrschaft 
was a system of domination in which the landlord was 
in a position to appropriate in cash or kind part of 
the agrarian produce from those peasants who had 
rented plots of his land, Furthermore, the landlord 
was able to extract a laboui— rent by imposing 
obligations on his peasants to work for him for a 
certain number of days during the year on those lands 
which he farmed himself. Finally, the landlord could 
not only determine the economic activities of his 
peasants with regard to the use they made of the 
rented land and the disposal of their agrarian 
produce, but he could also exert bis authority with 
regard to the overall structure of peasant life
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stipulating, for example, conditions for marriage 
among peasants or restricting the geographical 
mobility of his peasants.
Typically, revenue from demesne operations 
accounted for only a small proportion of the lord's 
dominical income. Based on gross revenue figures for 
Lower Austria in 1754 it has been calculated that 
revenue from demesne farming accounted for only 9.9% 
of dominical income, whereas revenue derived from 
robot and other labour services in cash and kind as 
well as dues and tithes in cash or kind accounted for 
29.5% and 28.8% respectively of total. dominical 
income. A series of smaller sources, such as woods 
<6.8%) or brewing rights <3.8%), made up the balance 
[Dickson I: 96-71. Rents and other payments of a
cultivating peasantry were thus of the utmost 
importance for the lords who did not themselves engage 
in large-scale farming. These payments were often 
customarily fixed. Periods of high inflation were 
therefore extremely disadvantageous for the lords 
whereas peasants would experience a beneficial effect. 
On the other hand, in order to be able to meet their 
monetary obligations towards their lords, the peasants 
had to produce for the market. They thus became 
dependent on agricultural cycles and price 
fluctuations. An agricultural crisis with a downward 
movement of prices for agricultural products could 
lead to increased indebtedness and ultimately to 
economic ruin. This risk was only partially made less 
hazardous by the economical and individual liberties 
which these market-orientated peasants necessarily 
enjoyed CFeigl 1985: 45-7],
Though the concrete forms of the relation of 
domination between lord and peasants, which
-  99 -
constituted the Grundherrschaft, varied across time 
and space, the structural organizing principle 
remained the same. The landlord's appropriation of 
parts of the agrarian produce and of the laboui— power 
of the peasants as well as his disciplinary 
interference in peasant life was based on his 
property rights. But these rights comprised more than 
only the landlord's legal title to the ownership of 
the land. These property rights also included the 
political and judicial power to persecute, prosecute 
and punish those peasants who had allegedly violated 
the rules and regulations in force on the manor or had 
allegedly committed a crime which unsettled and 
disturbed the manorial community. The landlord's 
economic power was thus backed up by his power derived 
from his right to patrimonial Jurisdiction which 
included (welfare and security) police Ccf. following 
chapter for welfare and security police; on landlords' 
policing functions as part of their jurisdiction: 
Tezner 1898: 104 n.18; Osterloh 1970: 46-7; Osswald
1907; Tractatus 1679].
The landlord's patrimonial jurisdiction, however, 
was circumscribed in a number of ways. To begin with, 
during the reign of Maximilian I and Ferdinand I in 
the 16th century the principle was established that 
patrimonial jurisdiction should only constitute the 
court of first instance. Those peasant subjects 
sentenced in the patrimonial courts could appeal to 
the government of the territorial ruler for a review 
of their case. The patrimonial landlords were thus 
subordinated to the authority of the territorial 
ruler CFeigl 1964: 48; Feigl 1974: 58], Furthermore,
as each property right included judicial powers there 
was a plethora of concurrent and competing judicial
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authorities each of which was claiming immunity from 
each others' interference.
The inherent conflict between these different 
judicial authorities was the result of two conflicting 
legal principles, the personal and the territorial 
principle CFeigl 19645 186-2283. According to the 
personal principle, every inhabitant had his or her 
personal place of jurisdiction: peasants at the
patrimonial court of their landlord, aristocratic 
landholders at the court of the lord-1ieutenant 
C Landinarschallsgerlcht] . According to the territorial 
principle judicial powers were related to the place in 
which a punishable act was committed or in which a 
perpetrator was apprehended or else in which the 
disputed 'object' was kept or found. On the basis of 
this territorial principle, the landlord exercised his 
patrimonial jurisdiction over all those crimes which 
were committed on his land and on the farms and in the 
houses and buildings of his peasants CTractatus 1679: 
Tit. 4, §§1-3; Tit. 14, §§1-33. This meant, that a
landlord could persecute, prosecute and punish even 
those people who were not his own dependents as 3.ong 
as they stayed within the area over which he possessed 
jurisdiction. On the other hand, as soon as 
perpetrators had left his jurisdiction the lord of the 
manor had to seek the cooperation of the holder of the 
judicial powers in that area into which they had fled 
if he wanted to pursue the persecution.
In Lower Austria and Styria, for example, village 
courts existed side by side with patrimonial courts. 
They had the task of maintaining public order on the 
streets, lanes and squares as well as in the areas 
adjacent to the village. They were entitled to 
supervise the village community and all those
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activities and institutions wliicli related to the 
village as a whole. Their task thus ranged from the 
policing of the parish fair to the control of the 
quality of the products on sale and of the weights and 
measures used in the shops [Tractatus 1679: Tit. 3, §§
1, 43. If all houses in a village belonged to the same 
landlord, then, as a rule, he also possessed the right 
to exercise the judicial authority over the village as 
a whole. If there was more than one landlord with 
patrimonial rights in the village, then the judicial 
authority over the village belonged normally to the 
one with more dependent subjects in the village [Feigl 
1964: 123-43 . It was on the basis of the territorial
principle that the village authority could claim the 
jurisdiction over crimes committed within the village 
vicinity but outside the judicial reach of individual 
landlords [Tractatus 1679: Tit. 3, §33. But as in the
case of patrimonial jurisdiction, had the perpetrator 
absconded and reached a location not under the 
jurisdiction of the village authority only 
negotiations between the authorities involved could 
bring a lawful solution. These negotiations could be 
protracted not only because of contradictory claims by 
the respective judicial powers to rightful and 
exclusive jurisdiction in contested cases, but also 
because of the obligation of each landlord, engrained 
in the feudal relationship between lord and peasant, 
to protect and represent his dependent subjects vis-a- 
vis other lords.
The judicial power of the lord of the manor was 
further circumscribed in that he possessed only the 
imperium mixtum, not the imperium me rum. That is to 
say, patrimonial jurisdiction did not comprise the 
power to pass sentence over those crimes which carried 
the death penalty or severe corporal punishment such
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as dismemberment. The imposition of these punishments 
was left to the county courts [ Landgerichte} . The 
patrimonial authorities were obliged to hand over to 
these county courts all those persons accused of such 
crimes [Feigl 1964: 26-7; Feigl 1974: 223. Apart from
persecuting, prosecuting and sentencing those people 
who had been convicted of having committed a serious 
crime as well as carrying out the sentence, the county 
courts were also charged with maintaining public order 
and ensuring public safety in that geographical area 
over which they exercised jurisdiction. But either 
task was hampered by the fact that the county courts 
had to respect the legal immunity and the judicial 
powers of patrimonial authorities as well as the 
authorities of towns and markets. In order to 
apprehend criminals the county courts had to seek the 
cooperation of the holders of the Imperium mixtum. And 
with regard to maintaining public order in their 
district, they were confined to those public highways 
or areas over which no authority could extend its 
patrimonial jurisdiction CFeigl 1964: 179-833.
But like the imperium mixtum, the imperium merum 
was in the hands of the higher nobility in Lower 
Austria. Over the decades, the territorial rulers 
would sell ever more rights to county court 
jurisdiction, which were in their possession, to 
aristocratic landlords for reasons of revenue. By the 
middle of the 18th century the county courts had thus 
been reduced to 'private* courts LMell 1916: 7-8;
Feigl 1974: 59 n. 1403 . We shall see shortly why the
purchase of the right to county court jurisdiction was 
such an attractive investment for aristocratic 
landlords. In the context of our discussion on 
policing in Austria it must be emphasized that the 
necessary cooperation and sometimes formal negotiation
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between holders of the imperium mixtum and those of 
the imperium merum, but also between different county 
court jurisdictions, could not but impede efficient 
policing.
As shown, the patrimonial jurisdiction of the 
lords of the manor was circumscribed by the 
interaction between a multitude of autonomous legal 
authorities. But there were also limits to the 
judicial power of the landlords which stemmed from the 
interaction between lord and dependent peasantry. The 
agrarian crisis of the 14th century enabled the 
peasants to improve their position vis-h-vis the 
landlords [on crisis: Lutge 1950; Bruckmiiller 1985:
137-451. The sharp decline in prices for agricultural 
products and the concomitant rise in prices for 
manufactured goods affected both peasants and lords. 
But the peasants had sold only that part of their 
grain crop on the markets which was left after the 
payment of rent in kind (grain) to the landlord and 
after putting aside their crop for self-consumption. 
The landlord, on the other hand, was lumbered with 
grain which he had to sell on the market to realize 
his rent. His economic position was further weakened 
by the demographic repercussions of the epidemics 
which were spreading throughout Europe. The decline in 
population resulted in a decline of rent income for 
the landlord in that many farmsteads would not be 
inhabited. Furthermore, the shortage of labour meant 
that landlords had to pay higher wages and offer more 
favourable conditions to agricultural labourers 
employed in the manorial economy. To make matters 
worse for the landlords, the inflation of the 15th 
century further reduced their rent income in that 
those money rents which had been fixed in the past 
could not be adjusted to the new situation. It was
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within this context that the peasants could improve 
their position. But not only did they often succeed in 
enlarging their farms and reducing obligations imposed 
on them by the landlords, they also strengthened their 
position within the structure of patrimonial 
j urisdiction.
In the course of the high and late middle ages 
the close involvement of peasants in the proceedings 
in the patrimonial courts was established. First, they 
acted as jurors or 'lay* assessors passing sentence 
over those brought before patrimonial courts. Second, 
peasants were pronouncing on traditional law. In open 
court and in the presence of the heads of the houses 
which fell under the jurisdiction of the court, the 
lord would ask the eldest and most respected members 
of the community to direct the assembly on the laws 
which had been traditionally applied in the cases 
under consideration. Since the 15th century, these 
directives £ Weistijmerh were written down. Apart from 
statements on the prosecution of crimes and the 
punishment of offenders, these Wei stumer contained the 
rules and regulations which defined the rights and 
duties of the members of the manorial community £Baltl 
1951, 1953; for the situation in Bohemia in the 17th
century cf. Stark 1952: 348-573.
But while the peasants might have expected to 
achieve a higher degree of legal certainty through the 
recording of the law, it would be the landlords who 
could turn this innovation to their advantage. Now 
that the law and the sentences to be passed for 
committed crimes or minor misdemeanors had been fixed, 
court proceedings turned from a potentially 
contentious cooperation between the lord as the 
supreme holder of patrimonial judicial authority and
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the lay assessors as the 'representatives' of his 
dependent subjects into a set-up in which the role of 
the assessors was merely passive in that most of the 
cases before the court had already been covered by the 
recorded law and thus were not open for interpretation 
by the jury. The decreasing importance of the active 
involvement of the peasant members of the manorial 
community was reflected in the tendency to hold court 
in the lord's chancery instead of sitting in judgement 
in the meetings of the whole community, in public
places at fixed times during the year. Though the
judicial power of the lord of the manor remained 
circumscribed by the law as it had emerged through the 
interaction of lord and peasants, with the
marginalization of the peasants in the court 
proceedings the lords had, in fact, improved their
power position by the end of the 15th century.
With the onset during the late 15th century of 
population growth and the price revolution new 
economic dangers and opportunities presented
themselves to the landlords. For the seignorial 
landlords of Upper Austria, for example, it has been 
pointed out by Rebel [1983: 233 that
the threats offered by the inflationary 
devaluation of fixed rents and by the increased 
costs of conspicuous consumption were more than 
offset by the decreasing cost of labor; by the 
increase in the economic rent of the soil; by 
inflationary profit-taking through large-scale 
investment in land, credit, and commodity 
markets; and by exploiting the advantages of 
having economic, social, and political 
connections that transcended the limits of the 
local economies . . . The Upper Austrian . . . 
magnates were in a particularly favorable 
position in that they could draw on an expanding 
labor pool for skilled, diverse, and increasingly 
cheap labor, an advantage that would distinguish 
their experience with forced labor and rural 
industry from developments in Bohemia where labor 
was scarce.
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But to benefit from the opportunities offered by the 
economic upswing, landlords considered it necessary to 
turn the manorial law to their advantage. One way of 
doing so was to 'reform' the recorded Welstiimer which 
constituted a barrier for wide-ranging innovations. 
Those articles in the Welstiimer which did not meet 
with the lords' approval were changed and new rules 
were added to the existing ones by the lords. The 
absolutism of the territorial prince to which the 
magnates objected was introduced by them on their 
manors. They considered it legitimate for them to take 
on the role of legislator and thus of the creator of 
new law. In the manner of absolutist rulers they 
asserted the right to confirm and. 'interpret' existing 
legal arrangements made by their predecessors 
conveniently forgetting that, unlike royal
'privileges' which were in principle revocable, the 
recorded directives had not been freely granted by 
them but were part of the peasants' justly acquired 
rights CFeigl 1974: 115-203. Police legislation on the
territorial level was thus shadowed by police 
legislation on the local level. In the course of the 
16th century and during the 17th century the police 
legislation of the lords led to the substitution of 
the commonly formulated Welstiimer for 'ordinances' 
issued by the lords without consultation [Winter 1913: 
233-4; Baltl 1953: 62 n.268; Rebel 1983: 151-6; Feigl
1974: 121-31; Feigl 1964: 41-2, 205-7; cf. following
chapter on 'police' legislation].
The net result of these changes in the legal 
make-up of the manorial community was a strengthened 
position of the lords. To the extent that all peasant 
wars in the ' long' 16th century were defeated by the 
magnates, their power over their peasants increased 
Con peasant wars Bruckmliller 1985: 186-2143. They used
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this power to develop a bureaucratic manorial 
capitalism [ Virtschaftsherrschaft (A. Hoffmann)], not 
only in Upper Austria but throughout east Central 
Europe, and most particularly in Bohemia and Inner 
Austria. The objective of the magnates was "not merely 
to enter the market in a capitalistic manner but also 
to control as great a portion of it as possible 
through economic diversification, direct control over 
significant quantities of goods and over their flow, 
and the acquisition of exclusive administrative, 
judicial, and policing functions over specific 
markets" [Rebel 1983: 22; Bruckmuller 1985: 224-30;
Matis 1981b: 2823 .
It is in the light of the emergence of this type 
of bureaucratic manorial capitalism in the course of 
the 16th century that the reason for the interest of 
the magnates in taking on the difficult, cumbersome 
and rather expensive task of exercising county court 
jurisdiction becomes understandable. Not only did the 
acquisition of the judicial power strengthen the 
personal bond between lord and subject peasantry; it 
also gave the holder of the county court jurisdiction 
the administration of economic 'police'. It depended 
on the county court authorities whether the police 
regulations of the territorial ruler or those of the 
Estate assembly would be implemented. The position 
gave leeway to its holder to select those pieces of 
police legislation for implementation which conformed 
to his interests [Hoffmann 1952: 99; Hoffmann 1979:
2283 . For example, ordinances by the territorial ruler 
concerning vagrancy could be implemented in such a way 
that police pressure on vagrants led to them having 
to take up employment either on the lords' manor or 
with employers promoted and in business with the 
lords. By the same token, regulations concerning
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Furkauf were most likely to be enforced only if such a 
practice violated the lord's economic interests. In 
his endeavour to monopolize the local market he would 
want to establish himself as the prime purchaser to 
whom all marketable agricultural produce and 
manufactured goods had to be offered in the first 
instance. He could use his judicial and policing 
powers to pursue this goal [Hoffmann 1979: 297-3001.
To sum up, patrimonial judicial authority and the 
control over policing was vitally important for the 
economic interests of the landlords. At the same time, 
their economic prowess also determined their political 
position vis-A-vis the territorial ruler: the
political ascendancy of the Estates in the 16th 
century was firmly based on the economic strength of 
their manorial economy. Thus, any attempt by the ruler 
to accrue policing powers to himself would not only 
undermine the social and economic power of the 
manorial lords but also their 'national' political 
power, and was therefore likely to be resisted.
C) Landlords and peasants in Bohemia
We have seen that since the 16th century there 
had been attempts in the Austrian lands of the 
Habsburg monarchy to transform the traditional 
Grundherrschaft into a new type of bureaucratic 
manorial capitalism. But the figures given at the 
beginning of this chapter showed that even as late 
as 1754 the landlords in Lower Austria derived less 
than 10% of their dominical income from demesne 
operations. The situation was decidedly different in
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Bohemia. According to the revised tax cadastre of 1756 
for Bohemia, more than three quarters of dominical 
income originated in the economic activities of the 
landlords themselves. Income from seigneurial 
breweries and other commercial enterprises accounted 
for 43% of total dominical revenue, and income from 
demesne farming constituted on average 38% of revenue. 
Rents in cash and kind and other obligations of the 
subject peasantry accounted for the remaining 19% of 
total dominical income [ Hanke 1973-4: 486; Dickson I:
95] . These regional differences are related to the 
overall importance of dominical lands in the 
respective agricultural economies. The proportion of 
dominical lands to total productive acreage after the 
middle of the 18th century has been calculated as 
follows: Lower Austria - 26%, Moravia - 35%, Bohemja -
42%, Galicia - 50%. The proportion of dominical arable 
lands to productive acreage shows a similar picture: 
Upper Austria - 0.6%, Styria - 2.3%, Lower Austria - 
4.3%, Bohemia - 12% [Melville 1981: 3023. All these
data support the view of the Bohemian landlords as 
active economic entrepreneurs.
It was during the 16th and 17th century that 
Bohemia witnessed the gradual rise of large-scale 
serf-tilled manorial estates. The Thirty Years War was 
an important watershed in the social and agrarian 
history of Bohemia. During the war years, the 
population declined by more than 40%, from 1,700,000 
before the war to 950,000 in the immediate post-war 
period CKlima 1985: 195 and passim for following
discussion]. As a consequence of the decline in 
population, a large number of agricultural holdings 
was abandoned and much of the land became fallow. In 
this situation landless peasants were enabled to 
occupy and cultivate vacant holdings. At the same time
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lords themselves were encouraged to take over fal3ow 
land, either adding it to their existing demesnes or 
establishing new ones. But the devastation of the war 
had been so fundamental that official surveys 
estimated that in the 1650s 25% of peasant lands were 
still abandoned in Moravia, and 20% in Bohemia in the 
1680s C Kann/David 1984: 13.73.
Not only did parts of abandoned peasant holdings 
become incorporated into the estates of the great 
nobles during that period, but so did the bankrupt 
estates of the lower nobles who lacked sufficient 
subject peasantry to withstand the post-war 
agricultural crisis [Kann/David 1984: 1183. It was
during those decades after the war that the foundation 
was laid for the accumulation of land in the hands of 
a small group of members of the Herrenstand (princes, 
counts, and barons). This concentration process 
resulted in a constellation in which just ten owners, 
including the Crown, controlled 27% of the total 
agricultural revenue in 1770 [Dickson I: 93-43. The
predominance of the Herrenstand over the lower 
nobility can also be deduced from the fact that, in 
1789, the value of the dominical lands of the 
princes, counts, and barons in Bohemia accounted for 
68% of the total value of all dominical lands <162 
mill. fl. out of 239 mill, fl.) [Hanke 1973-4: 4«6-73.
As a matter of fact, the small landed nobility had 
virtually disappeared by the early 18th century. In 
the 18th century, Bohemia was - cum grano sails - a 
land without gentry [Melville 1981: 3013.
But the great nobles, who formed ever larger 
estates, experienced a severe manpower shortage in the 
second half of the 17th century: epidemics, hunger and
the plague, all connected with the war and the
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devastation it brought, had long-lasting effects 
CKavke 1964: 583. This shortage was aggravated by the
fact that formerly landless peasants who now settled 
on fallow land were no longer obliged to rely on wage 
labour to make a living. This and the overall decline 
in population led to a general rise in wage levels. At 
the same time the demand for agricultural produce fell 
also markedly, reflecting the overall decline in the 
size of the urban population. As Kliraa C 1985: 1963
argues:
Under these twin pressures, lords looked for the 
means to cut production costs of their estates, 
and this was made possible by the increased 
exploitation of the various labour services
(corve£ or Rabat) of the serfs, for which of 
course the lords paid nothing at all. The 
extension of labour services on their demesnes 
enabled the lords to sell their produce cheaply 
both at home and on the international market, and 
accordingly labour services were increased
considerably from the mid-seventeenth century 
onwards.
The changes In the relationship between lords and 
peasants must be related to the socio-economic 
consequences of the political and military defeat of 
the Bohemian nobility at the hands of the Habsburg 
Emperor Ferdinand II, in the Battle at the White 
Mountain in November 1620. The military reconquest of 
Bohemia by the Bavarian and Imperial forces was 
accompanied by the political proscription of the bulk 
of the old seigneurial class and the concomitant 
economic expropriation of its estates. The 
confiscation and redistribution of these estates by 
the Habsburg state resulted in a new type of 
landowner: "a new, motley aristocracy of fortune,
expatriate captains and emigrant bravos of the
Countex— Reformation" [Anderson 1974: 307; Richter
1971-73: 354-53, Furthermore, the anti-Protestant
measures of 1627-8 resulted in the emigration of a
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quarter of the native nobility [Dickson I: 843. In
addition to these changes in landownership as a result 
of the crushed rebellion came those originating in the 
vicissitudes of the war. Though three-fifths of 
subjects recorded in the tax-roll of 1654 in Bohemia 
had still native lords, only one third of all 
landlords still possessed their old estates: two
thirds of the holdings belonged to lords who had 
either taken over other holdings within the country or 
who, as foreigners, had acquired landed property in 
Bohemia for the first time [Richter 1971-73: 354;
Dickson I: 843.
The changes in landownership offered the new 
landlords an opportunity to do away, if they so 
wished, with local customs which had hitherto
regulated the subject peasantry's obligations towards 
their landlords and replace them with new, harsher 
rules. The Renewed Territorial Ordinance of 1627, the 
new Constitution for Bohemia, had already worsened the 
position of the peasantry by legally incorporating 
features of the landlord-peasant relationship. It 
endorsed the lords' rights to restrict peasant 
mobility, to decide on peasant marriages, and to 
interfere with the 'patriacharchal' authority of the 
head of the peasant family [Kavke 1964: 58-93. It was
within this context that the serf-tilled large-scale 
manorial economy developed.
The crop production on the enlarged demesne 
estates was destined more for the domestic than the 
foreign market [Kann/David 1984: 1183. It has
therefore been argued [Spiesz 1969, 1969a3 that it
would be inappropriate to conceptualize the structure 
of domination in the manorial economy in Bohemia as 
'second serfdom'. As the agricultural production was
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geared towards the home markets, the purchasing power 
of the peasants had necessarily to be sustained given 
the decline in urban population and thus in urban 
consumption. These considerations for the peasantry
were absent in Poland where production for
international markets allowed the system of 'second 
serfdom* and the concomitant destruction of the
purchasing power of the peasants. Whether we want to 
define the power configuration within which the
peasants were situated as 'second serfdom' or not, the 
fact remains that their position had vastly 
deteriorated during and after the Thirty Years War. 
Such was the intensity of their exploitation that in 
1680 they rose against their lords demanding the 
abolition or reduction of their robot obligations and 
withholding their labour services. They attacked the 
castles and demesnes of the nobility and could only be 
suppressed by the deployment of imperial troops. Over 
one hundred peasants were executed in the aftermath of 
the revolt and a robot patent was issued by Leopold I 
in which the state intervened for the first time 
directly in the relationship between lords and serfs.
This intervention was firmly aimed at benefiting 
the lords. It was stipulated that the serf was obliged 
to perform labour services on the demesnes of his lord 
for three days a week, but at hay-making and harvest 
time, and also at the fish harvest, the number of days 
could be increased by the lord "at will" CKlima 1985: 
196; Wright 1966: 154-53. The stipulated maximum
duration of the weekly robot now became a rule even on 
those estates where hitherto no labour obligations had 
been fixed and the subjects had enjoyed more 
advantageous conditions [Richter 1971-73: 323-53.
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Another labour services decree was issued in 
1738. This patent reflected the policy of Charles VI
of placating the nobility in order to ensure the
succession of his daughter to all his lands CWright 
1966: 155] . All serfs were now required to perforin
labour services for their lord, whether they actually 
held land or not. But during the previous decades the 
shortage of manpower had been converted into a
substantial surplus: the population increased
considerably and had more than doubled to about
1,970.000 in 1754: "the lord now found himself with
far more labour at his disposal than he could fully 
utilize. The following course was therefore adopted. 
Serfs who lived locally continued to work on the
lord's demesne, in much the same way as before, but in 
the case of those living at a distance from the
demesne the labour services were commuted to a money 
rent" CKlima 1985: 1983.
This was the situation when Maria Theresia 
ascended to the throne in 1740. The Bohemian Estates 
had been politically emaciated ever since the 1620s. 
They were not in a position to combat the nascent 
absolutist state in Bohemia. Rather than fight it, 
they copied absolutism and run their demesne estates 
accordingly. The victory of the Emperor at the White 
Mountain in 1620 had reduced his political dependence 
on the Bohemian aristocracy. But the post-1620 
Bohemian aristocracy now turned its energy to economy 
activities which, in the long run, enhanced its power 
position within the absolutist polity. For the 
aristocracy in the Austrian and Bohemian lands of the 
Habsburg Empire, patrimonial judicial authority and 
the control over policing was vitally important to 
their economic interests. Economic prowess determined 
their political power position vis-A-vis the
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territorial ruler. The political ascendancy of the 
Estates in the 16th century was firmly based on the 
economic strength of their manorial economy.
The conflict between monarchical government and 
the Estates in the Austrian Empire was played out 
within an explictly formulated ideological context. In 
the Austrian lands of the Habsburg Empire between 1500 
and 1800 the legal and ideological assumptions about 
the legitimacy and capacity of monarchical government 
to influence and shape social life were contained in 
the concept of 'police'. In the following chapter I 
will discuss the transition from a practice which 
regarded policing as the administration of the affairs 
of the state to the practice of 'high policing' with 
the police as a preventative force functioning as the 
early-warning system of an authoritarian state and 
mainly concerned with the defence of the realm 
[Brogden 1987: 8 on these two types of policing].
These changes in the meaning of 'police' were the 
ideological reflection of changes in the social and 
political power structure of early modern society that 
led to the formation of the modern state. In the 
following chapter I thus aim to achieve two goals. 
First, I want to describe the evolution of that set of 
ideas that helped to legitimate monarchical rule vis- 
a-vis the Estates. Second, by analysing the changing 
meaning of 'police' I want to establish the context 
within which the formation of police-forces under the 
control of the state has to be placed. These attempts 
by the state to increase its coercive powers by 
forming a state police will be discussed after the 
following chapter.
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III* "J?.Ql±ce" and the state, Legal and ideological
assumptions on ..state capacity in the Austrian lands of 
the Habsburg Empire. 15QQ - 1800.
A) The concept of 'police' and 'police' legislation: 
Organizing social life.
In German-speaking Europe the term 'police'
[ Policey3 was first found in the towns and, 
subsequently, in the principalities: in Wurzburg in
1476, in Nuremberg in ordinances of the town council 
[ Regiment und Polliceil of 1482 and 1485, in the 
Electorate of Mainz C Regiment und Pollucy] in 1488. 
From the early 16th century, the combination 'police 
and good order' or 'good police and order' is used in 
the sources. In the imperial and the territorial 
police ordinances C Pollzelordnungen] of the 16th
century the word 'police' was used in a very distinct
and specific way. The spelling of the word 'Policey' 
was not fixed. One can find ' Policy <ei)' ,
'Pollicey<ei) ' , 'Pollizey<ei) ' , 'Politzey', 'Pollucy',
'Pollucey' and 'Pullucey in the sources. Its meaning, 
however, remained invariable: it meant the condition
of good order in the public realm and in the common 
weal. The aim of 'police' was to establish a well 
ordered civic or territorial community. 'Good police' 
[ gute Polizei3 meant the redressing and correcting of 
disorder. Furthermore, the word 'policey' was also 
used to refer to the instructions and activities which 
were considered necessary for the maintenance or 
reformation of 'good order', thus being identical with 
'police ordinance'. In the course of the 16th century 
the term was used in an increasingly extended form to 
indicate one of the major tasks of government: the
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ruling authorities claimed a general competence in the 
combating of all socjal disorders for which existing 
law and custom did not provide a remedy CMaier 1980: 
92-8; Knemeyer 1967: 155-62; Preu 1983: 33-5;
Oestreich 1982: 156; Scribner 1987: 1043.
In so far as the police ordinances were 
dissociated from custom and traditional law, they 
constituted a new departure in the history of the 
formation of the modern state. The police ordinances 
created new law. The ordinances were deliberate acts 
of will and reason. These new laws stood, in 
principle, in stark contrast to the old law C gutes 
elites Rechtl which had not been created and enacted by 
a secular sovereign legislator but was thought of as 
representing and expressing perennial norms contained 
in tradition, ethical values, and religious 
prescriptions. 'Old' law was not enacted but 'found'; 
changes in the law were thought of, not as a 
purposeful creation, but as a 'reformation' of still 
binding traditional norms. The task of the ruler, 
which emerged from this notion, was to provide for pax 
et iustitia. For the medieval ruler to govern meant to 
sit in judgement; to 'find', ascertain and confirm law 
was the ruler's main political responsibility.
The rulers performed this task within two main 
constraints. The dominant ideology contained the idea 
that the rulers had received their authority from God, 
Dei gratia. As deputies of Christ, vicarli Christie 
their office, as ministerium, obliged them to perform 
their duties in a devout and just way. But in so far 
as the rulers' 'legislative' power was subordinated to 
their judicial power (or, rather, was by and large 
comprised by it), they did not only rule under God but 
also under the law. This constraint of the ruler's
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authority, which was rooted in religious ideology, was 
complemented by a political constraint. The power 
structure of medieval society, which was characterized 
by a plurality of autonomous, if not autogenous, 
authorities with economic and military resources of 
their own, prevented the ruler from imposing law 
without the consensus of the meliorum et maiorum 
terrae. Herein lies the fundamental tension of the 
medieval polity: as a consequence of the feudal
contract, the vassals were obliged to give aid and 
counsel, consilium et auxiliumt to their feudal lord; 
but given the fragmented power structure, this duty to 
give advice could be transformed into a right to be 
consulted and even the right of approval. Likewise, 
the duty to come to the support of the lord could be 
interpreted as legitimating the participation in the 
administration of the realm. While the nobility was 
thus providing power resources for the ruler, at the 
same time it also restricted his use of these 
resources. In the course of this negotiated
confrontation, the nobility acquired (and reaffirmed) 
legal rights which further bound the ruler. These iura 
quaesita were, in principle, unimpeachable by the 
ruler. This led to a situation in which 
particularistic law or individual rights held
predominance over general or universal law C Brunner 
1973: 133-46; Boldt 1984: 48-50, 54-9; Berman 1983:
292-4, 482-6; Maier 1980: 50-3; Raeff 1983: 53;
Brauneder 1976: 210; Merk 1934: 481-993.
Keeping the peace and providing justice were the 
two main responsibilities and justifications of royal 
authority. The task of preserving the peace, however, 
gave the rulers the opportunity of formulating and 
creating new law in the imperial and territorial peace 
statutes CLandfriedenl . Between 1103 and 1235 eighteen
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Imperial peace statutes were issued; and between 1093 
and 1235 ten territorial peace statutes were 
published. It was this legislation which turned a 
ruler increasingly into a legum condi tor. The peace 
statutes of the twelvth and thirteenth centuries were 
mainly concerned with preventing violence, blood feuds 
and duels, but also with preserving public order more 
generally, which led to including some matters of an 
economic and administrative nature into the statutes. 
To achieve these goals the existing legal order was 
systematized and reformed and rulers demanded of all 
people within their jurisdiction to obey these new 
laws. This legislation remained firmly rooted in the 
legal thinking of the time in that it emanated from 
the ruler's duty to maintain pax et iustitia. In the 
late middle ages the regulative force of these 
statutes waned and aristocratic self-help to redress 
perceived wrong came to the fore again. It was only in 
1495 that a new Imperial Peace Statute was issued at 
the imperial diet at Worms forbidding feud and violent 
self-help. But the ' Ewiger Landfrleden* ['Eternal
Peace of the Land' 3 of 1495 was not an expression of 
the authority of the Emperor, rather the contrary: The
Imperial Estates acquired the right to determine the 
composition of the Imperial Court [ Reichskammei—
gericht3 which was designed to guarantee the peace by 
allowing and securing due legal process. The Imperial 
Peace Statute of 1495 thus restricted, not augmented,
the legislative power of the Emperor CBoldt 1984: 56-
7, 123-4, 256; Berman 1983: 493-510; Oestreich 1980:
21-4; Brunner 1973: 17-9; Gernhuber 1952; Angermeier
1966; Landwehr 19683.
Since the notion of the ruler as legislator was 
familiar through the tradition of the peace statutes, 
the police ordinances of the 16th century, as enacted
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law, did not break completely with legal tradition, 
Furthermore, though police legislation was the 
prerogative of the ruler, co-operation between him and 
the Estates was by no means ruled out. Thus the 
police ordinance of Lower Austria of 1552/1568 stated 
that it had been issued with the knowledge and consent 
of the Estates CCod. Aust. II: 1473. It was a kind of
emergency legislation, dictated by dire need [ der 
notturft nachl , and passed in the interest of the 
common weal L gemeiner JITutzen] . Veil into the 17th 
century, police ordinances were typically drawn up on 
the instigation of the Estates and with their active 
participation [Schulze 1982: 393. The decline in the
power position of the Estates in the wake of the 
Thirty Years War found one of its expression in their 
diminished role as participants in police legislation.
It was through defining and re-defining the
meaning of the 'common weal' that the territorial 
rulers attempted to undermine existing iura quaeslta 
which restricted the growth of their legislative 
authority. As long as the Estates had not yet been 
deprived of their power, the notion of the bonum 
connnunet which the ruler had the duty to guarantee, 
was entwined in the notion of pax et lustitia\ the
legislative authority of the ruler, as expressed in 
the police ordinances, was considered to emanate from 
his judicial power. The common weal or welfare was
seen as the result of justice as represented and
exercised by the ruler and of the condition of peace 
to which this justice gave rise. But this consensual 
understanding of the legal and political order was 
undermined by the development of absolutism. The 
definition of the common weal now became the domain of 
the ruler and his staff; it became the strategic point 
of the ruler's penetration into the traditional power
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structure in his attempt to accrue powers to himself 
which so far he had had to share with the Estates 
[Maier 1980: 157-9; Merk 1934: 503-93.
By the ruler's appellation of the common weal, 
'policey' could be constituted as lus inspectionls and 
as lus reformandi politicumt i.e., police legislation 
could claim the right and duty, not only to oversee 
the social and political consequences of the iura 
quaeslta as they materialized in 'private' legal 
orders, but to redress any resulting harm to the salus 
publica. And even if this common weal was defined in a 
traditional way as the maintenance of the old status 
order, in a time of fundamental social and economic 
change the ever more far-reaching police regulations 
in defence of the old order could not but strengthen 
the state as legislator and thus contribute to its 
rise above the old powers CPreu 1983: 47-51; Willoweit
1978: 20; Grawert 1972: 11-4; Maier 1980: 119; Vessel
19783.
We can gain an insight into this process by 
reconstructing the notion of the 'good order' which 
informed the police ordinances. The Imperial Police 
Ordinances of 1530, 1548 and 1577 regulated a variety
of activities and circumstances. In order to prevent 
the blurring of status distinctions, dress regulations 
and sumptuary laws were enacted whose disregard was 
either punished by the confiscation of the luxury item 
or by the imposition of a high fine. These sumptuary 
laws also covered excessive expense at christenings, 
weddings and funerals. Blasphemy and cursing was made 
punishable as was adultery, concubinage and 
procuration of women. Provisions prohibiting the 
formation of economic monopolies as well as the 
practice of selling and buying goods under avoidance
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of market transactions L Fiirkauf] were among the most 
important regulations concerning economic matters. 
Profiteering, usury, and embezzlement was considered a 
criminal offence and so was breach of trust, 
particularly in cases of wardship. Slander and libel 
became punishable; adulterators of wine and of 
foodstuffs faced severe penalties. Such was the range 
of the provisions and prohibitions in the imperial 
police ordinances that increasingly all imperial 
criminal law was concentrated in these ordinances 
CSegall 1914: 101; Maier 1980: 833. Since the Imperial
Peace Statute of 1495 had already outlawed feud or 
private warfare as a legitimate means of redressing 
private grievances, issues of 'public order" in the 
narrow sense of public tranquillity and the absence of 
illegitimate violence in social relations were 
marginalized in these ordinances CKoch <ed. > 1747,
vol. II: 332-45 (1530), 587-606 <1548>; vol. Ill: 379- 
98 <1577> for edition of Imperial Police Ordinances].
By and large the police ordinances of the 
principalities within the Empire resembled the 
imperial police ordinances. The Police Ordinance of 
Lower Austria in 1542, for example, maintained that 
vice, frivolity and wrongdoings of the populace had 
stirred the wrath of God. This was evident in the 
threat to the well-being of the population posed by 
the Turks and by inflation. The reformation of good 
police I Reformat ion guter Pollicey3 was therefore 
necessary. The Police Ordinance of Lower Austria in 
1568 reiterated the concerns and objectives of the 
1542 ordinance. Vice and frivolity, annoying bad 
habits and extravagance, expressed by gluttony and 
unseemly and immoderate attire, had brought the wrath 
of God in the guise of the Turks upon the populace. 
Re-establishing a common order and good police [elne
-  123 -
gemelne Ordnung und Reformation guter Politzey] made 
it incumbent upon the ruler to implant C Pflantzungl 
virtue, propriety, discipline, decency and piety in 
his Christian subjects CHanns Singruener n.d. for 
Police Ordinance of 1542 ; for Ordinance of 1568: Cod. 
Aust. II: 147-51; on Ordinance of 1552: Brauneder
1976; Hampel-Kallbrunner 3 962: 45-9 on dress
regulations] .
In these as in other territorial police 
ordinances of the 16th century, 'good order* was 
related to concerns about morality and comprised 
primarily the conduct of a virtuous and religious 
life. Religion, both as a body of beliefs and as a 
pattern of behaviour was the primary concern. Good 
order was thought to exist only if the subjects led a 
modest, orderly Christian life. It is therefore not 
purely accidental that the list of regulations in the 
police ordinances of the 16th century frequently 
commenced with prohibitions concerning blasphemy and 
cursing: Apostasy of religious faith was considered to
be the root of all social evil and disorder t Knemeyer 
1967: 179; Raeff 1983: 167-8].
Though police legislation increasingly
constituted the main bulk of the ius publicum, it 
also contained rules and regulations concerning the 
ius privatum CSchraelzeisen 1955; Schmelzeisen (ed. ) 
1968 and 1969 for edition of German police and 
territorial statutes]. The civil and public law 
dimensions of police legislation are particularly well 
manifested in the state's concern with monitoring and 
deploying the country's population in general, and the 
labour force in particular. Numerous pieces of
police legislation between the 16th and 18th century 
attempted to secure a continuous supply of the work
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force and to shape the conditions of work. The 
fundamental principle, underlying police regulations 
on work, was simple: idleness is the parent of vice,
and, in particular, of begging and vagrancy. Idle 
persons were not tolerated: should admonition or
imprisonment not convince them of the social 
undesirability of their behaviour, idle persons should 
be ordered to leave the territory CCod.Austr. I: 205
(January 1679) where penalties are listed for workshy 
vagrants ranging from expulsion and incarceration to 
capital punishment "in order to set a warning 
example"]. According to an ordinance for Vienna in 
1563, all unemployed people should be expelled from 
the city. To prevent them from finding accommodation, 
the police ordinance in 1597 threatened all inn­
keepers with severe punishment should they give board 
and lodging to the unemployed (as well as to vagrants 
and criminals). Such was the concern of the 
authorities with detecting the unemployed that in the 
early 18th century special district commissioners were 
set up to trace the whereabouts of unemployed 
individuals. In 1721 these commissioners were placed 
under a special municipal commission for security 
CGeschichte Wien V/2: 133-53.
Closely connected with the question of work and 
idleness was the problem of the poor and beggars. How 
best to deal with them was a major political issue. 
One recurrent trait of the attempts to come to grips 
with this problem was the distinction between 
'deserving' and 'undeserving' poor. In Vienna in 1443 
an ordinance regulated the tasks of the city official 
C Sterzenmeisterl who had the penal authority over 
local and foreign beggars CLuschin v. Ebengreuth 1879: 
2333 . They had to prove to him that circumstances 
beyond their contro] had compe]3ed them to take up
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begging. If he was convinced of the truth of their 
claim, he could issue a certificate allowing them to 
beg provided, however, that they could prove knowledge 
of the common Christian prayers and that they had gone 
to confession during the previous year and received 
the sacraments CWeiB 1882/1: 3613.
The police ordinance of 1552 made it incumbent 
upon the parish authorities to provide for their poor. 
Apart from giving alms to their poor, local 
authorities discharged of their duty by issuing 
certificates to their 'deserving' poor which allowed 
their holders to beg within the locality [Feigl 1964: 
128-303. The financially less well-off parishes, 
however, were legally entitled to issue certificates 
granting the right to beg outside the locality. For 
holders of such a licence, Vienna seemed to be the 
most rewarding place. But with an increasing number of 
certified as well as unlicensed beggars and vagrants, 
particularly during the 'crisis of the 17th century', 
there arose the need of controlling this category of 
people more stringently [Hoffmann 1952: 246-8 states
that in 1727 about 8 or 10 per cent of the population 
of Upper Austria, i.e. almost 26,000 people were 
considered by the government to be in need and 
deserving of support3.
The local authorities were reminded by the 
government that they had an obligation to look after 
their 'deserving' poor; should they not comply with 
this rule they would face severe penalties. But the 
reissuing of such admonitions indicates that the local 
authorities did not heed them [Cod.Aust. II: 76
(ordinance of 1662), 76-7 (for its reissue in 1682);
Cod.Aust. I: 207-9 (ordinance in 1695)3. The county
courts [ Landgerichtel , which were under the authority
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of local aristocratic landlords, were urged to co­
operate in order to improve the combat of vagrancy 
CCod.Aust. I: 727, 730 (Ferdinand Ill's county court
regulation of 1656), 757 (for ordinance in 1697)]. But 
for reasons discussed in the previous chapter, the 
state was rather powerless to coerce the local 
authorities and power-holders into determined action. 
It thus took it upon itself to persecute the beggars 
and vagrants.
In the 18th century, 'police' raids across the 
country to apprehend suspicious individuals were made 
fairly frequently [ Land-Visitatlons-Ordnung in June 
1727, in: Cod.Aust. IV: 433; Visitatlons-Ordnung
(Upper Austria) 1752 in: Sammlung/MT I: 376-83]. In
1721 in one of these raids, the government of Lower 
Austria deployed more than 1000 cavalry and four- 
hundred infantry in addition to the forces provided by 
the local authorities CGutkas 1973: 297-8]. Those
able-bodied, unlicensed vagrants, caught either in 
these raids or in the course of normal policing, could 
be compulsorily conscripted into the army CCod.Aust. 
I: 206-7 (March 1693); 210 (May 1697); 216 (February
1698); Sammlung/MT III: 222 (August 1755); V: 60-1
(June 1766); VIII: 492-6 (December 1767)]. But while
the army thus contributed to the endeavours of the 
state to police vagrants and beggars, it also 
contributed to the problem of vagrancy. Discharged 
soldiers frequently roamed the country begging for 
money and sustenance but also extorting money by force 
CCod.Aust. I: 4-5 (for 1606/1609/1611)]. Crippled and
disabled soldiers who could not find employment added 
to the problem. The period of war between 1672 and 
1714 aggravated the situation and it was in response 
to deteriorating conditions that the state embarked on 
a policy of devicing state-subsidized invalidity
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provisions for disabled soldiers. This policy was the 
starting-point for a comparatively wide-ranging system 
of state provisions such as pension schemes for civil 
servants in the course of the 18th century CWunder 
1984].
Yet another way of dealing with the 'undeserving' 
poor or beggars was to put them into workhouses 
CCod.Aust. II: 545-7 (July 1671); I: 205 (January
1679); 209—19 (May 1697)]. There they had to work for
the food and shelter they received. The first of these 
houses was founded in 1671 in Vienna (Leopoldstadt) 
and over the next hundred years or so eleven more of 
them were established throughout the Habsburg monarchy 
CBruckmuller 1985: 270; Stekl 1978: 62-73, 181].
Beginning in the 1720s, mercantilistic ideas 
penetrated this mechanism of social control. Charles 
VI envisaged a network of such houses across the 
country engaged in manufacturing. For small wages the 
inmates, hitherto "idle persons", would produce goods 
out of domestic raw material so cheaply that expensive 
imports would be unnecessary thus making sure that, 
"for the common good", money would not leave the 
country [Cod. Aust. IV: 160 (January 1724)]. The
workhouses thus acquired a double task. First, they 
should 'socialize' the inmates so that they would 
become obedient subjects; second, they should instil a 
strict work discipline in the inmates without which an 
efficient work process would not be possible CStekl 
1978: 91].
The 'policing' of economic activities was also 
manifested in rules forbidding workers to go into 
service with more than one employer or to change the 
place of work (or, for employers, to take someone into 
employment) at times other than stipulated in the
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ordinances [Schmelzeisen 1955: 328-38], This provision 
was meant to contain competition amongst employers for 
workers in times of scarcity but also to restrain 
workers from achieving an advantageous wage-bargaining 
position CCod.Aust. I: 281-2 Dienstbotenordnung
(September 1688)3. With regard to the level of wages, 
ordinances frequently set an upper limit to prevent 
workers from taking advantage of the scarcity of 
labour and demanding higher wages C on wages for day 
labourers: Cod. Aust. I: 480 (ordinance for
woodcutters in 1689), Cod. Aust. II: 425-32 (ordinance
for labourers in vineyards in 1666)3. These 
regulations harked back to economic measures taken by 
the territorial rulers and the manorial lords since 
the second half of the 14th century. After the Black 
Deaths in the middle of 14th century a policy of 
regulating wages and working-conditions had been 
pursued to combat the strengthened position of 
peasants and day-labourers which had resulted from 
the decline in population. As early as 1352, for 
example, wage scales for labourers in vineyards had 
been fixed in response to labour shortages CMitterauer 
1974: 36-7; Liitge 1950: 193-8; Hon-Firnberg 1935: 55-
1123 . The new police ordinances explicitly forbade to 
demand, concede or agree on wages higher than the 
officially fixed rates [Schmelzeisen 1955: 350-93.
These attempts to coerce workers into compliance were 
underpinned by outlawing workers' combinations [Tyrol 
Police Ordinance of 1573, and the Austrian Ordinance 
for Domestic Servants 1688 in: Cod.Aust. I: 278-81,
§10; Schmelzeisen 1955: 367-83.
Police ordinances also legislated on the 
conditions of taking up a profession or entering a 
trade. The 'policing' of the guilds can serve as a 
prominent example. Typically, craftsmen could only
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pursue their occupation as members of a guild. But in 
their policy against monopolies, territorial rulers 
would sometimes threaten to license outsiders should 
the guilds not perform their duties which they were 
considered to have vis-a-vis the public. It could also 
happen that guilds suffered attacks at the hand of the 
rulers who tried to suppress them out of opposition to 
any sort of semi-private associations. The Tyrol 
Ordinance of 1602, for example, forbade blacksmiths 
and carpenters to form a corporation or guild 
[Schmelzeisen 1955: 305, n. 82]. Over the years, the
guilds became public bodies in that they owed their 
privileges to the sovereigns' concessions Ccf. King 
Matthew's decree in 1617 that henceforth all guilds 
needed the sovereign's concession: Hoffmann 1979: 230-
1] . But it was only in the second half of the 18th 
century that the guild system in Austria came under 
sustained political attack. At the end of the reign of 
Joseph II gradual reform had whittled away the power 
of the guilds. An important step towards curbing their 
power was the division of industrial enterprises into 
those producing for the local market ['police' 
industries] and those producing for a distant market, 
either domestic or foreign ['commercial' industries] 
in 1754. These 'commercial' industries were placed 
outside the guild restrictions. As a consequence, the 
number of masters working for distant markets was not 
any longer determined by the guilds but by market 
forces. This policy did not only establish the state's 
supervisory control over the guilds, it also allowed 
to instrumentalize the guilds for a state policy aimed 
at stepping up economic production and to increase the 
population and thus the economic and political power 
of the state [on 'police' industries: Slokar 1914:
132-42; Pribram 1907: 38, 104, 268; Gutkas 1984: 182;
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on the guilds: Komlos 1986: 442-8; Hoffmann 3 952: 399-
4153 .
The economic measures contained in the police 
ordinances of the 16tb and early 17th centuries did 
not amount to a mercantilistic policy 'before 
mercantilism' . The goal of these economic policies was 
the maintenance of a 'moral economy': the preservation 
of the established status order by securing the means 
of subsistence for each established 'estate' and 
social group according to its respective ranking, 
standing and tradition [Hartung 1950: 76-73. But there
occurred a decisive shift after the Thirty Years War 
which did constitute a new departure. In the period 
of reconstruction after the breakdown of political, 
economic and religious order, the state's aim of 
achieving financial strength through economic growth 
gained priority in economic policy over the 
maintenance of the 'moral economy'. It now became the 
aim of the economic policy of the state to manipulate 
and mobilize all sections of society in order to 
increase, and make use of, the economic potential of 
the country [Preu 1983: 17].
The police ordinance which Leopold I issued in 
1671 indicates the changes taking place in the last 
decades of the 17th century CCod.Aust. II: 153-93. As
so often before, the ordinance imposed sumptuary laws 
restricting in particular the wearing of luxurious 
dresses. In one respect, this ordinance remained 
within the traditional form: it asserted the
importance of maintaining social distinction and 
distance between the various groups of society CPlodek 
1976: 100-13. Conspicuous consumption was accepted as
an affirmation of status; attempts of certain sections 
of society to live outside their station by emulating
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their social betters were deplored. While the highest 
three ranks of society were thus exempted from the 
regulations concerning the wearing of dresses, the 
rest of society had to conform to the newly laid-down 
rules. But in two other respects, this police 
ordinance expressed the realities of a new age. To 
start with, the traditional religious motivation for 
issuing an ordinance had receded. The ordinance was 
formulated, not in order to redress religious or moral 
wrong-doings, but to prevent the purchase of expensive 
foreign goods which led to "an extremely large sum of 
money" to be taken abroad. The ordinance thus
perceived a sovereign territory as a spatially bounded 
economic area - a major step towards state-formation. 
Furthermore, the classes which were established by the 
ordinance were constructed with reference to the 
sovereign's court; the closer in their political, 
social and administrative functions individuals were 
to the centre of courtly life, the less they were
restricted by the provisions concerning the wearing of 
particular types of clothes. In both respects, the 
sovereign became the focal point in the ordinance.
This trend was reinforced in the police ordinance 
of 1686 CCod.Aust, II: 159-611. Whereas in the
ordinance of 1671 the three highest ranks of the 
status order had been exempted from the provisions 
concerning 'conspicuous consumption', they, too, were 
now subjected to the new rules. This inclusion
indicates the increasing incorporation of even the top 
status groups into a system of domination which
centred on the ruler residing at his or her court. 
Furthermore, the ordinance of 1686 put the ruler's 
officials in charge of executing the new regulations. 
The responsibility of the state for maintaining good 
order was thus firmly extended to include not only
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legislative duties but also executive tasks. This 
could not but mean a subordination, at least in 
theory, of the local aristocracy under the supervision 
by the state Con police ordinances of 1671 and 1686: 
Bruckmiiller 1985: 276-8; Hampel-Kallbrunner 1962: 50-
631. In 1697, finally, the sumptuary laws became a 
means of enhancing the revenue of the ruler who faced 
financial difficulties due to the Turkish wars. The 
ordinance stated that the financial burden of the wars 
made it necessary to impose a fine for the wearing of 
dresses embroidered with silver or gold or, 
alternatively, to sell licences which exempted their 
holders from these provisions CCod.Aust. II: 165-61.
By the end of the 17th century, then, the ruler's 
interests and concerns had firmly taken the central 
place in the territorial police ordinances.
When in August 1749, during the great reforms of 
the state under Maria Theresia, the subject-matter of 
'police' was raised, the discussion and understanding 
of 'police' was informed by the developments since the 
second half of the 17th century. For Count Haugwitz, 
Maria Theresia's chief reforming minister, the main 
goal of a well-organized police was to ensure that 
money was not to leave the country in exchange for 
luxury goods from abroad. In line with mercanti1istic 
thinking and the disciplining thrust of the 
intensifying absolutist state, the officials in the 
' Direct or ium in publicis et camera 1 i bus' were agreed 
that squanderers had to be compelled to show 
moderation C OEZ II/l/l: 242 f. ; Mayer 1986: .773, It
was this reasoning which led 'logically' to an 
ordinance on luxuries in September 1749. Not as if 
this ordinance prohibited the purchase of luxury 
articles; rather it set out to prevent the import of 
luxury goods and articles. Apart from mercanti1istic
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ideas, consideration for the status concerns of the 
aristocracy and for the adverse impact on the domestic 
industry of sumptuary laws as well as the 
difficulties, thought unsurmountable, in enforcing 
them, informed this ordinance LOEZ I1/2: 391 ff,].
It thus retained the main thrust of the luxury 
'Patent' of 1732 [Cod., Aust. IV: 770], There, for the
first time, it had been explicitly stated that the 
domestic industry which produced luxury items should 
be protected against foreign competition. The state's 
policy concerning luxury had thus taken a decisive 
turn. Up to the middle of the 17th century, sumptuary 
laws in general, and luxury decrees in particular, 
were motivated by attempts to stabilize and maintain 
the traditional religious order and the status 
distinctions between the ranks of society. After the 
end of the Thirty Years War these motivations receded 
in importance and rational considerations commensurate 
with mercantilistic policies came to inform state 
policies on luxuries. The ruler's interest in economic 
protectionism went hand in hand with the realization 
that economic and social developments had transformed 
society to such a degree that the traditional status 
order could not possibly be re-established by passing 
traditional sumptuary laws CStolleis 1983a: 35-503.
The concern for the promotion of the welfare and 
economic interests of the state, which could be 
discerned in the regulations regarding luxury, also 
informed the draft by the government of Lower Austria 
of the realm of activities subsumed under 'police' 
which was presented to Maria Theresia in 1768. It was 
maintained that police was nothing but the promotion 
of the well-being of the individual families in order 
to bring about the welfare of the state as a whole
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[Bibl 1927: 2113. Starting from this premiss nine
areas of police activities were distinguished: 
population policy, health, religion and propriety, 
supply of victuals, supervision of the quality of
foodstuffs and other vital goods and their price, 
industry (which included education, soil cultivation, 
matters concerning trade, commerce, crafts and
industry proper), poor relief as well as unemployment 
relief, building police, and, finally,
'administration', i.e., the execution of police 
regulations [Walter 1927: 22-3; Osterloh 1970: 137, n.
5; Bibl 1927: 211-3; Kallbrunner 1916: 2393. A13 these
areas were claimed to fall firmly within the policing 
duties of the state.
B) 'Police' and natural law theories of the state.
The police ordinances since 1671 ref3ected the
increasing political predominance of the territorial
ruler. This predominance was ideologically supported 
by the natural law theories which had been formulated 
since the late 17th century. Since then, and well into 
the second half of the 18th century, 'police' was
thought to be concerned with promoting the public 
good, the happiness, or even bliss [ Gluckseligkelt3 of 
the population. To put it more succinctly: Since the
mid-17th century the purpose of the state had been
seen, both by the rulers themselves and the majority 
of the natural law theorists, as going beyond the 
confines of preserving pax et lustitia and comprising 
the task of actively promoting the secular and
material welfare of the state and the population.
Salus publica and felicltas/beatltudo civitatls 
replaced pax et lustitia as the primary definition of
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the Staatszweck or 'state-objective'. Not the 
'reformation' of a destabilized 'good old order', but 
the creation and formation of a new order based on 
reason and rationality was now thought to be the 
ruler's task CScheuner 1979: 477-82; Engelhardt 1981:
48-50; Vessel 1978: 135-50; Hennis 1959; Funk 1863:
536-7; Vehler 1987/1: 233-403.
In Christian Wolff's rationalistic natural law 
theory, socletas civilis, which was thought to have 
been established through a social contract and to be 
identical with the 'state', was "a means to promote 
the common weal Lgemeine Vohlfahrth **. The contractual 
relationship between sovereign authority and its 
subjects comprised the promise by the ruler "to muster 
all his powers and diligence to devise those means 
beneficial to the promotion of the common weal and 
security and to make all necessary preparations for 
their deployment". The subjects, on the other hand, 
promised "to consent and accede to any given 
instructions which are considered by the ruler to be 
beneficial to them" [ Wolff 1725/1756: §§4, 230; 223,
4333 .
This theory established a particularly strong 
teleological conceptualization of the 'state'. The 
state had now become a rationally created means to 
achieve an end which was conceived as prior to the 
state. This meant, in effect, that political rule or 
domination could not any longer be derived from, and 
legitimated by, its origins, for example as being dei 
gratia; rather, political legitimation was derived 
from the purposive and rational pursuit of common 
welfare as the contractual end CNiedhart 1979: 2013.
In Wolff's philosophy, every activity was regarded as 
lawful which conformed to reason. The state as the
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sole and only guardian of the common weal was not only 
entitled to but, indeed, obliged to subject to its 
direct control all facts of social life [Strakosch 
1967: 120; on Wolff cf. Krieger 1957: 66-71; on
Pufendorf, Wolff and the influence of natural law 
theories on the policies of enlightened absolutism: 
Voltelini 1910; Stolleis 1981: 67; Stollberg-Ri1inger
1986: 103; Bloch 1961: 65-6; on the relationship of
natural law, rationalism and enlightenment/enlightened 
absolutism cf. Wieacker 1967: 249-3473.
In this theory, as in all the other natural law
theories before the middle of the 18th century, the
common good was not defined by taking the welfare and
well-being of individuals as the starting-point. 
Rather there was the assumption of a coalescence of 
the interests of the state and those of the individual 
subjects (organized in patriarchal families). Should a 
conflict between these interests arise, then private 
interests should be curbed in favour of public/state 
interests. Thus, on the one hand, the state-objective 
of common welfare confined domination by formulating a 
'social' goal the pursuit of which was considered the 
only legitimate activity of the state. On the other 
hand, however, it was left to the ruler's discretion 
to determine the means which would serve the common 
weal best; to destroy those political or social forces 
thought to prevent its promotion; and to decide on the 
degree of 'civil' liberties permissible from the point 
of view of the common welfare. This ambivalence was 
particularly manifest in the writings of Justi and 
Sonnenfels who, in the second half of the 18th 
century, were influential in forming political 
thinking in the Habsburg monarchy [Tribe 1988: chap.
43 .
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Johann Heinrich Gottlob von Justi, who, in the 
early 1750s, had taught in Vienna, adhered to Wolff's 
teleological conceptualization of the state. The 
creation of "the common blissful happiness 
[ gemeinschaftliche Gliicksellgkeit] of ruler and 
subjects" was the purpose of the state; it was the 
duty of the ruler "to maintain and increase the 
fortune and assets of the state and make his subjects 
happy" [Justi 1755/11: §15; I: §21], Justi conceived
the relationship between ruler and subjects as one of 
mutual obligations: the ruler's responsibility with
regard to the promotion of happiness was matched by 
the subjects' duty to obey [Justi 1755/1: §21;
Haussherr 1953: 843 . But not only did the state become 
a means to an end in this theory; the subjects, too, 
became instrumentalized as a means of the state: it
was their duty "to promote with all their powers the 
welfare of the state" [Justi 1771/1969: §1363. This
idea was derived from the quintessentially 
cameralistic notion that the welfare of the individual 
subject was a necessary precondition for the ruler's 
financial wealth. Thus, whereas rational natural law 
served as the springboard for the definition of the 
state-objective, cameralistic theories informed the 
thinking about the practical policies and, at the same 
time, served as their justification [Stollberg- 
Rilinger 1986: 104-5, 109-103.
Justi defined 'policey' as the "science to 
organize the internal constitution of the state in 
such a way that the welfare of individual families 
should constantly be in a precise connection with the 
public good Idem allgemeinen Besten3" [Justi 1760/1: 
§33 . This view of the police was shared, as we have 
seen, by the government of Lower Austria in 1768. 
Police was thought of as an activity aimed at
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mediating between the happiness of the individual 
(family) and that ' of the state. Justi thus rejected 
the idea of a coalescence of private and public 
interests. The recognition of private interests led to 
the idea of a sphere of civil liberties which remained 
outside the reach of the state. Justi argued that "as 
long as the citizens are obliged to obey only those 
laws that had been enacted for the common happiness, 
they are in fact free. This is the essential
characteristic of civil liberties C biirgerliche
Freyheit3" CJusti 1771/1969: §235],
But this assertion of the llbertas civilis 
remained restricted in several ways: first, happiness
as the purpose of the state remained the determinant 
of liberty; second, neither ruler nor 'state' were
said to be equally bound by enacted law; third, there 
were no legally fixed guarantees of those liberties. 
If the common weal was both linked to private welfare 
and was dependent on the balance of individual
happiness and the happiness of the state, then the 
activity of the state had necessarily to be concerned 
with both private and public happiness at the same 
time. The pursuit of private interests could not be 
left to the discretion of the individual (family), but 
had to become an area of intervention within the 
purview of the state. Furthermore, according to Justi, 
the overall aim of the state had to be to curb the 
power and influence of all social groups and the 
political estates to remove any possibility of them 
challenging the authority of the state and, as a 
result of their struggles between themselves,
destabilizing the community. Neither was thought to be 
beneficial to the common welfare CJusti 1755/1: §76;
Schulze 1982: 94; Klippel 1976: 63, 66; Stollberg-
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Rilinger 1986: 120; Kluetjng 1986: 87-114; Engelhardt
1981].
For Justi 'police* comprised all activities 
concerned with the promotion of the common weal. 
'State-objective' and 'police-objective' were 
identical: the furtherance and maintenance of the
salus publica. Joseph von Sonnenfels, who took up a 
professorship in Vienna in 1763 and was to be an 
influential member of the political classes in the 
Habsburg monarchy over the following decades, however, 
departed from the tradition of equating police with 
welfare. For him "police is a science to establish and 
manage the internal security of the state" [Sonnenfels 
1768/1: §293. The sphere of internal security, as the
area of police intervention, comprised two distinct 
dimensions: "public security" as the condition where
the state had nothing to fear from its citizens, and 
"private security" as the condition where the citizens 
were protected from illegal encroachments by the state 
on their civil liberties as well as from attacks on 
their life, property and honour [Sonnenfels 1768/1: §§ 
31 ff. ; Osterloh 1970: 49-79 for summary of
Sonnenfels's ' Polizeywissenscbaft' ; Ogris 1988: 26-
303 . The concern for both "public security" and the 
citizen's protection against criminal assault led to 
Sonnenfels's involvement in the formation of police 
forces under the control of the state.
There are two aspects in Sonnenfels's arguments 
which are of some importance to our discussion. First, 
it would be wrong to assume that those activities 
which were aimed at promoting <economic> welfare would 
be considered as falling outside the purview of the 
state now that police was conceptually restricted to 
establishing and managing internal security. Rather,
-  140 -
Sonnenfels accepted that economic changes had brought 
a certain degree of autonomy for private economic 
activities. A distinct economic discipline, the 
' Handlungswissenschaft* , was to analyse these new 
developments COsterloh 1970: 79-1043. Freed from
economic considerations, the 'security' police 
(forces) could now be used more efficiently to deal 
with the disruptive effects of the strengthening of 
private forces which resulted from the economic
changes. The police (forces) were construed as a 
coercive instrument which intervened when it became 
necessary to "keep the private forces in a position of 
subordination to the forces of the state" [Sonnenfels 
18173 . In so far as the control over the police 
(forces) should reside with the territorial prince,
this new definition of police extended the power of 
the ruler to the detriment of the Estates and local 
power-holders [Link 1983: 536-7; Maier 1980: 187-8;
Schulze 1982: 102-9; Preu 1983: 157-643.
This description of the task of the police as a 
guarantor of 'public security' sheds ample light on 
its importance for maintaining 'private security'. For 
Sonnenfels 'civil liberties' consisted in the "freedom 
to act in so far as this act did not violate public 
welfare loffentliche Wohlfahrtl" [Sonnenfels 1768/1: 
§763 . This understanding of civil liberties remained 
in line with the position already taken by Justi. 
However, Sonnenfels supported attempts to codify 
criminal, public, and civil law, Such codification was 
an important step towards establishing 'private 
security'. A certain degree of coherence and
predictability of the law would be achieved by 
formulating legal principles as the cornerstones of 
codified law [Strakosch 1967; Ogris 1981: 146-51;
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Matis 1981a: 21; on codification: Kocher 1985: 380-3;
Wieacker 1967: 335-93.
But Sonnenfels did not transcend the confines of 
monarchical absolutism. On the one hand, he was 
adamant that legislation should bind the ruler as well 
as the ruled and be limited to those enactments which 
pertained to the common weal. On the other hand, 
however, Sonnenfels left it to the monarch's
discretion to determine whether any particular law did 
or did not contribute to the salus publics [Sonnenfels 
1768/1: §76; Ogris 1988: 35, 42-51; Wolff 1725/1756:
§433 argues that subjects do normally not know what 
constitutes the common good] . This bias in favour of 
the monarch was also reflected in Sonnenfels's notion 
of 'police'. As the police was charged with 
controlling social groups in order to prevent any of 
them gaining a preeminence which would threaten not 
only social harmony and happiness but also the very 
existence of the state, Sonnenfels understood the 
police as an instrument used by the absolutist state 
as a means of securing its own existence COsterloh 
1970: 513.
A second aspect of Sonnenfels's discussion of the 
police deserves attention. Standing in a legal and 
theoretical tradition which went back to the late 15th 
century, Justi conceived police essentially as ' cura 
promovendi salutem publicam'. By removing concern for 
welfare from the field of activity of the police, 
Sonnenfels defined the task of police much narrower 
than the overarching 'state-objective'. Putter in 1770 
epitomized the new departure in the thinking about 
police when he conceived police * as ' cura avertendi 
mala futura' . Not the promotion of the common good, 
but the concern for averting the ills to come would
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increasingly define the task of the police. It was 
this re-definition of police which shifted the meaning 
of police as the synonym of good government and public 
order to a conceptualization of the police as an 
organizational force charged with maintaining public 
order and safety and with preventing and investigating 
unlawful activities CPutter 1770: § 321; Maier 1980:
163; Walter 1927: 25; Pasquino 1978: 45-7; Preu 1983:
167-92].
The dissociation of an all-encompassing notion of 
bonum commune and the narrower concept of internal 
security made two different kinds of developments 
possible. On the one hand, 'police' could develop into 
an executive organ of the state. While the state 
claimed the sole competence of defining the common 
weal (which was equated with the welfare, internal 
security and survival of the state), the police would 
become that governmental instrument which performed 
all those tasks without which the internal security of 
the state would be put in Jeopardy. As we shall see in 
the following chapter this was the course of events in 
Austria since Joseph II and his Minister of Police, 
Count Pergen who established a secret police force 
operating throughout the monarchy. Its main task was 
the surveillance and apprehension of individuals 
considered to be enemies of the state [Walter 1927], 
On the other hand, a re-evaluation of the notion of 
salus publica would lead to a different definition of 
police. In the last two decades of the eighteenth 
century German idealist philosophy set out to destroy 
the natural law theories regarding the 'objective' of 
the state. The concept of salus publica was, rightly, 
interpreted as enabling the state to interfere with 
the self-determination of the individual. In clear 
contradistinction it was maintained that it was a
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human right of each individual to embark on 'the 
pursuit of happiness* unencumbered by the 'police' 
state [ on the impact of the American Revolution on 
German political thinking cf, Dippel 1978].
In this theory, the scope of state activity was 
limited to guaranteeing a legal framework which would 
allow each individual to participate in society on the 
basis of individual property/properties. For Kant, 
salus publica was exactly that legal constitution 
which guaranteed everyone his freedom within the law. 
Kant maintained that, within such a legal context, 
everyone would retain the right to pursue his own 
happiness by whatever means, so long as he did not 
impair the general lawful freedom and thus the rights 
of his fellow subjects at large CKant 1793: 382;
Schulze 1982: 152-7; Scheuner 1979: 486-8; Klippel
1976: 131-4; Engelhardt 1981: 70, 75; Preu 1983: 193-
273; Stolleis 1981: 75-9; Krieger 1957: 86-1253. This
perspective led to the conceptualization of police, 
not as an interventionist force with almost 
totalitarian powers, but as an executive body 
operating within the law. It was charged with ensuring 
that all hindrances and threats to the security and 
welfare of the citizen, not the state, were averted 
thus enabling his self-determined individual pursuit 
of happiness CBerg 1799-1809; Funk 1863: 513-5; Maier
1980: 200-7].
Towards the end of the 18th century in Austria, 
there was not yet an economic and social basis for a 
potent 'bourgeois' society which could have 
transformed theory into practice. There, in the last 
decade of the eighteenth century, the reality was a 
restaurative state, as we shall see later in this 
analysis of the Austrian state. Nevertheless, the
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policies of social engineering by the absolutist 
Habsburg monarchy' had contributed to the gradual
emergence of distinct 'bourgeois' groups such as
intellectuals and civil servants who were demanding 
ever more radical political reforms to establish their 
right of full political participation and social 
equality Con the Austrian 'Jacobins' cf. Wangermann 
1959; Reinalter 19803. These demands, partially 
engendered by state policies, were gradually
undermining the material and ideological foundations 
of the absolutist monarchy. At the same time, the 
policies of the absolutist state, propelled by (geo-) 
political requirements since the loss of Silesia in 
1740 and legitimated by rationalistic theories of rule 
and domination, had whittled away the power of the 
traditional bearers of authority, the aristocracy and 
the clergy. Their attempt to regain lost ground in the 
period of the Turkish War and the wars with
revolutionary France contributed to the formation of 
an authoritarian regime in the 1790s. This 
restaurative state used its police forces to stifle 
and suppress political and social discontent. In the 
last decade of the 18th century, 'police* was firmly 
established, and deployed, as the repressive arm of 
the state.
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IV. The formation of the, .state police In Vienna and
the Austrian lands of the Habsbur.g Empire. 1500 -
1790.
In this chapter I chart the attempts by the 
monarchical rulers between 1500 and 1790 to organize a 
state police force under their exclusive control which 
was charged with maintaining 'good government and 
order' by enforcing the regulations issued by the 
monarchical government and contained in the police 
ordinances. This organizational effort was part of the 
endeavour of the state to establish a monopoly of the 
legitimate use of force within its territory.
A) The state police until the reign of Maria Theresia
The efforts of the Habsburg rulers to get a hold 
over existing police forces and to organize their own 
police under their own control are well documented in 
the case of Vienna. In 1221, the charter of the city 
of Vienna stipulated that each citizen had the duty 
to contribute to the protection of the city against 
internal and external enemies. This duty reflected the 
organizing principle of the medieval town in the 
German lands. The relation of the individual citizen 
with the town as a corporate body resembled that of 
the peasant with his feudal lord: he swore an oath of
fealty which compelled him to render certain services 
and perform certain duties in his capacity as a 
citizen in support of the town. This relationship was 
normatively founded on the idea of the 'common weal'. 
Not only did this notion of ' salus publica' comprise 
the duty of any citizen not to undermine the common
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good, but also to further it by personal services and 
material contributions [ Merk 1934: 4863. The payment
of taxes as well as the defence and policjng of the 
town were part of the citizens' obligations towards 
the town [Brunner 1973: 352-33.
In Vienna, the contro3 over policing 3 ay with the 
twenty-four aldermen under the direction of the town 
judge CPolizei 1867: 198; Gescbicbte Wien II/3 <3900):
4653. The office of town judge, which seems to have 
been founded in 1137, was under the contro3 of the 
prince. While the prince retained the right of 
appointment, the office of town judge bad in effect 
been monopolized by patrician families since the 
middle of the 13th century [Hellbling 1956: 104-53.
After the plague in the 14th century had depleted the 
ranks of the civic guard [ Biirgerwehrl , a decree by 
Rudolph IV in 1361 required a!3 citizens, without any 
exceptions, to share in the duties of guarding the 
city CBibl 1927: 243. In 1322, the city had been
divided into four districts to a!3ow a more efficient 
policing. Each district had its own civic guards under 
the command of their captain; the burgomaster of 
Vienna, however, was in charge of the overa]3 
supervision of the guards [WeiB 1882/1: 369-703. But
over the years it became customary for the well-to-do 
citizens to pay poorer citizens to perform the 
policing duties in their stead. So unreliable did 
policing become that the council decided in the middle 
of the 15th century to staff the guard at the city 
gates and the city walls with municipal employees 
[Polizei 1867: 1983. Outside the city walls a 'roaming
formation* on horse [ streifende Rotte3 was to protect 
travellers on the highroads [Mayer 1985: 42; Polizei
1867: 199; Link 1983: 5093.
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The government [ Regiment] , which Emperor 
Maximilian I established in the course of his 
administrative reform in Lower Austria in 1493/1501 as 
the supreme provincial administrative body and 
administrative court of the prince, affected the 
structure of policing in a number of ways. Though 
policing power in Lower Austria was still exercised by 
the lords of the manor or, respectively, the 
municipal council, police supervision now rested with 
the 'regime' of Lower Austria. This 'regime' was 
charged with tracing suspicious individuals, 
interrogating them and, if necessary, trying them. 
They were responsible for quelling any city riots and, 
in case of a pending attack from outside, they had to 
mobilize the defence forces CMayer 1985: 46 f.;
Polizei 1867: 198] . To give greater urgency to the
activities of the law-enforcing authorities, the 
instructions issued by Ferdinand I laid down that 
those people who had suffered from street robbery 
could claim compensation from the patrimonial 
authorities responsible for apprehending the robbers 
if it was proven that they had neglected this duty 
CTezner 1898: 41-2, 67-70, 80-6, 107; Cod.Aust. I:
102; Cod. Aust. II: 146 on the administrative
(policing) duties of the local authorities and the 
procedure for redressing illegal actions by the 
authorities].
These reforms constituted but another step 
towards the subordination of Vienna under the control 
of the prince. In 1517 the Emperor reserved himself 
the right to assess the suitability of those citizens 
elected for the position of burgomaster or councillor. 
After the revolt of the council of Vienna and the 
Estates of Lower Austria against the 'regime' in 
1519/20 was crushed, Ferdinand I issued a new charter
-  146 -
for Vienna in 1526 [Novotny 1963], It established the 
office of town advocate C Stadtanwal t] . The town 
advocate was in the employ of the prince. His task was 
to supervise the proceedings of the city council. 
Officials from the 'regime' now audited the city's 
public accounts. They informed the government on any 
tax arrears and debts incurred by the municipal 
authorities. Furthermore, twelve of the twenty-four 
members of the 'inner council', the administrative 
body of the city, were appointed by the prince. These 
twelve councillors together with the town judge formed 
the city court which was in charge of criminal cases 
and matters arising from indebtedness. Through this 
new charter the council thus became increasingly 
subject to instructions and supervision from the 
government. At the same time, by excluding artisans 
from membership of the 'inner council', the patrician 
character of the city council, which had been 
gradually eroded by an influx of (albeit wealthy) 
craftsmen since the late 14th century, was restored 
C Hellbling 1956: 102-8; Oestreich 1980: 127-8; Mayer
1985: 47; Bruckmuller 1985: 148-9, 184-6; WeiB
1883/11: 366-9.
Religious unrest in the wake of the Reformation 
led to the establishment of the Viennese Day and Night 
Watch C Wiener Tag- und Nachtwache3 in 1528 CVeltz6 
1902: 9-10; Mayer 1985: 60] or 1531 COberhummer I: 30] 
with a total strength of sixteen men. This watch was 
formally linked to the municipal finance department 
C Obei— Stadt-KammeramtTi but it did not have a 
commanding officer who would have organized and 
controlled its activities. In 1543 this watch was 
separated into a Day Watch, consisting of seventy men, 
and a Night Watch, comprising fifteen to twenty men. 
The Night Watch, which remained under the formal
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supervision of the financial department, was now 
charged with standing guard on the city walls, while 
the Day Watch, now under the command of a colonel of 
the guard [ Obrist-Wachtmeisterl and drilled in a 
military fashion, was to guard the city gates from 
sunrise to dawn CMayer 1985: 63; Veitz6 1902: 15-163.
In 1564 the number of men serving in the Night Watch 
was increased, but its size remained still 
considerably lower than that of the Day Watch. The 
scope of duty of the Night Watch was also enlarged and 
now included policing within the city walls. In the 
same year the Viennese City Guard C Wiener 
Stadtguardial , consisting of sixty mercenaries and 
paid by the municipal authorities, was founded CBenna 
1942: 91-2; Mayer 1985: 703. The town advocate was now 
put in charge of all aspects of policing: all matters
to do with 'welfare' (health, poverty, market, trade, 
cleanliness) and security (including monitoring 
foreign visitors) fell now within his remit [WeiB 
1883/11: 3703.
Only five years later a re-organization of the 
police forces took place. By imperial ordinance, the 
Night Watch and the Day Watch were reunited and 
incorporated into the City Guard. The cost of these 
new City Guards [ Stadtguardl] , which now comprised 150 
men, was to be defrayed by the municipal authorities. 
The Guards were not allowed to enrol men who lived in 
Vienna. The commanding officer, who was to be paid by 
the city, had to be presented to the Emperor for 
approval. The task of these new guards included 
opening and closing the city gates, controlling the 
city walls, checking upon dangerous individuals and 
peacebreakers, and enforcing compliance of the
citizens and foreigners with compulsory registration 
[Mayer 1985: 68-72; Velz6 1902: 16; Oberhummer I: 30;
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Ehrenfreund 1919: 123 . In 1570, In order to improve
the policing of the countryside, the Estates of Lower 
Austria established a police force of forty-five men 
(including twenty cavalry). Initially, this police 
force was under the command of the LandprofoB, an 
officer from within the Estate administration, but 
since the middle of the 17th century, the 
RegierungsprofoB was put in charge, thus linking the 
force more closely with the territorial ruler CFeigl 
1964: 183, n,253,
Both town judge and town advocate in Vienna were, 
as we have seen, imposed on the municipal authorities 
by the government. In 1576 the municipal authorities 
attempted to gain a greater influence in the policing 
of Vienna by creating municipal police commissioners. 
But no sooner had these commissioners taken up their 
jobs than conflicts arose between them and the town 
judge over the accounting of fines and the 
apprehension of 'malefactors'. As expected, the 
government of Lower Austria sided with the town judge 
and in 1581 the commissioners handed in their 
resignation. The municipal authorities had evidently 
failed to establish some autonomous control over 
matters of policing CGeschichte Wien V/2: 1323.
In 1580, faced with the growing danger of Turkish 
invasions, the government appointed a city commander 
C Stadthauptwannl who was to take charge of the 
military aspects of the City Guards. But since the 
municipal authorities had to feed the bill for this 
force, there remained at least a certain degree of
municipal control over the Guards. In 1582 the city
commander ordered the Guards to be augmented by
enlisting 150 imperial troops. At the same time the
Guards' pay was now underwritten by the government
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C Veltz6 1902: 24, 33], But the resistence of the
citizens of Vienna was such that no real fusion 
between the old Guards and the imperial squad 
[ kaiserliches Fahndl'3 ensued CMayer 1985: 743. In
1586, finally, the Guards came under the command of 
the Court War Council and were thus removed from any 
supervision by the city council, but also from the 
provincial government [Veltz6 1902: 243. The
resistance to this force, however, did not abate. Such 
was the attitude of the citizens to the force that the 
Vienna Police Ordinance of 1597 threatened anyone who 
attacked the Guards with the imposition of the death 
penalty in the case of conviction CGeschichte Wien 
V/2: 1333,
The size of the new Guards increased over the 
years. In 1595 it comprised already 500 men and, in 
response to the military situation in 1618, the new 
Guards were augmented to 1200 men. In the same year a 
troop on horseback of 300 men was formed which was to 
assist in policing and was also to function as a 
reconnaissance detachment in case of enemy activities. 
But mounting costs led to its dissolution in 1621 
[Polizei 1867: 205; Velz6 1902: 39; Mayer 1985: 74-53. 
During the siege of Vienna by the Turks in 1663 the 
Guards, which had been called the ' Imperial Viennese 
City Guards Regiment' [ kaiserliches Wiener 
Stadtguardia-Regimentl since 1634, numbered 2000 men, 
only to be reduced after the Austrian victory in 
August 1664 to 1200 men in order to relieve the 
Estates of Lower Austria and the city of Vienna from a 
financial burden CMayer 1985: 75-80; Veltz6 1902: 41;
Polizei 1867: 211-23.
The Guards were not a very effective city police 
force. Bad pay and squalid accommodation contributed
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to the demoralization and inefficiency of the force. 
Furthermore, there appear to have been disagreements 
between the provincial government and the municipal 
authority over the deployment of the force as well as 
an increasing alienation between the citizenry and the 
Guards [Mayer 1985: 77-83. One reason for this
alienation may have been the involvement of members of 
the Guards in illegal activities detrimental to the 
interests of the citizens. In the Vienna market 
regulations of 1638 and 1665, for example, soldiers of 
the Guards were accused of being prominently engaged 
in ' Furkauf' . They obviously took advantage of their 
role as market police to appropriate goods under 
avoidance of proper market transactions to their own 
financial benefit CGigl 1865: 153, 1563.
To counterbalance the deplorable state of affairs 
a new force, the ' Rumorwache* , was established in 1646 
which was under the direct supervision of the 
provincial government. But the establishment of this 
new force was not Just a 'pragmatic* response by the 
government to 'technical' deficiencies of the existing 
forces. Rather, it was an expression of the conflict 
between the prince and the Estates. As I pointed out 
when discussing the distribution of political power in 
pre-absolutist Austria, the Estates could rightly 
consider the government and its highest 'officials' as 
representing, in the end, their interests. Whereas the 
City Guards operated under the ultimate control of the 
prince, the Rumorwache was thought to be a 
'governmental' force: the City Guards received their
instructions from the War Council, the Rumorwache , 
however, was instructed by the government of Lower 
Austria [Cod, Aust. II: 263 (for instruction in 1672);
Mayer 1986: 90; WeiB 1883/11: 403; Ehrenfried 1919:
133 . Since 1654, this new force of five officers and
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sixty men was paid, however, by the municipal 
authorities CGeschichte Wien V/2: 1333.
Their duties were comprehensive COberhummer II: 
203-6 on the instructions for the new force]. They had 
to apprehend a wide range of perpetrators: 
blasphemers, be they drunk or sober; workmen and 
traders who went about their business on Sundays and 
public holidays during the time of church service and 
mass; beggars without permit and those beggars of 
Catholic faith who could not prove that they went to 
confession regularly; Jews without permit to stay in 
Vienna on Sundays and public holidays; magicians, 
sorcerers and fortune-tellers; prostitutes, adulterers 
and adulteresses; rapists and those who had committed 
incest; usurers and profiteers, be they Christians or 
Jews; drunk and disorderly people; those who stayed on 
in pubs after licensing hours; all persons bearing 
arms, except soldiers; people involved in routs and 
riots; gamblers and thieves, burglars and murderers; 
those persons who, as bearers of a contagious disease, 
had returned to Vienna before their days in quarantine 
outside the city had lapsed. The Rumorwache was thus 
charged with acting as public health officers, 
maintaining public order, upholding public morality, 
and providing internal security - all this under the 
supervision of the provincial government and its 
officials [The Vienna market regulation of 1647 put 
the Rumormeister also in charge of the market police: 
Gigl 1865: 153-53. The instruction of 1706 reaffirmed
the tasks of the Rumorwache and added as new important 
tasks street-lighting and fire-fighting. In this new 
instruction the military character of the Rumorwache, 
in particular with regard to internal discipline, was 
once again emphasized as was its subordination under
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the provincial government [Oberhummer II: 206
'Instruction' ] .
But there was yet another police force which was 
controlled by the provincial government: the Security
Day and Night Watch C Slcherhei ts Tag- und Nachtwachel . 
It had already been formed in the 1580s after the old 
Day and Night Watch had ceased to exist as an 
independent body. The Security Day Watch was directly 
answerable to the provincial government, the Security 
Night Watch, however, was subordinated to the
Rumorwache. The Rumorwache, in turn, was under the 
supervision of the government of Lower Austria 
[Seliger/Ucakar 1985: 66]. In the early 1740s the
Security Day and Night Watch was commanded by one
principal officer and had a total strength of 120 men, 
divided evenly between the two watches. On the beat,
the Day Watch was controlled by four officers and the
Night Watch by three. At that time, the Rumorwache 
consisted of one principal officer and his deputy and 
fifty-three men under the direct command of three 
sergeants. The cost of the Security Watch was about 
10,000 f 1. , that of the Rumorwache about 4,500 fl. 
[Polizei 1867: 2213.
An instruction of 1733 clearly defined the main 
task of the Security Watch as that of catching 
beggars. Apart from specifying the lines of command 
and the duties of the Security Watch, the instruction 
also specifically warned the Watch not to get in any 
kind of argument or even fight with the other two 
forces should they not be given the kind of support by 
either of them to which they deemed themselves 
entitled. It thus acknowledged the uneasy relationship 
between the three police forces and the low position 
of the Security Watch vis-a-vis the other two forces
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COberhummer II: 215-26; on the tension and conflict
between City Guards and the Rumorwache: Cod.Aust. II:
311 (instruction in 1678 and in 1700) which admonished 
the Guards to co-operate with the Rumorwachel . But all 
three forces were subordinated to the provincial 
government of Lower Austria, not to the municipal 
authorities of Vienna; they were not communal or city 
police forces. The dissolution of the City Guards in 
1741, of the Security Watch in 1776, and of the 
Rumorwache in 1791 by the government was proof of this 
subordination to the government of Lower Austria 
COberhummer I: 34; Seliger/Ucakar 1985: 66-7; Mayer
1985: 93 ff. ] .
B) The reform of the state police under Maria Theresia
In the reforms of the state in 1749 the 
Directorium in publicis et camerallbus was created as 
the highest governmental body for the political and 
fiscal administration of the territories of the 
Habsburg Empire (excluding Hungary). At the same time, 
the organization of provincial government underwent 
fax— ranging changes. In the 'Representations and 
Chambers' C Reprasentationen und Kammern ] , the 
influence of the Estates was much reduced: provincial
government 'represented' now more comprehensively the 
wishes and interests of the monarch [some aspects of 
the state reforms will be discussed at the end of this 
chapter] . The Directorium now decided that in all 
Austrian lands police commissions should be 
established which would be in charge of implementing 
this police agenda. These police commissions were to 
be set up within the 'Representations and Chambers' 
and their members should be recruited from amongst the
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staff of the provincial government CBenna 1953: 198;
OEZ II/l/l: 2443. For Lower Austria, however, a
different procedure was devised as the reform of the 
provincial government had not yet been concluded. 
There, a Court Commission was established which was 
responsible for the 'welfare* police in all its 
manifold aspects: from enforcing the luxury decree and 
the regulations regarding commerce I Konunerz- und 
Luxuspolizei 3 to dealing with the 'deserving' and the 
'undeserving' poor as well as ensuring public safety 
and security [OEZ II/2: 4023.
After some organizational restructuring, the 
Hofkowmlssian In Polizei-, Armenverpflegs-,
Sicherheits- und Schubsachen set about their task 
under the chairmanship of the president of the 
provincial government of Lower Austria. This
presidency had been achieved only after some 
determined manoeuvre of the provincial government 
which had feared for its influence should police
matters for Lower Austria be decided at the Court 
without its participation CMayer 1986: 77-83. In 1751
this Court Commission was further augmented by 
incorporating the Court Commission for Endowment Funds 
[ Stiftungs-kommission 3, which was supervising the 
administration of the financial means used for 
providing for the 'deserving* poor [ Stekl 1978: 333 .
The enlarged CPolice3 Court Commission was formally 
incorporated into the Directorium in February 1752.
But within little more than a year this structure was
overhauled again when the reform of the 
'Representation and Chamber' of Lower Austria was 
concluded and the duties of the Court Commission fell 
on this newly organized provincial government [OEZ 
11/1/1: 244-9; OEZ 11/2: 401-7; Bibl 1927: 200; Benna
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1942: 68; Benna 1953: 198-200; Qsterloh 1970: 47-9;
Mayer 1985: 129-31; Oberhummer I: 683.
Notwithstanding these organizational innovations, 
the Directorium was convinced that further changes 
were necessary since they perceived a widespread 
disregard for the decrees and regulations issued on 
behalf of the territorial prince CBibl 1927: 201-2;
Kallbrunner 1916: 2383. This perception had resulted
in the introduction of the office of police 
commissioner for Vienna in 1751. In that year twenty- 
four commissioners were appointed as liaison officers 
between the CPolice3 Court Commission and the police 
forces of the city [OEZ II/l/l: 246; OEZ II/2: 405;
Osterloh 1970: 763. These city police forces comprised 
by now the officials of those patrimonial authorities 
which had jurisdiction in the suburbs of Vienna. While 
the inner city was under the immediate jurisdiction of 
the territorial ruler, the increase in population had 
let to the sprawling of the city into adjacent areas 
in which patrimonial judicial authority was exercised 
by individual lords. It was one of the tasks of the 
newly appointed police commissioners to ensure co­
operation between these authorities in the suburbs and 
those governmental forces and offices in the inner 
city.
A further step towards a more comprehensive 
surveillance of the population in Vienna was taken 
when the office of commissioner was expanded. Eight 
commissioners for the inner city and twelve 
commissioners for the suburbs together with a number 
of ' house inspectors' [ Hausnachseher 3 were put in 
charge of keeping a close watch over the inhabitants 
and visitors of Vienna, conducting secret inquiries, 
if need be, to ascertain whether they abided by the
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regulations concerning compulsory registration [Bibl 
1927: 204], In 1754 this system was improved by giving 
it a more hierarchical structure. From within the 
provincial government, twelve chief commissioners were 
appointed who, with the help of a secretarial staff of 
six, had to supervise the police in the four districts 
of the inner city and the two districts in the 
suburbs. In order to improve the system of 
surveillance, the office of 'special constable* 
[ Unterkommissar 3 was established at the same time. 
Citizens of Vienna would be appointed as special 
constables by the government on the suggestion of the 
city council. They did not receive any pay, but were 
exempted from trade tax. In all, 188 special 
constables were installed. Their main duty was the 
policing of compulsory registration. Their activities 
were controlled by three professional 'police
supervisors' [ Folizei-Aufseher 3 , who were directly 
answerable to the chief commissioners. But drunkenness 
and lack of diligent performance of duties led to the 
abolition of the office of special constable in 1756 
CSammlung/MT 2: 357-60 for instruction for special
constables; Bibl 1927: 205; Kallbrunner 1916: 238-9;
Oberhummer I: 23-3; Benna 1953: 200; Osterloh 1970:
76-7; Mayer 1986: 81-23,
In 1773 a Commission for Police and Security was 
established as a separate department within the 
provincial government. This Commission of seven 
government officials was in overall charge of the 
police forces in the city CMayer 1985: 151—2; Bibl
1927: 2173. The Commission supervised the activities
of the 'police office' I Polizeiamt 3 which had been 
created as the supervisory local body of the Viennese 
police forces and which comprised twelve officials and 
a secretarial staff of eight under the direction of
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two senior officials [Bibl 1927: 220; Osterloh 1970:
142 describes the police office as consisting of one 
senior official <Palizeioberaufseher) and his
personal assistant, four police officers and six 
secretaries]. The reform of 1776 created a new police 
force and introduced the office of 'district
superintendent' [ Bezirksaufseher 3, who was a 
government official [Mayer 1986: 813. Each of the
twelve superintendents was responsible for the police 
in his own district. He had to ensure public
tranquillity, order, propriety and security as well as 
the diligent execution of the governmental decrees.
But he had also to make sure that the private welfare
of the citizens was not obstructed [Osterloh 1970: 
145; Sammlung/MT 8: 614-34 for 1776 reform] ,
Improving the monitoring of the movements of the 
population was a major concern of this new police 
order. To achieve this, the system of compulsory 
registration was reinforced. The owners or caretakers 
of houses were required to bring to the attention of 
the district superintendents all 'suspicious' lodgers 
or house guests. Furthermore, they had to inform the 
district superintendents on o3d 3odgers moving out and 
new ones moving in [Sammlung/MT 8: 618-203. This law
thus reaffirmed the legal duty of the citizens to help 
the authorities monitor the movements of the 
population. The Vienna Police Ordinance of 1597 had 
stipulated that anyone who would not register guests 
or visitors with the authorities would lose his status 
and rights as a citizen [Geschichte Wien V/2: 133; for
new rules concerning the registration of the people in 
Vienna in 1696: Cod.Aust. I: 468-93. In July 1746 and
June 1751 compulsory registration was justified in two 
decrees as an important measure against vagrancy 
[Sammlung/MT 1: 32-3, 295-73. Yet another decree
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concerning compulsory registration in May 1757 was 
followed by two more decrees in Apri] 1765 
CSammlung/MT 3: 350; Sararalung/MT 4: 376-633. The
owners and caretakers of houses were again reminded of 
their duty to register all those individuals living in 
their house who had not yet had abode in Vienna for at 
least ten years. Information about these individuals 
concerning name, religion, nationality, age, marital 
status, occupation, date of arrival and/or (expected) 
departure had to be forwarded to the authorities. The 
second decree enacted that 'house inspectors' 
C Hausvisitations-kommisslonMre 3 had to visit the 
houses assigned to them for surveillance once a month 
to enforce compliance with compulsory registration. 
Whereas eighty years earlier the task of inspecting 
the houses in Vienna had been assigned to the City 
Guards and the Rumorwache, this responsibility was now 
transferred to special officials [Cod.Aust. II: 263-4
for instruction to police forces in 16853.
This system of compulsory registration could only 
be operated efficiently if it was possible to clearly 
identify each individual house. The numbering of 
houses allowed such a systematic recording of places 
of abode. The numbering of houses had already been 
introduced in 1556. Then it was motivated by the dire 
needs of the expanding court of the monarch for 
finding accommodation for its; staff. To satisfy this 
need, the requisition of accommodation was considered 
justified. Yet another attempt at gaining a more 
detailed knowledge of the number of houses in Vienna 
was made in 1664, In 1749, the municipal authorities 
engaged in a project of surveying and numbering the 
houses in order to draw up a tax register. The census 
of 1770, which was undertaken for military purposes,
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led, finally, to an effort to enforce the legibility 
of house numbers [VeiB 1883/11: 3883.
One reason for the police reform of 1776 was the 
indiscipline and inefficiency of both Security Day and 
Night Watch and Rumorwache as well as public hostility 
towards the forces. This had caused the provincial 
government to suggest an overhaul of the police system 
to the Court Chancery in 1773 COberhummer I: 35-6 for 
comments of the government of Lower Austria; on 
obstruction of police work by the public: Cod.Aust. I:
210: people preventing Rumorwache from catching
beggars are to face punishment (May 1697); Sammlung/MT 
1: 34 (January 1747; instruction of Maria Theresia in
1754 in: Oberhummer II: 226-9, also: Sammlung/MT 2:
331-2; for decree concerning resistance to Security 
Day and Night Watch: Sammlung/MT 4: 36-73. As a
result, a Military Police Guard IMilitar Polizei Wache 
3 replaced the Security Day and Night Watch in 1776 
[Sammlung/MT 8: 630-43. This force of 250 men, who
were taken over into the force from active military 
service and were accommodated in twelve barracks 
across the city, was answerable to the government of 
Lower Austria. During the next fifteen years the force 
grew to 355 men including officers [Oberhummer I: 743.
The instructions for the force were, in effect, 
an extended version of those issued for the Rumorwache 
in 1706. The Military Police Guard was responsible for 
public safety and public security: it was charged
with controlling street cleaning and traffic as well 
as with lighting the street lamps; at night the men 
had to be particularly alert to all kinds of 
suspicious activities which might disturb the peace, 
offend public propriety or might be linked to 
unlawful acts. Idle children prowling the streets had
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to be returned to their parents; if parents were found 
repeatedly not to have taken care of their children, 
they had to be reported to the district superintendant 
[ Bezirksaufseher ] , who, together with the captain of 
the Military Police Watch, was in command of the 
force. The men were admonished that they did not have 
the right to arrest individuals unless issued with a 
warrant or directed by their superiors. Rather than 
arrest a suspect straight away, they had to wait for a 
superior officer to be fetched to decide whether a 
person should be taken into custody. This procedure 
should be particularly adhered to if a clergyman or a 
person of rank was involved. In any case, the 
policemen should take care not to offend the public in 
any way and, above all, should await orders from the 
government in case of riots before discharging their 
weapons [instruction in: Oberhummer II: 229-553.
At the end of the reign of Maria Theresia the 
police of Vienna was firmly placed under the 
supervision of the government of Lower Austria. 
Through the Commission for Police and Security, the 
government of Lower Austria was in charge of the 
police: the governmental commission was the
supervisory body for the police office, the district 
superintendents and the Military Police Watch. But the 
police reforms of Joseph II further extended the 
government's control over police forces.
C) The state police under Joseph II
The reform of the police system, on which Joseph 
II embarked in the spring of 1782, was initially 
closely connected with the reorganization of the
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political administration of Lower Austria. It was the 
overall intention of these political reforms to reduce 
the participation of the Estates in the government of 
the country. Up till now the diets had elected six 
delegates from among their members who, under the 
chairmanship of the Landmarschall had supervised the 
execution of the laws and decrees passed by the 
Estates, The competence of this committee [ standisches 
Verordnetenkollegium ] included, amongst other things, 
the recruitment, supply and accommodation of troops 
and the administration of taxation. The central 
government now decided that the government of Lower 
Austria should take over these duties and that the 
Estates should only be represented in the government 
by four delegates. Only those members of the diet 
could become delegates who had acquired a government 
certificate attesting to their eligibility. As members 
of the government these delegates would have the same 
responsibilities as the other officials [Walter 1927: 
28; Benna 1953: 202; Hellbling 1956: 302-3; Bibl 1902: 
10-11; Klingenstein 1983: 378-93.
It was also decided that Vienna should have a 
circle office [ Kreisamt 3 of its own. Matters of 
police, which so far had rested with the provincial 
government of Lower Austria, should be transferred to 
the chief of the Kreisamt, the Stadthauptmann or 
Polizei-Obei— Aufseher ['city commander' or 'police 
superintendent' 3 . But in so far as this Kreisamt was 
also a political office, all its dealings, including 
police matters, would have had to be reported back to 
the provincial government, thus retaining overall 
governmental control [cf. the Emperor's orders of 1- 
March 1782 to the Court Chancery in: Walter 1927: 28;
the Kreisamt will be discussed at the end of this 
chapter3. Internal discussions about the organization
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of the police, however, led to the conclusion that it 
would be impossible on practical grounds to transfer 
the police duties to the Stadthauptmann, who, after 
all, was already encumbered with extensive political 
responsibilities [Mayer 1985: 190 ff. ; Benna 1953:
202-3; Walter 1927: 28-9].
The decree of 28 April 1782 thus provided for the 
following police organization in Vienna: the municipal
authorities were put in charge of all matters 
concerning trade, street cleaning, street paving and 
street lighting but also of the market police; as part 
of his police duties, the Stadthauptmann would have to 
supervise the diligent performance of these duties by 
the municipal authorities; the town court was made 
responsible for all aspects concerning security, in 
particular for arresting perpetrators and for the 
compulsory conveyancing of beggars and other unwanted 
individuals; finally, the newly created director of 
police, who was to be independent of the 
Stadthauptmann and directly subordinated to the lord- 
lieutenant, would be in charge of the secret police 
and the remaining matters of police [Walter 1927: 29-
30 for excerpt of decree issued by Court Chancery on 
the jurisdiction of each authority].
All matters of policing, which so far had resided 
with the provincial government, had now been 
transferred to separate public bodies. Though the 
division of labour between these distinct authorities 
was relatively clear cut, it was with regard to the 
office of director of police that uncertainties arose. 
First, it was not defined without ambiguities what 
should be understood by 'remaining matters of police'; 
this was likely to lead to controversies over the 
precise competence of each authority. Second, the
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director of police was the immediate subordinate of 
the governor <lord-lieutenant> of the provincial 
government to whom he had to send his reports, 
bypassing the government. The governor, in turn, would 
transmit these reports to the Emperor, himself 
bypassing the Court Chancery. This line of command and 
communication would give room for organizational 
manoeuvring which, in the end, led to the separation 
of the police from the government and to its 
organizational independence [Valter 1927: 30; Valter
1972: 1123.
By the end of 1782, the organization of the 
police in Vienna had already been altered. Count 
Pergen, the governor of Lower Austria, and Beer, the 
director of police, convinced the Emperor that the 
Police Vatch, which had been put under the command of 
the town court early in the year, should be 
subordinated to the provincial government by 
affiliating it with the office of the director of 
police. In support of this change they argued that 
the town court had not been performing its duties 
diligently and did not supervise the Police Vatch 
sufficiently [Valter 1927: 30-1; Benna 1942: 1103.
Joseph II agreed to these changes and, after 
establishing the police in Vienna along these lines, 
it was now thought desirable by both the Emperor and 
Count Pergen to extend this system to all hereditary 
lands.
Pergen's line of reasoning expressed the 
underlying logic of state centralization very 
cogently. He perceived the relationship between Vienna 
and the hereditary lands as one between centre and 
periphery/"province". It was considered necessary for 
the centre to have constant knowledge of the movement
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of individuals in the provinces who might be suspected 
of criminal behaviour. This constant surveillance 
could only be achieved, so it was asserted, if a 
uniform and integrated system of police was introduced 
throughout the monarchy. Only uniformity and 
consistency would allow the police to be conducted 
efficiently from the centre. Police commissioners, who 
had to receive training from the director of police in 
Vienna, would have to be sent into the provinces. 
These commissioners would take control over all 
aspects to do with surveillance. In particular, they 
would supervise the system of compulsory registration 
and the movement of travellers, looking out for 
individuals who might have been already put on 
official lists of suspected individuals. In order to 
be able to perform these tasks the commissioners would 
take command of the local police forces.
These police commissioners would keep close 
contact with the director of police in Vienna; in the 
last instance, they were answerable, not to the
provincial governments, but to the director of police 
in Vienna and, through him, to the governor of Lower 
Austria. The provincial governments, which had
hitherto been in control of the police in their
respective territories, would thus have to hand over 
this responsibility to the centre. Up till now, for 
the provincial governments this centre had been the
Court Chancery. But Pergen's plan for the police in 
the monarchy did not assign any influence to the Court 
Chancery. It aimed therefore not only at restructuring 
the relationship between centre and periphery, but 
also at reorganizating the spheres of competence of 
the political offices within the central state 
apparatus [Walter 1927; 32-3; Benna 1942; 111],
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But Pergen's attempts at centralizing the police 
system of the monarchy met with spirited resistance 
from the Court Chancery which was determined not to 
lose any power to the governor of Lower Austria, In 
the spring of 1785 it was thus resolved that only 
matters concerning the secret police should be 
transmitted by the police commissioners directly to 
the police directorate in Vienna. All the other 
'public' matters of police should be dealt with by the 
police commissioners under the direction of the 
provincial governments. Through establishing a 
supervisory role for the provincial governments in 
non-secret police matters, the Court Chancery, as 
their direct superior office, had secured its 
influence. [Between 1785 and 1787 directors of police 
were appointed throughout the monarchy: for Prague and
Briinn, for PreBburg, Ofen and Troppau, for Linz, 
Milan, Pest, Hermannstadt and Innsbruck; the police 
commissioner of Graz had jurisdiction over Inner 
Austria as whole; in Lemberg, Triest and Brussels, 
where the office of director of police had already 
been established, an organizational structure along 
the lines of the Viennese police system was 
introduced; cf. Walter 1927: 34-5; Benna 1953: 204-5;
Oberhummer I: 50; Mayer 1986: 833.
The instruction which was issued for the police 
commissioners in 1785, delineating their duties and 
responsibilities, expressed unambiguously the 
supervisory role of the heads of the provincial 
governments over the directors of police [for 
instruction: Oberhummer II: 133-65, for supervisory
role: ibid. : 134, 137, 1603 . The activities of the
police commissioners were restricted to matters 
concerning the security of the state and of the 
individual. Their remit did not cover 'welfare
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police*. For example, it was stated explicitly that 
matters concerning market transactions should be of no 
concern to the directors of police unless public 
safety was at stake. Police directors had to take 
action against health hazards such as those caused by 
rotten vegetables or putrefied fish. But as a matter 
of principle police directors had not to interfere 
with matters of ' Publics et Politics* [Oberhummer II: 
149, 1463.
In order to be in a position to prevent, detect 
and investigate unlawful activities or those 
considered undesirable from the point of view of 
public order, the respective local or regional police 
force (security watch) was put under the command of 
the directors of police [Oberhummer II: 150, 159-603.
They were responsible for their efficient deployment 
during day and night; they were answerable, too, for 
the forces' diligent performance of their duties. It 
was left to the discretion of the police commissioners 
how they organized the forces, though suggestions were 
put forward on the basis of the experience in Vienna 
[Oberhummer II: 1603. To achieve the best results, the
police commissioners were advised to co-operate 
closely both with the other public local authorities 
and with their colleagues in the other provinces as 
well as in Vienna. The success of policing throughout 
the monarchy depended, it was argued, on the diligent 
collation of "data" and the continuous interchange of 
the important pieces of information among the offices 
involved in policing [Oberhummer II: 136-7, 141, 143,
148-50, 153, 1573.
But yet again, this organizational structure was 
not to remain in force for long. The instruction for 
the directors of police and commissioners in the
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provinces, which was issued in November 1786, in 
effect downgraded their importance within the system 
of police. In line with an order directly given by 
Joseph II in September 1786, the directors of police 
lost control over matters of police to the municipal 
authorities [Mayer 1986: 833. The directors of police,
not any longer in charge of the police forces and 
matters concerning public security and the security 
and safety of the individual citizen, were reduced to 
the role of inspectors ascertaining whether the 
municipal authorities were performing their policing 
responsibilities meticulously. They did not have the 
right to interfere in the actual policing, but rather 
had to inform the head of the provincial government 
should they discover any deficiencies. The directors 
of police had to be kept informed about official 
correspondence and they were entitled to demand and 
receive support from the local authorities, but they 
were prevented from taking any initiative of their own 
on matters concerning policing. This meant that with 
regard to matters concerning 'public* police the 
governor of Lower Austria and the director of police 
in Vienna had lost out, and that the Court Chancery, 
to whom the heads of the provincial government had to 
report, had reasserted its influence Ccf. instruction 
of 1786 in: Oberhummer II: 165-83.
It would appear that this reorganization was the 
pragmatic response to the opposition the system of 
police encountered in the provinces after its 
introduction in 1785. Then, the provincial governments 
had in effect lost their responsibilities for 
policing; the municipal authorities had to deal with 
police commissioners whose brief had not been clearly 
delimited vis-A-vis the municipal magistrates; the 
heads of government, though formally the
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commissioners' superior authority, had to reckon with 
the directors sending secret reports to the governor 
of Lower Austria; and the Court Chancery, one may 
surmise, might have been interested in rescinding the 
intra-governmental compromise which had cut into their 
power [Walter 1927: 35 on the opposition to the new
structure of the system of policing throughout the 
provinces] .
Furthermore, the reform of municipal local 
government in 1783 had streamlined the town 
administrations. The elected mayors, vice-mayors, and 
town councillors now needed governmental approval in 
regard to their qualification. Magistrates and town 
syndici had to come from the civil service rank. 
Magistrates performed their task for life, mayors for 
a duration of four years which, however, could be 
prolonged by the government for another four years. 
All holders of these positions drew a salary from the 
state; they did not so much represent the citizens of 
the town, but rather acted as agents of the 
territorial ruler. The magistrate itself was divided 
into three senates each of which had clearly defined 
responsibilities: the senatus in publicis et
oeconomicis was in charge of the political and 
economic administration; the senatus in iudicialibus 
civilibus was the court of civil law cases; the 
senatus iudicialibus criminalibus constituted the 
criminal court [Hellbling 1956: 306-7; Kann 1974: 177-
8] . It might have been hoped by the government that 
this new structure of local municipal government might 
be sufficiently well equipped to police the towns 
efficiently.
With regard to 'public' policing in the 
provinces, Count Pergen's plans for centralizing all
aspects of police in his hands were thus thwarted by 
the instruction of November 1786. However, Pergen 
succeeded in keeping the system of police for Vienna 
unaltered, with the director of police in charge of 
all aspects of policing CWalter 1927: 373. With regard 
to the secret police, too, Pergen's position remained 
strong. Though the police commissioners would be 
operating under the direction of the head of the 
provincial government even as secret police agents, 
their reports would have to be sent directly to 
Pergen by the heads of government. Under circumvention 
of the Court Chancery, Pergen would both communicate 
the information from the provinces directly to the 
Emperor and transmit the Emperor's orders to the 
provincial authorities C instruction concerning secret 
police of 1786, in: Walter 1927: 46-50; also reprinted
in: Oberhummer II: 168-76; on communication: Walter
1927: 473.
The tasks of the secret police were 
comprehensive. With regard to maintaining public order 
and avoiding any threats to the state, the police 
officers were urged to inquire thoroughly the opinion 
among the population about the monarch and 
governmental policies; in particular, they were 
admonished to survey the activities of likely rabble- 
rousers [ Aufwickler des leichtglaubigen Pobel <s) 3
[Walter 1927: 47, 483. Furthermore, they were
instructed to monitor the movements of suspicious 
individuals, in particular of foreigners. But they 
were also urged to ascertain whether any money was 
being brought out of the country.
But their brief was even more comprehensive. Not 
only did they have to spy on the population at large, 
but also on other state officials and the military
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personnel. In fact, to keep state officials under 
close watch was considered the primary concern of the 
secret police. What opinion does the public hold of 
the official ? Does he accept bribes ? Has he any 
relatives living abroad and does he communicate with 
them in a suspicious way ? Does he keep confidential 
contact with foreigners or even pass on official 
documents ? These were the concerns which the secret 
police should address [Walter 1927: 473. As we shall
see in the last chapter in this part on the Austrian 
state, the duties of the secret police reflected the 
increasing disenchantment of reform-minded bureaucrats 
with Joseph II's reversal of 'enlightened' policies 
and their gradual move into active political 
opposition. But the military personnel, too, was to be 
investigated by the secret police to detect any 
officer who might have dubious secret contact with 
foreign powers. Finally, though it was conceded, that 
the clergy was, on the whole, well-inclined towards 
the monarchy and supportive of it, it nevertheless was 
to be surveyed lest some of its members should agitate 
among their congregation against the state [Walter 
1927: 48; Fournier 1912: 43.
The secret police was advised to put particular 
emphasis on the efficiency of the local system of 
compulsory registration to achieve the desired goals. 
Furthermore, they were to employ people who were in a 
particularly good position to collect valuable 
information as their personal assistants. Domestic 
servants and coachmen, for example, should be employed 
as informers; only those persons who could be trusted 
to co-operate with the police should be helped to gain 
employment in the post office. Surely, it would be 
completely superfluous, it was stated in the 
instruction, to give any pointers to the police
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officials as to how the post office could be used for 
their purposes ! In any case, letters from and to 
suspicious individuals should be opened and analysed 
CValter 1927: 493.
This system of secret police, thus established in 
1786, was to remain in force essentially unaltered 
until the revolutionary turmoil in the middle of the 
19th century. Its guiding principle was the view that 
the duties towards the state would not allow any 
compassion or consideration for those bent on opposing 
it [Walter 1927: 49; Benna 1942: 983.
Longevity of the command structure of the police, 
however, was not the hallmark of the system of 1786. 
Yet again, a re-organization was implemented in 1789. 
It would seem that the heads of the provincial 
governments and the magistrates in the provincial 
towns were either not willing, capable or in a 
position to conduct the police in an efficient way 
Ccf. chapter VIII. on growing political and social 
discontent in the monarchy in the late 1780s3. Whereas 
the police in Vienna operated rather successfully, the 
police in the provinces was not up to expectations. 
When, due to reasons of health, Pergen had to shed 
some of his administrative responsibilities at the 
beginning of 1789, Joseph II put him in overall charge 
of the police in the monarchy. From now on, the heads 
of the provincial governments had to liaise with 
Pergen and his office, which was not any longer 
incorporated into the government of Lower Austria, but 
had become an imperial ministry [ Hofs tel lei . In the 
last instance, the orders concerning police were given 
by Pergen. In the provinces, the police of the 
regional towns and market places had to remain in 
direct contact with the capital of the province which,
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In turn, would have to report to the police 
directorate in Vienna. At the end of this system stood 
Pergen, supported by his two officials, who was 
answerable only to the Emperor [Walter 1927: 37-93.
This was the structure of the state police when 
Joseph II died in 1790. I will resume the discussion 
of the state police in Austria when I analyse the 
reform policies of Leopold II. In the previous 
discussion on the concept of ' policey' and on the 
formation of police forces under the control of the 
state, it should have become evident that 'policing' 
was mainly concerned with monitoring the population. 
The surveillance of people and disciplining them so 
that they would not create 'bad government and 
disorder' but rather contribute to the public welfare 
as defined by the state was a more important 
consideration than preventing 'crime*. We have also 
seen that a permanent struggle was waged within the 
state apparatus over the exercise of control over the 
police forces. The conflict between central and 
provincial state agencies over policing authority was 
complemented by conflicts over competence within the 
central state agencies. The factionalized and 
fragmented structure of the state apparatus which was 
reflected in these conflicts became even more apparent 
when the secret police as the coercive arm of the 
state was charged with monitoring even the state 
officials themselves.
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D) Police, local government and state reform under 
Maria Theresia and Joseph II
The police reforms I have discussed so far were 
implemented in that political space where the 
authority of the monarchical government was not 
principally disputed by the aristocracy. As we saw, 
the lordships enjoyed great economic as well as 
political and judicial powers over their subject 
peasantry. It was this power on the local level that, 
in principle, allowed the lords to wield power on the 
'national' level as well. The centralizing thrust of 
the modernizing absolutist state, which was reflected
in its attempts to harmonize judicial and political 
power across the territories of the monarchy,
constituted therefore a fundamental threat to the 
power resources of the aristocracy.
With the introduction of 'circle offices'
[ Krelsamterl under Maria Theresia, the central 
government imposed some sort of state supervision over 
the local landlords in the political and judicial 
administration of their manor. The circle offices thus 
set out to penetrate that political space which had so 
far been monopolized by the aristocracy. These circle 
offices under the direction of circle captains 
supervised the implementation of the new system of 
taxation on the local level. But the circle captains 
were also urged in an instruction issued by the 
government of Lower Austria in 1753 to uphold the 
Catholic religion, seize heretics, check the use of 
parish funds, inspect charities, investigate guilds,
and visit prisons [Dickson I: 281 n.1273 . More
generally, the circle officials had the task of 
protecting the peasants against their lords. In this
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capacity they were charged with overseeing the 
implementation of the governmental decrees thus 
controlling the 'political' function of the local 
authorities. With regard to economic matters, the 
officials were to make sure, for example, that the 
peasant would not any longer be forced to give his 
lord a right of pre-emption on his agricultural 
products; the peasant should be free to sell his 
produce in the free market tSammlung/MT VI; 255-8 
<July 14, 1770)3,
Circle officials also infringed upon the
landlords' patrimonial judicial authority. It was 
decreed in December 1769 that punishment of peasants 
by patrimonial courts should not be imposed until the 
circle offices had been informed about the case and 
had approved the sentence of the patrimonial court 
[ Sammlung/MT V: 479], But the circle offices also
acted as the local state agency with which peasants 
could lodge a legal complaint about their landlords. 
In this capacity the officials were entitled to 
investigate maltreatment of the subject population in 
villages, monasteries and schools. This curtailment of 
the landlords' judicial power was enhanced by the 
introduction of the institution of the 'subject's 
advocate' i Unterthansadvokat3 whose task it was to 
provide legal advise to the peasants once they had 
brought a charge against their lords [Link 1983; 522;
Liebel-Weckowicz 1985: 345-6; Hantsch 1968: 157-8;
Brunner 1973: 455; Dickson I: 277-803. But whilst this 
law laid down the peasant's right of complaint, a 
patent of February 29, 1772 defined the manner in
which peasants could bring these complaints against 
their landlords. In it those peasants were threatened 
with the most severe punishment who showed
"stubborness, obstinacy, disorder, wickedness
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C Frevell , wantonness C Uebermutl , or who would dare to 
take part in mob gatherings and uprisings" 
CSammlung/MT VIII: 5393.
The central state agencies clearly understood 
that there was bound to be some sort of accommodation 
between local landlords and circle officials. After 
all, the circle captains shared a similar social 
background with the local aristocracy. Moreover, the 
lowez— rank officials were likely to be well aware that 
there were material gains to be made if they showed 
leniency in their dealings with manorial officials. As 
a result of this situation central government issued 
decrees in which government officials (including 
circle officials) were threatened with stiff
penalties should they accept presents from members of 
the local community CSammlung/MT V: 404-5 (1769)3 and
in which all "understandings and partialities" between 
circle and manorial officials were prohibited 
CSammlung/MT VI: 407 (October 1771)3. Eventually,
circle officials were forbidden to accept food from 
the lords' stewards without payment CSammlung/MT VII: 
516-8 (April 1776)3. But the close connection between 
local aristocracy and circle officials remained a 
problem for the state. This situation led Joseph II to 
dismiss a considerable number of circle captains right 
at the beginning of his reign CLiebel-Veckowicz 1985: 
3553 .
By 1780, a total of seventy circle offices had 
been set up across the monarchy C Stundner 1970: 133.
Under Joseph II practically the whole administration 
on the level of local government came under the 
control of the circle offices. Towards the end of his 
reign circle captains were urged to go on a tour of 
inspection in their district once a year. They had to
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ascertain whether the officials of the local 
authorities knew the laws of the land and applied them 
in their daily actions and, more generally, whether 
governmental decress were complied with. Furthermore, 
they had to investigate whether vagrancy and begging 
were kept in check by the local authorities, whether 
the streets were maintained in good condition and 
whether the weights and measures used in economic 
transactions were correct [Liebel-Weckowicz 1985: 
349] .
The judicial power of the landlords had already 
been curbed at the beginning of the reign of Joseph 
II. The Penal Law of September 1781 reasserted the de 
Jure subordination of the patrimonial courts under the 
circle offices: it reaffirmed the right and duty of
the circle offices to approve of the sentences imposed 
by manorial courts by stipulating that any prison 
sentence of more than eight days had to be approved by 
the circle officials. But even more detrimental to the 
patrimonial lords' interests was the provision in the 
law which prohibited the patrimonial courts from 
levying any fines on convicted perpetrators 
CKropatschek/J.II 2: 252-4; in particular § 11 <p.
253); Bibl 1902: 163. But the legally sanctioned fees
did not pay for the salary of the patrimonial 
officials. Since the judicial and policing functions 
which the landlords performed thus incurred a 
financial deficit, many of them did not object out of 
hand to the state's attempts at taking over these 
tasks [ Feigl 1964: 327-83. This state of affairs
wasmade worse for the patrimonial lords by yet another 
important curtailment of their patrimonial judicial 
authority. A decree in 1787 laid down that only 
landlords with a legal qualification were entitled to 
exercise patrimonial judicial authority. If they did
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not possess this qualification they had to employ duly 
qualified officials CMischler/Ulbrich I: 393.
The institution of the circle offices 
demonstrated the central government's endeavour to 
encroach upon the privileges of the patrimonial 
authorities. This judicial assault on patrimonial 
authority was complemented by the reform of agrarian 
policies which aimed at curtailing the economic power 
of the aristocratic landlords over their subject 
peasantry. I shall analyse these agrarian reforms in 
the next chapter. It will be one of the main concerns 
of the remaining chapters to analyse why the various 
attempts of the Emperor to curtail the power of the 
aristocratic landlords failed in the end.
But before engaging on this task the 
establishment of the circle offices should be briefly 
placed within the context of the political reforms of 
the state under Maria Theresia [see Dickson's 
magisterial study on 'Finance and Government under 
Maria Theresia, 1740 - 1780' as the most detailed and 
authoritative account yet on state reform in the 
Austrian Empire] . The principal stimulus to political 
reform in the Habsburg monarchy was the serious 
defeats inflicted by the Turks during the 1730s and by 
Prussia during the 1740s and in the Seven Years War. 
The loss of Silesia, and in particular the Silesian 
linen industry, to Prussia in the War of the Austrian 
Succession in 1740 did not only deprive the monarchy 
of a major source of revenue; it also meant the loss 
of Austria's proponderance within the (German) Empire 
through the rise of Prussia. But this loss of 
leadership had a liberating effect for Austria: as
(German) Emperors, the Austrian monarchs had 
considered it imperative to pursue a policy of
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alliances with the Estates in each principality of the 
(German) Empire in order to prevent developments 
towards princely absolutism in the territories. 
Absolutist centralization of government in the 
principalities of necessity would have undermined the 
imperial structure. But the upholding of the autonomy 
of the Estates out of 'imperial' considerations 
weakened Austria internally: she could not
legitimately pursue a policy of curbing the powers of 
her own Estates while at the same time upholding the 
principle of political participation of the Estates in 
the (German) Empire. Her weakened position within the 
(German) Empire allowed Austria to embark on a policy 
of absolutist reform; her defeat at the hands of 
Prussia made such reforms imperative [Strakosch 1967: 
19; Scott 1990: 1503.
The loss of Silesia was in itself a bad blow for 
the monarchy. But the fact that within a few years the 
Prussian government had vastly increased the taxation 
collected, almost doubling the total revenue from 3.9 
million florins to slightly over 7 million florins, 
demonstrated to the Austrian government beyond any 
doubt the relative backwardness of the monarchy. As it 
was perceived by the government, the Prussian success 
had been achieved by the more efficient administration 
provided by Prussian officials and by abolishing both 
the Estates' right to approve taxation and their 
involvement in its collection CScott 1990: 1523. To
the Estates within the Habsburg monarchy the 
subordination of the Estates by Prussia in the 
conquered territories demonstrated beyond any doubt 
that they would not gain in power if the Austrian 
monarchs would be defeated by Prussia. The defence of 
the realm made institutional reform necessary: that
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much was agreed between monarchical government and 
territorial Estates.
The reforms under Maria Theresia aimed at 
excluding the Estates' influence in politics et 
cameralia. The power of the Estates was curbed in two 
respects. First, changes in the administration of 
taxation vastly reduced the Estates' control over 
public finance. Second, changes in the organization of 
the state apparatus marginalized the aristocracy in 
the political decision-making bodies. With regard to 
fiscal policy, the right of the Estates to approve of 
the taxes demanded by the ruler was de facto curbed. 
To start with, instead of the annual approval of the 
ruler's tax demands the Estates were now compelled to 
agree to tax demands for a period of ten years. 
Furthermore, from now on the approved taxes should be 
considered as fiscal resources under the control and 
at the immediate disposal of the territorial ruler. 
The traditional separation between the fiscal 
administration of the Estates and that of the 
territorial ruler, between the Camerale and 
Contributionale was suspended. From now on, the 
collection and administration of both direct and 
indirect taxes were considered the task of the state. 
Fiscal administration was to be taken out of the hands 
of the officials of the Estates and placed in the 
hands of the ruler's staff. It was considered 
appropriate to charge the Estates for this reduction 
in their responsibilities by increasing the amount of 
Contribution they had to forward into the coffers of 
the state. This increase went hand in hand with the 
abolition of the freedom from taxation on their 
property for the aristocratic (and clerical) 
landlords.
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On the local level, the circle officials were 
charged with supervising the administration of the new 
fiscal system. Within each province, the newly
established Reprasentationen und Kammern
['representations and chambers'] were put in charge of 
all fiscal affairs. The head of the provincial 
government was appointed by the ruler without formal 
consultation with the Estates. But even more important 
for the position of the Estates was the fact that the 
head of the provincial government was now at the same 
time also the chairman of the Estate's standing
(governing) committee. The delegates of the Estates in 
this committee, furthermore, now needed the approval 
of the state. In effect, the power of the Estates as a 
political body was restricted to the Judlclaliai
judicial responsibility was all that was formally left 
to the Estates as a consequence of the reforms [for an 
excellent account of the intricacies of the reforms 
cf. Dickson, vols. I and II; Hellbling 1956: 288-318
for brief factual account of reforms under Maria 
Theresia and Joseph II; Walter 1958; cf. also, e.g., 
Link 1983: 520; Dopsch 1980: 34; Sturmberger 1969: 89- 
90; Ilwolf 1914: 172. The organizational changes and
'rationalizations' in the structure of central 
government are beyond the scope of the current
discussion. Suffice it to say that in their political 
implication they replicated the transformations on the 
provincial level: they aimed at marginalizing the
political influence of the Estates and their 
aristocratic representatives in the governing bodies.]
This absolutist reform programme since the middle 
of the 18th century laid the foundation for the 
formation of a civil service increasingly open in its 
middle and lower ranks for men without aristocratic 
background. It has been estimated [Dickson I: 306]
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that at Marla Theresia's accession in 1740 total 
numbers of royal officials in the Austrian, Bohemian, 
and Hungarian lands of the Monarchy, including those 
employed at Court, numbered about 6,500. On the basis 
of an estimated population in these lands of 12.7 
million, this amounts to about one royal official for 
2,000 people C Dickson I: 36, table 2.5 for population 
estimate] . By 1762, these numbers had increased to a 
total of almost 10, 000 for the same 
geographical/political area: 7,494 (or 6,966) royal
officials in the Austrian and Bohemian lands, and 
2,424 (or 2,817) in Hungary and Siebenburgen. If we 
again relate these figures to the estimated
population, we arrive at the following relations: for
the total population (of an estimated 14 million), 
there was one royal official for 1,400 people; for the 
combined population of the Austrian and Bohemian lands 
of 7,3 million, there was one royal official for 980 
citizens (or 1: 1047), and for the Hungarian lands
with an estimated population of 6.7 million, one royal 
official for 2764 citizens (or 1: 2378) CDickson I:
309 (for number of officials), 36, table 2.5 (for
estimated population)]. At the end of Maria Theresia's 
reign the number of officials had increased to an 
estimated total of 11,000: "1,500 at Court, further
1.500 in the central offices, 1,700 locally in the
Bohemian and Austrian lands, 1,500 in Galicia, and
2.500 in the Hungarian lands, with perhaps 2,000 
officials of the Vienna City Bank" [Dickson I: 310].
Dickson argues that these results implied "that a 
considerable increase in the numbers of officials 
occurred between 1740 and the end of the Seven Years 
War. This is not unlikely, given the doubling of royal 
revenue in the same period, and the qualitative 
evidence that Haugwitz's revolution in government 
greatly increased its scope" [Dickson I: 309], The
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increase in numbers during the co-regency appears to 
have been mainly due to the acquisition of Galicia,
These royal officials were trying to intensify 
the 'policing* of the political, social and economic 
life of the monarchy. This attempt can be read off the 
statistics on the number of decrees that were 
published during the reform period. During the first 
decade of Maria Theresia's reign, 1741-50, "the annual 
average number of published decrees was only thirty- 
six, much the same as the average thirty-one of the 
period between 1731 and 1740. From 1751 to 1760, the 
annual average was sixty-eight, from 1761 to 1770 100, 
from 1771 to 1780 ninety-six . . . The total number of 
decrees listed for 1780-9, 6,206, is more than double
the 3,017 of 1741—80. The annual Josephine average is 
690" [Dickson I: 3183. The administrative machinery
of the state had got into full swing in Joseph's 
reign.
As a consequence of the political and economic 
reforms of Maria Theresia and Joseph II, a 
bureaucratic stratum distinct from the officials of 
either the Estates or those of the lords of the manor 
developed. This stratum of state officials did not 
just grow in numbers; the officials also gradually 
developed a specific professional ethos. The material 
basis for the formation of this professional and 
social identity was the financial security which each 
state official enjoyed. State officials could rely on 
material support even in case of illness, incapacity 
to work as a result of old age and in case of 
redundancy as a result of administrative reform. 
Furthermore, the state provided for the officials' 
bereaved family. This renumerative system was 
institutionalized during the governmental reforms in
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1749/50 and was cast into a final form in 1781 by 
Joseph's decree on superannuation. This decree moulded 
the civil service until the middle of the 19th 
century. It linked the pensions of civil servants to 
their position within the career structure and the 
length of their service to state.
In this way the 'rational' civil servant became 
interested in being promoted so that he would draw a 
higher salary. But he was also motivated to consider 
his occupation as a long-term career as it would 
provide him with financial security in old age and 
also give his family financial support after his 
death. These material provisions helped to turn taking 
a job in the civil service into a career worthwhile 
pursuing. This transformation became further 
entrenched when in 1786 the seniority principle put 
the system of promotion on a less personalized and 
arbitrary basis. Now that entrance into the civil 
service was dependent on passing an exam and 
promotion, salary and superannuation were - in theory, 
at least - removed from nepotistic favourism or 
arbitrary interference on the part of the political 
authorities. As a result, the civil service could take 
on the form of a professional career which was not 
exclusively open to sons of aristocratic families, but 
also to men with a 'bourgeois' background Con civil 
service: Wunder 1984, in particular: 342, 374, 404-5;
Heindl 1985; on reform in 1786: Kropatschek/J. 11 11:
928-93.
In his famous 'epistle' to his civil servants in 
1783, Joseph II tried to shape the contents of their, 
professional ethos [ OEZ 11/4: 123-32 for reprint of
'epistle']. In it, Joseph admonished his officials to 
perform their duties diligently and with creative
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enthusiasm, to follow the spirit of the decrees they 
were supposed to implement, and not to stick slavishly 
to the letter. Every civil servant, on every level in 
the service, was to contribute to the joint effort of 
increasing the common weal of the state. Joseph urged 
his officials to realize that their 'fatherland' was 
the Monarchy as a whole, not particular nations or 
regions within it. All prejudice or acrimonious 
rivalry within the bureaucracy based on such feelings 
of regional distinctiveness had to be overcome C OEZ 
II/4: 127]. Clearly, the civil service was considered
by the Emperor as an integrative force, overcoming the 
national fragmentation of the monarchy and helping to 
establish a unitary centralized state CBruckmiiller 
1984: 91-23. With its appeal to the civil servants to
perform their duties sine Ira ac studio, under
conditions of constant communication with each other 
along clear lines of authority and the admonition not 
to attempt to gain personally from these 
administrative activities, this document enshrined 
some of the principles which gained prominence in Max 
Weber's ideal type of rational bureaucracy.
We shall see in the last chapter that the
reform-minded bureaucrats contributed to the 
instability of the political regime in the 1790s. But 
I will now return to the central political
confrontation in the Habsburg Empire: the struggle
between monarchical government and the aristocracy 
over the distribution of political power. I argued 
above that the institution of the circle offices can 
be interpreted as an attempt by monarchical government 
to encroach on the political power base of the 
aristocracy which was firmly laid in their patrimonial 
authority. In addition to this institutional 
innovation, the peasant policy of the absolutist state
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was aimed at gradually undermining the hold of the
landlords over the local, peasant population. It was
thus part of the power struggle between ruler and
aristocratic landlords. It is to these agrarian
policies that I now turn.
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V. Peasant policy and tax reform of the absolutist
state in the 178Qs and the resistance oi the.
aristocracyi
A) Peasant policy under Joseph II
The peasant policy of Maria Theresia and Joseph 
II was not confined to attempts to undermine the 
patrimonial judicial authority of the landlords. To 
maintain the capacity of the peasants to pay taxes as 
well as ensure that their living conditions did not 
undermine their capacity to serve as conscripts in the 
army were core concerns for the monarchy. Maria 
Theresia maintained in 1770 that the peasantry, as the 
largest class among the state's citizens C Staatsburger 
3 , was the foundation and the greatest support of the 
state. The peasants, therefore, had to be maintained 
in such a condition that they could nourish themselves 
and their families. At the same time they had to be 
able to contribute to the taxes in times of war and 
peace. The [property] rights of the lords of the 
manors had to yield to these 'welfare' considerations 
[ Griinberg II: 118-93. This sentiment of Maria
Theresia's was shared by Joseph II. In 1785 he argued 
that, as the noblest class of human beings, the 
subjects, and in particular the peasants, had to be 
set free; they should not have to pay any other dues 
than those levied for the common good. The ruler had a 
moral duty to change all those laws which had been 
detrimental to the citizens at large even if opposed 
by the most privileged landlords who might have held 
their land for hundreds of years CGrlill 1963: 3753.
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When Joseph II expressed these views he had 
already translated political ideas into policies. In 
November 1781 he had issued a patent abolishing 
serfdom in Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia 
CKropatschek/J. II 1: 423-4; Link 1949; 106-12; on
hereditary subjection of the peasants in Bohemia in 
the 17th century cf. Stark 1952; 357-62; Feigl 1980;
48 on the definition of serfdom, Leibeigenschaft, in 
the literature and political discussion of the 
enlightenment]. The peasants in the Bohemian lands 
were granted the freedom of marriage, the right to 
learn arts and crafts of their choosing, and the 
freedom of movement - if provisions relating to 
conscription were observed. Peasants were now allowed 
to move from place to place, settle down or seek 
employment in any part of the monarchy. Henceforth, 
only the formal consent of the landowner was necessary 
and this consent should be given without incurring any 
cost to the ex-serf; fees on departure were thus 
abolished. The law confirmed the continuation of the 
existing urbarial patents which laid down the 
peasants' manorial obligations. But the statute also 
stipulated that, apart from these established services 
and dues, "no further burden can be imposed on the 
subject". Following this patent, serfdom was also 
abolished in Austria in 1782 and in Hungary in 1785 
CHeinsch 1980; 2213.
To understand the significance of this policy for 
determining the social and political character of the 
absolutist regime, we have to situate it within the 
context of the state's economic policy. Since the late 
17th century agencies within the political apparatus 
of the monarchy had advocated an interventionist, 
mercantilist economic policy. In 1699 the Bohemian 
Lieutenancy Council put forth a comprehensive plan for
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customs reform. This plan provided for high tariffs on 
imports of finished goods and on exports of raw 
materials, and low tariffs on imports of raw materials 
and exports of finished goods CKann/David 1984: 121-2;
Klima 1965: 109-191. In the course of the 18th
century, the state increasingly supported
manufacturing industry:
Manufacturers obtained preferential customs on 
the import of raw materials. Guild restrictions 
did not apply to them and they could employ any 
amount of skilled as well as unskilled labour 
. . . Manufacturers, their sons and employees were 
not liable to conscription, and soldiers were not 
to be quartered on the premises of manufacturing 
firms. In the 18th century a number of new 
customs regulations restricted imports of foreign 
goods and protected the home market for the 
native manufacturing industry. Manufacturers , . . 
were exempt from taxation during the whole period 
that ended with the abolition of serfdom . . , the 
state made considerable loans to manufacturing 
firms, which were in effect subsidies [Klima 
1957: 943,
In Bohemia, this policy resulted in the 
foundations of twenty-five manufactories by 1775. In 
1788 this number had risen to eighty-six. Predominant 
among the manufacturing industries (both in 
manufactories and in domestic industries) were those 
producing textiles, with about 177,000 employees in 
1775 and 230,000 employees in 1780. Glassworks and 
ironworks, the next two leading industries, employed 
by comparison only 3,622 and 2,354 workers 
respectively [Hanke 1973-4: 481; Kann/David 1984:
2053 . In Bohemia in 1788 the official statistics 
listed 435,641 persons engaged in manufacturing 
industry. The manufacturing population thus comprised 
about 15% of the total population. Almost three- 
quarters of these employees were spinners: out of a
total of 313,842 spinners, 234,008 span in flax and 
hemp, 51,087 in wool, and 28,747 in cotton. By 1797,
-  191 -
the manufacturing population had increased by more 
than 27% to 555,074, of whom almost two-thirds (or 
354,308) were spinners. By 1797, therefore, almost 19% 
of the population in Bohemia were employed in the 
manufacturing industries.
A comparison with Lower Austria shows the 
advanced economic position of Bohemia. In 1783, the 
registered industrial population in Lower Austria 
amounted to 94,094 or 5.8% of the total population. 
Two years later, this number had risen to 120,614 or 
7.5% of the population. Two-thirds of those, employed 
in industry (or 81,756) were spinners. In 1790, about 
11% of the population were employed in manufacturing 
industries (or 182,473), but the percentage of those 
employed as spinners as a proportion of the 
mannufacturing workforce had slightly decreased from 
67.8 % in 1785 to 65.7% in 1790 [Dickson I: 47-8 for
employment figures; Bolognese-Leuchtenmiiller 1978: 50-
1 for population figures of Lower Austria; to 
calculate the percentages for Lower Austria in 1790 
the population of 1789 serves as point of reference; 
cf. Melton 1982: 51-5 and Freudenberger 1960: 395-7 on 
Bohemian textile industry].
Many manufacturing enterprises in Bohemia were 
owned by the aristocracy. And though the lords of the 
manors took advantage of the fact that the serfs, now 
increasingly employed in their commercial enterprises, 
were still legally bound to the soil, the traditional 
relationship between lord and serf was gradually 
converted into a contractual economic relationship 
based on wage labour. By supporting the rise of new 
industries within the traditional agrarian economy, 
the absolutist state did not only help to bring about
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economic advance, but also the victory of new social 
relations over old ones [Klima 1957: 92, 94],
In the second half of the 18th century the 
numbers of large bourgeois manufacturing enterprises 
increased. Such was the growth of these enterprises 
that almost all the cotton mills were in the hands of 
non-aristocratic owners by the second half of the 18th 
century. Not only linen merchants who set up workshops 
for the finishing processes of linen production, but 
also artisans who had done well enough to own big 
enterprises employing several hundred workers competed 
with the aristocratic manufacturers. But the 
continuation of feudal restrictions did not only 
result in these urban and bourgeois enterprises being 
established in royal towns, especially in Prague. It 
also meant that these urban entrepreneurs encountered 
obstacles in the way of expanding production. In 
effect, with the mobility of labour still restricted 
under the conditions of serfdom, "manufacturers 
competed with each other for domestic workers, 
offering high wages, until they realized that the 
existing system was unworkable" [Klima 1957: 96-73.
In this situation, the abolition of serfdom cut 
back the commercial advantage of the lords of the 
manors, which had emanated from their politico-cum- 
legal domination over those peasants holding leases on 
their land, and enabled the urban, merchant and 
artisan entrepreneurs to expand their manufacturing 
enterprises [Hanke 1973-4: 539-403. Accordingly it was 
explicitly stated in the patent which abolished 
serfdom that it would "usefully influence the 
improvement of agriculture and industry". There is no 
doubt that the abolition of serfdom contributed to 
the process of the gradual emancipation of the peasant
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from his traditional bonds. But * liberated* from the 
soil which he had tilled and which had provided him 
and his family with the basic means of subsistence he 
now had to enter a new type of economic relationship 
as a wage labourer. He was set free to enter and 
produce a new relationship of dependence.
The robot patent for Bohemia in August 1775 had 
already contributed to the formation of this new 
economic relationship. As in 1680, the patent of 1775 
was preceded by peasant uprisings. Excessive robot was 
only one among a number of lordly practices which put 
a heavy burden on the peasantry. These practices 
included not paying peasants for fire or weather 
damage, payments which were deductible from the 
Contribution; unwarranted demands of fees for levying 
tax; and compelling peasants to buy from, and sell to, 
lordships at fixed prices [Dickson I: 126-73. In a
period of bad harvests and famine, these oppressive 
practices finally resulted in peasant uprisings. Such 
was the intensity of these rebellions that the 
peasants could only be defeated by the deployment of 
troops forty thousand strong CMelton 1982: 63-4;
Wright 1966: 41-5; on robot obligations in Bohemia in
the 17th century cf. Stark 1952: 362-743.
The novel aspect of the 1775 patent was the 
division of serfs who performed labour services into 
eleven categories. By far the heaviest burden of 
labour service was placed upon the bettei— off 
peasants. Their obligations were considerable. At the 
same time the decree greatly reduced the obligations 
of smallholders, cottagers and landless serfs. The 
rationale behind this policy was the state's endeavour 
to free some of the labour in rural areas for work in 
domestic industry and the manufactories: "The
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'freeing* of the landless rural population from the 
agricultural sector as a result of the Labour Services 
Decree of 1775 met the growing demand for manpower in 
the various industrial enterprises that were coming 
into existence, and gave a much-needed boost to their 
development" [Klima 1985: 211; also ibid.: 198-9, 201- 
23 . At the same time, the commutation of surplus 
labour services to money rents continued and the 
monetarization of the lord-serf-relationship further 
contributed to the peasant's involvement in market 
relations.
In addition to the patent of the abolition of 
serfdom, Joseph II introduced other measures aimed at 
improving the position of the peasants vis-A-vis the 
landlords. A law, issued at the same day as the patent 
abolishing serfdom, provided that peasants could 
request to obtain property rights over their farms. 
The circle offices were charged with paying "close 
attention to make sure that there is neither the 
slightest compulsion [to buy], nor the subjection of 
the peasants to burdensome conditions"
[Kropatschek/J.II 1: 422-33. Those subjects who
already owned their lands should be able to "use, 
pawn, mortgage, sell or exchange" as they pleased. The 
sole exception was that lands attached to the 
farmhouse could not be sold without it. The new law 
also gave the peasant owner the right to go into debt 
without the permission of the lord, but the limit of 
his liability was set at two-thirds of the value of 
the property. By bestowing property rights upon the 
peasant who farmed the land, the law made market 
transactions of landed property easier.
A string of laws regulated the hereditary 
acquisition of peasant farms. The law of April 1787
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designated the eldest son as legal heir. By preventing 
the division of the farm unit through inheritance, it 
aimed at ensuring the survival of the farm as a viable 
economic unit. At the same time, it also drastically 
limited the nobles' right to choose among heirs. If 
the lords raised any objections, the final decision on 
the rightful inheritance rested with the circle 
offices [Kropatschek/J . 11 13: 98-101; also: ibid:
vol. 15: 126 ff. ; vol. 17: 35; vol. 18: 590; cf.
Gutkas 1982: 17-8; Link 1949: 124-93.
The position of the peasants was further enhanced 
by the government's attempts to make eviction of 
peasants from their holdings almost impossible. 
Peasants could be evicted as a last and most severe 
form of punishment if they had been lawfully 
convicted; but only if and when the circle office had 
endorsed the sentence could eviction take place. 
Eviction was also possible if the peasant's 
accumulated debts went beyond the two-thirds mark set 
by the decree of November 1781 [Link 1949: 124-63.
Given these reform measures it can be argued that 
Joseph II attempted to improve the position of the 
peasants at the cost of the aristocratic landlords. 
One motive behind these policies was the endeavour to 
curtail the political power of the aristocracy by 
undermining their legal, economic, and social hold 
over their subject peasantry. When we now turn to 
another set of reform measures we shall see that 
another motive for the state's peasant policy was the 
government's concern with ensuring as broad a tax 
basis as possible. Again, this goal set the monarchy 
against the entrenched interests of the aristocracy. 
However, in the pursuit of this goal it also became 
manifest that the aristocratic opposition was not just
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a force to be confronted 'outside' the political state 
apparatus, but rather that it was part of the 
political apparatus and operated 'within* it.
The attempts of the landlords in the first half 
of the 18th century to encroach on the rustikal lands 
occupied by the peasants constituted a major threat to 
the tax revenue of the monarchy CKomlos 1986: 472-4 on 
which the following account is based]. The growth in 
population had increased the demand for land. The 
endeavours of the lords to increase the rent of their 
lands were, however, thwarted by the fact that they 
found themselves locked in long-term contracts which, 
in the current situation of great demand, were highly 
unfavourable for them. The landlords, therefore, 
attempted to encroach on the lands leased to the 
peasantry in a number of ways. They had the land 
revert back to their own use or subdivided the leased 
holdings. In some cases, lords forced their peasants 
to switch their landholdings to other parts of the 
manor; in other cases more labour services were 
demanded than were contractually due. But landlords 
also tried to convert leases from tenures-foi— life 
into short-term leases. In a period of rising 
population and rising demand for land, this more 
flexible contract opened up the opportunity for the 
landlords to raise rents in the future:
Converting leases, however, threatened the 
government because changing the legal status of 
the land led to loss in tax revenue. The allodial 
land of the lord was subject to extraordinary 
taxes which had to be approved by the provincial 
assemblies. The government attempted to cope with 
this situation by ordering lords to pay taxes on 
the rustikal land converted into dominikal land, 
but the provincial estates resisted resolutely in 
the name of the ancient tax-exempt status of the 
lords [Komios 1986: 473].
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Faced with this resistance by the aristocracy,
the monarchy adopted another strategy in 1751 in 
Bohemia. It was stipulated that exchanging a peasant's 
plot for another and reverting rustikal lands to 
dominikal land required prior approval of county
authorities. After 1769 conversion of any kind was 
prohibited in Bohemia and eventually lords were 
prohibited even from purchasing land from the 
peasantry. In 1786, all commoners were allowed by the 
government to purchase manors. Peasants were thus 
legally entitled to expand their landholdings; and 
some of them even acquired manors by forming
companies: "In 1805 there were 12 such manors in
peasant hands in Bohemia; ownership was divided among 
215 peasants" CKomlos 1986: 4743.
B) The tax reform in the Austrian Empire in the late 
1780s
Joseph II was not content with only defending the 
existing tax system against attempts by the 
aristocracy to alter it to their advantage. 
Complementary to this reactive policy was the 
endeavour to create a new tax system. But creating a 
new system of taxation meant, of necessity, to 
restructure the political and economic relationship 
between lord and peasant. On the one hand, given the 
political power structure, tax revenue could only be 
increased by transferring a larger amount of peasant 
income into the coffers of the state. But if this 
transfer was not to lead to the economic ruin of the 
peasantry, and thus to the destruction of the economic 
basis of the tax system, the peasantry's obligations 
towards their landlords had to be reduced accordingly.
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Only then was it possible for the peasants to bear the 
new economic burden imposed by the state. Thus, the
introduction of a new system of taxation constituted,
in effect, a political struggle between ruler and 
aristocracy over the ground rent. On the other hand, 
imposing taxes on the aristocracy inevitably led to 
the same confrontation. Their political and economic 
power would enable the manorial lords to shift their 
own tax burdens onto their serfs. Only by erecting 
regulative safeguards could the state attempt to 
prevent the landlords from recovering their tax 
payments to the state by imposing greater demands on 
their serfs [Wright 1966: 142; Vilfan 1973: 5;
Rozdolski 1961: 9-10] . In so far as a new tax system
affected both power and purse of the lords, it was 
likely to arouse their determined resistance.
In November 1783 Joseph II informed the First 
Chancellor, von Kollowrat, of his plans to reform the 
tax system in the Habsburg monarchy. The basic 
principle of this reform project was the physiocratic 
belief that land was the source of wealth in the 
state. The plan provided for the existing
distinctions, which divided land into noble, crown, 
peasant and Church lands, to be wiped out. The
Theresian system had established different taxation 
rates for dominikal and rustikal lands. The lord's 
dominikal land was taxed according to its net, while 
the peasant's land was taxed according to the gross 
product. Joseph proposed that the reform should 
provide for all lands to be taxed at an equal rate 
regardless of who owned them or leased them. He laid 
down that in future only the net product was to be 
taxed. In order to arrive at a just distribution of 
the tax burden, the land was to be resurveyed and 
reassessed and a uniform percentage of its value
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levied upon it. A part of this percentage was to go to 
the landlords as compensation for the lass of dues, 
the rest was to be paid to the government in taxes 
[Link 1949: 131; Liebel-Weckowicz 1974: 74; Mikoletzky
1971: 312, 315-7; Rozdolski 1961: 17-203.
The Court Chancellery did not approve of this 
reform program. And neither did the State Council. In 
the previous year, Joseph had already initiated some 
reform in Galicia to relieve the situation of the 
peasantry there. But Count Hetzfeld, the President of 
the State Council, advised against reform and warned 
that the welfare of the peasant subjects must not be 
achieved by destroying the aristocratic manorial 
system of domination [Rozdolski 1961: 163. This
consideration also led him to opposing the extention 
of the Galician reform principles to all the lands of 
the Habsburg monarchy. The Chancellery endorsed these 
objections and implemented administrative delaying 
tactics to bring the project to a halt [Rozdolski 
1961: 17-233. Undeterred by this obstructionism,
Joseph reverted to an old device: in the summer of
1784 he installed a 'Tax Regulation Court Commission' 
to overcome intragovernmental opposition. But as the 
president of the court commission, von Zinsendorf, 
vehemently disagreed with Joseph over the best method 
of calculating taxable income, resistance from within 
the administration to the new tax system continued 
[Liebel-Weckowicz 1974: 75; Mikoletzky 1971: 319-20;
Rozdolski 1961: 263.
The next major step in organizational terms was 
taken in spring 1785 when it was resolved on April 15 
that for each province there should be established 
commissions which would operate directly under the 
court commission. Their task was to supervise the
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newly established subconnnissions within each district 
of the provinces. These subconnnissions, consisting of 
a circle official and a steward from the cameral 
estates, had, in turn, the duty to oversee the 
surveying and assessing of the land on the local level 
[Link 1949: 132; Bibl 1902: 18-213. This emphasis on
supervision resulted from a fundamental
infrastructural weakness of the state: the government
had no staff that was either large enough or we] 1- 
trained enough to carry out the task of resurveying 
and reassessing the land; the survey, therefore, had 
to be executed within the manorial organization by 
manorial officials with the assistance of peasants. It 
was stipulated in a governmental decree that the local 
judges and jurors had to be present at these local 
surveys CGriill 1963: 3783. In order to deter those
participating in the survey from falsifying the 
figures, their renumeration should be based, not on 
the time expanded, but on the correctness of the 
survey data. Soon afterwards, however, it was decreed 
that local judges and jurors shoud not be reimbursed 
at all as the project contributed to the 'common weal' 
[Mikoletzky 1971: 3233.
According to the patent of April 20, 1785, all
arable land was to be surveyed and its probable 
produce estimated on the basis of past yields. This 
survey was thought as laying the foundation for a new 
system of taxation "without increase in the present 
contribution . . . each province, each community, each 
individual shall give according to the fertility of 
the land" [quoted in: Link 1949: 132-33. Aware of the
need to obtain the co-operation from the landowners 
for this project, and conscious of the lack of any 
means to coerce them into co-operation, Joseph 
remitted in advance all penalties for those landowners
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who had concealed part of their property in the 
Theresian surveys. He ordered that no landowner was to 
be questioned if lands "which had hitherto been 
undiscovered ... suddenly appeared" [quoted in: Link
1949: 1333 . Such was the opposition to the whole
enterprise, however, that in February 1787 Joseph II 
had to issue a circular urging that "all obstacles, be 
they persons or things, are to be eliminated" 
[Kropatschek/J. II 13: 207-8], And in order to overcome 
the resistance of the village headmen and elders he 
resolved in December 1787 that "agitators and 
ringleaders who have incited their communities to 
refuse to give the necessary data , . . are to be 
punished, with the explanation that the penalty is due 
solely to their obstinacy" [Kropatschek/J. 11 13: 219-
20] .
Despite the attempts to obstruct the land survey, 
most of the land reform work was completed during 
1787. But there still remained the question of 
calculating the seigneurial obligations. Only if the 
urbarial regulation would prevent the manorial lords 
from passing on the financially detrimental effects of 
the land reform to their peasants, would the power 
position of the noble landowners have been seriously 
undermined. The issue of seigneurial obligations 
hinged on setting an upper limit on the individual tax 
burdens. In February 1788, the Emperor laid down that 
no subject was to pay more than 50% of his gross 
product as a total obligation to the combined 
collection of lord, village, and state [Rozdolski 
1961: 104], In no instance should it be possible for
the manorial lords to increase their subjects' 
obligations in order to push the total obligations to 
the 50% margin in those cases where so far less had 
been demanded from the peasants. Joseph's reform plan
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also provided for all urbarial obligations to be 
commuted - " de regula" - to money payments. But to
ease this process, a period of transit j on was 
designated in which payment in kind was still allowed 
[Rozdolski 1961: 103-63.
The translation of these ideas into a binding 
decree was placed into the hands of Councillor of 
State Eger who took over the presidency of the court 
commission after the dismissal of von Zinsendorf by 
Joseph II. But while Eger was more in agreement with 
the Emperor's policy than von Zinsendorf, the effect 
of this change of personnel was somewhat diluted by 
the decision to subordinate the new commission to the 
Court Chancellery and the Chancellor, Rudolf Chotek, a 
supporter of von Zinsendorf, who was to sign the
decrees which Eger drew up. And the Court Chancellery
tried very quickly to put the breaks on. Soon after 
Eger's appointment a general survey of urbarial 
obligations in all provinces of the monarchy was 
ordered by the Chancellors Kollowrat and Chotek. Not 
only did they play for time as such a survey was bound
to be highly time-consuming; they also seem to have
hoped to stir up opposition among the manorial lords. 
They justified the survey as "necessary because it 
allows to gain genuine and reliable data about the 
loss which the manorial lords will suffer as a result 
of substituting the new constitution for the old 
system" [quoted in: Rozdolski 1961: 1103. But no
sooner had Joseph discovered this ploy than he forbade 
the Chancellery any direct interference with the 
deliberation of Eger's commission.
There were further administrative attempts by 
high officials within central government to prevent 
the formulation and the publication of the tax and
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urbarial regulations [Rozdolski 1961: 111-6], In
January 1789, a few months before the publication of 
the decree, the Chancellery tried yet again to
convince the Emperor that insisting on this reform was 
inadvisable: "a decision by authority, which measures
all dues by the same scale and commutes them into 
money payments, without respect for deep-rooted 
customs, legal contracts, and .judicial settlements, is 
incompatible with the duty of the state to protect the 
property of each of its subjects I Burger! and 
transgresses the limit of a moderate form of
government". Apart from taking recourse to fundamental 
principles which, in the Chancellery's opinion, 
should guide the policies of the state, pragmatic 
arguments were put forward. If the nobles became 
impoverished, as after the enactment of the decree 
they surely would, they would no longer be able to
support charitable institutions. Furthermore, it would 
be ingenious to assume that the effect of this reform 
would be beneficial to the national wealth since the 
industry of the peasants would not increase in such a 
degree that the loss of the manorial lords would be 
made good. If the reform had to go ahead, then the 
commutation of seigneurial obligations into money 
payments should at least be postponed until November 
1790. If not, this "revolution" would severely 
undermine the economic fortunes of those landlords who 
were running large-scale estate economies [quote in: 
Link 1949: 137-8; Rozdolski 1961: 114; Mikoletzky
1971: 337-8; Grunberg II: 440-13. But this
intervention of the Chancellery could not deter 
Joseph, and neither could the resignation of Count 
Chotek. Rather than sign the decree which in his- 
opinion meant the destruction of the nobility, Chotek 
resigned five days before its publication.
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In spite of all the opposition, the Tax and 
Urbarial Reform Patent was published on February 10, 
1789 [ Kropatschek/J. 11 17: 153-70]. Its first part
dealt with the Imperial land tax. It declared that the 
new tax aimed at a "perfectly equal distribution" of 
the tax burden. In order to achieve this goal all 
differences among estates as well as the quota system 
for different provinces were abolished. In future, all 
those who owned land, be they peasants or landowners, 
were to pay 12s 2 per cent of the gross income derived 
from the land, in taxes. With tax now imposed on the 
gross rather than on the net product of agriculture, 
Joseph had changed his essential principles of 
taxation. Liebel-Weckowicz C1974: 78] argues that this
change was caused by the dire financial needs of the 
Habsburg state due to the fiscal repercussions of 
Joseph's involvement in the Turkish War, We will 
discuss the importance of this war for the political 
regime in greater detail in a later chapter.
The peasants' obligations towards thejr lords 
were dealt with in the second part of the edict. It 
was declared that it was the final aim of the state 
"to strengthen those who live on the land and to 
enable them to carry out their duty as citizens". To 
achieve this aim, peasants "severely oppressed by the 
demands of the land and tithe lords" bad to receive 
relief. Therefore, "a just goal and irremovable 
limits" had to be set wherever dues and services 
surpassed the subject's ability to pay. It was thus 
provided that the peasant could keep 70% of gross 
income. The remainder of 30 % was shared by the state 
and the lord: the state should receive 12^^^ per cent, 
the lords 17^ ' 9 per cent. But this sum was to cover 
all of the lord's costs in labour services and other 
seigneurial dues rendered by the peasantry. This meant
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that from now on all seigneurial obligations had to be 
settled in money [Link 1949: 129-41; Liebel-Weckowicz
1974: 78-80; Mikoletzky 1971: 338-40; Rozdolski 1961:
117-21; Feigl 1980: 50; Heinsch 1980: 2213.
The reform of the urbarial obligations was to 
apply only to rustical peasants:
the relations between dominical peasants and 
their lords would continue to be determined by 
mutual, private agreement. Cottagers and 
laborers, of course, did not come under the new 
regulation. The operation of the law was further 
narrowed by the stipulation that only those 
rustical peasants who paid more than two gulden 
annual land tax could qualify for its benefits. 
Only a minority of peasants of Bohemia Ce.g., 
R. A. 3 stood to gain any immediate advantage from 
the new law, and those serfs whose conditions 
were not to be regulated by it resented being 
left out ... [Wright 1966: 1473.
As there was a considerable number of dominical 
peasants, the regulations constituted a major 
concession to the manorial lords [Rozdolski 1961: 119-
203 .
If we try to characterize this agricultural 
reform in socio-economic terms, prime emphasis must be 
put on the attempt to transform the manorial economy 
from a system of production (and domination) based 
largely on labour services and rent in kind into an 
economic enterprise centred on money transactions and 
money rent. The reform aimed at turning the manorial 
lords into recipients of a fixed rent without any 
lawful possibility of increasing their yield [Feigl 
1982: 259-60; Bruckmiiller 1985: 292; Rozdolski 1961:
10, 13-43. This reform, therefore, reinforced the
trend towards the monetarization of the economy which 
has already been mentioned above. This monetarization 
went hand in hand with an increase in the importance
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of wage labour. As we have seen, the law reduced the 
amount of robot at the command of the lords and forced 
the lords to seek wage labour. This could not but 
drive up the level of wages for free labour. Dominical 
peasants, cottagers and labourers, who had not been 
affected by the reform, could thus 'benefjf from it 
in the long run, as they could now work for increasing 
wages after they had performed their robot services 
CWright 1966: 1473. Wage labour was also favoured by a
concession made by the Emperor to assuage manorial 
lords in Bohemia and Galicia: "If a lord found it
completely impossible to manage his estate without 
labor services, the peasants were to perform their 
customary duties until November 1, 1790. For this
work, they were to receive a money wage fixed by the 
government. In other words, the ex-robot peasant was 
to become an agricultural wage-laborer for one year 
before the full effect of the robot abolition system 
came to fruition" CLink 1949: 142; Rozdolski 1961:
1213 .
The formulation of a new policy is one thing; its 
implementation quite another issue. Hitherto, manorial 
officials had collected the taxes approved by the 
Estate assemblies. In the course of 1789, however, tax 
collectors became state officials [Rozdolski 1961: 72- 
43 . It was said of the manorial tax officials that 
they lacked the inclination to implement the new tax 
system CKropatschek/J.II 17: 256 (September 15,
1789)3. It was therefore decreed that the tax
collectors should not any longer be dependent on the 
manorial lords, but become subordinated to the 
commission for tax regulation and the local circle 
offices CKropatschek/J. 11 17: 250 (September 17,
1789)3. But as we saw earlier in this chapter, there 
was a certain degree of mutual understanding between
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the local landholders and the circle officials. As was 
to be expected, in the preparatory phase of the new 
tax and urbarial system the circle officials were 
often sympathetic to the complaints and delaying 
tactics of the landlords. This collusion had led to 
Joseph's order that every candidate for the office of 
circle captain had to obtain the approval of the 
provincial commission in charge of the tax and 
urbarial regulation. Naturally, the Court Chancellery 
objected vehemently to this order. But in realization 
of the true situation at the local level, Joseph felt 
compelled after the publication of the regulation 
patent to warn the circle captains in Inner Austria 
that they would be dismissed from office should they 
show any aversion to the new system [Rozdolski 1961: 
145, n, 773 . Thus, even with tax collectors being in 
the employ of the state, there was still some doubt as 
to the diligency with which they would perform their 
task or, rather, given the influence of the circle 
offices, whether they were allowed to perform their 
duties.
But even if the officials of the commission for 
tax and urbarial regulation were willing and eager to 
do their job, they had to confront not only the 
obstructive activities of the manorial lords, but also 
the hostility of the provincial governments which 
sided with the local aristocracy. Far from aiding the 
tax officials with the execution of their tasks, they 
denounced them as agitators being engaged in the 
business of alienating the peasant subjects from their 
lords: again, the Court Chancellery was prepared to
endorse this view [Rozdolski 1961: 143-53. As before
the publication of the patent, the high state 
officials actively opposed the new system after its 
introduction.
This opposition of the high state officials, all 
of them members of the landowning nobility, and of the 
manorial lords to the new tax and urbarial system can 
be deduced from their political and economic 
interests, as discussed above. It would be wrong to 
assume that this active resistance to state-induced 
agricultural reform policies was something new and 
never experienced before. When attempts were made to 
regulate the urbarial obligations of the peasants in 
Bohemia in the early 1770s, a pattern similar to the 
constellation and events of the late 1780s developed. 
Assisted by the provincial government and the Court 
Chancellery which did not consider exerting any 
pressure, the Bohemian lords resisted the imperial 
order to write down all seigneurial dues which their 
peasants had to render. When, after the robot patent 
of 1775, special court commissioners were sent to 
Bohemia and Moravia to investigate peasant complaints 
that manorial lords would not comply with the 
stipulations of the patent, both provincial government 
and Court Chancellery accused the commissioners of 
consciously stirring up trouble; instead of restoring 
law and order, they would contribute to the break-up 
of public order [Griinberg 1911: 145-53],
The very same collusion between high state 
officials and the local aristocracy could also be seen 
in Silesia in the late 1760s and early 1770s. Instead 
of ensuring the successful implementation of the robot 
patent of 1771, the provincial government attempted to 
dodge the law C Griinberg 1911: 133-433. And it was in
Silesia and Bohemia that the manorial lords resorted 
to a ploy, which was to be resurrected in the late 
1780s, to regain some of the losses suffered under the 
new laws: the manorial lords deprived their peasants
of the traditional right to use the allodial and
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manorial woods and grassland. In 1789 they argued that 
this step was justified because they alone were 
obliged under the new law to pay the taxes which had 
been imposed on these lands. Fully supporting the 
claims of the manorial lords, both Court Chancellery 
and provincial governments proposed that, instead of 
having the right to use these lands free of charge, 
the peasant subjects had either to pay part of the
taxes or to pay a fee to the lords as compensation
[Rozdolski 1961: 145-63.
There were two overriding financial reasons for 
the aristocracy to oppose the new law. First, 
landlords in Bohemia and Austria were used to 
receiving on average between 20 to 30 per cent of the 
peasant's gross income. The 17 per cent which the new 
law set as the ceiling on payments to the lord was 
thus evidently below the customary amount on which the 
lords had based their economic calculations. Second, 
the new tax collectors, which were responsible to 
central government, posed a serious threat to the 
Estates' administration of tax collection as they were 
to collect the Estates' traditional taxes as well:
The taxes owed the estates could not very well be
added to Joseph's new land tax . . . Yet the old
taxes had been set aside to amortize the 
provincial debts and if they were to vanish, all 
payments on the principal and annual interest on 
these debts was threatened with default. It is 
because they were literally faced with bankruptcy 
that the provincial estates were on the point of 
revolt when Joseph died [sc. on February 20, 
17903 ... [Liebel-Weckowicz 1974: 803,
Discussing the seigneurial opposition to reform in 
Bohemia, Wright points out that, as an effect of the 
reform, seigneurial incomes were reduced:
Land values declined sharply because of the 3 oss 
of income and because of genera3 uncertainties 
occassioned by tax, land, and robota reforms ...
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Agrarian reforms were not alone, however, in 
reducing the sales value of land; state lands in 
considerable quantity were thrown on the real 
estate market, depressing prices even more. At 
the same time the uncertain effects of the 
agrarian and tax reforms made lenders chary about 
extending credit to noble landowners ... In 
addition, the losses of robota forced the 
seigneurs to hire labor, and agricultural wages 
were increasing with the reduction of robota 
[Wright 1966: 162; Kerner 1932: 2113.
But the peasants, too, were dissatisfied with the 
refom. As we have seen above, not all peasants would 
be covered by the new regulation. Those serfs whose 
conditions were not regulated by the new law were 
bound to resent being left out. Furthermore, as a 
concession to the manorial lords, robot commutations 
and abolitions which the peasants had anticipated, had 
been suspended in those cases in which a petitioning 
lord could show that the immediate application of the 
law would work a hardship on him. Peasants feared that 
this respite was the first move towards the ultimate 
evasion of the law CWright 1966: 1473, But peasants
were also under the impression that the reform 
constituted only a first step towards freeing them 
from all obligations towards their lords. According to 
the Bohemian tax commission this apprehension was the 
reason why the peasants refused to sign a form 
acknowledging their current urbarial obligations. Such 
was the extent of this misapprehension, fuelled by the 
events in France, that an Imperial decree had to be 
published in September 1789 in which it was made clear 
that no further reforms could be expected. The peasant 
opposition to the reform led to the outbreak of 
peasant uprisings throughout the monarchy. Military 
force had to be used to quell this unrest [Rozdolski 
1961: 128-32; Griinberg II: 450-1; Wright 1966: 148;
Liebel-Weckowicz 1974: 80-13.
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Shortly after the accession to the throne in 
February 1790, Leopold II took the first step towards 
the repeal of the tax and urbarial regulation. By a 
law of March 22, 1790, the Court Commission for Tax
Regulation, as well as the various subcoramissions in 
the provinces, were abolished; the Court Chancellery 
was to take over the task of the Commission. The same 
law also abolished tax collection by Imperial 
officials; it was argued that this system had meant an 
additional burden to the peasants as the Imperial 
officials had to be salaried to fulfill their function 
CKropatschek/Leo.II 1: 59-603. On April 6, 1790, the
first of the decrees abolishing the Josephinian tax 
and urbarial system was issued. This decree for Lower 
Austria was followed by decrees for Austria above the 
Enns (April 19), for Styria (May 5), for Carinthia 
(May 20), and for Carniola (June 10). For Galacia a 
patent was signed on April 19 and for Bohemia on May 
9, 1790. Responding to the critical situation in
Hungary (which we will discuss in the following 
chapter), Joseph had already ordered on January 28,
1790 that in Hungary all work on the cadastre should
be halted CBibl 1904: 82; Link 1949: 149-51; Rozdolski
1961: 1583.
In the decree repealing the Josephinian system 
Leopold II considered himself "duty-bound to protect 
the lawful property of the nobility and to lend an ear 
to their complaints at the arbitrary and gratuitous 
curtailment of their justly acquired rights". Urbarial 
obligations constituted "the natural bond between lord 
and subject" and were beneficial to the peasants as 
it was on the basis of this obligation that the 
subjects would always obtain support from their lords 
whatever the circumstances. Leopold admonished the 
subjects "to cast aside the fallacious delusion as if
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their obligations towards their lords had ever been 
rescinded or that it ever could in fact be rescinded" 
[quoted in: Mikoletzky 1971: 3443. With this decree, 
therefore, Joseph's agrarian reform had been revoked 
and the claims of the manorial lords to the legitimacy 
and propriety of their domination over their subjects 
had been accepted.
Throughout the monarchy, peasants rose against, 
the restitution of the traditional conditions. In 
Bohemia, in particular, this protest was much 
influenced by the ideas of the French Revolution. 
There, the peasants (or, at least, their leaders) were 
not content with challenging the lords' right to 
impose seigneurial dues, but aimed for the destruction 
of the feudal system as such. In Krain, too, peasant 
unrest went beyond the protest against economic 
seigneurial obligations and encompassed demands for 
political representation of the peasants in the 
Estates assembly. The peasants in Bohemia and St.yria, 
too, made the same political demands [Reinalter 1988a: 
73-6; Reinalter 1988b: 189-96; Zwittei— Tehovnik 1975:
97-1073. But instead of giving in to these economic 
and political demands, the Court Chancellery empowered 
provincial governors to proclaim a state of emergency 
thus enabling them to dispatch military reinforcements 
in aid of landlords beleaguered by recalcitrant
peasants C Wangermann 1959: 68-703.
In order to understand why the aristocracy
succeeded in defeating Joseph's tax and urbarial 
reform, we have to go beyond an analysis of the
interest constellation which bound together noble 
landowners and high officials of central and
provincial government agencies. The room for manoeuvre 
of the absolutist state was severely restricted in the
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late 1780b . Political conflict in the Austrian 
Netherlands and Hungary threatened the political 
survival of the Habsburg Empire. The financial and 
military demands of the war against the Ottoman Empire 
made it necessary for the monarchy to give in to the 
interests of the aristocracy. This need for 
establishing some cohesion within the ruling class was 
reinforced by the political repercussions of (the 
ideas of) the French Revolutions. It was within this 
context that Joseph's tax reforms were revoked. In the 
remaining chapters, this regime crisis of the Austrian 
monarchy in the late 1780s and 1790s will be analysed 
in greater detail.
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VI. The political crisis in the Austrian Netherlands
and Hungary in the late 1780s.
A) The Austrian Netherlands.
The reforms which Joseph II introduced in the 
Austrian Netherlands resulted in the virtual collapse 
of Imperial authority there. His religious reforms met 
with the opposition of the Belgian clergy amongst 
whose ranks there were no supporters of a reform of 
the Catholic Church as could be found in the
hereditary lands of the monarchy CStradal 3 968: 2753.
As in the Austrian lands, the religious reform 
policies were informed by the Emperor's insistence 
that as God's guardian of the welfare and tranquillity 
of his realm, he had the right, and obligation, to 
prevent the publication of those apostolic briefs and 
bulls which he considered to undermine the civil 
authority, or subordinate it to that of Rome. In
asserting the right to exercise the placet regiunt, 
Joseph claimed both secular and sacred, predominance 
over the Pope in his territory. It was an important 
means of establishing a national church in the face of 
the ultramontanistic claims of the Roman Catholic 
Church. At the same time, religious reform was thought 
to bring about economic advantages: ''[Religious]
toleration, in my view, simply means that in purely 
temporal affairs, I would employ and allow the 
possession of property and the rights of citizenship 
to those who bring benefit to the state",
notwithstanding their religious beliefs, as Joseph 
declared [quoted in: Davis 1974: 3933. But in a
country such as Belgium where a substantial
proportion of the population in the 1780s <17,350 of
approximately two million women and men) devoted
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Itself to religious service, and where most of the 
regular clergy were life-long residents in their 
parishes and thus closely involved in the everyday 
life of their congregation, reforms considered by them 
to undermine the position of the Catholic Church were 
bound to be opposed CPolasky 1987: 28-9, 33-43.
But this situation did not deter the monarch. 
Official recognition to Protestantism in the Austrian 
Netherlands was given in November 1781. The immediate 
protests from the Belgian episcopacy were to no avail; 
the right for the Protestants to worship was not 
rescinded by the government. But worse was to befall 
the Catholic establishment. A first decisive step 
against ultramontanism was taken in the same month 
when all monastic orders in the Belgian provinces were 
declared to be absolutely and completely independent 
of all foreign superiors. Henceforth they were to be 
subject to the jurisdiction of the diocesan bishops. 
As Davis [1974: 1993 points out this provision meant
"that cloisters would no longer secure and maintain 
from Rome exemptions from episcopal jurisdiction in 
exchange for monetary considerations, and exempted 
abbots and prelates would not forward confirmation 
fees outside the country".
Extending the reform policies already undertaken 
in the Austrian hereditary lands to the Austrian 
Netherlands, it was ordered in January 1782 that an 
inventory was to be taken of "all convents and 
religious orders of either sex which lead a purely 
contemplative life without contributing in any visible 
manner to the welfare of their fellow men" t quoted in: 
Davis 1974: 2043 . This was the first concrete step
towards the dissolution of the Belgian convents. The 
disestablishment of these contemplative orders was set
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In process In March 1783 when the order was given to 
transfer all assets of those convents singled out for 
dissolution to a special religious fund from which 
pensions could be provided for the displaced monks and 
nuns. Following this order, altogether 163 cloisters 
were disbanded in the Austrian Netherlands [Davis 
1974: 2093. These dissolutions were not unique to the
Austrian Netherlands. In 1780, there were slightly 
over 2,000 monasteries in all the Habsburg 
territories. By 1790, slightly more than a third of 
all monasteries had been dissolved. In the same 
period, the number of monks and nuns fell from some 
40,000 to slightly over 27,000 [Dickson I: 72-7; Scott
1990: 1713.
Two further reforms reinforced the rift between 
the Belgian clergy and the Imperial government. In 
November 1783, Joseph II forbade the publication of 
papal bulls conferring benefices. The Pope thus lost, 
in effect, the right to confirm, invest, or institute 
religious offices below bishoprics. Finally, in 
October 1786 the old episcopal seminaries were 
disestablished in favour of two new institutions 
under the government's control - a general seminary 
at Louvain and an affiliate at Luxemburg were now to 
train young clerics on the basis of a curriculum 
drawn up by government. Such was the dislike of this 
institution that in December 1786 students revolted 
against the regime and the doctrinal contents of the 
teaching which they considered heretical. Troops had 
to be called in to quell the rebellion and on December 
13 the seminary in Louvain was invested by troops [for 
religious reforms cf, Davis 1974: 189 - 219; Schlitter
1900: 21-35; Polasky 1987: 39-433.
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But while the opposition amongst the clergy 
against the religious reforms took a violent turn, 
discontent with Imperial rule had not yet spread 
amongst the political and social elite outside the 
Church. But the political and judicial reforms, which 
Joseph set out to implement, were to change this 
elite's attitude towards the Imperial government soon. 
It was after religious protest was joined by political 
opposition to Imperial government that monarchical 
authority in the Austrian Netherlands was severely 
threatened.
The plans for the revision of the entire Belgian 
administrative and judicial system were announced in 
January 1787. The administrative reform provided for a 
centralized and departmentalized Council of General 
Government which was to take over the responsibilities 
of the collateral councils - the honorific Council of 
State, the Privy Council, and the Finance Council - 
and all existing councils and commissions which were 
to be abolished, with the one exception of the bureau 
of customs Con the administrative structure before the 
reforms: Polasky 1987: 16-93. All judicial matters
should fall within the remit of a newly-instituted 
Sovereign Council of Justice; financial matters were 
to be dealt with by the renovated Chamber of Accounts. 
For administrative purposes, the ancient political 
divisions of the provinces were dissolved and 
supplanted by nine circles, each governed by an 
intendant with the assistance of twelve district 
commissioners. They were to supervise all phases of 
public administration, whether political or economic, 
and had the power to overrule the traditional 
authority, the Estates. In order to further curtail 
the power of the Estates, the permanent deputations, 
which had been in effect responsible for the
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continuous administration of the provinces, were 
abolished Con permanent deputations: Arndt 1843: 244;
Davis 1974: 15-203. The Estates retained two 'checks'
on the Emperor's authority. They still had the right 
to vote on the Austrian tax subsidy twice a year. And 
they were allowed to elect five representatives in all 
who, if approved by the government, could represent 
them to the new general council. But these delegates 
were to appear only when summoned to render, as it. was 
put by the government, "advice and information . . . 
relating to the general interest of the province" 
[quoted in: Davis 1974: 229; on administrative reform:
Arndt 1843: 254; Davis 1974: 228-9; Polasky 1987: 45-
63 .
The judicial reform aimed at the suppressj on of 
the traditional system of provincial, municipal, 
seigneurial, and ecclesiastical justice. These old 
jurisdictions were replaced by sixty-four regional 
courts which operated under the central direction of a 
Sovereign Council of Justice located in Brussels. This 
central court also supervised the two newly-created 
appeal courts - one located in Luxemburg, the other in 
Brussels CArndt 1843: 259-60; Davis 1974: 230-13.
The political opposition to these administrative 
and legal reforms was fuelled by the consequences of 
an economic crisis in 1786-7. With the end of the 
American War of Independence shipping firms 
representing countries at war had withdrawn from the 
Austrian Netherlands thus terminating the commercial 
boom of the decade's earlier years. As a result, 
production was cut back in the urban industries 
leading to a drastic reduction in the work force. The 
impact of unemployment was compounded by widespread 
crop failures and the government's insensitive policy
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since December 1786 of permitting duty-free departure 
of grain. But at the same time as free trade in grain 
was introduced, the government also attempted to 
recoup lost revenue by raising import duties. Eising 
bread prices were thus accompanied by overall 
inflation. While this situation could not but 
exacerbate the living conditions of the city dwellers 
at large, the government's failure to open the Scheldt 
Eiver against Dutch opposition enraged the commercial 
sections of society since, as a result, Antwerp could 
not regain its former economic grandeur CDavis 1974: 
248-9; Weis 1975: 783.
Given the nature of the reforms, it was to be 
expected that the Estates, as the traditional power- 
holders most directly affected, would attempt to 
resist their implementation or even to overturn them. 
But the ensuing conflict between the government and 
the Estates was intersected by demands for 
institutionalized political participation by those 
sections of bourgeois society such as the wholesalers, 
manufacturers, and bankers who were outside the guilds 
and consequently without political representation. The 
forces which resisted governmental policies were thus 
constituted by a structurally contradictory alliance 
between the defenders of the old order and the 
proclaimer of a new, 'democratic* political order 
[Polasky 1987: 303.
The Estates of Brabant formed the spearhead of 
the opposition of the traditionalists. As the 
traditional responsibility of the Estates for matters 
of state revenue would lead us to expect, their main 
source of power was the refusal to approve taxation 
and subsidies as desired by the government. It was, in 
particular, the third Estate - dominated by the guilds
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□f Brussels, Louvain, and Antwerp - who urged to exert 
financial pressure on the government and only to yield 
to financial demands by the government in exchange for 
a revocation of the reforms. In the highly-charged 
political atmosphere of spring 1787, the political 
opposition of the Estates was taken up by the citizens 
who, between April and June, began to seize arms and 
organize themselves into free corps, Such was the 
agitation that the governors-general in the Austrian 
Netherlands announced in May that all Imperial decrees 
had been suspended - although this proclamation had no 
backing from the Emperor [Davis 1974: 239-40; Polasky
1987: 49, 55-7; Arendt 1843: 257; Schlitter 1900: 96-
7; Stradal 1968: 278; Lorenz 1862: 47-553.
A change at the top of the Belgian government did 
not bring any respite for the Austrian rulers. The 
compromise proposed by Joseph, which provided for the 
termination of the position of the i ntendan+.s under 
the condition that the customary taxes, including 
arrears, had been paid and the companies of military 
volunteers had been disbanded, was rejected. The 
social and political unrest as well as the military 
confrontation which ensued when the volunteers corps 
could not be disarmed by government troops showed up 
the weakness of the Austrian rulers. Because of its 
involvement in military conflicts elsewhere, the 
Imperial government could not dispatch a strong 
military contingent to the Austrian Netherlands:
Joseph was faced with turbulent factions in 
Galicia and an incipient revolt in Hungary . . . 
and Prussian agents, active there as in the 
Netherlands rebellion, were inciting them to 
throw off the Habsburg yoke. But more than this, 
the Emperor had involved himself in Russia's war 
against the Ottoman Empire, and the Emperor was 
at that moment making feverish preparations to 
take personal command of an army being launched 
against Belgrade CDavis 1974: 245; Polasky 1987:
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60-3; more on these conflicts later in this
chapter].
Though a new military commander for the Austrian 
Netherlands managed to bring a resemblance of order by 
a policy of strength in 1788, the power of the 
opposition could not be broken. In the winter of 
1788/89 the Estates of Brabant and Hainaut again 
refused to vote the desired subsidies. This refusal 
led to the Emperor's declaration that he no longer 
considered himself bound to uphold the privileges of 
the Estates and he thus ordered the Belgian
government not to reconvene the Estates any more 
CArendt 1843: 266-8; Davis 1974: 251-2; Polasky 1987:
81-3; Stradal 1968: 283-4]. The confrontation between
Estates and Emperor came to a head in June 1789 when 
Joseph proclaimed all provincial privileges "abrog&s, 
cassis, et annul£s ". This declaration included the 
Joyeuse Entr&et which was the constitution of Brabant 
confirming the rights and privileges of the Estates 
(including the right to resistance if the ruler 
disregarded its provisions which he had to confirm 
when being sworn in) . Being the only written 
constitution in the Belgian provinces, the Joyeuse 
Entree was considered as the basic law of the Austrian 
Netherlands CSchlitter 1900: 4; Arendt 1843: 268-9;
Polasky 1987: 88; Stradal 1968: 287],
After this breach of the constitution by the 
Imperial government, the confrontation intensified. 
While the traditionalist opponents under Van der Noot 
organized for armed resistance through a committee in 
Breda to where they had flown to escape the 
persecution by the government, the democratic forces 
under Vonck formed the ' Pro Arls et Focis ' group in 
Brussels at the beginning of the summer of 1789 
CStradal 1968: 289-901. The leaders of this group
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represented precisely those classes that posed a 
potential threat to the traditionally privileged 
orders with their demands for political 
representation. More than a third of its members were 
lawyers. But they were the ones without those (pre­
reform) government connections which had given lawyers 
the basis of their economic and political power. 
Wholesale merchants and bankers constituted the second 
largest group, followed by members of the liberal 
professions CPolasky 1987: 88-1063.
Despite their ideological and political 
differences, the Vandernootists and Vonckists formally 
merged to form one revolutionary committee in October 
1789 and., after mobilizing a citizens' and peasants' 
army, defeated the Austrian troops in December 1789: 
"In only two months, the Belgian general Van der Mersh 
and his ragged band of artisans, lawyers, peasants, 
and monks had driven the Austrian dragoons from their 
country" CPolasky 1987: 129; Stradal 1968: 292-3003.
The military involvement with the Ottoman Empire and 
the trouble in Hungary were one of the reasons for 
Austria's military weakness. But social unrest, too, 
weakened the monarchy: Peasant unrest in Bohemia in
the wake of Joseph's tax reform made it appear 
necessary for the provincial government there to 
insist on the retention of the German regiments which 
central government had planned to deploy in Belgium 
[ Wangermann 1959: 343.
In January 1790, the victorious Belgian provinces 
sent delegates from the Estates to Brussels. There on 
January 18 they signed a treaty establishing the new 
government of the Etats Belgiques Unis. The delegates 
pledged to protect the Catholic religion and to 
preserve the separate provincial constitutions:
Agreeing that the provincial Estates should 
retain all of their traditional powers, the 
Estates [General] elected delegates from each of 
the provincial Estates to serve in a permanent 
national Congress. They limited the authority of 
the new executive body to issuing money and 
defending the country. The Congress could declare 
war and peace, establish a national army, and 
conclude foreign alliances. The Estates General 
would continue to exercise an even more limited 
legislative function [Polasky 1987: 135; Stradal
1968: 1968: 303].
These delegates to the Estates General and the 
Congress, all of them members of the pre-revo]utionary 
Estates, were agreed upon their joint responsibility 
for reestablishing traditional Belgian institutions 
and privileges. The ideological and political 
differences among the forces which had resisted the 
Austrian rulers had now to be addressed. Faced with 
the task of establishing a political order independent 
of the Austrians, one central question required a 
clear answer: where does sovereignty reside - in the
Estates, as the traditionalists argued, or in the 
people, as the democrats maintained. Popular 
sovereignty for the traditionalists meant the indirect 
representation of all the Belgian people by the 
privileged orders - that is, the Estates. For the 
democrats, popular sovereignty meant full political 
rights for all citizens under the rule of law. But for 
them, * citizens' meant the members of the eductated 
and propertied bourgeoisie; they had no intention to 
grant political citizenship rights to the propertyless 
[Polasky 1987: 150-2, 272; Stradal 1968: 300-1, 305],
The political disintegration (along class-lines) 
of the victorious anti-Austria coalition led to civil 
war during the summer months of 1790. This fighting 
between the Belgian rebels offered the Austrian 
government the chance to reconquer Belgium [Stradal
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1968: 309-123. The Convention of Reichenbach on July
27, 1790 was the military and political turning-point
in the fortunes of the monarchy. This agreement with 
Prussia obliged the Habsburgs to conclude a peace 
settlement with the Ottoman Empire without territorial 
aggrandizement. It thus confirmed the status quo ante 
bellum with regard to the situation in the Balkans and 
in the relations of Austria and Prussia regarding 
Poland. As a consequence of thes Convention, the 
Austrian armies -could attack Belgium at full strength 
by the autumn of 1790 now that the Turkish campaign 
was completed. After invading Belgium on November 24, 
Austrian troops reoccupied Brussels on December 3 
CStradal 1968: 313-5], Following this reconquest,
Leopold repudiated most of Joseph's religious reforms 
though the Edict of Toleration remained in force. As 
in other parts of the monarchy, Leopold guaranteed 
that the privileges of the Estates as they had existed 
during the reign of Maria Theresia would be 
maintained: "The collateral councils were restored ,..
Reforms in the judicial system could be instituted 
only with the consent of the provincial estates, and 
they, as well as the judges of the superior courts, 
must be consulted on all matters of general 
legislation, including those related to the imposition 
or regulation of customs" [Davis 1974: 281],
Disunity amongst the forces opposing the monarchy 
and changed military constellations allowed the 
Imperial government to regain control of the Belgian 
provinces. But as we have seen this victory by the 
government was accompanied by a policy of placating 
the privileged orders. A similar pattern emerges when 
we now analyse the political conflict between central 
government and aristocracy in Hungary.
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B) Political conflict in Hungary.
In the discussion about the conflict
constellation in the Austrian Netherlands, I argued 
that events in Hungary constrained central government 
in its policies towards the rebellious province. In 
the context of the analysis of peasant reforms in the 
1780s, I also emphasized that the resistance of to the 
Emperor's policies was particularly strong amongst the 
Hungarian aristocracy. Their opposition compelled 
Joseph II to revoke most of the reforms which he had 
introduced in Hungary since the early 1780s. Why was 
there such determined aristocratic opposition and why 
did the Hungarian nobles succeed in their struggle 
against Joseph?
For more than one and a half centuries since the 
Battle of Moh&cs in 1526, large parts of Hungary were 
occupied by the Ottoman Empire. If the Habsburg
monarchs did not want to lose those areas in the
western and northern parts of the country which still 
remained under their jurisdiction, then they had to 
make concessions to the demands of the Estates to 
prevent them from aligning themselves with the Ottoman 
rulers. With the loss of Hungary the strategic
position of the Habsburg Empire would have been
seriously weakened. It would have enabled the Ottoman 
Empire to prepare in a more unrestrained way for an 
onslaught on other regions of the Habsburg Empire, On 
the other hand, if the Estates did not want to fall 
under the authority of the Ottoman rulers, then they 
could not forego the military and financial support 
which their kings could offer them in their capacity 
as rulers over other Habsburg lands.
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This constellation resulted in a constitutional 
dualism between monarchy and Estates. This, admittedly 
frequently strained, co-operation could not be 
completely destroyed even by the success of the 
Imperial troops against the Ottoman Empire in the 
Turkish Wars between 1683 and 1699 - though It.
undermined the settlement of Sopron of 1681. That 
settlement saw the fortunes of the Hungarian nobility 
revived after the loss in power in the wake of the 
defeat of a nobles' revolt against Habsburg rule in 
1670, Then, the Hungarian constitution had been 
suspended and, without a functioning diet, taxes were 
imposed by royal decrees. In the late 1670s, however, 
yet another rebellion against the Habsburg ruler had 
resulted in the conquest of thirteen counties of 
northern Hungary. Under these circumstances and in the 
face of an approaching war with the Turks, Leopold re­
established the old constitution: "The diet Cof
Sopron] was permitted to elect a new palatin [i.e. 
viceroy, R.A.] ... Hungarian troops were no longer to
form an integral part of the imperial army . . . The 
sales taxes, imposed by royal decree Con spirits, 
meat, and - in some areas - grain, R. A, ] , which the 
nobles found particularly objectionable, were 
abolished. The Hungarian Chamber, its staff purged of 
foreign councilors, was to cooperate with, but not be 
subordinate to, the Viennese Hofkammer. Traditional 
courts resumed their functions, and sentences passed 
under the special judiciary of 1671-79 were mostly 
invalidated" [Kann/David 1984: 139].
But after the Imperial troops had conquered Buda 
in 1686, Leopold I summoned a diet at Pozsony
[ PreBburg] in 1687. Up to that time the Hungarian 
nobility had the right to elect the king. It was the 
customary and legal procedure that, when the king
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died, a Coronation Diet assembled, elected the ruler, 
drew up a list of conditions which the king-elect had 
to accept before he could be crowned and legally 
become king. The Estates which assembled at the diet 
at Pozsony renounced their right to elect their king 
and accepted the hereditary kingship in the male line 
of the Habsburg family. They also renounced the ius 
resistendi, i.e., their right to armed resistance 
against an "unjust king" who violated their 
privileges, as it had been laid down in the Golden 
Bull of 1222. The right to hold Coronation Diets and 
the privileges of these Diets were, however, retained. 
But though the ruler conceded that he would preserve 
all the laws of the land and the lawful rights of the 
inhabitants, it was agreed that the exact meaning of 
these laws and rights would be determined by mutual 
agreement between the king and the Estates. This 
stipulation opened, in principle, the way of
questioning the validity of all aspects of the 
Hungarian constitution [Heckenast 1985: 114-5; Sugar
1958: 341, n. 41; Barudio 1981: 274-6; Kann/David
1984: 140-1]. But whereas these constitutional
conflicts could erupt in the future, the present 
reality was the administration of the reconquered 
Hungarian territories through the Viennese Hofkammer 
without Hungarian involvement.
The Peace of Karlovce CKarlowitz] in 1699, which 
brought the Hungarian Lands (Hungary proper,
Siebenbiirgen/Transsyl vania and Croatia) under the
jurisdiction of the Habsburg Emperors, made it 
manifest that the Turkish card could not any longer be 
convincingly or successfully played by the Hungarian 
nobility. Militant resistance between 1703 and 1711 
against Habsburg proto-absolutism, and in particular 
against the reforms of the war tax (the Contribution>
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which was to be made stable and permanent, with the 
nobility having to pay a share, proved, therefore, to 
be unsuccessful. But there remained the potential 
danger of a renewed confrontation with the Ottoman 
Empire, which might have been supported by the French 
monarchy. This political consideration must have 
convinced the Habsburg monarchs that it was advisable 
to adhere to their legal obligations, into which they 
had entered in 1687, and seek the consent of the 
Hungarian Estates to the Pragmatic Sanction which 
established hereditary succession to the throne even 
in the female line. This consent was given by the 
Estates in 1722/3, but on condition that the king or 
queen of Hungary had to be crowned in Hungary and had 
to take an oath confirming the Hungarian constitution 
and, in particular, the right of Hungary to be 
governed according to her own laws, i.e., as a regnum 
independens, This consent of the Hungarian Estates to 
being ruled by the Habsburg dynasty was reinforced in 
1741 when the diet at Pozsony offered support to Maria 
Theresia at a time when the Bavarian elector had 
invaded Upper Austria with the assistance of France 
and had already been crowned king of Bohemia. In this 
situation, the support of the Estates for Maria 
Theresia could not but strengthen and reaffirm the 
constitutional dualism between crown and Estates 
C Barudio 1981: 291-2; Heckenast 1985: 1201.
In Hungary, then, only the diet in co-operation 
with the monarch could pass laws; and it was the diet 
which had the duty to see to it that the constitution 
was observed. Issues of taxation and anything to do 
with the military had to be brought before the diet. 
While the magnates and the high clergy were 
represented in the Upper House, the Lower House was
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constituted of representatives from the lower clergy, 
the royal free towns and the counties
[Cs&ky 1980: 56-73. To get a better understanding of
the power of the Hungarian nobility vis-a-vis the 
Habsburg monarchs we have to describe local government 
or administration in the counties of Hungary in some 
detail.
The county in Hungary was a Standestaat en 
miniature. The nobility discharged their overall 
responsibilities for legislation, jurisdiction and 
administration at the county assembly, or general 
congregation, which was convened normally twice a 
year. It was on these occasions that the county 
nobility discussed propositions for the diet, elected 
their delegates and instructed them how to vote at the 
diet. Because of this right of instruction it was not 
the diet but the counties that were the real vehicle 
of legislative action in Hungary LKir&ly 1969: 1133.
The power of the members of the county assemblies was 
expressed in their right to elect the county officials 
who were also paid by the Estates and bound to them by 
an oath of office. The control by the Estates over the 
county administration, which was based on this 
procedure for recruiting officials, was enhanced by 
the fact that the Estates also elected the deputy 
county high sheriff [ alispAn 3 , who was the head of 
the county administration. The appointment of the 
county high sheriff Cfoisp&n 3 was in the hands of the 
king. The main task of the county high sheriff was to 
summon the general congregation and to preside over 
its proceedings. As a matter of fact, such was the 
distribution of power in the counties that the high 
sheriff could not pursue a political course to which 
the county nobility objected.
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In their executive function, the counties could 
not be directed by the high sheriff. The collection of 
taxes, the distribution of the military burden, and 
the administration of justice was in the hands of the 
county officials under the direction of the deputy 
county high sheriff. These officials were also 
charged with executing the royal ordinances. But 
should these ordinances not meet with the approval of 
the Estates, their execution could easily be 
obstructed or totally discarded, i.e., put aside by 
the deputy high sheriff with the customary formula: 
cum respecta ad acta [Bernath 1963: 352; Haselsteiner
1983: 27-38; CsAky 1980: 573.
Aristocratic local self-government was dominated 
by one section of the nobility: the bene
possesslonati, Compared to this group, the 
possesslonati held less political power. These two 
aristocratic groups can be distinguished along 
economic lines. While both were involved in the 
economic management of their estates, it was primarily 
the bene possesslonati who produced predominantly for 
the market. It could be argued, therefore, that local 
government was in the hands of the gentry. The 
magnates, about 4,000 strong, occupied the Imperial 
offices; the impoverished nobility, the bocskoros 
nemesek% were politically dependent on the gentry: 
such was their status and power position that 
everywhere could the county officials force them to 
contribute to the county taxes and periodically the 
state also taxed them, which led to them being called 
the taks&s nemesek (taxed nobles) [Haselsteiner 1983: 
19-26; KosAry 1987: 29-333.
Given Joseph II* s endeavour to centralize 
political power and establish a strong absolutist
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state, the autonomous local administration in Hungary 
could not but challenge the Emperor. At the beginning 
of his reign he already indicated his intention to do 
away with the special status of Hungary among the 
Habsburg lands. Then he refused to be crowned king of 
Hungary and thus to take the oath binding him to 
uphold the laws and the constitution of Hungary. The 
explicit challenge to the privileges and rights of the 
Hungarian nobility was intensified by his refusal to 
summon the Hungarian diet. But this unconstitutional 
decision of the Emperor resulted, unintentionally, in 
mobilizing the nobility at the local level where their 
power position was most entrenched. On the one hand, 
this decision curtailed the nobility's right to voice 
their grievances and participate in the legislative 
process; on the other hand, it increased the 
importance of the county assemblies as they were now 
the only way to formulate and express the political 
demands of the nobility.
As no diet was convoked by Joseph II, all of his 
reform policies in Hungary were unconstitutional. This 
was the case with the emancipation of the peasants in 
August 1785, the abolition of the manorial courts and 
the concomitant provision for the appointment of 
village notaries charged with enforcing the laws, 
protecting the peasants' rights, and serving as links 
between the state and the people. The tax and urbarial 
regulation of 1789, too, was unconstitutional and so 
was the reform of the local administration in 1785 
when Hungary was divided into ten districts
incorporating four or five counties. These districts 
were headed by royal commissioners. These 
commissioners replaced the county high sheriffs and 
took over the executive function of the deputy high 
sheriff. The royal commissioners supervised the county
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administration, and the deputy high sheriffs, now also 
appointed by the king, became royal officials with 
tasks similar to those of the circle captains in the 
hereditary lands of the Habsburg monarchy. This 
attempt to transform county administration into 
fully-fledged bureaucracies affected the county 
officials, too, who, instead of being elected by the 
county assemblies, were now also appointed by the king 
[Haselsteiner 1983: 38-41; Kann/David 1984: 225-63.
The nobility's chance to revert to open 
opposition against the Emperor's policies came when 
the Habsburg monarchy engaged in yet another military 
conflict with the Ottoman Empire in February 1788, 
this time as an ally of Russia. In 1715, it had been 
agreed between the Estates and Charles VI (as king of 
Hungary Charles III) that a standing army should be 
created in Hungary. The Estates ackowledged the need 
for a tax for this purpose but they also maintained 
the right to consent to the necessary taxes and 
subsidies at their diet. At the same time, the 'Muster 
of the Nobles' , or Insurrectio, was not abolished: 
this general levy obliged the nobles to go to war if 
the land was in danger and the king called them to 
arms; but, notwithstanding the king's call, the diet 
retained the ultimate decision as to the extent and 
the modalities of the muster. This obligation to 
military service in person was the foundation of the 
nobles' immunity from taxation. The institution of the 
insurrectio thus enabled the nobles to shift the 
entire financial burden of a standing army to the 
peasantry. But in so far as a considerable part of the 
responsibility for recruiting troops, preparing 
quarters for them, and supplying the army was assumed 
by the counties, the nobles exerted their influence on 
the military and military politics, on both the
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central and regional level [Haselsteiner 1983: 46-50;
Kir&ly 1969: 1103.
Since the reign of Maria Theresia, the county 
administration communicated in military matters with 
regional commissaries who had been appointed by the 
director of the commissariat us provlncialist the 
department within the Hungarian provincial government 
in charge of military affairs. The Hungarian 
provincial government, in turn, was in communication 
with the General Command Hungary and its commander, 
the supremus armorum Regiorum in Hungaria praefectus. 
This general command was subordinated to the War 
Council in Vienna which retained overall authority in 
all matters concerning military infrastructure, 
strategy and tactics. Given, in addition, the diets 
right to authorize the necessary subsidies for the 
army, the tight entanglement of military and civil 
agencies in military politics made protracted and 
time-comsuming negotiations on military matters likely 
which might, in cases of military emergencies, impede 
military success [Haselsteiner 1983: 51-3; Kir&ly
1969: 103-53.
Joseph did not summon a diet at which the Estates 
could have given their consent to his military policy 
during the confrontation with the Ottoman Empire in 
the late 1780s [for the following discussion cf. 
Haselsteiner 1983: 126-2163. He called on the nobility
in the counties, assembled at their general 
congregations, to provide for the manpower needed to 
replenish the ranks in the regiments which would be, 
or had already been, depleted owing to desertion or 
losses in combat as well as to provide for the 
financial and material support needed for the troops. 
In 1787 and 1788 the counties did not oppose the
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Emperor's demands, though many of them did remind 
Joseph that the legal procedure would require a diet 
to authorize the necessary personal and material 
subsidies. They therefore demanded a diet to be 
summoned at which they could give their consent to his 
military request as well as present their grievances 
[ gra.vaininal to the monarch. In this demand the
nobility was supported even by the Hungarian 
provincial government. Even the Minister of Police, 
Count Pergen, advocated a conciliatory approach and 
declared in November 1788 that the Estates' 
"enthusiasm seems to have reached such a pitch, that
force and compulsion will scarcely suffice to
constrain these people" [quoted in: Vangermann 1959:
503 . But the Emperor did not yield to the requests of 
the Estates. In 1789, Joseph justified his position 
by arguing that in this situation of military 
emergency no diet could possibly be convoked without 
detrimental repercussions to the cause of military
success [Haselsteiner 1983: 144, 147, 196-73.
In the summer of 1789 it became manifest that 
the regimental recruitment of volunteers was not 
sufficient to fill the vacant ranks in the army; the 
contribution of the Estates in the counties was 
unavoidable. But in the autumn of 1789 the majority of 
the counties refused to cooperate with the monarch. 
Again, the Estates in the counties pointed out that a 
diet had to be convoked at which the Emperor's demands 
had to be discussed. But there were new arguments 
raised as well. The general congregation of the county 
of Nogr&d, for example, maintained that, even if the 
manorial lords were inclined to participate in the new 
drive for recruiting soldiers, they could not 
successfully do so as the Emperor's agrarian reforms 
had undermined their influence on their peasant
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subjects. Furthermore, the military demands of the 
current conflict had already reduced the number of 
peasants and agricultural labourers in the counties to 
such an extent that the execution of the necessary 
agricultural tasks and thus the provision of food for 
the population as well as the alimentation of the army 
had been put at jeopardy [Haselsteiner 1983: 180-13.
Indeed, the bad harvest of 1789 added to the rise 
in prices for agricultural products already under way 
due to military provisioning and worsened the living 
conditions of the population. The peasant population 
had clearly to bear the brunt of the personal and 
material cost of the war; they also had now to face 
the consequence of the financial repercussions which 
the war had for the government. Such were the 
financial straits of the government that it decided 
early in 1789 that all products delivered to the army 
should only be paid for after the war. If this 
condition was not accepted by the vendors, the 
military was to be sent in in order to forcibly 
appropriate the necessary goods [Haselsteiner 1983: 
193-43.
As a consequence, at the end of 1789 there was 
resistance to governmental policies both among the 
nobility and the peasantry of Hungary. And there was 
the possibility of a war on two fronts looming on the 
horizon: against both the Ottoman Empire and Prussia.
In such an event central government had planned to 
withdraw a large contingent of the troops stationed in 
Hungary and to move them north-west against Prussia. 
The Emperor would thus have been deprived of the means 
which would have allowed him to try to impose his will 
on a recalcitrant nobility and peasant population. 
Faced with the virtual collapse of Habsburg authority
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already in the Austrian Netherlands, central
government urged the monarch to revoke his reforms in 
Hungary. This Joseph did in January 1790, with the 
exception of the patents of religious toleration and 
peasant emancipation CWangermann 1959: 50-53.
Though victorious as to the repeal of most of
the reform policies, the nobility still insisted on
the convocation of a diet at which Joseph's successor, 
Leopold II, should be crowned and their political 
demands be voiced. The reform party within the diet, 
led by the bene possess!onati% embraced fax— reaching 
proposals for constitutional amendments:
(1) annual meetings of the diet should be held in 
Pest, and royal invitations for the convocaction 
should not be necessary; <2> all taxes and 
subsidies should be voted by the diet; <3) the 
convocation of the diet might be postponed, if 
necessary, only by the diet itself, and then for 
no longer than three years; <4> the crown should 
have only a suspensive veto regarding drafted 
legislative acts, and if the draft were passed
over the king's veto, it must be promulgated by
him as law of the land; <5> a newly created 
Senate should control all royal decrees, and if 
any were found unconstitutional, they should be 
revoked; (6) the Royal [Hungarian] Chancellery 
should be transferred from Vienna to Hungary, 
where it would be responsible to the diet; (7) 
the folspSinok should be appointed by the king 
from four candidates nominated by each county; 
<8) all national officeholders should be 
appointed by the king from four candidates 
presented by the Senate; (9> Hungary should have 
her own national army, independent of the 
Imperial [ Hof-] Kr!egsratt controlled and
commanded by a central military headquarters to 
be staffed by members of the bene possess!onat!\ 
CIO) the Palatine [i.e. the viceroy] should head 
the military headquarters and receive his 
instructions from the king by way of the newly 
created Senate; (11) the !us resistendi should be 
reestablished [Kir&ly 1969: 1813.
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In short, these proposals aimed, at almost total 
political control of the nobility, and in particular 
the bene possess!onati% over royal power.
The aristocratic reform party pursued three 
strategies in order to achieve their political goals. 
First, the nobility organized its own military force 
along the lines of the Insurrection "The bander!urn of 
1790 was nothing more than a specific form of the 
insurrection given a different name primarily because 
it was organized by the gentry-dominated county 
administrations and not called forth by the king, and 
also because it was mobilized not for the defense of 
the country but ostensibly for another ... [internal] 
reason" [Kir&ly 1969: 1843. It was the intention of
the bene possess!onati to keep the banderia at a high 
level of training and preparedness. For this reason, 
young noblemen were to be enlisted so that they would 
be ready to take command of rebel units in case of a 
general uprising. In some counties, unit commanders, 
supported by county officials, visited the villages 
assigned to them to assess the manpower they had 
available, make inventories of all weapons and able- 
bodied noblemen, and take oaths of loyalty - even from 
peasants as it was feared that the court would 
mobilize the serfs against their lords. By promising 
the lower, impoverished sector of the lesser nobility 
that they, too, would in future be exempt from 
domestic taxes and free of periodic assessments for 
state taxes, the bene possessionati secured the 
support of the boscoros newesek.
Second, the bene possessionati tried to enlist 
the support of officers and soldiers of the Hungarian 
regiments CKir&ly 1969: 187-903. For this purpose
discontent within the officer corps of the Hungarian
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army was exploited. There were four points which 
constantly recurred in the proposals, petitions, and 
appeals drafted by different Hungarian regiments: 
"They sought to have Hungarians appointed as
commissioned, warrant, and noncommissioned officers in 
the Hungarian regiments and to oust non-Hungarians 
from those ranks in these regiments. They wanted to 
increase the efficiency of the service by introducing 
Hungarian as the official language of command. They 
called for the establishment of a Hungarian Supreme 
Command and War Council, subordinate to the diet. They 
proposed that in time of war the Hungarian unit should 
be merged into a single Hungarian corps" [Kir&ly 1969: 
1883 . These proposals aimed, in fact, at making the 
Hungarian units independent of the War Council in 
Vienna and thus of Imperial central government and to 
subordinate them to political institutions in Hungary 
which would have been dominated by the bene
possessionati. Such was the response of Hungarian 
officers to the advances of the reform party that in 
the summer of 1790 Leopold II considered the Hungarian 
units to be highly unreliable CKir&ly 1969: 1893.
The third strategy which the aristocratic reform 
party pursued in order to achieve their political 
goals was entering into negotiations with Prussia. In 
1788 Prussia had joined Britain and Holland in a
Triple Alliance. It aimed at keeping France out of the
Austrian Netherlands and at checking Russia and 
Austria in the Balkans. The reform party thus 
considered Prussia to be interested in supporting 
internal divisions in Hungary and to be a potential 
ally in its struggle with the Habsburg monarchy. In 
line with this consideration, contact was established 
with the Prussian government as early as July 1788 
[ Wangermann 1959: 103. The aim was a Prusso-Hungarian
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military alliance against Austria, and a Prussian 
guarantee of Hungarian independence irrespective of 
the results of the prospective war [Sugar 1958: 341;
Kir&ly 1969: 190-53. But Leopold II acted swiftly to
destroy all Hungarian hopes of foreign intervention by 
concluding, in July 1790, the agreement of Reichenbach 
with Prussia Ccf. the previous cection on the Austrian 
Netherlands]. With an armed clash between Prussia and 
the Habsburg monarchy thus forestalled, Leopold II 
decided to pour the troops previously stationed on the 
Silesian border into Hungary. Military resistance to 
Habsburg rule was not any longer a viable option for 
the Hungarian nobility: "With this turn of events, the 
feudal revolt and its concomitant banderlum movement 
gradually faded into oblivion" [Kir&ly 1969: 1903.
This collapse of the feudal revolt was not solely 
caused by Leopold II's strategy to undermine the 
'diplomatic' efforts of the aristocratic reform party 
in Hungary. Leopold also mobilized the bourgeoisie of 
the towns against the nobility. As it became apparent 
during the sessions of the diet that the aristocratic 
reformers intended to keep the commoners excluded from 
high state offices and army commissions, Leopold II 
payed lip-service to the demands of some sections of 
the urban bourgeoisie for greater political 
representation. Leopold even encouraged publications 
critical of the aristocracy's privileged position. 
These publications were not submitted to the ordinary 
censorship and were even distributed by Leopold's 
agents and their assistants. But as soon as the feudal 
revolt had collapsed, Leopold quickly disregarded the 
political requests of the urban bourgeoisie [Kir&ly 
1969: 196-211; Wangermann 1959: 77, 86-83.
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Even if it had been possible to mobilize the 
hitherto unpolitical urban bourgeoisie in greater 
numbers, they still would not have posed a serious 
challenge to the power of nobility. In terms of sheer 
numbers, the urban bourgeoisie - merchants, craftsmen, 
'professionals' and 'intelligentsia' - constituted 
only about 2 per cent of the population in Hungary, 
whereas the nobility formed about 4.4 per cent of the 
population CBenda 1972: 483. Exploiting the conflicts
between serfs and manorial lords, however, would have 
given the monarch much greater leverage. The history 
of peasant unrest in Hungary made this consideration a 
viable option.
To put the peasant unrest of the 1780s and in 
1790 in its social and economic context, we can, yet 
again, draw on Kir&ly's seminal account of Hungarian 
history in the 18th century:
Already in the early 16th century Imperial forces 
penetrated Hungary every year because of the long 
Ottoman wars. The presence in Hungary of massive 
foreign forces meant the presence of many more 
persons to be fed, and this ' imported' consumer 
market created a great demand for food. The Peace 
Treaty of Karlovce in 1699 . . . seemed to spell
the end of this advantageous economic situation 
. . . But the formation of the standing army only 
sixteen years later guaranteed that a large 
number of consumers would be permanently 
stationed in Hungary. The War of the Austrian 
Succession <1740-48) and the Seven Years' War 
<1756-63) created new and even more profitable 
food markets for the landlords ... The landowners 
. . . considered the profits from their lands not 
as reinvestable but as a means of augmenting 
their own luxury. This attitude prevented the 
occurrence of a broad agrarian revolution on the 
English pattern ... CB3y the middle of the 
agrarian boom in the 1760s the repopulation of 
Hungary was complete. The virgin lands that could 
be freely settled had disappeared, and this made 
the serfs ever mare dependent on the whims of the 
landowners ... C It3 led to an acceleration in 
their obligations to the lords and the gradual
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expropriation of their landholdings CKir&ly 1969:
9-10].
In 1765 and 1766, excessive urbarial duties and 
fees were the principal cause of peasant unrest in the 
Transdanubian region. The peasants' refusal to pay 
part of the urbarial fees or to perforin the prescribed 
robot led to the promulgation of the urbarial 
regulation in 1767 CKos&ry 1987: 17-83. The most
ferocious peasant revolt in Hungary during the 18th 
century occurred 1784 in Siebenbiirgen/Transsyl vania. 
In this region the urbarial regulations of 1767 had 
never been introduced. When Joseph II ordered a 
military conscription for Transsylvania in 1784, many 
peasants believed that enlisting into the Frontier 
Guards would relieve them of any obligations towards 
their manorial lords - a widespread view, as the 
governor of Siebenburgen reported to the Court 
Chancellery in August 1784 CZieglauer 1881: 18;
Schaser 1848: 60-1, 83; Schuller 1969/11: 121-2;
Kutschera 1985: 2653. But the lords continued to
demand the customary robot and urbarial services from 
all their peasants, notwithstanding any claims by them 
of immunity as members of the Guards. Under the 
leadership of Horia and Closca, about 30,000 Rumanian, 
Saxon, and Hungarian peasants rebelled against the 
landlord class, killing, reputedly, 157 nobles and 
destroying more than 230 mansions, 23 churches and 389 
villages CKutschera 1985: 265, n. 79; Kir&ly 1967:
143, n. 14; Kir&ly 1969: 2173.
The demands of the peasants in 1784 are 
noteworthy because they were forward-looking and 
revolutionary in character rather than appealing only 
for the renovation of supposedly violated 'customary 
rights'. They demanded the abolition of the nobility; 
only through public service should nobles gain a
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livelihood. Aristocratic landowners should be
expelled from their manors and all manorial lands 
should be distributed among the peasants - in 
anticipation of an Imperial decree which the peasants 
expected to be issued of necessity shortly. Finally, 
like the common people, all nobles should pay the 
Contribution henceforth [Zieglauer 1881: 21-2; Schaser 
1848: 77, n. 3 . Though Imperial forces suppressed the
revolt by force, this rebellion caused Joseph II to 
decree the abolition of serfdom in the Hungarian lands 
in 1785.
The peasant movement in the spring of 1790 was 
caused by the fear that the enlightened reforms of 
Joseph II would be revoked. The 'Peasants' 
Declaration' of May 1790 called on "all peasants, take 
mercy on yourselves, raise your cudgels, pitchforks, 
and axes against the cruel, lazy, good-foi— nothing 
lords, who destroy the country and rob the King". The 
peasants declared that they stood by all the 
regulations of Joseph II and that they would not let 
"one jot of them abolished, for all of them are as 
sacred, just, and beneficent as if God Himself had 
suggested them to him". They pledged their unstinting 
support for Leopold II and demanded that "the diet, 
which is not needed because we already have our King, 
should act in our behalf, or else we shall hold a diet 
here, the like of which has never been seen, and to it 
will go only those who support the King". They also 
demanded the abolition of county offices as well as 
the abolition of labour services due to landlords even 
in their limited form as established by Joseph II's 
edicts [text of declaration in: Kir&ly 1969: 241-3; on 
peasant movement in 1790: Kir&ly 1969: 218-33; Kir&ly
1967; Sugar 1958: 3433.
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In their clear support for Leopold II the 
peasants demonstrated to the nobles that there was a 
possibility of coalition between the monarch and the 
peasants against them. Given the overall constellation 
of forces in the summer of 1790, with the array 
occupying Hungary since mid-August - serving both as a 
warning to the recalcitrant nobles and as a shield for 
the Estates in case of a peasant revolt a
compromise was struck between the monarch and the 
Estates, The Estates accepted that Hungary was a
hereditary monarchy and dropped all proposals for 
constitutional reform. On the other hand, however, the 
Coronation Diet of 1790/91 reiterated the principle 
that legislative power should be shared by the Crown 
and the diet; it was agreed that the promulgation and 
approbation of laws was the right of the king, but 
that these laws had to be passed by the diet in the 
first place. The king was urged to summon the diet,
not as he would see fit, but at regular intervals of 
three years. It was laid down that the king could
exert his executive power only within the confines of 
the law and that the delegates to the diets should 
have immunity from prosecution by government agencies, 
enjoying, rather, freedom of opinion and speech. The 
diet also confirmed that Hungary was an independent 
kingdom to be governed only according to its own laws 
and constitutions and not like the other lands of the 
Habsburg monarchy [Cs&ky 1981: 40-5], The peasant
revolt of 1790 was reflected in the social legislation 
of the diet: the urbarial regulations of Maria
Theresia, hitherto an extra-constitutional royal 
rescript, was incorporated into the laws of the land 
and the abolition of perpetual serfdom was solemnly 
endorsed, thereby reaffirming the freedom of movement 
of the serfs [Kir&ly 1967: 1563.
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VII. The military and financial repercussions of the
Turkish war in the late 1780s and .,the.-,revolu.t.iQnary
wars with France in the 1790s.
In the previous chapter I have shown that the 
Turkish War had some impact on the capacity of 
political groups and social classes in the Austrian 
Netherlands and Hungary to resist reform policies 
imposed on them and their countries by the Imperial 
government in Vienna. I have shown how the concurrent 
conflicts in Hungary and the Austrian Netherlands 
prevented central government from quelling each 
respective resistance by the use of military might. 
But while military constellations were initially 
beneficial to the opposition forces, changes in 
geopolitical relations also helped to restore Imperial 
authority. But this restoration could only be achieved 
by reinstating the traditional aristocratic elite in 
their privileged position within the state. This 
rapprochement between monarchical ruler and Estates 
was precipitated by the break-up of the opposition 
movement along class and political lines. It became 
evident that the interests of the aristocracy in 
reestablishing their traditional rights could not be 
reconciled with the revolutionary democratic demands 
of hitherto politically disenfranchised bourgeois 
groups. In the case of Hungary, the possibility of 
peasant unrest drove the aristocracy finally back into 
an alliance with the monarchy.
In this chapter I will take the argument about 
the importance of military conflict in the interstate 
system for the distribution of political power within 
the Austrian monarchy a step further. The conciliatory 
policy of the monarchical ruler towards the 
aristocracy must also be seen as being informed by the
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realization of the central government that it had to 
face two problems due the geopolitical constellation: 
the mobilization of an army of sufficient size for the 
military confrontation with the Ottoman Empire and the 
provision of financial means to support it. At the end 
of the 1780s, events in France added to these 
concerns. Not only did the ideas of the French 
Revolution potentially undermine the traditional power 
structure and made it thus imperative for monarchical 
ruler and aristocratic power holders to close ranks. 
But since 1791 the Austrian Empire was involved in a 
series of wars with revolutionary France which 
exacerbated the fiscal and 'manpower' problems of the 
government. Given the entrenched position of the 
aristocracy within agrarian society on the local 
level, further attempts to stifle its power would have 
led to a serious weakening of the international 
standing of the Empire. It will be the main task of 
this chapter to analyse the effects of the wars in the 
late 1780s and 1790s on the financial situation of the 
monarchy. But the effects of conscription on the 
political constellation within the monarchy, too, must 
briefly be discussed.
It is notoriously difficult to ascertain the 
correct size of the armies of the pre-modern era. 
Within the confines of already highly unreliable 
official figures on army size, a distinction would 
also have to be made between nominal, effective, and 
battle strengths of armies. Based on official figures, 
Dickson [II: Appendix A, Table 1, p. 3533 gives the
official infantry and cavalry strength of the Austrian 
military establishment for 1787, that is, before the 
war, as amounting to a total of 221,572 men, of which 
179,112 were infantry and 42,460 were cavalry. By 
October 1788, the total had increased to 313,804 men,
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of which 261,000 were infantry and 52,804 were 
cavalry. By 1790 the official strength of infantry and 
cavalry had risen to 314,783 men, to fall back to a 
total of 215,478 in the? year after peace was 
concluded. It rose again during the wars with 
revolutionary France since 1792 to a total of 313,874. 
This would mean that the military establishment in 
peace time was about 215,000 men, in time of war it 
was increased by 100,000 to about 315,000 men.
If one compares some of the figures given by 
Dickson with those in other publications, one 
immediately realizes the degree of uncertainty which 
prevails in this area. Hauer C1849: 623 gives the
effective strength of the Habsburg armies in 1787 with 
247,048 men, thus exceeding Dickson's figure of the 
nominal strength by more than 25,000. Allmeyei— Beck 
[ 1983: 833 gives the strength of the army in the
Turkish War with 281,847 men, of which 245,062 were 
infantry and 36,785 cavalry. It would appear that this 
figure states the effective strength of the army. 
Roider C1982: 1773 states that the official strength
of the Austrian army at the outset of war was 245,000, 
of whom 140,000 were to take the field against the 
Turks in the spring of 1788. Meynert C1854/IV: 1133
maintains that the nominal strength of the Austrian 
army at the outset of the wars with France must have 
been 267,000 men <infantry and cavalry), but concedes 
that the Turkish War must have reduced the effective 
numbers dramatically. Rothenberg [1982: 243 states
that at the outbreak of hostilities with France in 
April 1792 there were but 230,000 effectives compared 
to a paper strength of the Austrian military 
establishment that exceeded 359,000 Ccf. Rothenberg 
1977: 167 where he gives the number of effectives with
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250,000, pointing out that this number was raised to 
about 300,000 the following year].
Although we cannot establish the correct, nominal 
or effective, size of the army at the start of the 
Turkish War (or, for that matter, of the wars with 
revolutionary France), we know that the war effort 
made it imperative for the authorities to mobilize the 
male, adult population even if the intake of men was 
somewhat less than the 40 per cent or so of the 
peacetime military establishment, as Dickson's figure 
would suggest. As in any war, recruiting soldiers and 
securing the financial resources for the war effort 
were the major concerns of the authorities. It was 
during the Turkish War that the political consequences 
of the system of recruitment, which had been reformed 
by Joseph II in 1781, were felt for the first time.
This new system constituted a modification of the 
system introduced by Maria Theresia ten years earlier. 
Then, copying the Prussian system, regimental 
recruitment was replaced by conscription. The 
traditional system of regimental recruitment operated 
sometimes on the basis of inducing males to 
voluntarily enrol in the army in exchange for some 
sort of reward but, more frequently, took on the form 
of drafting men into the army by the use of force. In 
the new system, the German-Austrian hereditary lands 
were divided into thirty-seven districts which had to 
present a specified number of their male population as 
conscripts to the recruiting army officers. Certain 
categories of people were exempted from military 
service: the clergy and the aristocracy, civil
servants, wealthy citizens, but also those individuals 
who were considered necessary for the economic welfare 
of the people - peasants, artisans, miners, river
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navigation and manufacture. This meant, in effect, 
that the lower strata in the countryside and those 
people employed in the small craft economy were 
normally drafted [Allmeyer-Beck 1983: 81-23. It is
also worth realizing that the system of conscription 
established direct contact of the state with the 
peasant population. This direct contact also increased 
the state's concern with the well-being of the 
peasants and thus with their overall living 
conditions. Agrarian policy and the protection of the 
peasants and peasant land from excessive landlord 
demands was closely linked to these concerns Ccf. 
Hintze 1962: 350]
The most decisive input into this system by 
Joseph II was his attempt to put it on a sound 
'statistical' basis. He recognized that an efficient 
system of conscription depended on the state knowing 
exactly the composition of the population at large. He 
thus provided for state commissioners to make a 
census of the population in the military districts. 
With the help of standardized questionnaires, these 
district commissioners had to take down the data for 
each family as well as the number of cattle in each 
village. The files for each village were to be updated 
annually and were made available to both the military 
and political authorities CBradler-Rottmann 1973: 60-
1; Allmeyer-Beck 1983: . 823. The reform of
conscription itself did not really introduce any 
significant new aspects. Though it confirmed the 
principle that, in theory, each male citizen between 
the age of seventeen and forty was liable to render 
military service, the decree retained the provisions 
for exempting certain categories of people. It also 
provided for the possibility for those with sufficient 
means of either buying an exemption or sending a
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substitute. But in the case of those men unfortunate 
enough to be drafted, military service lasted a life­
time Con the conscription system: Heinl 1941: 13-4;
Jahns 1891/III: 2294-7; Meynert 1868-69/1973/III: 283- 
6; Fiedler 1986: 903.
As Wangermann [1959: 28-93 put it, "tuJnder the
new system of recruitment to the regiments, nearly all 
non-privileged subjects and especially the peasants, 
lived under the constant threat of having to spend the 
rest of their lives in the army. The system was 
universally condemned". In the Tyrole, resistance to 
the system compelled the Emperor to withdraw it from 
the province. Conscription was also one reason for the 
internal unrest during the French wars since 1792 
[Reinalter 1980: 155-7; Reinalter 1988a: 76-7;
Reinalter 1988b: 196-83. But not only did the peasants
have to bear the brunt of conscription, the peasants, 
especially those in the provinces behind the battle 
front, also suffered greatly from requisitions and 
from the imposition of extraordinary labour services 
for the maintenance of the army [Wangermann 1959: 293.
The main threat to the stability of the regime, 
however, did not come from popular resistance to 
conscription. The financial repercussions of the wars 
far outweighed the destabilizing effect of popular 
unrest. As with regard to figures on the size of the 
military establishment, a note of caution has to be 
issued as to the reliability of state revenue and 
expenditure figures which can be found in 
publications. In the appendix to this chapter, the 
reader will find three tables which list figures for 
state revenue, state expenditure, and military 
expenditure between 1781 and 1811 <the year in which a 
financial reform was implemented to cope with the
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bankruptcy of the state). As is immediately evident 
when looking at the figures, there is considerable 
variation between the various figures given. The 
explanatory notes will, it is hoped, indicate some of 
the reasons for these differences and divergences and 
allow the reader to make judicious use of the data 
contained in these tables.
The years in these tables refer to military 
years, i.e, the year 1785, e.g., comprises the twelve
months between November 1, 1784 and October 31, 1785.
It is important to keep this in mind when one analyses 
expenditure (or revenue) data for those years in which 
Austria was involved in wars. For the period covered 
by the tables, the following military involvements 
would have to be considered:
1785: conflict over the river Schelde;
February 1788 - 1790: Turkish War;
April 1792 - October 1797: First War of the Coalition
(Peace of Campo Formio);
March 1799 - February 1801: Second War of the
Coalition (Treaty of Lun6ville; Austria has to end 
military involvement);
April/September 1805 - December 1805: Third War of the 
Coalition (Treaty of Pozsony/PreBburg; Austria has to 
end involvement);
April 1809 - July 1809: armistice at Znoi j ino/Znaim
ends war with France (October 1809 Treaty of 
Schonbrunn).
As the figures given in the tables show, military 
expenditure in the period 1781 to 1811 has always 
been higher than expenditure for civil administration 
or debt repayment. It is also evident that, as soon as 
Austria was involved in - military confrontations, 
military expenditure rose dramatically. What common
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sense leads us to expect, is borne out by the data:
for example, in 1788 59.5 per cent and in 1809 more
than three quarters, or 75.4 per cent, of all
expenditure were committed to the military
establishment. These percentages constitute the lowest 
and highest percentages respectively in war years 
[based on the data given by Czoernig]. But in order to 
fully appreciate the financial repercussions of the 
various war efforts during the period 1781 to 1811, it 
is apposite to calculate state expenditure as 
percentage of state revenue: how much of state revenue 
was committed to the military, to civil
administration and to debt servicing ? This
information is contained in Table 4 in the appendix to
this chapter [again based on the figures given by 
Czoernig].
Whereas in 1788 'only' three quarters of the 
total state net revenue were spent on the military <= 
75.9 per cent), more than twice the net revenue was 
spent on the military in 1809 <= 208.6 per cent). In
1795 for the first time more than the total net
revenue was spent on the military <139 per cent). As 
could be expected, in years of peace this percentage 
was radically reduced, so that between 1802 and 1804 
an average of 51 per cent of net revenue were 
committed to the military establishment (though in 
1807 and 1808 an average of 68.8 per cent were spent 
on the military). But as the figures also indicate, in 
the years of peace between 1788 and 1810 debt 
servicing commanded a higher percentage of state 
revenue than civil administration (except in 1806). As 
this debt was mainly caused by military spending 
during war, it is evident that even in peace time 
civil expenditure was clearly subordinated to military 
and military-related spending.
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How was this military effort financed ? 
Wangermann [1959: 26-30] points out that the economic
policies of central government since the mid-1780s had 
already negatively affected the commercial sections of 
society even before the Turkish War. The constant 
demand of the state for privately borrowed money had 
resulted in a chronic shortage of credit and inflation 
of the interest-rate for private would-be borrowers as 
financiers preferred the secure investment in the 
credit-hungry state rather than in rickety new 
industrial or commercial enterprises. Until 1786, 
money could be put into private foundations which then 
advanced considerable sums from these private assets 
to peasants and entrepreneurs as credit. But in 1786 
it was decreed that all these capital assets in the 
private foundations had to be transferred immediately 
to state funds, with the result that a situation of 
chronic credit shortage was transformed into one of 
acute crisis. When in January 1787 the existing usury 
laws were repealed, the lid was taken off the interest 
rate altogether. As a result, the economic situation 
of this section of society further deteriorated.
The imposition of a new war tax also contributed 
to the economic crisis:
The burghers (and the badly-paid officials) were 
subjected to the new war tax at the very time 
when rapidly rising prices had already forced 
them to tighten their belts a good deal. The 
rapid rise in prices had originally been caused 
by the diversion of supplies to the army. It was 
aggravated by the fact that the Emperor, 
undeterred by the extraordinary situation created 
by the war, remained faithful to his policy of 
abolishing governmental regulation of internal 
trade, and simultaneously reducing imports. Thus 
the Viennese poor man's diet of imported fish 
disappeared from the market at the same time as 
bread and meat were rising in price [Wangermann 
1959: 29-303.
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A large number of poor people, who had their meagre 
savings invested in one of the 'brotherhoods', a sort 
of mutual friendly society, had already suffered
financial hardship when these saving banks were 
dissolved by the government. Many of the petitions 
which were lodged with the authorities in an attempt 
to reclaim contributions were turned down. The 
economic depression, therefore, cut straight across 
all sections of society.
During the French wars the government 
increasingly followed the course of emitting paper 
money, the so-called Bancozettel, as a means of 
financing the war effort [for the following
discussion: Klein 1974: 95-8; cf. also explanatory
notes to Table 1 in the appendix to this chapter] . 
This course had already been pursued in the 1780s. In 
1785 paper money amounted to 12,9 mio. fl. CM, and 
totalled 28,1 mio. fl. CM, in 1790. In 1795 it was 
almost three times higher than in 1785, amounting to
35,5 mio. fl. But it was only since August 1796 that
the limits imposed on the emission of the Bancozettel
were lifted to eleviate the financial crisis of the 
state. The economic and financial effect of this 
policy, however, made itself not immediately manifest:
Despite the issue of large amounts of paper 
currency and the mounting deficits during the 
1790s, the financial system of Austria - except 
for the run on the Viennese banks in 1797 - had 
remained quite stable. The quantity of paper 
money poured into the economy had not caused the 
serious inflation it should have, because during 
the war years merchants and vendors accepted the 
currency at face value. The confidence in the 
currency along with good harvests kept prices of 
food and other products fairly stable throughout 
the period, which not only maintained the 
monarchy's financial system but helped to 
preserve social and economic peace as well. By 
1801, however, confidence in the money was 
eroding, and inflation was becoming serious. By 
1803 prices in Vienna ranged from three to four
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times what they had been in 1790 ... CRoider
1987: 373-43. .
The monetary policy of the state was not limited 
to emitting paper money. The state also reverted to 
the time-old strategy of depreciating the silver 
coins, turning the currency in effect into a purely 
internal means of exchange. The government also 
introduced new taxes: in 1789 and 1790 a war tax,
which constituted a top-up on the Contribution of 
between thirty and sixty per cent, was introduced as 
was an income tax in 1799 which covered twenty-three 
income groups and amounted to an additional imposition 
of between 2te and 20 per cent of the respective 
income. This income tax of 1799 was introduced in 
place of the forced loans which had been in operation 
since January 1794. This forced loans scheme had 
stipulated that manorial lords had to forward sixty 
per cent of their Contribution, their dependent 
subjects thirty per cent; people owning houses in 
Vienna or in the provincial capitals had to lend an 
amount equivalent of fifty per cent of the tax they 
had to pay on their houses; Jews had to provide the 
equivalent of thirty per cent of the tax for Jewish 
people; civil servants and clergy above an income of 
300 fl. CM. had to contribute between 5 and 15 per 
cent of their income; the remainder of the people with 
income of more than 100 fl. CM, were grouped into 
various categories and had to provide between 4 and 12 
per cent of their income as forced loans. These forced 
loans should have paid an interest of 3te per cent
after the war, but due to financial manoeuvrings of
the state the papulation did not see any returns on 
their loans. It has been calculated that this tax 
raised about 9,5 mio. fl. CM. in 1798 C Botzenhart
1980: 488]. Finally, the government also received
subsidies from Great Britain insupport for the
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Austrian military effort against France. Between 1800 
and 1808 a total of 31,3 mio fl. CM. was transferred 
into the coffers of the Austrian state in that way. 
And between 1808 and 1810 a sum of about 30 mio. fl. 
CM was raised through external loans [Klein 1974: 92- 
53 .
The financial repercussions of Austria's military 
involvements can be immediately appreciated when we 
look at the size of the indebtedness of the Austrian 
state. At the beginning of the 1790s the national debt 
was about 391 mio. fl. CM [Otruba 1985: 2493; in 1811 
this had risen to about 671 mio. fl, CM [Hauer 1848: 
164; Botzenhart 1980: 487 cites the semi-official
figure of 686,2 mio, fl. CM.3. According to figures 
given by Klein [ 1974: 983, 15.7 per cent of the
revenue were spent on interest payments on the 
national debt in 1789, but by 1810 this percentage had 
risen to 29 per cent. In these circumstances, a reform 
of the financial system was considered necessary. This 
reform took the form of a devaluation of the
Bancozettel', they could be exchanged for redemption 
notes [ Einlosvngs-scheinel of the new Wiener Wahnmg 
in relation 5:1 [Botzenhart 1980: 4903.
The burgeoning fiscal crisis of the Habsburg 
monarchy between 1790 and 1811 was compounded in the 
early 1790s by the political repercussions of the
ideas of the French Revolution and by the opposition 
amongst sections of the population to the restaurative 
policy pursued by the government to contain the
political and social impact of both revolutionary 
ideas and military conflict. It is within this context 
that I shall take up the history of the state police 
in the Austrian Empire in the following chapter.

APPPENDIX
Chapter VI.
State revenue of the Habsburg monarchy, 
1780 - 1811
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Table VI. 1 State Income of the Habsburg 
monarchy, 1780 - 1811 (In mio. fl CM)
Year I. II. III. IV. V. VI.
1780 n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a
1781 64.2 65.8 68.6 7,4
1782 63.9 75.3 85.0 22.7
1783 63.9 64.4 78.3 12.4
1784 68.5 69.0 88.7 17.0
1785 75.8 76.6 86.3 14.1
1786 73,3 74.3 88.8 13.8
1787 75.6 76.2 92.5 22.2
1788 87.0 87.4 112.7 38.3
1789 80.4 83.6
1790 85.1 85.6
1791 80.4 89.3 80.4
1792 85.5 86.7 85.5
1793 84.3 85.6 84.3
1794 92.1 92.7 92.1
1795 67.3 67.6 67.3
1796 64.9 65.6 64.9
1797 70.3 71.0 70.3
1798 72.6 73.2 72.6
1799 80.0 80.3 74,7 74.0
1800 85.7 85.9 75.6 65.5
1801 70.4 95.5 *84.4 82.1
1802 80.2 86.2 71.5 70.4
1803 88.8 101.4 *84.2 76.1
1804 99.9 107.6 80.7 78.0
1805 97.8 111.8 76.0 78.1
1806 83.6 86.7 55.5 51.2
1807 119.9 140.0 *89.6 67.1
1808 157.4 161.9 72.9 66,9
1809 155.0 94.7 *42.6 31.1
1810 136.6 135.6 33.9 (27.1) 25.0
1811 70.8
Sources and Explanatory Motes:
Col. I. = Hauer 1849: 361-2; Hauer gives 'real state income': 
"reelle Staatseinnahmen"; extraordinary revenue has been 
excluded (subsidies, loans etc.). To ascertain the real
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increase in revenue over the decade of 1781 to 1790, an 
inflation rate of 9,5 per cent has to be taken into account 
tcf. Otruba 1985: 2193, The nominal increase in revenue 
between 1804 and 1810 is also due to inflationary processes, 
it does not represent a real increase tcf. Klein 1974: 913,
Col. II, = Czoernig 1861: 122, 124. Czoernig states on p. 124 
n.2 that for the period 1799 - 1810 his figures are for 
"Bancozettel" CBZ3. It should be noted that, while at the end 
of the 'first war of the coalition' in 1797 the value of the 
Bancozettel was still roughly on par with fl CM, the BZ 
experienced a devaluation after it was officially decreed in 
April 1797 that there should cease to be an obligation to 
accept BZ for fl CM and thus to honour the BZ by converting 
it without deduction into fl CM. According to the official 
statistics the exchange rate was as follows: in January 1800
- 114 fl. BZ = 100 fl CM; in January 1802 - 120 fl BZ = 100 
fl CM; 1804 - 134 fl BZ = 100 fl CM; 1806 - 157 fl BZ = 100 
fl CM; 1808 220 fl BZ = 100 fl CM; 1810 - 409 fl BZ = 100 
fl CM. According to one economic historian the exchange rate 
before the financial reforms of 1811 was 492 fl BZ = 100 fl 
CM, and the rate of 5 fl BZ to 1 fl CM was established in 
the 1811 financial reforms [cf. Botzenhart 1980: 487; cf. also 
Klein 1974: 97 for exchange rates]. Tegoborski 1843/1: 14 
gives the following exchange rates [first figure = year, 
second = January, third = July3: 1799 - 103 - 106; 1800 - 
113 - 115; 1801 - 116 - 116; 1802 - 119 - 120; 1803 - 130 - 
132; 1804 - 134 - 135; 1805 - 133 - 132; 1806 - 147 - 184;
1807 - 190 - 197; 1808 - 204 - 242; 1809 - 221 - 315; 1810
- 469 [? 409 ?3 - 405; 1811 - 500. (See below col. Ill)
Col. III. = Czoernig's figures re-calculated on the basis of 
the exchange rate BZ - fl CM. According to the figures given 
in Botzenhart 1980: 487 and Klein 1974: 97, Czoernig's 
figures have been multiplied as follows:
1799 = 0.93
1800 = 0.88 
1802 = 0.83
1804 = 0.75
1805 = 0.68
1806 = 0.64
1808 = 0.45
1810 = 0.25 C= 409 BZ = 100 fl CM3
= 0,20 [= 492 BZ = 100 fl CM; figure is given brackets]
1811 = 0.12
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Col. Ill contnd.: Figures with * have been calculated on the 
basis of the exchange rate of the previous year.
Col. IV. = Beer 1877: 390-1. Beer points out that Czoernig's 
original figures for 1799 - 1810 <as rendered in col. II.) 
give a distorted picture because they are based on BZ 
without taking account of the impressive disagio. He has 
therefore calculated his figures on the basis of the average 
annual value of the BZ measured in fl CM. The figures he uses 
for this calculation into fl CM are taken from files of 
Baldacci's [cf. Baldacci 18893. Beer's figures for 1793 - 1798 
have been calculated by deducting the amount he gives for 
the annual deficit for the respective years (on p. 391) from 
the annual expenditure he states on p. 390.
Col. V. = Hock 1879: 595 C1781-833, 608 [1784-863, 621 [1787- 
83: total revenue (including extraordinary revenue as listed 
in col. VI.)
Col. VI. extraordinary revenue according to Hock 1879: 595 
[1781-33, 608 [1784-63, 620 [1787-83. According to Hock 1879: 
620, Austria took up two new loans in 1787 (= 12,3 mio fl,
CM) and in 1788 (= 22.2 mio. fl. CM) during the war with 
Turkey.
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Table VI.2 State Expenditure of the Habsburg
monarchy, 1780 - 1811 (in mio. fl CM)
Year I. II. III. IV.
1780 n.a n.a n.a n.a
1781 65.0 69.4 8,4
1782 80.6 85.4 22.7
1783 71.1 74.9 10.7
1784 78.2 84.2 13.1
1785 83.9 87.1 7.1
1786 81.4 85.7 12.5
1787 82.4 85.4 23.4
1788 111.5 114.7 55.8
1789 120.0
1790 113.1
1791 112,3 91.4
1792 90.8 86.9
1793 115,6 112,9
1794 151.3 147.7
1795 135.9 133.3
1796 158.2 154.7
1797 131.6 130.4
1798 133.2 129.3
1799 (143.5) 137.1
1800 (146.8) 143.9
1801 (*132.4) 128.4
1802 (97.9) 87.3
1803 (*95.6) 75.4
1804 (85.6) 78.3
1805 (99.2) 102.7
1806 (104.1) 97.5
1807 (*132.2) 98.5
1808 (85.5) 78.7
1809 (*117.9) 86.3
1810 (87.8) 76.1
1811 117.7
Sources and Explanatory 1Totes:
Col. I. = Czoernig 1861: 123, 125; his figures between 1799 
and 1810 have been converted from BZ fl into fl CM and are 
given, therefore, in brackets. Figures with * indicate that
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they have been converted from BZ fl into fl CM on the basis 
of the exchange rate of the previous year. The 1810 figure is 
based on 409 BZ fl = 100 fl CM. f. for exchange rate Table 1, 
explanatory note to col. III. Czoernig's figures include 
expenditure for civil administration, the military, and 
interest on national debt plus (credit) repayment plus 
redemption of BZ. They cannot, therefore, be directly 
compared with the figures given in col. II.
Col. II. = Beer 1877: 390, 392; debt repayments and 
redemption of Bancozettel not included in expenditure figures
Col. III. = Hock 1879: 595 [1781-83], 608 [1784-86], 621 
[1787-8]
Col. IV. = extraordinary expenditure according to Hock 1879: 
595 [1781-3], 608 [1784-6], 621 [1787-8]
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Table VI. 3 Military Expenditure of the Habsburg
monarchy, 1760 ~ 1611 <in mio. fl CM)
Year I. II. III. IV. V. VI.
1780 n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a
1781 30.5 33.1
1782 27.6 30.2
1783 32.6 37,0
1784 28.3 32.6
1785 36.6 38.6
1786 29.8 33.3
1787 34.1 36.8
1788 25.5 38.0 63.5 66.4
1789 26.1 43.3 69.4 71.7
1790 26.5 41.8 68.3 69.7
1791 25.8 25.4 51.2 51.3 51.3
1792 27.4 16.6 44.0 44.3 44.3
1793 29.1 41.6 70.7 69.5 69.5
1794 27.3 58.0 85.3 85.4 85.4
1795 27.3 67.3 94.6 94.6 94.6
1796 27.1 82.9 110.0 110.0 110.0
1797 92.7 92.7
1798 81.9 81.9
1799 89.7 96,8 (90.0)
1800 96.2 111.1 (97.8)
1801 87.4 94.4 (*83.1)
1802 45.4 55.4 (46.0) (38.7)
1803 35.9 47.0(*39.0) (*37.8)
1804 34.4 46.1 (34.6) (32.6)
1805 64.8 87.5 (59.5) (47.4)
1806 57.5 94.3 (60.4) (67.8)
1807 52.2 105.4 (*67.5) (60.7)
1808 45.2 100.8 (45.4) (48.2)
1809 66.8 197.6 (*89.0) (113.9)
1810 52,2 223.4 (55,9) (43,9)
1811 28.8 30.4
Sources and Explanatory Fotes:
Cols. I., II., III. = Hauer 1849: 70; col. I. = ordinary 
expenditure; II. = extraordinary expenditure; III. = sum total
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(without expenditure for building of garrisons which would 
add 28.0 mio flCM [= figures given for 1781 - 1793] to sum 
total. Hock 1879 gives figures for 1781-88 which are fairly 
similar to those in col. I. (cf. Hock 1879: 597, 607, 620 f.). 
He gives the extraordinary military expenditure in 1787 with 
6.6 mio. fl CM, in 1788 with 38 mio fl. CM which gives him a 
sum total of military expenditure in 1787 = 33.6 mio, in 
1788 = 62.2 mio. fl. CM. He also states (1879: 630) that 
between 1787 and 1790 (inclusive) the military expenditure 
amounted to 252.1 mio. fl. CM with 107.2 ordinary and 144.9 
mio. fl, CM extraordinary expenditure.
Col. IV. = Beer 1877: 390-1; Beer gives amount in flCM on the 
basis of BZ converted into flCM according to the respective 
(average) annual exchange rate (for figures 1799 - 1810).
Col. V. = Czoernig 1861: 123, 125; the figures given in 
brackets are re-calculated on the basis of the average annual 
exchange for the respective years of BZ fl. into flCM, These 
bracketed figures should therefore be compared with Beer's 
figures in col. IV. Figures with * have been calculated on 
the basis of the exchange rate of the previous year; for 
1810 the exchange rate has been calculated as being 409 BZ 
fl = 100 flCM; with 492 BZ = 100 flCM the bracketed figure 
would read 44.7 mio flCM. Cf. Table 1 explanatory note to 
col. I. for exchange rate.
Col. VI. = Schmidt-Brentano 1975: 105. For the years 1802 - 
1810, Schmidt-Brentano gives the figures in BZ fl (nominal 
value). The bracketed figures give the amount in fl CM into 
which the BZ fl have been converted. Cf. notes to col. V for 
exchange rates used for the years 1807 and 1809. The figures 
in this column should be compared with those bracketed 
figures in col. V. The figure for 1811 in Wiener Wahrung.
P.S. It may perhaps be interesting to compare the figures 
given above with the figures Mayr 1940: 22-7 gives in his 
discussion of that period. He states that the military 
expenditure for 1787 - 1797 amounted to 784 mio. flCCM). For 
the following years he offers the following figures [as 
above, BZ fl will be converted into flCM and given in 
bracketed figures):
1799 111 mio. (103.2)
1800 129 mio. (113.5)
1805 180 mio. (122.4) [Mayr talks about 0.5 mio. per 
day]
1806 106 mio. (67.8)
1807 106 mio. (67.8: on the basis of the 1806 exchange 
rate)
1808 106 mio. (47.7)
1809 262 mio. (118.0:
(65.5:
on the basis of the 1808 exchange 
rate)
on the basis of the 1810 exchange 
rate)
1810 223 mio. (55.8)
-  266 -
Table VI.4 State Expenditure of the Habsburg 
monarchy, 1780 - 1811 <as per cent of state 
revenue)
Year civil
administration
military
establishment
debt
servicing
1780 n.a n.a n.a
1781 27.8 50.3 20.7
1782 30.7 40.1 36.2
1783 29.8 57.4 23.2
1784 41.2 47.2 24.9
1785 39.0 50.4 20.1
1786 39.5 44.8 25.2
1787 37.5 48.3 22.4
1788 32.6 75.9 19.1
1789 34,8 85.8 23.0
1790 27.9 81.4 22.8
1791 27.9 57.5 40.4
1792 29.3 51.2 24.3
1793 32.1 81.2 21,8
1794 50.0 92.1 21.1
1795 33.3 139.8 27.8
1796 41.0 ■ 167.6 32.5
1797 29.4 130.5 25.4
1798 30.6 112.0 39.5
1799 30.3 120.6 41.3
1800 27.0 129,3 37.8
1801 28.3 98.8 30.3
1802 30.4 64.2 42*2
1803 26,4 46.4 40.8
1804 26.9 42.9 36.3
1805 23.9 78.2 28.4
1806 40.0 108.7 38.9
1807 32.3 75.3 39.9
1808 19.9 62.3 32.3
1809 39.0 208.6 29.0
1810 38.1 164.7 56.1
1811 72.1 40.7 53.5
Source: Czoernig 1861: 122-3.
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VIII. State police and Jacobins in Austria in the time 
of the French Revolution.
I have discussed above how Leopold II attempted 
to stabilize the Habsburg Monarchy by appeasing the 
privileged orders with the repeal of most of the 
Josephinian reforms and the hitherto politically 
disenfranchised bourgeois groups by endorsing their 
demand for adequate representation in the diets. Not 
only in Hungary but also in Styria did Leopold support 
the political demands of the non-privileged orders, 
including the peasantry, against opposition by the 
nobility [Wangermann 1959: 77-81, 85, 1033. But
whether the Emperor's endorsement of these political 
demands was more than a tactical move to win the 
loyalty of the non-privileged order in a time of 
crisis it is impossible to say - Leopold died before 
this policy could be implemented in Styria, The reform 
of the state police under Leopold II, however, can be 
interpreted as an attempt to make concessions to 
enlightened bourgeois concerns about state power.
The reorganization of the state police
constituted a partial victory for the Court 
Chancellery. The police system in the monarchy in its 
current form ceased to exist by decree of the Emperor 
when Count Pergen, after being vigorously attacked by 
other central government officials ever since Joseph's 
death, finally asked in 1791 to be relieved of his 
duties. It has been argued by Wangermann [1959: 93-5]
that Pergen resigned in March 1791 because Leopold II 
put the hitherto autonomous Ministry of Police under 
the authority of the law. As recently as February 28, 
a general instruction had been issued designed to
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prevent in future any violations of legality by the 
police:
Since the unfortunate are entitled to my full 
protection, I hereby order . . . to see to it that 
every three months a Justice of the Court of 
Appeal and a Councillor of the [Lower Austrian] 
Government are sent to the Polizeihaus in order 
to inspect the treatment of prisoners 
Immediate steps are to be taken to ensure that no 
one is detained for more than three days without 
the notification of the authority concerned and 
the commencement of the investigation in which a 
Justice CJustizmanril is always to participate 
CKropatschek/Leo.II 3: 232-3, quoted in:
Vangermann 1959: 93].
The affirmation of due legal procedure in the 
instruction constituted a clear break with the conduct 
practiced by Pergen. When Pergen had submitted an 
account of the duties of the secret police to Leopold 
II in 1790, he pointed out that the summary 
investigation of arrested persons provided the basis 
for the Emperor's decision "whether they are to be 
handed over to the Criminal Court, or whether there is 
to be a secret police investigation". But as there 
were no published regulations governing these secret 
police investigations with regard to methods of 
i witnesses* or proof of guilt, this
procedure clearly deprived the prisoners of the 
protection of the law [Wangermann 1959: 39]. Leopold
II's instruction made it clear that the new Emperor 
did not condone this state of affairs.
But while the secret police was more firmly put 
under the authority of the law, its surveillance 
function was enhanced. This was considered necessary 
for two reasons. First, the First War of the Coalition 
against France generated widespread resistance amongst 
the middle and lower classes. This war reinforced the 
sympathies these classes had with the ideas propagated
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through the French Revolution. Second, the government 
feared that revolutionary France would send agents 
into the territories of the monarchy with the 
intention of undermining political stability there. As 
a consequence of this fear, the police was given the 
task of observing all foreigners, and, in particular, 
Frenchmen and Italians, who resided in the monarchy 
for reasons unknown to the state. Accordingly, those 
places such as coffee houses and inns which were 
frequented by foreigners were put under observation 
[Reinalter 1988a: 99-100; Wangermann 1959: 61-43.
The new police organization, which was 
implemented after Pergen*s departure from office, made 
the heads of the provincial governments again 
responsible for policing their lands. Henceforth they 
would communicate directly with the Court Chancellery 
COEZ 11/1/2: 94; OEZ II/4: 1603. However. the
supervision over policing in Vienna was again 
incorporated into the remit of the government of Lower 
Austria [Walter 1927: 52-33. Thus, while Pergen*s
separate Ministry of Police was abolished, the Court 
Chancellery nevertheless had to share responsibility 
for policing in the monarchy with another government 
office.
The new police order for Vienna in November 1791 
reflected the changed circumstances
[Kropatschek/Leo.II 4: 471-94 for new police order3.
The inner city of Vienna was divided into four, the 
suburbs into eight districts. The police in each 
district was controlled by a 'district superintendent' 
[ Bezirksdirektori who was a provincial government 
official CBenna 1942: 1243. These district
superintendents were by and large independent from the 
director of police: they would communicate directly
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with all government offices bypassing the director of 
police; their immediate superior was the president of 
the government of Lower Austria, not the director of 
police in Vienna. The officers of the patrimonial 
authorities in the suburbs were urged to co-operate 
with the district superintendents CBenna 1942: 126;
Oberhummer I: 59],
The district superintendents in the suburbs were 
to be assisted by 'special constables'. With the re- 
introduction of 'special constables' as assistants to 
the superintendents in the suburbs a clear reference 
was made to the police system under Maria Theresia. As 
in the 1750s these special constables should be 
reimbursed for their work by tax reductions CBibl 
1927: 2593. Furthermore, police forces under the
supervision of the superintendent should be 
established in all suburban districts. A 'Civil Police 
Watch' C Zivil Polizei Wachel , consisting initially of 
a total of 64 men (or eight in each district), had 
duly been founded by the end of 1791. It was 
independent from the Military Police Watch, which 
retained its responsibility for policing the inner 
city. As a result of the establishment of this new 
force, the police forces in Vienna now amounted to a 
little over 400 men CEhrenfreund 1919: 28; Oberhummer
II: 256-7; Mayer 1985: 110-13. But already during the
summer of 1792 a committee of inquiry was set up to 
investigate into the newly established organization of 
the Vienna police forces. This inquiry finally led to 
the dissolution of the new force in 1793. However, it 
was re-established in 1807 C Benna 1942: 93; Mayer
1985: 1123.
The police reform of 1791 led to one 
institutional innovation: the foundation of a public
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health service in each suburban district, consisting 
of a surgeon, a physician and a mid-wife, under the 
control of the police. Such was the success of this 
service that by the end of its first year already more 
than 16,000 people had availed themselves of the 
services offered. This success was much helped by the 
fact that the poor were treated free of charge 
[Seliger/Ucakar 1985: 69; Oberhummer I: 60; Benna
1953: 212; Osterloh 1970: 1573.
The cost of this new system of police in Vienna 
for the 12 months between November 1, 1791 and October
31, 1792 was almost 168,890 f 1. About one quarter of
this sum was spent for administration with the head of 
the Vienna police, e.g., earning 4,500 fl. and each 
district superintendent earning 1,200 fl. The Military 
Police Watch claimed 23 per cent, whereas the newly 
established Civil Police Watch required only 5.5 per 
cent of the money. The new district health service 
took up 15.5 per cent of the budget, two thirds of 
which were spent on medicine for the poor (= 20,645 
fl.>. Finally, the last substantial amount was taken 
up by expenses incurred in the course of apprehending 
offenders. This category included the rewards paid to 
police informers <16.6 per cent of the total budget) 
[Oberhummer II: 80-3 for figures on police
expenditure] .
As we shall see later in this chapter, Francis II 
yet again changed the system of police. These changes 
under Francis II were part of his efforts to put a 
stop to all reforms which could be seen as endangering 
the privileged position of the aristocracy and the 
clergy. The constitutional reforms in favour of the 
disenfranchised political groups were dropped; 
voluntary agreements between lords and tenants on
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labour services were favoured over their compulsory 
commutation into money payments; greater influence was 
conceded to the clergy by dissolving the 
Ecclesiastical Commission which had been a mainstay in 
the government's attempt to influence religious 
affairs; and large-scale compulsory retirement of 
Josephinian officials was set in process [Wangermann 
1959: 107-153.
The restaurative policy of the new Emperor was 
mainly occasioned by the need for financial and 
political support by the aristocracy and the clergy 
during the French wars. Subsidies had still to be 
voted by the Estates and given the spiralling cost of 
the wars, the government depended on the swift 
cooperation of the privileged orders [Reinalter 1981: 
97; Wangermann 1977: 2363 . But the new policy had
destabilizing repercussions for the monarchy. Feasant 
protests which had to be suppressed by the deployment 
of the military were the result of the new government 
policy on labour services [Reinalter 1980: 153-43. But
even more politically destabilizing was the dismissal 
of the Josephinian officials. This move estranged the 
reform-minded civil servants from the regime.
The status and economic position of these middle- 
ranking civil servants was closely linked with the 
reform policies of the enlightened, absolutist state. 
Organized in the various lodges of the Freemasons, in 
the 1780s these civil servants thrashed out ideas of 
their own about the reform of state and society. Their 
involvement in the absolutist reform policies had 
initially convinced them that the monarchy could be 
reformed without revolution and violence. The purge of 
the civil service by Francis II thus could not but 
estrange the majority of these reform-minded officials
-  274 -
from the regime. Ousted from office for going beyond 
the political confines of a traditional state, many 
civil servants organized themselves in secret circles 
to continue their fight for reform [Reinalter 1981: 
96] .
Vhen Joseph II engaged on his reform course, he 
had tried to mobilize support among the intellectuals 
of the non-privileged order for his policies of 
containing and curtailing the powers of the 
aristocracy and the established clergy. One means of 
attaining this support was the liberalization of 
censorship law in 1781. The new rules on censorship 
established a degree of freedom to write and read 
unique in the German-speaking territories. But we have 
already seen when discussing the secret police under 
Joseph in the second half of the 1780s that the 
liberalization of the censorship laws was undone once 
the demands by the intellectuals for reform surpassed 
what the government attempted to achieve: the
containment of the aristocracy as a political force, 
but not its destruction C Bodi 1978: 40-3; Grab 1978:
55-63.
These disillusioned Intellectuals now forged 
links with the estranged Josephinian civil servants. 
In their circles, they discussed the developments in 
France and circulated prohibited newspapers and books 
amongst themselves. Their own experience of 
marginalization in the political system as well as the 
ideas of the French Revolution made them advocate the 
overthrow of the political regime and its replacement 
by a constitutional republic based on human and civil 
rights [Reinalter 1988a: 147-55]. To spread their
ideas, the members of these circles would try to 
recruit new members to their groups and publish and
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distribute leaflets, pamphlets, and songs CWangermann 
1959: 133-73.
In Hungary, too, political groups formed in 
opposition to the regime. Under the leadership of 
Martinovics, who had served under Joseph II and 
Leopold II, two societies were formed: the Society of
the Reformers of Hungary and the Society of Liberty 
and Equality, The lesser nobility and gentry 
constituted the backbone of the Society of the 
Reformers, Its catechism envisaged an independent 
Hungarian republic ruled by the Hungarian gentry. It 
provided for the suppression of all privileges of the 
aristocracy and high clergy and for the equal 
representation in the parliament of non-nobles. A 
spontaneous uprising of the Hungarian gentry would 
achieve these aims. But this was considered as only 
the first move towards the overthrow of the old 
regime. Once the Society of Reformers had succeeded in 
bringing down the regime, then the intellectuals and 
enlightened noblemen, organized as the Society of 
Liberty and Equality, would liberate the peasants from 
their feudal bonds and crush the privileged position 
of the gentry. It was thus essential in Martinovics's 
strategy that the Society of Reformers should know 
nothing of the Society of Liberty and Equality. The 
Reformers would mobilize on the basis of Hungarian 
nationalism, carrying those social groups with them 
which were interested in national independence; the 
'Jacobins', i.e. the members of the Society of Liberty 
and Equality would mobilize on the basis of social 
issues. They would constitute an independent, federal 
republic in which each province would have its own 
assembly CPalmer/Kenez 1961: 423-6; Body 1962: 11;
Benda 1979: 201-33.
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But neither in Austria nor in Hungary were these 
conspiratorial circles of mainly intellectuals and 
former civil servants a real threat to the state. 
There was no substantial bourgeois stratum in the 
Habsburg Empire which could have provided the mass 
support for revolutionary action. Nor did these 
circles attempt to gain the support of the peasants. 
Contrary to the situation in Ireland, which we will 
discuss in the following, second, part of this thesis, 
there was no social basis on which a mass mobilization 
for the overthrow of the established order would have 
been feasible [cf., however, Wangermann 1959: 137, who
points to Styria where the joint campaign of the
burghers and peasants for constitutional reform had 
forged a link between these two groups] . But the main 
reason for the ineffectiveness of these circles was 
the restructured police system in the Austrian Empire.
The death of the Leopold had ushered in yet
another period of police reform [Reinalter 1980: 158-
62, 174-9, 181-43. Whereas under Leopold II the police
system in the Habsburg monarchy in general, and in
Vienna in particular, took on features of that during 
the reign of Maria Theresia, under Francis II the
Josephinian police system of the mid-1780s was 
resurrected. At first, the Court Chancellery under the 
Supreme Chancellor, Count Kollowrat, and in close co­
operation with von Sonnenfels, criticized the 
preeminence of the government of Lower Austria within 
the system of police and demanded the subordination of 
all Austrian police under its control CBenna 1953: 
214] . But as before, the Court Chancellery did not 
succeed. Instead of giving in to its demands, Francis 
II informed Kollowrat in January 1793 that he intended 
to re-establish the Josephinian police system and that 
he had already appointed Count Pergen as his minister
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of police. Already in September 1792 the Emperor had 
written to Pergen that he wanted him to set the secret 
police onto a proper footing again. As secret police 
correspondence from the provinces had for the most 
part ceased after Pergen's resignation in March 1791, 
the Emperor's interest in re-establishing the secret 
police was manifest [ Vangermann 1959: 120-13. In
January 1793 Francis also informed the president of 
the government of Lower Austria that henceforth all 
matters concerning police had been transferred to
Count Pergen and that therefore all police files in 
the government's archives had to be handed over to him 
COEZ I1/5: 400-1; Benna 1942: App. I and 113.
Pergen hastened to re-assert his authority in 
matters concerning police. In two long official
documents in early 1793 he reminded the police 
officers and the presidents of the provincial
governments of their rights and duties [Benna 1942: 
127-45 for copies of these documents] . One of his main 
objectives was the attempt to clearly delineate the 
respective sphere of competence of each authority 
involved in policing. He confirmed that the directors 
of police were subordinated to the presidents of the 
provincial governments. He left it to their discretion 
how they organized the system of police outside the 
provincial capital: whether they wanted to employ
government officials as police officers or whether the 
local magistrates should take charge of the police. In 
any case, however, he emphasized the obligation of 
both local magistrates and the patrimonial authorities 
to inform the respective circle office on any person 
actually or reputedly dangerous to the security of the 
state. Pergen maintained that the police should not 
get involved in matters concerning public welfare 
[ polltlco-publlcal , which also included matters such
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as street lighting and road paving. The police was to 
concentrate on public security, not on the active 
promotion of (economic or social? welfare. But it was 
Pergen's conviction that upholding public security 
would contribute to the material welfare of the 
citizens. The paramount importance of enforcing the 
system of compulsory registration and, more generally, 
of state surveillance was reiterated. Pergen impressed 
upon those responsible for policing on the provincial 
and local level the need to pay close attention to the 
subversive machinations of those political clubs and 
organizations up and down the country which, inspired 
by developments in France, were trying to arouse the 
population with 'freedom humbug' C FreiheitsschwindelZ . 
In Pergen's view it was necessary to counter the 
publications of subversive pamphlets by government 
propaganda CVangermann 1959: 123-4 on the
surveillance of French residents in Austria and the 
government's efforts to expel them; Reinalter 1988a: 
101-2, 103, 1113.
This strong emphasis on the task of the police to 
maintain public order/tranquillity and security in a 
time of political* turmoil led also to the rescinding 
of the judicial duties of the police superintendents. 
Leopold II had tried to accrue the right to adjudicate 
in civil matters to the police should the parties 
involved decide to turn to the police in these matters 
[Kropatscheck/L.II 4: 476-73. He had thus attempted to 
appropriate the power of jurisdiction for some cases 
of Niedergerlchtsbarkeit for the state. Under Francis 
II, however, the police was relieved of this duty and 
installed as an exclusively executive body COberhummer 
I: 83-4; Benna 1942: App. Ill for copy of letter by
the president of the government of Lower Austria to 
the directors of police rescinding their judicial
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rights]. With regard to shedding the police of its 
responsibilities for the local public health service, 
Pergen was encumbered by its popularity. Nevertheless, 
Pergen introduced a number of measures in order to 
reduce its cost: A means test on those who wanted to
use the service was introduced; regulations were 
issued to keep down the cost of prescriptions; and the 
service was limited as far as possible to treatment in 
hospital [ Vangermann 1959: 122]
Pergen secured for his ministry of police the 
responsibility for all activities to do with state 
security [Benna 1942: 180-3, who quotes Pergen's
statement on the sphere of competence of his ministry]
. The tasks to be performed included surveillance of 
foreigners <e.g. issuing of visa) and diplomats, 
enforcement of compulsory registration, the licensing 
of theatres, surveying of public opinion and its 
'guidance', and uncovering of secret societies 
C Vangermann 1959: 125-7], From 1801 onwards Pergen's
ministry was also in charge of censorship 
[ Kropatschek/F. II. 16: 157; Benna 1953: 221-5]. In
January 1794, a Court Resolution had already informed 
Pergen "that he was to receive fortnightly lists of 
all permitted and prohibited publications from the 
Censorship Department, and that all cheap publications 
intended for mass circulation would in future have to 
be approved by his ministry before permission to print 
could be granted" [Vangermann 1959: 128].
Furthermore, Pergen asserted the right to appoint all 
police officers in Vienna. At the same time, the 
government of Lower Austria was put in charge of trade 
supervision and market police and matters concerning 
public safety and public hygiene.
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Though this clear distinction between the 
responsibilities of the ministry of police and those 
of the government of Lower Austria would appear at 
first sight to have limited conflict and competition 
between the two government bodies, in reality this was 
not the case. First, the same police forces were 
answerable to two different bodies according to the 
tasks they were performing at any one time. This could 
not but give rise to controversy. Second, Pergen was 
not prepared to accept any communication between the 
director of police in Vienna and the government of 
Lower Austria of whose content he was not aware. In 
December 1793 he requested that the director of police 
provided him with a copy of all those reports which 
were being sent to the government. Furthermore, before 
any suggestions concerning innovations or improvements 
in policing were sent to the government, he demanded 
to be informed and consulted beforehand. But it would 
seem that the director of police was reluctant to 
conform to these demands, a fact manifestly reflected 
in Pergen's reminder of this request in March 1794 and 
February 1795 [ Oberhummer I: 89-903.
Despite the opposition by the government of Lower 
Austria to a reduction in its power, the ministry of 
police could secure its predominance. Whereas in the 
provinces all matters concerning the employment of 
officials were settled by mutual agreement, in Lower 
Austria, on the other hand, the government was 
bypassed. The directorate of police in Vienna was 
obliged to keep the ministry of police informed about 
its policing activities, whereas the provincial 
directorates were required to communicate directly 
with the ministry only in difficult cases. As 
Oberhummer [II: 1053 pointed out the voluntary and
amicable co-operation between the ministry and the
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provincial directorates opened up an opportunity for 
either side to bypass, if thought advisable, the 
president of the provincial government. In any case, 
the recurring justification for the different 
treatment of the government of Lower Austria was the 
importance which was attached by the minister of 
police to an efficient policing of Vienna in the 
interest of the security and survival of the state in 
a time of internal and external threat COberhummer II: 
96-7, 100-53 . It was only in March 1848 that all
matters concerning police were incorporated within the 
ministry of the interior CBenna 1953: 2303.
Since the summer of 1793 the police had been 
aware of the identity and movements of some of the 
'Jacobins' - as the members of these circles were now 
called by the state authorities. When they attempted 
to exploit the discontent amongst the population 
during the crisis of the summer of 1794, the police 
moved in and arrested the ringleaders. In his seminal 
study on that period, Vangermann cogently describes 
that critical situation:
The failure of the [military! campaign of 1793 had 
shattered whatever hopes of a short war had 
survived earlier disasters. The preparation of the 
1794 campaign involved new financial burdens . . . 
and a new drain of the badly needed manpower from 
the land to re-form depleted regiments. The 
continued requirements of army provisions helped 
push up prices from the already high level 
prevailing since the Turkish War and jeopardized 
supplies for the capital. The attempts to suppress 
exports to Revolutionary France and, after April 
1794, also to Revolutionary Poland inflicted 
considerable dislocation on Austrian commerce and 
industries. Everywhere an acute lack of money and 
men made itself felt. To crown all, the 1794 
harvest in Hungary, the monarchy's principal 
granary, was threatened by a severe drought. 
Inevitably, the brunt of all the hardship was 
borne by the non-privileged, who were still 
waiting for the concessions which had seemed at 
hand at the close of Leopold II's reign, but which
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had been shelved In that of his son [Vangermann 
1959: 1413.
In 1794, peasant resistance to recruitment became more 
obstinate and the sympathy for the French soldiers and 
the ideas of the French Revolution was growing. This 
sympathy "emerged in all the Habsburg provinces 
through which French prisoners of war had been 
transported, and even more in those where they finally 
settled. Everywhere the population showed a keen 
desire to come into close contact with the prisoners, 
and it was not long before the relations established 
were so friendly that an alarmed Ministry of Police 
urged decisive intervention" [ Vangermann 1959: 142-3;
Benda 1977: 2783.
In the summer of 1794, the police arrested the 
leading Jacobins in Austria and Hungary, and after the 
Jacobin Trials in 1794/95, two Austrian and eighteen 
Hungarian 'conspirators' were executed [Schuh 1979; 
Schuh 19803. The restaurative 'police-state' had been 
established. It was founded on the cooperation between 
monarchy and aristocracy which had come about in the 
face of external military and ideological threat 
coupled with an internal revolutionary challenge by 
disappointed sections of the middle class and the 
peasantry to the established political, economic, and 
social order.
Fart .Tw q
The state, police and public order: 
Ireland in the late 18th century.
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IX. The cleavage structure of Ireland in the l & H
Century
As in the chapters on the Austrian Empire it will 
be the main task of this analysis to describe and 
explain the ways in which the form and dynamics of the 
Irish class and cleavage structure have been affected 
by geopolitical relations of violence. Again it will 
be the analysis of attempts by the state to establish 
police forces under its own exclusive control for the 
maintenance of public order which will allow us to 
elucidate the distribution of power in Ireland. In
this introductory chapter I shall sketch three
interrelated components of the Irish conflict 
constellation. Conflicts arose from the fact that 
Ireland was a colonial dependency; that it was a 
Protestant kingdom in which the Catholic majority was 
politically and socially disenfranchised; and that its 
agrarian economy and society were affected by
commercialization. It will be the task of the
following chapters to show the impact which the
American War of Independence and the wars with
revolutionary France had on the power structure of 
Ireland.
A) Ireland as a colonial dependency
For most of the 18th century Ireland is a
prominent example of a colonial dependency. The
structure of both the Irish economy and polity was 
determined by, and subordinated to, English interests. 
In her economic relations with England, Ireland was 
subordinated to English interests in many respects. In 
the 1660s the English parliament passed legislation to
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prohibit the importation of Irish cattle into England 
[e.g., 15 Charles II, c. 8; 18 Charles II, c. 23. The
act of 1667 forbade the importation of cattle, sheep, 
pigs, beef, pork and bacon from Ireland into England 
after February 2, 1667. As the export of cattle
constituted the largest share in Irish trade, 
accounting for 55 per cent of the total export value 
in 1665, this act was thus seriously affecting one of 
Ireland's main sources of earnings CO'Donovan 1940: 
49-76; Crotty 1966: 12-73. An act of 1699 prohibited
the export of Irish woollens to any country other than 
England CIO & 11 William III, c. 10 <Engl.>; Kelly 
1980 on the history of the act3. Given the high duties 
on the import of woollen manufactures already 
operating in Britain, this act amounted in effect to 
an embargo and brought a serious set-back to the Irish 
woollen industry CO'Donovan 1940: 84-93; Crotty 1966:
11; McDowell 1979: 15; Beckett 1981: 155-6; Cullen
1986: 131-413.
The growth of the brewing industry in the early 
18th century was hampered by a series of British acts 
from 1710 onwards which stipulated that only British 
hops could be Imported into Ireland [e.g., 9 Anne, c.
12; Mathias 1959: 151-70 on the history of the Irish
brewing industry in the 18th century3 . An act of 1746 
made it illegal to export glass to any country 
whatsoever. Goods from British plantations had to be 
imported into Ireland through Britain; this 
stipulation, in turn, hampered direct export to the 
plantation "since an export without a corresponding 
import of commodities rendered shipping arrangements 
impractical" [O'Connell 1965: 51; cf. 19 Geo II, c. 12 
<Engl.> 3.
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Some economic activities were not regulated 
prohibitively. In 1696 English parliament enacted that 
from August 1, 1696 "hemp, flax and all production
thereof" imported into England from Ireland should 
enter free of all customs duties in order to reduce 
English dependence on foreign, continental linen C 7&8 
Will. Ill, c. 393, Furthermore, in 1705 direct 
exportation of Irish linen to the colonies was allowed 
[3&4 Anne, c. 7; Harte 1974: 91-3], Although export of 
Irish linen was unhindered Irish coloured linens were 
excluded from the British market in the interest of 
the Scottish linen-weavers
[3 Geo. I, c. 21; Beckett 1981: 1683. The provision
trade, including the export of cattle-products, was 
likewise unrestricted.
A look at Irish trade in the 18th century shows 
the Increasing commercialization of the Irish economy. 
But it also clearly shows the dependence of economic 
growth in Ireland on the English or British markets. 
In 1665, export in current values was a mere a&400, 000 
CO'Donovan 1940: 533. In the 1710s, however, it passed 
£1,000.000, giving a compound rate of increase of 2 
per cent £ Cullen 1981: 39 for these and the following
figures] . Slow growth in exports between the 1710s and 
1740s was followed by sustained growth. Between 1743/4 
and 1770/1 exports rose by 150 per cent, i.e. at a 
compound annual rate of 3.4 per cent. For the entire 
period 1743/4 to 1792/3 exports rose at a compound 
rate of 2.9 per cent. This indicates that after 1770/1 
the pace slackened. For the period 1792/3 to 1835 the 
rate of growth fell further, to 2.6 per cent per year. 
But the war years between 1793 and 1815 were a period 
of boom with the volume of exports rising by 40 per 
cent between 1792 and 1815. Exports valued at current 
prices rose by 120 per cent. According to Cullen
-  288 -
these years were the culminating phase of a long wave 
of expansion going back to the 1740s CCullen 1987a: 
100] .
The rapid growth of Irish trade was due to the 
expansion of Irish-British commerce. At the beginning 
of the 18th century 46 per cent of all Irish exports 
went to Britain. In 1740 Irish exports to England had 
risen to almost 54 per cent. By 1780 the dominance of 
the British markets had become even more demanding 
with more than 79 per cent of exports going to 
Britain. This figure was surpassed in 1800 when over 
85 per cent of the total of Irish exports went to 
Britain [Cullen 1968: 453. With regard to imports into 
Ireland, Britain was equally dominating. At the 
beginning of the 18th century British imports 
accounted for almost 54 per cent of all imports into 
Ireland. By the end of the century almost 79 per cent 
of all imports came from Britain [Cullen 1968: 453.
For Britain, the relative importance of the trade 
with Ireland increased when both the linen trade and 
the provisions trade grew rapidly in the second half 
of the 18th century. Imports from Ireland into Britain 
accounted for 3.9 per cent of all imports in 1700. By 
1750 almost 8 per cent of all British imports came 
from Ireland. In 1781 imports from Ireland constituted 
more than 14 per cent of all imports, falling back to 
10 per cent in 1800 [Cullen 1968: 463. In 1700 more
than 4 per cent of total British exports went to 
Ireland, reaching more than 10 per cent in 1750. In 
1771 almost 15 per cent of all British exports went to 
Ireland and in 1781 Ireland received 15.3 per cent of 
all British exports. In 1800 the importance of Ireland 
as a market for British goods had been somewhat 
diminished with 11.1 per cent of all British export
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going to Ireland. During the 18th century, however, 
British trade with Ireland was greater than that with 
any other European country [Cullen 1968: 46-7].
Throughout the eighteenth century the export of 
linen textiles far exceeded agricultural exports. So 
predominant was the export of linen textiles that at 
the end of the 1750s as much as 80 per cent of Irish 
exports to Britain (by value) consisted of linen cloth 
and yarn [Cullen 1968: 513. From 1710 onwards the
Anglo-Irish trade balance was in favour of Ireland 
[James 1973: 198-200; Clark/Donnelly 1983b: 293.
However, "Ireland's favorable balance was consumed in 
large part by charges paid for shipping, by merchants' 
commissions, by interest on loans, and especially by 
rents paid to absentee landlords [residing in 
England]'* [James 1973: 205]. Furthermore, the steady
growth of Britain's share in Irish trade does not only 
reflect the strength of the British economy, but gives 
also testimony to the advantages Britain gained from 
the restrictions imposed on Irish colonial and foreign 
trade.
Summarizing his magisterial study on Anglo-Irish 
trade in the 18th century, Cullen arrives at the 
following conclusion:
It seems clear that England's industrial 
expansion and Ireland's economic development in 
the 18th century are associated. Alternative 
markets for Irish products were few, and the 
English market, from the start the motor of 
expansion in the linen industry, came in the 
second half of the 18th century to play the same 
role as far as Irish agricultural products were 
concerned. At the time England's industrial 
expansion hardly appeared to threaten Ireland* s 
industrial prospects. Indeed the growth in 
effective demand in Ireland made possible by 
enlarged export outlets appeared to strengthen 
industry, and, as the second half of the 18th 
century progressed, larger units employing more
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capital and an extended division of labour 
replaced small and scattered units, many of which 
had succumbed to English competition in the 
middle of the 18th century CCullen 1968: 2063.
For better or worse, however, the structure of 
the Irish economy and Irish economic development was 
profoundly influenced by political and legislative 
action taken in England. The highly profitable 
provision trade, for example, was the result of the 
involuntary development of the new industry of 
processing meat products as a response to the Cattle 
Act of 1667 [ O'Donovan 1940: 623. Since this act
permitted the export of provisions to continental 
Europe, the British American colonies and the American 
colonies of the continental powers, Ireland, instead 
of sending live cattle to England, turned to exporting 
salt beef, salt pork, butter, and some cheese. But 
until the Seven Years' War, Ireland was prevented from 
exporting provisions to England. And as the embargo on 
the export of provisions in February 1776 during the 
first phase of the American War would show, the 
provision trade of Ireland with other regions was not 
outside the regulatory reach of the British 
government. It was because of this political 
subordination that the objection to the trade 
restrictions was as much constitutional as economic.
Economic dependence was accompanied, and 
maintained, by a highly developed system of political 
and legislative subordination. Poynings' law of 1495 
gave the Irish Privy Council the right to suppress or 
alter Heads of Bills arising in either Irish House of 
Parliament. The same power could be exercised by the 
English Privy Council once a Bill had been sent by the 
Irish Privy Council for scrutiny. On return of an 
altered bill from the English Privy Council the Irish
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Houses of Parliament had only the alternative of 
either accepting or else rejecting the bill. It was 
therefore only in cooperation with the Privy Councils 
that the Irish parliament could legislate [Foster 
1988; 23; Beckett 1981; 51 on Poynings' Law],
Moreover, in the Declatory Act of 1720 the 
British legislature had claimed its supremacy over the 
Irish parliament by asserting the right of binding 
Ireland by its acts [McDowell 1979; 130-13. It had
also stipulated that the British House of Lords was 
the final court of appeal in all Irish litigation. 
Furthermore, as about two-thirds of the revenue of the 
country, including customs and excise, had been voted 
to the crown in perpetuity - the Hereditary Revenue -, 
the financial control of parliament was heavily 
limited. Until 1768, when the Octennial Act was 
passed, there was no law limiting the duration of 
parliament which thus lasted an entire reign [McDowell 
1986; 205-73. This encroached most seriously on the
electoral privileges of the voters. There was no 
Habeas Corpus Act and judges held their seats not 
during good behaviour but during pleasure. Finally, 
there was no national militia and, until 1780, no 
Irish Mutiny Act which would have regulated the Irish 
military forces.
The legislative dependence of the Irish
parliament was reflected in the structure of the 
political administration. There was a complete 
separation between the legislature and the executive. 
The Lord Lieutenant as the chief governor was
nominated and appointed by the British government and
represented the King and the English cabinet. His
tenure of office was thus not dependent on his 
securing a majority in the Irish house of commons, but
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on the support of the British government and on the 
overall political constellation in Britain. The role 
of the Lord Lieutenant had gained in importance since 
the viceroyalty of Viscount Townshend in 1767. 
Townshend had been instrumental in breaking-up the 
'undertaker' system in which local magnates undertook 
to carry through the king's business inside parliament 
in return for a generous share of administrative 
patronage. He had succeeded in bringing administration 
back to Dublin Castle, the seat of the Lord Lieutenant 
[Bartlett 1979: 88-112; McCracken 1949: 152-683.
The management of the Irish parliament in 
general, and the securing of revenue (money) bills in 
particular, became the chief task of the Lord 
Lieutenant and the Irish administration. To achieve 
this task the administration used the traditional 
means of patronage to create peerages, positions, and 
pensions for supporters of the administration. The 
administrative exercise of the executive authority lay 
in the hands of the Chief Secretary who was also the 
leader of the house of commons. Appointed by the 
British cabinet, his powerful position owed much to 
the fact that he was responsible to the Lord 
Lieutenant alone and that he was the channel through 
which honours, favours and rewards were dispensed. 
Since the 1760s all political and administrative power 
became increasingly centralized in the hands of the 
chief secretary [Johnston 1963: 393.
B) Political and religious cleavages in Irish society
To fully understand the political structure of 
Ireland in the 18th century one has to recognize that 
Ireland was a Protestant kingdom although the mass of
the population were Catholic. Protestants alone held 
the elective franchise and were eligible to sit in 
parliament; they alone could hold office under the 
crown; they alone could participate in local 
government. The Roman Catholic population, which 
represented about three-quarters of the inhabitants of 
Ireland, was deliberately kept in a position of 
political, economic, and social inferiority through 
acts of parliament. A plethora of * penal laws' between 
1692 and 1728 prevented the Catholics from acquiring 
the economic means and the social position which would 
have enabled and entitled them to participate in the 
country's government. It was indicative that those 
provisions of the penal laws that were taken most 
seriously were directed, not against the practice of 
the Catholic religion, but against Catholic landed 
property, for land was the basis of political power 
[Troy 1793: 17; Stewart 1977: 103-4; Corish 1981: 73
ff. ] .
Through the penal laws the Catholic majority was 
marginalized and the 'Protestant Ascendancy* 
established [on Anglo-Irish Ascendancy as a political 
and social elite: Beckett 1976; Canny 1987 on the
identity formation of the Anglo-Irish since the late 
16th century; Foster 1988: chap. 8 on 'The Ascendancy
Mind']. This Ascendancy was thoroughly Anglican, in 
distinction to the Protestant Dissenters of Scottish 
origins who settled in Ulster in the 17th century. 
This Anglican, Anglo-Irish Ascendancy was not so much 
a strictly ethnic group but rather a socio-political 
elite which constituted itself in and through 
parliament. The Irish parliament in the 18th century 
was the exclusive preserve of the Ascendancy. Catholic 
peers who received writs of summons to the House of 
Lords were prevented from taking their seats by being
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unable to subscribe to the Oath of Supremacy. 
Throughout the century Catholics were excluded from 
membership of the House of Commons and between 1728 
and 1793 Catholics and those married to Catholics 
could not vote at parliamentary elections. The 'Popery 
Act' of 1704 stipulated that the oath of allegiance 
and an oath abjuring the Jacobite pretender had to be 
taken before voting at parliamentary elections 12 
Anne, c. 6; Simms 1986: 263-76; Beckett 1981: 157-83.
The test clause of the act made it obligatory for 
holders of public office to take the sacrament 
according to the usage of the Church of Ireland. This 
sacramental test clause was obviously meant to further 
legally maintain the exclusion of Roman Catholics 
from offices in the State, municipal corporations, and 
the army. But it equally applied to the Presbyterians, 
i.e., the Protestant dissenters, and brought about the 
political marginalization of this religious 
denomination as well. The explanation for including in 
an anti-Catholic bill provisions that obviously 
affected Presbyterians seems to lie in English tory 
politics, which was actively anti-dissenter at that 
time [Simms 1986: 263 ff.; Beckett 1948: 43-53, In any 
case, this act merely legally legitimized the 
marginalization of the Presbyterians which was in 
effect founded on their social and economic status. 
Most of them were tenant-farmers in the North and did 
not qualify as forty-shilling freeholders. This would 
have entitled them to participate in county 
elections [McCracken 1973a: 1393.
But not all sections of the Anglicans were 
represented in the Irish parliament. Rather, 
parliament was an instrument of the Anglican 
landlords. The landed aristocracy exercised decisive 
control over the election of the three hundred
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members of the house of commons. One hundred and fifty- 
constituencies each returned two members. Thirty-two 
of these were county constituencies, based on a forty- 
shilling freeholder franchise. In these constituencies 
control over the election of candidates could be 
exercised by creating fictitious freeholds and by 
putting pressure on the freeholders, by using bribery 
and patronage or by controlling the appointment of the 
sheriffs who acted as returning officers. There were 
also 117 boroughs (plus Trinity College, Dublin), and 
membership for these was less prestigious than for the 
county constituencies. Curtis C1937: 323-4] points out 
that
In the boroughs the votes varied from place to 
place; in some the corporation alone elected the 
member, in others the local magistrate, in others 
all the residents. Most of them were 
insignificant places, owned by the patron and 
called 'pocket boroughs', others, the 'decayed' 
or 'rotten' boroughs, had few or in several cases 
no inhabitants. The patrons had the nomination of 
176 members, and 86 sat for rotten boroughs. 
Above two-thirds of the seats in the House, 
[Henry] Grattan declared in 1790, were private 
property.
Lecky C 11: 347] states that in 1783 it was
computed "that 124 members of the House of Commons 
were absolutely nominated by fifty-three peers, while 
ninety-one others were chosen by fifty-two commoners". 
In those boroughs where only the members of the 
corporation and the freemen had the right to vote, it 
was imperative for the political magnate to ensure 
that the thirteen or sometimes twelve members of the 
corporation were his nominees and that only his 
supporters were admitted as freemen [McCracken 1973a: 
141]. In these constituencies control was less 
troublesome than in county constituencies. But, 
whereas, in fact, few county elections were contested, 
in those boroughs which were more open as regards
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representation as a result of a fragmented local power 
structure elections were more frequently contested 
[Foster 1988: 234-5],
Given the electoral system and composition of 
parliament, there is, thus, ample justification for 
arguing that "but for the handful of Protestant 
Dissenting M. P.s, and but for a few Protestant
Dissenting and Catholic landowners who had proprietary
interests in county elections, the Anglo-Irish
Ascendancy could be defined as comprising those who 
themselves sat in the Irish parliament or who 
exercised significant influence over the return of the 
300 members to the House of Commons" [Malcomson 1978: 
XIX3 . It was in parliament that the Ascendancy as the 
'political nation' of Ireland assembled. The overall 
position of the Irish Protestant Ascendancy as the 
dominant class within Irish society, however, brought 
about a general disposition towards centralization and 
uniformity in government. MacDonagh C1981: 316]
argues that "centralised authoritarianism and national 
uniformity were inherent tendencies in Irish 
government at all levels, including the local, even in 
the eighteenth century". The Protestant ruling class 
was numerically too small and it was too scattered in 
residence to govern individually or in small groups. 
Furthermore, given the economic conditions the parish 
could not be administratively self-sufficient. 
Finally, alienated from the mass of their fellow 
countrymen through differences in religion, language, 
interest and habit, the ruling class "bound themselves 
together on national rather than parish, county or 
even regional lines. Their primary identification was 
with their own order spread thinly across the entire 
country, not with a particular place or neighbourhood. 
Their common ground was Dublin It was thus in
-  297 -
parliament that the uneasy but necessary co-operation 
between the Irish ruling class and the English- 
orientated Irish administration had to materialize.
But the Irish administration, too, had an 
influence in parliament. In the 1690s, when the 
expenditure of the Irish administration was greater 
than the hereditary revenue of the crown, the Irish 
parliament had voted additional duties for a limited 
period only. It became therefore necessary for the 
Irish government to devise strategies and mechanisms 
to secure parliament's vote for supplies on which the 
maintenance of the administration depended. One way of 
doing so was for the administration to exert the power 
of patronage and bestow honours, favours, offices 
upon members of parliament and thus bind them to 
government interests. Kennedy [1974: 603 states that
in 1769 the Irish administration was likely to be able 
to control seventy-eight places, in 1782 ninety-six, 
and in 1789 one hundred and ten. That is to say, that 
the government's influence increased from 26 per cent 
to 32 per cent to 37 per cent of the lower house. It 
was through the use of patronage that the legislature 
was Joined to the executive.
In these cases patronage was distributed for 
electioneering and 'party' purposes. But patronage was 
also used as an essential part of local government. 
Local magnates who were not in systematic opposition 
to the government could expect a fair share of local 
patronage. Malcomson argues that political
considerations held low priority in local 
appointments, unless record of residence, size of 
property, and personal respectability of the persons 
under consideration were equal or nearly equal: 
"Those local magnates who had the distribution of it,
-  298 -
were not merely electoral interests; they were the 
unpaid representatives of the government in the 
provinces, and as such were entitled to expect that
the patronage as well as the authority of the
government would be delegated to them" [Malcomson 
1978: 248-9; 250-13.
In practice, there was a confluence of the two 
motives behind the system of patronage. The control, 
for example, which Lord Shannon exerted over the
county and borough constituencies of County Cork made 
him vital to the strength of the Irish administration. 
Well aware of his position of power, which he held
vis-A-vis the government as a result of his large
parliamentary following, Shannon demanded that "he
should always have the nomination of one bishop, one
judge, and one commissioner of the revenue, besides 
office for himself, inferior office for his
dependents, and the whole patronage of the county and 
city of Cork" [Shannon to the Earl of Buckingham 
[without date], quoted in: Brie 1983: 1023.
By and large, the Anglo-Irish Ascendancy and the 
Irish government were agreed on keeping the Catholic 
population excluded from political participation. The 
measures designed to achieve this were manifold [Wall 
1961: 13-33; Corish 1985: 123-5; Brady/Corish 1971 (on
the situation of the Catholic Church under the penal 
laws); Brady <ed. ) (1953) on Catholics and Catholicism 
as represented in the 18th century press] . In 1692 
members of both Irish houses of parliament were 
required to take an oath of allegiance, a declaration 
against the Mass, Transubstantiation, and other Roman 
Catholic doctrines, and also an oath abjuring the 
spiritual supremacy of the Pope. This act virtually 
prevented Roman Catholics from becoming members of
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parliament. In 1695 acts were passed against Catholic 
education, abroad or at home, and for disarming 
'papists' - as the Roman Catholics were now to be 
called. An act of 1698 allowed Roman Catholics to 
practice law only if they took an oath of allegiance 
and abjuration of the papal authority.
Barring Catholics from practicing law secured, in 
effect, the monopoly of government office to the 
Anglicans. This monopolistic position was strengthened 
by the fact that local administration of justice was 
completely in their hands. They alone appointed the 
sheriffs for each county, who, in turn, had the power 
to nominate people of sufficient property 
qualifications to serve on the grand jury of the 
counties. In 1708 the political exclusion of Catholics 
from grand Juries was legalized by an act which 
forbade them to act as grand Jurors. These grand 
juries were responsible both for criminal jurisdiction 
and for local government at the county level, 
deciding, as one of their major tasks, the level of 
county taxation, i.e. the county cess. They completed 
their domination of the machinery for the local 
administration of justice by monopolizing the task of 
the local justice of the peace and by retaining the 
right to adjudicate local grievances in their manorial 
courts.
In 1697 an act was passed for the banishment of 
all Roman Catholic bishops and dignitaries. At the 
time of the passing of the Banishment Act C9 Will. 
Ill, c. 1], thirteen sees were already vacant, and 
three archbishops and two bishops had left Ireland for 
the Continent on the defeat of King James in 1690. Of 
the eight bishops who remained in the country, only 
two, perhaps three, were still in Ireland by 1703
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[Wall 1961: 15-7; Brady/Corish 1971: 6-73. The
Banishment Act was complemented by the Registration 
Act of 1704 C2 Anne, c. 73. It stipulated that any 
secular priest who took a simple oath of allegiance 
would be officially registered and could then perform 
his priestly functions undisturbed by the political 
powers. This act brought about the registration of 
1,089 priests. It was to remain in force until 1780. 
The Registration Act was tightened up in 1709 C8 Anne, 
c. 33 when it was decreed that all priests who had 
registered in 1704 should now be compelled to take the 
Oath of Abjuration in open court. If they refused, 
they should be expelled from the country. But of those 
priests who had registered in 1704, only thirty-three 
are known to have taken the Abjuration Oath, This 
refusal of more than a thousand priests rendered 
government powerless against them, "as any attempt to 
banish them would have caused riots and rebellions in 
every parish in Ireland, and troops could not be 
spared in time of war to deal with such a situation" 
[Wall 1961: 55; cf. also Wall 1961: 23-4; Brady/Corish 
1971: 17-93.
The most fai— reaching legislation was the 'Popery 
Act' of 1704, which has already been mentioned above 
as regards its direct political implications. In its 
provisions relating to real property the 'Popery Act' 
thought to prevent any increase in the area of land 
held by Roman Catholics. This meant in practical terms 
that the property freehold of about one-eighth of the 
land which the Roman Catholics possessed by 1700 
should not be increased CCurtis 1937: 2763. The act
stipulated that Roman Catholics could only inherit 
from one another; that they might not purchase land 
and could not take a lease for a term exceeding 
thirty-one years; and that the lease had to be at a
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rent of at least two-thirds the yearly value. 
Furthermore, it was enacted that on the death of the 
landlord his land had to be equally divided among all 
his sons unless the eldest son 'conformed' to the 
established church - in which case he was to inherit 
the whole estate. This meant that there was a premium 
of religious conformity to be paid if the estate was 
to be maintained as a viable economic unit.
These provisions almost completed the destruction 
of the Roman Catholic gentry: "Landed families, faced
with a choice between conforming to the Church of 
Ireland and seeing their estates dissipated by 
repeated subdivision in successive generations, 
commonly preferred to conform; and those who did not 
tended to sink lower and lower in the economic scale 
. . . those who survived had no desire to attract the 
attention of government by engaging in any political 
activity" [Beckett 1981: 1583.
Estimates of the percentage of land in Catholic 
hands indicate the effect of the Villiamite land 
confiscation and the penal laws. In 1603 ninety per 
cent of the land under cultivation was held by 
Catholics; in 1641 fifty-nine per cent; in 1688 
twenty-two per cent; in 1703 fourteen per cent; and in 
1778 five per cent [Elliott 1982: 83. These figures
reflect not only the effects of the penal laws in the 
18th century but also the confiscations of land by the 
English crown during the seventeenth century. Up to 
1641 almost all the victims of these confiscations 
were the Gaelic Irish magnates. But after 1641 the 
'Old English', who had colonized Ireland under Henry 
II's 'lordship of Ireland' after 1171, also lost land 
to the crown. The plantations in Ulster were set in 
motion after 'the flight of the earls' to Rome in
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1607/8. The rebellion of Ulster chieftains against the 
authority of the English crown had ended in their 
defeat in 1603. When the leaders of the rebellion fled 
the country in 1607, their secret and unauthorized 
departure was treated as confession of treason and 
their estates were declared forfeit to the English 
crown.
The next major confiscation of land was the 
Cromwellian settlement of 1652. The Irish rebellion in 
1641 had been squashed by English troops. The English 
parliament had passed an act promising repayment in 
Irish land to those who would advance money for the 
war (the so-called 'Adventurers'). 2,500,000 acres out 
of the expected confiscations were set aside to meet 
this liability. But it was only after Cromwell's 
conquest of Ireland in 1652, that an Act of Settlement 
gave force to the Adventurers' Act of 1642. Those 
proprietors who had forfeited their land were
transported to Connaught and new proprietors
established in their place. Although legislation in 
1662 and 1665 in the reign of Charles II did reinstate 
a number of former proprietors, almost four-fifth of 
the land was now in the hands of Protestant landlords. 
The treaty of Limerick in 1691 after the defeat of 
James II against William ushered in the last 
substantial confiscation of land in the 17th century. 
Almost 1,000,000 acres were confiscated giving the 
Protestants legal control over about eighty-five per 
cent of the land under cultivation [Beckett 1981: 43- 
8, 87, 105-9, 119-21, 149; also Moody 1939, Perceval1-
Maxwell 1973, and Stewart 1977: 21-41 on Ulster
plantations; Prendergast 1865 and Bortigheimer 1971 on 
the Cromwellian settlement; Simms 1956 on the
Williamite confiscation].
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The restrictive penal laws of the 18th century 
drove many Catholics into trade as the only career 
open to them. And it was through commercial activities 
that a Catholic middle class developed during the 18th 
century. So successful were the Catholic merchants 
that the Protestant guilds and corporations frequently 
demanded protection from parliament against Catholic 
intrusion into their business interests. In February 
1762, for example, the corporation of Galway 
petitioned parliament complaining that Protestants 
were discouraged from following trade or business, 
papists in general declining to deal with them; and 
the wealth of the town, or by much the greater part of 
it, being in their hands, they thereby acquired 
considerable influence and power over the indigent 
Protestant tradesmen CJHC VII <1761-4): 1443.
This complaint contained some truth. The rules, 
regulations, and traditions of government in cities 
and chartered towns were often directly contravened. 
These charters provided that only guild members were 
entitled to to carry on trade. Catholics, however, 
were excluded from membership in guilds for economic 
and political reasons. In theory, therefore, it would 
have been possible to obstruct their trade and 
confiscate those goods which they offered for sale. 
But in practice, such a policy was likely to yield a 
negative result. First, the Protestant traders and 
merchants had to reckon with a boycott of their own 
goods by their Catholic customers. Second, there was 
nothing that could prevent Catholic merchants to set 
up business immediately outside the town boundaries. 
It was in this situation that the Protestant merchant 
class turned to parliament for support [Wall 1969: 
433 .
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One attempt by the Protestant urban middle-class 
to proscribe the economic activities of the Catholic 
merchants and traders was the endeavour of the
Protestant corporations and guilds to have a 
quarterage bill passed by parliament. MacGeehin has
succinctly summarized the issue at stake:
Catholics could not be permitted to become 
freemen of corporate towns as they would then 
share in all the privileges, exemptions and
benefits of freemen, and moreover, they would 
have the right of voting for members of
parliament and municipal officers , . . As non­
freemen were non-eligible to become "free 
brothers" in the guilds (i.e. they could not 
become full guild members), it was now decided to 
introduce to the guilds the new status of 
"quartei— brother" ... A non-freeman was admitted 
as a quarter-brother ... on payment of a fine 
called "intrusion money" and remained free of the 
guild so long as he paid his quarterage regularly 
every quarter day, and conformed to the guild 
regulations [MacGeehin 1952: 943.
Catholics regarded quarterage as an unjust and 
illegal levy and very often refused to pay it. The law 
courts, however, denied the legal right of guilds and 
corporations to enforce quarterage from non-freemen by 
virtue of their charters. The guilds and corporations 
attempted therefore to secure statutory sanction for 
quarterage. But although heads of quarterage bills
were passed in parliament in 1768, 1772, and 1778,
they did not get on the statute book because they were
cushioned in the privy council [MacGeehin 1952: 101
ff. 3 . The case for the Catholic interests was 
effectively made by the Catholic Committee which
organized and mobilized the Catholic middle class 
around this issue [cf., e.g., the committee's petition 
against the 1772 Quarterage Bill in: Minute Book: 14-
153 . This Catholic Committee was to play an important 
role in the struggle for Catholic emancipation in the 
1790s.
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It was due to the social composition of 
parliament that the Catholics occupied a fairly 
strong bargaining position- In a parliament composed 
almost entirely of landed gentlemen it was highly 
unlikely that additional supplies should be found by 
levying taxes on land. It was in the field of commerce 
that new sources of revenue were realized: taxes on
imports and exports and on the sale of tobacco, ale 
and spirits could be levied without too much adverse 
affect on the landed aristocracy and gentry. It has 
been calculated that customs duties and excise 
contributed around three-fifths to the national 
revenue for most of the 18th century. The English land 
tax had no parallel in Ireland and the "quit, and 
crown rents, which had to be paid by the inheritors of 
certain classes of forfeited property, were fixed and 
generally low [Dickson 1987: 76-73. Given this
structure of taxation, the landed elite, assembled in 
parliament, had very good reasons to protect the 
Catholic merchants and traders against any attempts by 
the Protestant urban middle-class to hinder their 
economic activities [Wall 19583,
But one should not overestimate the importance of 
the Catholic merchant class. Neither in the city of 
Dublin nor in Belfast and Derry was there any 
considerable number of Catholic merchants of
substance. In Cork, Limerick, Waterford and Galway as 
well as in many towns outside Ulster, however, they 
consolidated and extended their trade during the 
century. This found its expression in petitions
against Catholic traders such as the one from the 
corporation of Galway which I cited above. But even in 
these areas, the influence of Catholic merchants was 
far from being dominant. The city of Cork, for
example, had a two-to-one Catholic majority in the
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1730s; by the turn of the century, this majority had 
increased to four-to-one, including the extra-mural 
quarters. But of those merchants who engaged in 
foreign trade in 1758 only about twenty per cent were 
Catholics, and they formed about 27 per cent of a 
similar total in 1795 C Dickson 1980: 47; Wall 1969:
40-1], But notwithstanding these qualifications as to 
the overall position of the Catholic merchant class it 
should be noted that a Catholic middle-class did 
develop in the 18th century achieving such wealth 
which would allow the Irish Catholics by the time the 
Bank of Ireland was set up in 1783 to subscribe 10 per 
cent of the total capital [Foster 1988: 2053.
C) The agrarian economy and economic conflict
In agrarian Ireland during the 18th. century, 
ownership of land and control over the tenants who 
were cultivating it remained the foundation of 
economic wealth, political power and social standing. 
Economic changes in Irish agriculture and a social 
transformation of the agrarian class structure were 
thus likely to have a strong impact on the 
distribution of power chances in Irish society at 
large. Fundamental to the Irish land system in the 
18th century was its hierarchical structure. The 
estates of many landlords in Ireland in the 18th 
century were held by a mixture of two forms of 
property ownership. Freehold estate was land held 
under patent from the Crown which was encumbered only 
by a fixed "quit" rent of very modest proportions. 
Apart from the fee-simple or freehold estates there 
were those tracts of land occupied on the basis of 
perpetuity leases which run for three lives and were 
renewable for ever.
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Until the middle of the 18th century, landlords 
typically aimed at attracting substantial, industrious 
and resident improvers, preferably Protestant and 
English, as their tenants. In the seventeenth and 
early 18th century, when price trends had been 
indifferent and the great mass of rural inhabitants 
did not possess the necessary means of stocking a 
farm, leasing large units of land to single 
individuals who would reside on the land was meant to 
guarantee a steady rent return. As the number of 
migrants from England decreased around 1700, there was 
an additional incentive to let large units of land to 
single tenants since the local supply of capitalized 
tenants with the desired qualities was inadequate. The 
duration of the lease depended on the religion of the 
prospective tenant. In accordance with the Popery Act 
of 1704, Roman Catholics could not hold a lease of 
more than thirty-one years. For Protestants, however, 
there was no such limitation. Rather, they could be 
granted leases that remained in force as long as any 
number of persons named in the lease survived. With 
such a lease for lives the tenant became a freeholder 
and was thus entitled to vote in parliamentary 
elections. As the landlords' political clout depended 
on the number of voters they could control it was in 
their political interest to grant leases for lives.
The large size of the rented lands enabled these 
substantial lease-holding tenants to sublet tracts of 
their land at a higher rent and for a shorter term to 
undertenants. They could thus become 'middlemen' who 
were intermediaries between the head landlord and 
their own undertenants. Although middlemen were to be 
found in many parts of the country, it was only in the 
poorer parts of the south-west that the system was 
entrenched. In the dairying regions of Waterford,
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Cork, and Kerry, for example, the middleman system was 
universal. In these regions the middlemen were 
frequently Catholics involved in the dairy economy. 
They provided capital for dairying by letting cattle 
as well as land to "cowkeepers" or "dairymen" tenants 
C Cullen 1981: 100; Dickson 1980b: 1333. As this
involvement in building up a profitable industry 
indicates, middlemen were not necessarily 'rentiers', 
living on profit rents exclusively. Particularly in 
tillage areas, middlemen were large farmers who worked 
parts of their land themselves and sublet the 
remainder to several tenants [ for this and the 
previous paragraph: Cullen 1981: 99-108; Cullen 1986:
174-7; Dickson 1979: 162-853.
In the course of the 18th century, those tenant 
farmers, who were holding their lease either from a 
middleman or a head landlord, frequently established 
an economic and social relationship with yet another 
segment of rural society, the 'cottiers'. Different 
types of relationships were included in this category. 
Bell, writing in 1804, gave the following description 
of the "cottyers" in the late 18th century as a 
labourer tied to work for the farmer if required, at 
rates which were credited as payments against the 
rent:
The master allowed each cottyer an acre or two of 
ground to plant potatoes in, with liberty for his 
cow to graze on the pasture grounds; and he 
agreed to pay him a certain sum for every day's 
work ... the whole amount of the cottyer's wages, 
at the end of the year, did not exceed what the 
master charged for his potatoe-garden, and for 
the grazing of his cow [Bell 1804: 83.
In its essence this description is accepted by 
Dickson for the region of South Munster. Dickson 
[ 1980b: 1333 arrives at the conclusion that in South
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Munster in 1700 cottiers did not constitute a precise 
economic or tenurial category. The term was applied to 
anyone who lived in a cottage or a cabin, who wore 
brogues, and whose diet for much of the year was based 
on the potato. Dickson contents that towards the end 
of the eighteenth century, however, the term had
become synonymous with the tied labourer - whose 
subsistence was primarily derived from an acre or two 
of land paid for in labour. Cullen [1987a: 78-82]
distinguishes two types of 'cottiers', those who
rented land for a nominal rent from a farmer and
discharged their rent in labour reckoned by the day, 
and those without land who had to pay an inflated cash 
rent for a plot and had to seek employment where it 
was available. Beames [1974/75: 3523, on the other
hand, argues that in the counties of Clare, Limerick, 
Kerry, Tipperary, Waterford and parts of King's
County, the term 'cottier' designated an occupier of a 
smallholding up to about ten acres of land who paid 
rent in money, not in labour. It would therefore seem 
that the term cottier is best applied to those 
peasants who could either approximate to the status of 
a small farmer or fall to the status of a (migrant) 
farm labourer.
There were a number of conflicts inherent in the 
structure of the land system. A major contentious 
issue was the level of rent on lease-hold land. As the 
leases had a typical duration of twenty-one or thirty- 
one years, or three lives, the years or decades in 
which rent became a bone of contention are easily 
identified. Starting-point of such an analysis are the 
years immediately after the Treaty of Limerick in 1691- 
when some order was restored in Ireland [Cullen 1981: 
43-43. After 1691 there was massive resetting of land 
for several years as the difficult economic conditions
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of the late 1680s and early 1690s had led to the 
abandonment of many farms by their tenants, with 
Protestants frequently returning to England. With 
economic conditions remaining uncertain due to the 
continuing Nine Years' War, until 1697 landlords 
attempted to attract tenants by demanding low rents. 
These twenty-one and thirty-one years leases set 
before 1697 expired between 1712 and 1717, and 1722 
and 1727 respectively, causing a sharp rise in rents 
in the late 1710s and 1720s. In a period of economic 
stagnation these increases were responsible for a 
redistribution of a static national income in favour 
of the landlords. The next period of rent 
reassessment, however, fell into the period of 
economic growth. Lease for twenty-one or thirty-one 
years, or three lives, set in the 1720s, fell in 
typically at various dates from 1740 to 1770. Rising 
farm income due to the widespread commercialization of 
agriculture allowed for rents to roughly double 
between 1745 and 1770. The economic stagnation of the 
1770s also halted the rise of rents, but it was at 
some time during the sustained rise in prices during 
the war years between 1793 and 1814 that lands set 
before the 1770s usually became due for renewal. By 
1815 rents had probably doubled again to £12 million 
CCullen 1986: 177-83.
But conflict did not only arise over the level of 
the new rent but also over the renewal of the lease. 
In the course of the increasing commercialization head 
landlords realized that the middleman tenant who had 
taken land at low rents and on long leases was the 
beneficiary of the general economic advance. He had 
been subletting tracts of land on higher rents and 
shorter tenures to undertenants and had thus been in a 
much better position than the head landlord to
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appropriate more speedily the economic profits which 
the rise in farm income created. From mid-century, 
therefore, the conventional letting policy of 
landowners changed radically [Dickson 1980b: 135-73.
As old leases fell in landlords increasingly rented 
out land directly to undertenants. As a consequence of 
the economic upswing many more small tenants than
before were now capable of stocking a farm and of 
paying rent. Cullen C1981: 1013 has cogently
summarized the social and economic issues at stake:
Thus, the Cmiddleman3 system was being challenged 
from above by the urge of landlords to eliminate 
middlemen and from below by the rise of the 
bettei— circumstanced tenantry ready to pay higher 
rents and no more likely than middlemen
intermediaries to default on payment. Landlords 
were, however, very ambivalent towards the
replacement of middlemen: they frequently
envisaged their replacement, but when leases came 
up for renewal they as frequently relet the land 
to them. This ambivalence can be accounted for 
very simply by the fact that many of the
middlemen were related by blood or marriage to 
members of gentry families, or were Protestants 
whose replacement by occupying farmers in the
more backward regions necessitated a departure 
from long-established tradition of favouring the 
solvent Protestant tenant. But the break-up of 
the system was inevitable though it could be 
slowed down by the operation of family and social 
considerations.
But there also developed an increasingly sharp 
conflict between the prospering tenant farmer and the 
cottier and labourer class. Rising prices benefited 
the tenant farmer. But the commercialization of 
farming gave the tenant an economic incentive to 
restrict access to land and to decline to grant plots 
of land to the land-poor if his own labour needs had 
been satisfied. In areas where commercial farming was 
we 11-developed, the cottier or labourer found himself 
in a situation in which he had to pay a competitive 
rent for his plot without in many instances the
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compensation of higher wages or more regular 
employment [Cullen 1969: 173. This conflict between
the well-to-do farmer and the marginalized smallholder 
and labourer gained increasing importance in the 
second half of the eigtheenth century and during the 
nineteenth century.
To sum up, the economic and political structure 
of Irish society brought about a number of major 
conflicts. There were the nationalist ambitions and 
economic interests of the Protestant Ascendancy which 
were at odds with the policies of the Irish (and 
British) government. The Protestant Ascendancy pressed 
for constitutional reform in the form of parliamentary 
independence since their interests were subordinated 
to English interests through legislation in the 
British parliament. As these interests were related 
above all to commerce and trade, the Irish dominant 
class also demanded a thorough restructuring of the 
Anglo-Irish trade relations. Whereas the Protestant 
Ascendancy fought for parliamentary independence, 
parliamentary electoral reform was on the political 
agenda of the politically disprivileged Protestant 
middle class and was likewise demanded by Catholics 
and Protestant Dissenters who were disenfranchised on 
religious grounds. In so far as the Catholic majority 
strove for full social , as well as political 
participation in Irish society, and thus for a 
complete repeal of the penal laws, theirs was the most 
fax— reaching demand. Their threat and challenge to the 
established power structure was only surpassed after 
the French Revolution when the 'democratic 
republicanism' of the United Irishmen gained ground 
and brought further strain to an already highly 
fragile political structure. Finally, as in all 
agrarian class-societies faced with the
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commercialization of agriculture, Ireland also 
experienced agrarian unrest and agrarian class 
struggle.
In the following analysis I will discuss the 
extent to which this conflict structure gained 
momentum due to geopolitical constellations in the 
late 18th century. I will also show how the capacity 
of the colonial government to establish organizations 
under its own exclusive control for the maintenance of 
'good government and public order* was circumscribed 
by the internal power configuration as well as by 
geopolitical imperatives.
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X. The American War of Independence and its political 
repercussions In Ireland.
I will show in this chapter that the American War 
of Independence, which effectively began in April 1775 
with the Skirmish at Lexington, precipitated a change 
in the power structure of Ireland. After the 
withdrawal of troops from Ireland for combat in the 
American colonies it became manifest that the Irish 
government did not have sufficient means of coercion 
to police the country and protect it against a French 
invasion. In this situation, sections of the
Protestant population took it upon themselves to form 
private companies to preserve the 'peace and good
order' and defend the borders. These 'Volunteers' 
became a major force in Irish politics, transforming 
the political cleavage structure. It will be discussed 
in this chapter how the government attempted 
desperately to exert some form of control over the
Volunteers and to assert its authority.
A) 'Public order' and the formation of the
'Volunteers' during the American War of Independence
The imposition of an embargo on the export of 
provisions from Ireland in February 1776 had an 
enormous impact on Irish politics. The embargo was 
designed to secure the supply for the British army and 
navy by prohibiting the export of victuals, above all 
meat and butter, to the European continent and the 
rebellious American colonies CO'Donovan 1940: 119-273.
The opposition in parliament argued that the embargo 
would ruin the Irish provision trade. The 
parliamentary agitation against the embargo could not
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but appeal very strongly to the merchant elements 
outside parliament. As the first octennial parliament 
had entered upon its final session in February 1776, 
the parliamentary opposition was hoping that its
stance against the embargo would be translated into 
electoral gains in the pending general election. The 
economic consequences of the embargo, however, were 
detrimental, not so much to the merchants, but to the 
poor. As increasingly large supplies of provisions for 
the British troops were required, the price of 
foodstuffs rose substantially within a month. This 
resulted in numerous riotous attempts by the destitute 
to prevent the removal of cargoes of provisions. So 
alarming did the situation become that in 1777
legislation to control the price of foodstuffs was 
introduced. But despite the gains which could be 
realized under the embargo, the provision merchants 
demanded the repeal of the embargo as the ensuing 
shortage due to renewed export would allow them to 
demand even higher prices [O'Connor 19403.
Opposed thus by the opposition within the Irish 
parliament and by important agrarian and commercial 
interests in Ireland, this embargo served as a focus 
for a fai— ranging attack on the general commercial
restrictions imposed on Ireland by Britain. The 
renewed agitation for a change in the Anglo-Irish 
trade relations which followed the imposition of the 
embargo, finally led to the British trade concessions 
in 1780. But in order to understand why the agitation 
for a 'free trade' could be successful one has to
analyse how the military demands imposed on Ireland by 
the British government as a result of the military, 
engagement in the American colonies changed the 
parameters of Irish politics.
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The role of the Irish army was seen as 
encompassing manifold functions. The Irish army owed 
its structure and size to arrangements between William 
and the powerful country opposition in England in 
1699. As the 90, 000-strong English army was to be 
reduced in the aftermath of the 'Glorious Revolution*, 
Ireland was to become in effect a reserve camp where 
extra regiments, beyond the minimal 7,000 men left on 
the English establishment, were to be maintained at 
Ireland's expense. These Irish troops, comprising 
12,000 men, were considered to be freely available 
for overseas services and accountable to London 
[Dickson 1987: 49]. Apart from this imperial function
the troops were charged with providing for "the 
security of the kingdom from foreign and internal 
enemies, the support of the civil magistrates, the 
aiding the collection of the revenue, and the having 
an eye to the popish interest" ['Remarks on barracks', 
c. 1768, quoted in: McCracken 1986: 833.
For an adequate performance of these functions it 
was considered necessary that the number of troops 
remaining in Ireland should not fall below 12,000 [cf.
preamble to Augmentation Act of 1769 in which the
nominal strength of the army was increased to 15,235 : 
9 Geo III, c.2, s.2 3. As the total strength of the 
army in Ireland in January 1775 was 13,474 men [Burns 
1963: 433 , the number of troops remaining in Ireland
fell well below this margin of 12,000 men when in 
November 1775 the Irish house of commons approved the
despatch of 4,000 troops to America. It was this
withdrawal of troops from Ireland for combat in the 
American colonies which precipitated a profound change 
in the distribution of power chances within Ireland.
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In September and October 1775 the peasant secret 
society of the Vhiteboys was active in Kilkenny and 
Tipperary and' other counties in Leinster and Munster. 
This agrarian unrest did not allow the landlords to 
depart light-heartedly with the protection which the 
army offered them and their property. In a county such 
as Wexford where the many resident landlords provided 
a substantial gentry class, a volunteer force could be 
raised in 1775 in order to suppress Whiteboy 
disturbances [Powell 1970: 16-93. But in regions with
a low number of resident landlords the raising of a 
private volunteer force was not a viable option. But 
everywhere it was the army which bore the major 
responsibility for policing the countryside. As 
violent agrarian class struggle did not abate in the 
following months, government was confronted with the 
task of establishing and maintaining 'internal peace 
and good order' without being able to use a sufficient 
number of troops.
The entry into war of France in February 1778 and 
of Spain in June 1779 added the task of organizing 
the defence of Ireland against invasion to the 
government's concern with the suppression of 
'tumultuous risings'. Both threats - the one to 
internal peace, the other to the security of the 
borders - were linked in that troops were concentrated 
in those areas most likely to be exposed to enemy 
forces trying to invade the country thus leaving other 
parts of the country without military police forces. 
Faced with this dilemma the government considered a 
classical instrument: the (re-)introduction of a
militia CMcAnally 1949: 2-43.
In 1778 the Militia Act was passed [ 17&18 Geo 
III., c.133. It entitled the Lord Lieutenant to issue
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commissions to Protestants for arraying the militia in 
such counties as were considered to be in need for 
further police forces. The militia was to be called 
out "for the publick service at any time upon the 
authority of any magistrate for the purpose of 
protecting the peace, and enforcing the execution of 
the laws" Cs.343. Militia companies should not be 
smaller than one hundred men nor bigger than five 
hundred, except in the county of the city of Dublin 
<1,000 men), of Cork <600 men) and of Limerick <500 
men) Cs. 143. The cost for clothing and pay should be 
defrayed by the treasury Cs.203 and arms, 
accoutrements, and ammunition should be delivered out 
of the stores [s.213. Property qualifications for the 
officer ranks were stipulated so that the deputy 
lieutenant, for example, had to command a freehold of 
£300 per annum or had to be heir to £600 [s. 383.
When the Militia Bill was discussed in the Irish 
Privy Council a number of privy councillors pointed 
out the profound dilemma in which the government found 
itself. The Lord Lieutenant argued in April 1778, on 
the one hand, that "in the southern parts the number 
of Protestants is so inconsiderable, that it would be 
difficult to form a militia, and the troops being 
stationed in those parts, there cannot be much 
occasion for it". In the north, on the other hand, the 
militia would be rather an unreliable force given that 
its intended function was "the preservation of the 
peace and good order amongst the lower ranks of 
people". "The militia would be composed of that body 
of people which may be suspected of being inclined to 
enter into ... riots" such as those which ensued from 
the opposition to the payment of rents, tithes, and 
assessment. That is, it was argued that those people
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who should be policed would assume the role of the 
police [quoted in: Grattan I: 300-13.
The Lord Lieutenant estimated the cost for forty 
militia companies, consisting together (commissioned 
and non-commissioned officers included) of 4520 men, 
at about £34, 000 for two years tin: Grattan I: 3033.
But as the Irish administration faced financial 
bankruptcy it was considered to be too expensive to 
put the Militia Act into operation. The financial 
situation of the government was so desperate that the 
Lord Lieutenant felt that he could not encamp the army 
and that "a large sum ought to be remitted from 
England, or no defence can be made" [Buckinghamshire 
on June 28, 1778, in: HMC Lothian: 352; on bankruptcy:
Buckinghamshire to Lord North, May 16, 1778, in:
Grattan I: 324-53.
The impending state bankruptcy was a sympton of 
the severe credit crisis of 1777-8 which was caused by 
a sharp slump in linen sales. The American war had 
caused a depression in England which was reflected by 
the autumn of 1777 in slow sales and poor prices for 
Irish linen: "Adverse rates of exchange from the
autumn of 1777 heralded the beginning of an acute 
credit crisis. Unemployment was widespread in the 
towns. In the countryside the linen weavers were 
underemployed. Reduced incomes were reflected in a 
decline in the consumption of dutiable commodities; 
from the end of 1777 government revenue slumped; the 
government had to borrow from the banks. Credit became 
very tight ... A sense of economic crisis was 
pervasive" [Cullen 1987a: 75; Dickson 1987: 1473.
With the government thus incapable of providing 
protection, sections of the Protestant population took
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it upon themselves to form private companies to 
preserve "the peace and good order" and defend the 
borders: the 'Volunteers', who had come to the fore
with the Belfast Volunteers in March 1778, entered 
Irish politics as a major force Con Belfast Volunteers 
and the beginnings of the volunteers in general, HMC 
Charlemont I: 48-53],
It has been argued CBurns 1959] that the 
formation of the Volunteers was not linked with any 
kind of ineptitude and weakness of government: "During 
the spring and summer of 1778 neither local politics, 
national politics, nor Government's reputed impotence 
in a time of crisis fostered volunteering in Belfast. 
Behind the volunteers of 1778 was the precedent of
1760" [Burns 1959: 682], Burns C1959: 683] points out 
that "Government's financial distress was relieved in 
early June by a loan of £50,000 from the Bank of
England; the army was enabled to execute its planned 
manoeuvres and encampments in July". This 
interpretation, however, is at odds with the view a 
member of the Irish administration expressed in 
February 1785. In the debate on the militia in 1785 
the attorney general Fitzgibbon told the house of 
commons that the then chief secretary Heron had 
conveyed to the citizens of Belfast "that the 
government had no power wherewith to afford them
protection, [whereupon] they armed themselves" [Pari. 
Reg. Ire. V <1785): 226-7.; cf. also letter by Chief
Secretary Heron to Banks, the Sovereign of Belfast, on 
August 14, 1778, in: MacNevin 1845: 72, n. 1].
The Volunteer corps were formed either by a
landlord taking the initiative and enlisting his 
tenantry or by neighbours binding themselves together 
[McDowell 1979: 256]. They were thoroughly middle and
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upper class organizations with merchants and the 
professional class dominant in the towns and landlords 
dominating in rural areas. The gentry usually provided 
the officers, while the rank and file tended to be 
middle class - businessmen and farmers [McDowell 1986: 
222; Beckett 1981: 2123. The working class was bound
to be virtually debarred from Joining the Volunteers 
because of the expenses involved. After all, the 
Volunteers had to provide their own equipment and with 
the development of the Volunteers to a kind of status 
group and fashionable part of 'Society* the expenses 
for conviviality could be very high, indeed 
prohibitive. Under much changed circumstances, which 
will be discussed in the course of this analysis, one 
of the Belfast Volunteer companies would agree in 1792 
to adopt a cheap uniform in order to facilitate the 
admission of new members CMcSkimmln 1849: 233.
The class character of the Volunteers became 
unequivocally manifest in their endorsement of the 
Combination Act of 1780 [O'Connell 1965: 259-66;
McLernon 1976 and Park 1979 for a brief discussion of 
the various anti-combinations acts in Ireland in the 
18th century3. This Act declared all combinations of 
employers as well as employees to be "a nuisance" and 
inimical to civic liberty. This act was a determined 
attempt to curtail the power of the Dublin journeymen 
combinations which had been formed amongst the 
tailors, shoemakers, printers, shipwrights, wool- 
combers, flax-dressers, broadcloth-weavers, hosiers, 
rope-makers, lamplighters, masons and carpenters 
[McDowell 1979:233. Prices, wages, and working 
conditions were the object of their activities, much 
to the annoyance of the employers. When the journeymen 
assembled on June 13 to draw up a resolution in 
protest against the Combination Bill, the military
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was called out and the Volunteers rushed to prepare 
for the suppression of any riots and the defence of 
Dublin against "domestic enemies", as the Independent 
Dublin Corps put it. In the struggle with the skilled 
workers "the middle classes stood firmly on the side 
of the masters" [O'Connell 1965: 263].
In their endeavour to maintain order and support 
the civil authorities the Volunteers acted as special 
constables. They arrested dangerous criminals and 
escorted prisoners to court and to gaol; they 
protected the cargo of shipwrecks and provided 
protection for excise men; they were engaged in crowd 
control and the suppression of local riots and 
agrarian disturbances; they guarded French prisoners 
of war and acted as fire brigades; and sometimes they 
assisted in the collection of tithes [O'Connell 1965: 
83; McDowell 1979: 258; McDowell 1986: 223; Lecky II:
2303 ,
In 1779 the number of Volunteers had risen to 
over 40,000 and their discipline they resembled more 
and more regular soldiers. And when in the summer of 
1779 a French invasion was thought to be imminent the 
Irish government decided to distribute 16,000 stand of 
militia arms among the Volunteers for home defence 
[Lecky II: 234-5 ; Butterfield 1949: 110-1; Smyth
1979: 116 argues that "By the end of the summer of
1779 . . . the Volunteers more resembled the militia
than they did the rather self-consciously 
'independent' force a year before".] The distribution 
of these militia arms was the most visible sign of the 
weak infrastructural power of the Irish 
administration.
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The government found itself in a very real 
dilemma. On the one hand, the Volunteers did perform 
tasks in the maintenance of public order and the 
defence of borders which were beyond the capacity of 
the state. But on the other hand, the Volunteers 
formed companies of armed men which were outside the 
sphere of government influence. The Lord Lieutenant 
would have much preferred regular soldiers to defend 
the northern coast against the French instead of the 
Volunteer corps of Belfast and Carrickfergus which 
mobilized about 8, 000 men in May 1779. But he 
realized that seizing the Volunteers' arms would have 
been "a violent expedient", and even "the preventing 
them from assembling without a military force, 
impracticable". "In the interior and remote parts of 
Ireland", he argued, "magistrates are scarce, and 
those few act with reluctance and timidity"; 
suppressing the Volunteers would therefore have been 
"difficult and delicate". He then gave a description 
of the condition of local administration which 
highlights the overall infrastructural weakness of the 
state:
for when the civil magistrate will rarely attempt 
to seize an offender suspected of the most 
enormous crimes, and when convicted, convey him 
to the place of execution without soldiers, - 
nay, when in many instances, persons cannot be 
put into possession of their property, nor, being 
possessed, maintain it, without such assistance, 
- there is little presumption in asserting, that 
unless bodies of troops had been universally 
dispersed, nothing could have been done to 
effect" [for this and the above quotes: 
Buckinghamshire to Lord Weymouth, May 24, 1779,
in: Grattan I: 3493.
Buckinghamshire also complained in another 
letter to Lord Weymouth on June 4, 1779 that "it is
not understood C in England] how very little is known 
of the interior and remote parts of this kingdom, and
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how difficult it is to obtain intelligence which may 
be depended upon". He pointed out that only rarely did 
he know anything about the activities of the Volunteer 
companies before he would read about it in the public 
newspapers. And the personal communication he received 
had been frequently contradictory [letter in: Grattan
I: 3573. These difficulties in collating and
collecting information had most likely more to do with 
local power holders holding back information from 
central government than with little developed 
communications technology C Malcomson 1978: XXVI3.
The Earl of Carlisle, the successor to 
Buckinghamshire as Lord Lieutenant, emphasized the 
very same weakness, complaining in September 1781 
that the Volunteers had "the arms of Government in 
their hands" [Carlisle on September 16, 1781, in: HMC
Carlisle: 5183. A week or so earlier Carlisle had
justified his attitude vis-A-vis the Volunteers in a 
letter to Lord Hillsborough. In this letter he stated 
very clearly the difficulties the government had to 
face:
In accepting the eventual services of the 
Volunteer Corps, these considerations presented 
themselves to me, and quickly decided me in the 
part I was to take; viz., that our Army consisted 
of hardly ten thousand men; that your Lordship's 
intelligence announced an invasion of fifteen 
thousand of the enemy; that there existed in this 
country a force of about twenty-five thousand men 
bearing the arms which government had put into 
their hands; that these would undoubtedly take 
the field; that many had made the actual offer to 
act under Government: - under these circumstances 
I make no doubt you will perceive the danger of 
hesitation, as it might have implied distrust, 
and have made it very difficult for me to have 
obtained hereafter the direction of a power which 
may possibly decide the fate of this country [in: 
HMC Carlisle: 5173.
As the government did not have the means to suppress 
the Volunteers and establish a monopoly of the means 
of coercion, Carlisle tried therefore to co-opt the 
Volunteers and bind them in this way to the policy of 
the government.
Given the acknowledged strength of the Volunteers 
and the equally acknowledged weakness of the 
government during the American War of Independence, it 
was very likely that the Volunteers should make 
economic and political demands on the basis of their 
strength and in return for the services they rendered 
to the state. The agitation against the imposition of 
the embargo on provisions and the precarious economic 
situation in 1777-8 put economic demands on the top of 
the political agenda.
B) Constitutional reform and trade concessions: the
political success of the 'Volunteers'
In April 1778 the British House of Commons had 
resolved that Ireland should be granted a direct 
export and import trade with the colonies. The only 
articles excluded should be woollen goods and tobacco. 
Furthermore, Irish sail-cloth, cordage and cotton yarn 
was to be admitted into Britain. But the legal 
implementation of these resolutions for the relaxation 
of the commercial restrictions was virtually made 
impossible by the ferocious opposition of the British 
manufacturers to these measures. It was with regard to 
these measures that Edmund Burke sent his well-known 
letters to his constituents in Bristol justifying his 
support for trade concessions against their criticisms 
C Burke 18523. The proposal permitting Ireland the 
direct import from the colonies was dropped and the
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concession for direct Irish export to the colonies was 
diminished in its value by the huge number of articles 
which were to be exempted from export. But 
notwithstanding the revocation of the planned 
concessions, the very fact that the resolutions in 
favour of Irish trade had been carried at all in the 
British House of Commons, had a profound effect on 
public opinion. As Butterfield [1949: 793 puts it:
"The English had confessed their sins; the parliament 
at Westminster had admitted its duty to Ireland - who 
that was an Irishman at all could now deny that his 
country had a case ?"
These half-hearted policies of trade concessions 
were received in Ireland by declarations against the 
importation of British manufactures [Williams 1972: 
442-33. In 1779 non-importation agreements in Ireland 
gathered force [O'Connell 1965: 132 ff.3. Except for
most parts of Ulster, where those in the linen 
industry and trade feared British countei— measures, 
non-importation agreements were entered into 
throughout the country. These non-importation 
associations expressed the interests of the propertied 
commercial classes [O'Connell 1965: 1353. Furthermore,
the civic magistrates, high sheriffs, and grand 
juries, who played a major part in organizing them, 
were for the most part identified with the Volunteer 
movement [Beckett 1981: 2123. The social composition
of the associations made it difficult for the 
government to confront them head on. Even if their 
economic effect was rather limited, the success of the 
associations in arousing public opinion and popular 
emotions was a major problem for the Irish government. 
The agitation in Ireland was complemented by the 
policy of the opposition in the British parliament 
which used the Irish issue to vigorously attack the
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British government [Butterfield 1949: 83 ff.; 138 ff.;
169 ff.].
Before the Irish parliament met again in autumn 
1779 members of parliament had been urged by their 
constituents to press for the removal of the trade 
restrictions in the next session. In parliament an 
amendment to the Lord Lieutenant's address was carried 
stating "that it is not by temporary expedients but by 
a free trade alone that this nation is now to be saved 
from impending ruin". When the King's reply to the 
address was considered unsatisfactory the Volunteers 
staged a major parade on College Green (Dublin) on 
November 4, demanding a short money bill and relief 
from the commercial restrictions and displaying a 
placard with the slogan "Free trade or else ?". On 
November 24 Henry Grattan carried a resolution in the 
House of Commons by 170 to 47 "that at this time it 
would be inexpedient to grant new taxes". On November 
25 the parliament passed a short money bill and 
voted supplies for only six months and on the same 
daythe opposition in the British parliament renewed 
its attack on the Irish policies of the government. 
The pressure for some alteration of the Anglo-Irish 
trade relations was mounting.
Concessions were finally enacted. The
restrictions on the export of wool, woollen goods and 
glass from Ireland were wholly repealed. Ireland was 
allowed to trade with the British colonies in America, 
the Vest Indies and Africa on terms equal to 
Britain's. This meant that the Irish parliament had to 
impose duties on the imports and exports to and from 
Ireland equal to those paid in British ports. Ireland 
was allowed to import foreign hops and had the 
restrictions on carrying gold and silver coins into
-  326 -
Ireland lifted. The Irish were allowed to become 
members of the Turkey Company and to trade directly 
with the Levant Sea. The two restrictions which were 
still kept in force excluded Irish trade from the area 
covered by the monopoly of the East India Company and 
forbade the re-export of colonial products to Great 
Britain [McDowell 1979: 267-70; Lecky II: 242-3; 
Butterfield 1949: 175-7; Beckett 1981: 215-193.
These trade concessions were a major victory for 
the Irish Patriots. But there was still the 
legislative dependency of Ireland. After the economic 
success the demand for constitutional reforms gained 
force [O'Brien 1987: 28-62 gives a summary of the
political manoevres of both the Irish and British 
administrations and the Irish opposition] . In 
parliament on November 19, Grattan moved a resolution 
"that the king's most excellent majesty, and the lords 
and commons of Ireland, are the only power competent 
to enact laws to bind Ireland" [quoted in: Beckett
1981: 2193. Although Grattan did not succeed with this 
resolution in parliament, he expressed not only the 
sentiments of the Irish Patriots but also the real 
situation in Ireland: British acts were frequently
considered not to be binding.
On the one hand, there was popular resistance to 
the implementation of English law. Lord Lieutenant
Carlisle wrote to Lord Hillsborough in March 1782,
Your lordship cannot be ignorant that the actual 
exercise of the British Parliament of Ireland 
[sic!3 was utterly and totally impracticable long 
before I arrived in this country. There was not a 
magistrate or revenue officer, however attached 
to or dependent on the British Government, who 
could venture to enforce an English law. The
attempt would have been madness, as it was
certain to receive a general and decided 
resistance, [quoted in: Lecky II: 2893
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As a contemporary observer pointed out the refusal to 
pay hearth-tax was so widespread in some areas that 
"it was no uncommon thing for the officers of the 
government to consider whether the whole of the taxes 
collected in some particular districts would be equal 
to the expense that must be incurred by the armed 
force which it must be necessary to employ in order to 
compel payment of them" [Bell 1804: 293.
On the other hand, even those who as officials 
were in charge of implementing English law did not 
distinguish themselves through diligent performance of 
their duties. When the substitution of an Irish mutiny 
act for the British mutiny act, which had hitherto 
governed the Irish military, was debated in 1780, the 
then Lord Lieutenant supported such a measure:
few magistrates would be found, throughout the 
kingdom, who would enforce the [British] Mutiny 
Act; that hardly any Jury, grand or petite, would 
take notice of it; and that so far as it is 
necessary for the protection of the officers, in 
keeping up the discipline of the army, by 
punishing offenders, it would not be admitted; 
and Juries would find indictments and verdicts 
against every officer who might be prosecuted for 
the inflicting of Court-Martial sentences [quoted 
in: Grattan II: 743
When, in response to this situation, the heads 
of an Irish mutiny bill were passed by parliament 
and transmitted to England through the privy council, 
Grattan's principle was practically accepted by the 
government. The attempt by the British cabinet to 
uphold its legislative prerogative in Irish matters by 
making the mutiny act perpetual instead of accepting 
its limited duration for one year proved utterly 
countei— productive. The Volunteers in Newry took issue 
with this alteration of the mutiny bill and resolved 
in August 1780 that
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rather than submit to the perpetual establishment 
of martial law in this country, we are ready to 
engage, as citizens and soldiers, to undergo the 
toil and discipline that may be necessary in 
order to support the police, and to enforce the 
due execution of the law of this land [quoted in: 
Grattan II: 149]
The armed citizens did not intend to put up any longer 
with their legislative dependence from Britain. In the 
same resolution they unequivocally threw down the 
gauntlet:
we are firmly convinced that the influence of the 
Crown has increased, is increasing, and ought to 
be diminished; and that the freedom of the 
country can only be preserved by the spirit of 
the people, and the virtue of the House of 
Commons [quoted in: Grattan II: 148],
The renewed threat of invasion in 1781 underlined 
the Volunteers' influence in, and importance for, 
the Irish state. The Lord Lieutenant had to accept,
though grudgingly, the services of the Volunteers. On 
15 February 1782 the representatives of 143 Ulster
Volunteer Corps convened at Dungannon and passed far- 
reaching resolutions which had been drawn up in 
advance by Charlemont, Grattan, Flood and other 
patriots. They resolved that "a citizen by learning 
the use of arms does not abandon any of his civil
rights". They proclaimed that "a claim of any body of 
men, other than the King, Lords, and Commons of
Ireland, to make laws to bind this kingdom is 
unconstitutional, illegal, and a grievance". They also 
considered as unconstitutional the power exercised by 
the British and Irish Privy Councils and the 
perpetuity of the Mutiny Act. They demanded the 
independence of judges and reaffirmed the principle of 
free trade. They also expressed their pleasure at "the 
relexation of the penal laws against our Roman
Catholic fellow-subjects" [for the resolutions: Lecky
II: 283-5].
With the fall of Lord North's ministry in Great 
Britain, the formation of a Whig government under 
Marquis of Rockingham in March 1782 and the 
replacement of Carlisle as Lord Lieutenant by the 
Duke of Portland in April the prospect for 
constitutional reforms improved [Beckett 1972: 123-41
on co-operation between English Whigs and Irish 
Patriots] . For the third time, and at last 
successfully, Grattan moved a declaration of rights in 
parliament on 16 April 1782 [Grattan II: 236-8], As he 
explained in a letter to Charles Fox, who had joined 
the Whig government, these rights were meant to do 
away with "the causes for discontents and jealousies 
. . . : a foreign legislation - a foreign judicature - a
legislative Privy Council - and a perpetual army" 
[Grattan II: 243]. They were not meant to bring about
the severance of links with Great Britain as such: 
Ireland wanted to share the freedom of England and 
likewise her fate; "standing and falling with the 
British nation" was, Grattan argued, the desire of 
Ireland [Grattan II: 238; Harlow 1952: 527 ff. about
the idea of 'togetherness'].
The new Lord Lieutenant, the Duke of Portland, 
supported the demand for concessions with regard to 
legislative independence and alterations of the mutiny 
act. In a letter to Fox, Portland expressed his "most 
anxious wishes for a speedy and favourable 
determination". He maintained that
There is still an appearance of government; but 
if you delay or refuse to be liberal, Government 
cannot exist here in its present form; and the 
sooner you recal [sic] your Lieutenant, and 
renounce all claim to this country, the better 
[in: Grattan II: 274].
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Portland was in agreement with his chief secretary, 
Fitzpatrick, who had already complained to Fox that 
they had been sent upon "a hopeless errand". The real 
truth was, he had written, "that there is no existing 
government in this country ... I hope you will be 
speedy in your resolutions . . . Long debates in your 
cabinet upon these matters will be very dangerous" 
[in: Fox I: 3983.
Constitutional reforms were enacted in June and 
July 1782. The Declatory Act was repealed, and 
Poynings* law was drastically amended, providing that 
all bills which had been approved by both houses of 
parliament had to be transmitted unaltered to England, 
and stipulating that the British Privy Council was 
only entitled to veto, not to alter Irish bills. The 
Irish Mutiny Act was made temporary and the
independence of Judges was proclaimed by proscribing 
their appointment on good behaviour. Together with the 
Liberty of the Subject Act [22 Geo III., c. 113 , which 
had already been passed in February clarifying the 
right of habeas corpus, these statutes constituted a 
major constitutional reform.
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XI. Ireland after the constitutional reforms. 1782 -
1769.
I have argued in the previous chapter that the 
formation of the Volunteer forces during the American 
War of Independence created a very real dilemma for 
the Irish government. On the one hand, the Volunteers 
did perform tasks in the maintenance of public order 
and the defence of the borders which were beyond the 
capacity of the state. But on the other hand, the
Volunteers formed companies of armed men which were
beyond the sphere of government influence. Not having
the means of suppressing the Volunteers, the
government's policy of co-opting them, and binding 
them in this way to the government, proved to be no 
way out of this dilemma either. Given the acknowledged 
position of strength of the Volunteers and the equally 
acknowledged weakness of the government, it was very 
likely that the Volunteers should make political 
demands on the basis of their strength and in return 
for the services they rendered to the State.
But after the constitutional reforms in 1782 
there was a realignment within Irish politics which 
opened up the opportunity for the Irish government to 
reassert its authority. Several factors contributed to 
this realignment. The split within the patriotic party 
became evident with Henry Flood's agitation against 
the 'simple repeal' of the 'Sixth of George I', i.e. 
the Declaratory Act of 1720. Grattan and his followers 
accepted the repeal of the Declaratory Act as a 
sufficient guarantee of Ireland's constitutional 
independence. Flood, however, contended that an 
unequivocal and formal renunciation by the British 
parliament of its claim to legislative superiority was
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warranted. He argued that the Declaratory Act had only 
asserted the British parliament's right to legislate 
for Ireland and had not been the basis upon which this 
right was claimed. He argued, therefore, that an act 
by the British parliament renouncing the right, and 
not only the assertion of this right, to legislate for 
Ireland was necessary in order to prevent the British 
parliament from changing its mind in future times and 
repeal the repeal of the Declaratory Act thereby 
resuming legislative and judicial superiority. Flood's 
agitation ended in success: in April 1783 the British
renunciation act C 23 Geo. 3, c. 283 acknowledged the 
exclusive right of the Irish parliament to legislate 
for Ireland and the exclusive jurisdiction of the 
Irish courts [O'Connell 1965: 333 - 42; Beckett 1981:
228-93.
Flood's political agitation ran counter to the 
political strategy of Grattan and his supporters. They 
wanted to end political mobilization in Ireland, or 
rather: they wanted parliament to be the only
legitimate arena where political agitation should take 
place. At issue was the re-definition of the
relationship between parliament and the Volunteers now 
that legislative independence had been won. The 
question over the form of, and the way towards,
parliamentary reform was to make this problem 
manifest. At the National Volunteer Convention, which 
assembled in Dublin in November 1783, a plan for
parliamentary reform was agreed C HMC Charlemont I: 
120-36 on the proceedings of the convention and the 
parliamentary debate3. It was decided that all voters 
had to be resident and registered in their respective 
constituencies; that the poll in the county
constituencies were to be taken in all baronies at the 
same time; that the boundaries of decayed boroughs
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were to be enlarged in order to include neighbouring 
parishes and baronies; that the franchise was to be 
granted to the Protestant freeholders and 
leaseholders; that elections for parliament were to be 
held every three years; that pensioners at pleasure 
were to be excluded from the House of Commons; and 
that Members of Parliament who accepted a pension for 
life or a place under the crown were to offer 
themselves for reelection CMcDowell 1986: 271; cf.
Henry Flood's scheme for parliamentary reform in: 
MacNevin 1845: 197-8, n. 3 .
The very fact that an extra-constitutional body 
demanded the reform of the legislature and prepared a 
plan to such effect aroused the anger of the majority 
of the Protestant Ascendancy in parliament - be they 
supporters of the Castle or patriots. When Flood moved 
to bring in the reform proposals as a bill in the 
House of Commons on November 29, parliament refused, 
by 157 to 77 votes, to receive the bill. Moreover, it 
passed a resolution, by 150 to 68 votes, declaring 
that it would "maintain its just rights and privileges 
against all encroachments whatsoever". Significantly, 
Grattan, who had voted for Flood's motion, voted also 
in favour of this resolution. He was to keep this line 
when he condemned the discussions of the radical 
reform congress which took place in October 1784. He 
argued then that conventions or congresses of that 
kind would not be "reconcileable to a House of 
Commons. Two sets of representatives - one de Jure, 
and another, supposing itself a representative de 
factot cannot co-exist" CGrattan III: 2153.
But it was not the extra-parliamentary character 
of these "representatives" as such which aroused 
opposition. After all, Grattan and others within the
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patriotic party had availed themselves of their 
support in their own fight for free trade and 
political and Juridical independence. It was the
changed social composition of this extra-parliamentary 
body which caused widespread anxiety. In the same
speech Grattan drew the attention of the House to
the alarming measure of drilling the lowest 
classes of the populace, by which a stain had
been put on the character of the Volunteers. The 
old, the original Volunteers had become
respectable, because they represented the 
property of the nation; but attempts had been 
made to arm the poverty of the kingdom C Grattan 
III: 2153.
It was this fear that "the volunteers without 
property", as Fox wrote, would soon be the only 
government in Ireland, unless they were faced "in a 
manful manner" [Fox on November 1, 1783 in: Grattan
III: 108; Cannon 1969: 90-13 which informed the
patriots' response to demands for political reform. 
Charlemont, who was in principle in favour of some 
sort of parliamentary reform, expressed these
considerations bluntly when he wrote that
the true definition of a Just and beneficial 
reform in the representation of the people is
simply this, that property should be equally and 
fully represented. But change this into the 
allowance of suffrage to every indigent 
individual . . . and, instead of constitutional 
freedom, the alteration would be productive of 
anarchy ... [ HMC Charlemont I: 136; emphasis
added3.
Thus, the supporters of parliamentary reform 
stood a bad chance of succeeding in their agitation. 
Major representatives of the Patriots did not endorse 
a reform which would have reduced their own power as 
borough-owners or the power of the borough-owners who 
were their sponsors "by extending boundaries and by 
rendering void all bylaws designed to limit the number
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of voters" [O'Connell 1965: 3863. They were
furthermore concerned that a lowering of the property 
requirements for voters would usher in a state of 
"anarchy". This view was 'naturally' shared by 
government. Lord lieutenant Rutland was well aware 
that "the system of Parliament in this country . . . 
does not bear the smallest resemblance to 
representation. [But] I do not see how quiet and good 
government could exist under any more popular mode" 
[Rutland to Pitt, June 16, 1784, in: Pitt
Correspondence: 17-183. This common opposition to
parliamentary reform was so much more unassailable as 
the controversy within the reform group over Catholic 
enfranchisement did not allow for the rallying of 
support from the Catholic middle class [Rogers 19343.
The split within the patriotic party was also 
reflected in the response to the government's attempts 
to concentrate the means of physical coercion in their 
hands. In June 1782, when the government's infantry 
strength was down to 7,555 men, it was proposed by 
government to raise fencible regiments, a kind of 
full-time militia, as a means of restoring "to the 
Crown the sole exercise of the sword", as the Lord 
Lieutenant put it [O'Brien 1987: 147-83. Both the
British government and the Irish parliament accepted 
the government's proposals and it was decided that six 
regiments, two in each of the provinces of Ulster and 
Munster, and one each in Leinster and Connacht, should 
be raised.
This scheme was obviously designed to undermine 
the position of the Volunteers and eventually to 
threaten their very existence. Charlemont and most of 
the Patriots supported the public detestation of the 
fencibles which found expression in the radical press
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throughout the autumn and winter of 1782 C HMC 
Charlemont I: 75-773. But the protest was not
unanimous. All six officers who were responsible for 
raising the fencibles were leading members of the 
Volunteers and Grattan did not publicly denounce the 
fencible regiments. But continued public agitation 
(during the same months in which the 'simple repeal' 
campaign was conducted) eventually resulted in the 
scheme being abandoned in the autumn of 1783 CSmyth 
1979: 127-8; O'Connell 1965: 337-83.
But the government was not to be discouraged. The 
Duke of Rutland, who was sworn in as Lord Lieutenant 
in February 1784, was adamant that "the existence of 
any order and good government in it" would not admit 
of "a body of troops independent of and unconnected 
with the State" [Rutland to Sydney, May 29, 1784, in:
HMC Rutland III: 99; also: Rutland to Pitt, June 16,
1784, in: Pitt Correspondence: 183 . Rutland strongly
advised against the reduction of the army in Ireland, 
which was under consideration in the British 
government, because it would "dangerously encourage 
the volunteers": "If government is to be maintained
respectable in this country, it must be powerfully 
backed, and armed against all contingencies; and if 
this material check on the spirit of intemperance, of 
discontent, and of sedition be removed, no man can 
answer for the consequences" [Rutland to Sydney, June 
17, 1784, in: HMC Rutland III: 109; also: Rutland to
Pitt, June 16, 1784, in: Pitt Correspondence: 193.
In April 1784 agrarian unrest, the first signs of 
which could be seen in Kilkenny, broke out again. In 
the same month parliament was occupied. The "mob", 
showing itself well aware of parliamentary procedure, 
carried in the affirmative a motion that the Speaker
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should be hanged. In view of these happenings 
parliament later censored the Lord Mayor that he had 
not exerted himself as he ought to have done and
accused the magistrates and the police of inefficiency 
CBeresford Correspondence I: 255; Pari.Reg.Ire. Ill
<1784): 86, 149-50]. These disturbances as well as
the continued popular unrest in Dublin during the 
summer months gave some force to Rutland's opinion 
that Ireland was "not a land of tranquillity" [Rutland 
to Pitt, June 16, 1784, in: Pitt Correspondence: 19;
also: HMC Rutland III: 86-73. "The spirit of sedition
and tumult" in Dublin was considered to make the
strengthening of the garrison in Dublin necessary 
[General W.A.Pitt to Rutland, July 15, 1784, in: HMC
Rutland III: 1243. The perceived inactivity of the
magistrates to quell the disturbances led Chief 
Secretary Orde to argue for an inquiry into the state 
of the magistracy and the police [Orde to Rutland, 
June 24, 1784, in: HMC Rutland III: 1133. It was "the
dominion and tyranny of the mob", countenanced by the 
Volunteers (as Rutland saw it), together with the
magistrates' neglect of their duties which made 
Rutland call "loudly for an immediate and vigorous 
interposition of Government" [Rutland to Pitt, August 
15, 1784, in: Pitt Correspondence: 373 .
Pitt shared Rutland's concern with the political 
stability of Ireland. In the autumn of 1784 he 
proposed three reform policies which he considered to 
form "one general system" [Pitt to Rutland, November 
4, 1784, in: Pitt Correspondence: 503 . He proposed the 
establishment of a 'common market' of the British 
Isles by the freeing of trade between Ireland and 
Great Britain in exchange for an automatic Irish 
contribution towards the upkeep of the imperial navy 
[Kelly 1975: 536-63; Koebner 1961: 252-65). He
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proposed that, whenever the annual yield of the 
hereditary revenue exceeded £656,000, the surplus 
should be paid towards the expenses of the navy. He 
also proposed "a prudent and temperate reform of 
Parliament" which should "unite the Protestant 
interest in excluding the Catholics from any share in 
the representation or the government of the country" 
CPitt to Rutland, October 7, 1784, in: Pitt
Correspondence: 43-4]. Both the parliamentary reform
and the commercial settlement should be informed by 
due regard for the interests of the Protestant 
Ascendancy [Pitt to Rutland, January 6, 1785, in: Pitt
Correspondence: 56-7]. Finally, he proposed the
formation of a national Protestant militia. The aim 
was either to convert the Volunteers into a militia or 
to bring them "under the sanction and control of the 
executive Government" CPitt to Rutland, November 4, 
1784, in: Pitt Correspondence: 49]. Rutland saw as the
objective of these reforms the quieting of tumult, the 
subduing of the factions that had disturbed the
tranquillity, the establishing of a lasting commercial 
union and the laying of the foundations of eternal 
amity between the two countries [Rutland to Pitt, 
November 1784, in: HMC Rutland III: 154].
The political tactic aimed at linking the reform 
of the commercial relations closely with the formation 
of the militia. Economic concessions should induce the 
industrial and commercial interests to give the
monopoly of the means of coercion to the government. 
Rutland suggested to Pitt in November that
at the same time as you communicate participation 
of the commercial advantages as part of a great 
and conclusive system for the final settlement of 
this country, a militia should be constituted and 
an Act of Parliament passed rendering it high 
treason for bodies of men to assemble as 
volunteers, with arms, uniforms, accoutrements,
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etc., without a legal commission from Government
tin: HMC Rutland III: 148].
This linkage was maintained over the next few months. 
After the Irish parliament had generally endorsed 
Pitt's propositions in February 1785, Rutland was 
confident that the Volunteer army could be abolished 
and the sword be restored to the executive in a short 
time [Rutland to Sydney, February 20, 1785, in: HMC
Rutland III: 1821. After the revision of the original
propositions in the British House of Commons he was 
much less confident, realizing the strong Irish 
opposition to the modifications. He wrote to Pitt in 
July 1785 [HMC Rutland III: 2253 that he was in doubt
"whether we shall be able to contend with the 
volunteers this year, and establish a militia; that 
must be determined by events in the progress of the 
propositions [on commerce]".
In parliament, the supporters of the motion that 
a sum of £20,000 should be granted for the purpose of 
clothing the militia, made no bones about the 
objective of this motion: the abolition of the
Volunteers [on 1785 militia, McAnally 1949: 5-53. It
was pointed out that the Volunteers had done nothing 
to help quell the riots of the previous summer. The
Volunteers had not taken "that warm part" to suppress
the "very great violences and outrages" "which their 
former conduct had given reason to hope". This was all 
the more deplorable because these riots, which were 
not confined to Dublin, "had the very worst effect 
upon public credit and upon private property. There 
are too many gentlemen in this country who have 
occasion to borrow money, and such was the opinion in 
England, that no man would venture to lend a guinea" 
[Pari. Reg. Ire. V (1785): 225-63. The Volunteers had
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become unreliable in securing the economic interests 
of the dominant class.
The Volunteers had allowed their name to be 
"blasphemed" by admitting into their ranks "all the 
armed beggary of the soil", as the Attorney General 
put it [Pari.Reg. Ire. V <1785): 227]. The problem, as
Grattan saw it, was that "there is a cankered part of 
the dregs of the people that has been armed" . The 
"primitive Volunteers" were a "great and honourable 
body of men"; but "they who now assume the name have 
much degenerated" [ Pari.Reg. Ire. V (1785): 237-83.
Arthur Wolfe, who was to become Attorney General in 
1789, expressed fear for his property and religion 
should all Dublin Volunteers be under arms 
CPari.Reg.Ire. V (1785): 2323. The Attorney General,
moreover, charged the Volunteers with eulogizing 
American liberty, with mobilizing the "dregs of the 
people" in their pursuit of sedition and even inviting 
Catholics to arm themselves [Pari.Reg.Ire. V (1785): 
2273. The political conclusion of these charges was 
clear: a militia had to be established lest the
Volunteers should succeed in their attempts to attack 
state and property, constitution and religion. The 
resolution was carried by 139 to 63 votes. Given the 
tone and thrust of Grattan's intervention it was small 
surprise that the Chief Secretary thanked Grattan for 
"the distinguished part" he had played "respecting the 
establishment of good order and just subordination to 
the Legislature" [Orde to Grattan, February 17, 1785,
in: Grattan III: 2173.
Mobilizing the militia, however, would have 
confronted the government with the same kind of 
problems which had been anticipated in the Privy 
Council in 1778. In a letter to Rutland, Lord Sydney
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summarized the thinking within the English government. 
Firstly, there was "the Jealousy of the Volunteers" to 
be overcome. Secondly, the establishment of a militia
would be used as a pretext for arguing the case for
diminishing the army, which would be "by no means a 
desirable measure". Thirdly, as "it is taken for 
granted" that the militia had to be a Protestant one, 
the Roman Catholics "cannot but be offended at being 
deprived of their arms, which will be put into the 
hands of Protestants". This posed a very real dilemma: 
on the one hand, "it is not advisable to allow the 
Catholics power", but on the other hand, it was also 
"extremely unadvisable to give them offence and 
mortification" CLord Sydney to Rutland, January 7, 
1786, in: HMC Rutland III: 2733. The political risks
involved in establishing the militia were thus 
considerable. And it was only in the critical 
situation of 1793, when Britain was at war with 
France, that the government effectively established a 
militia [Militia Act 33 Geo III, c. 22; this act will 
be discussed in a later chapter] .
In the year "when volunteering was on the wane"
[Wall 1973: 213, Ireland experienced a new outbreak of 
sustained peasant unrest. In mid-1785 the new bout of 
agrarian unrest started on the borders of Cork and 
Kerry. By July 1786 the 'Rightboy' movement embraced 
the counties of Cork, Kerry, Clare, Limerick, 
Tipperary, Waterford and Kilkenny. The Chief Secretary 
was quick to point out that this renewed unrest should 
not be allowed to serve as a pretext for the 
Volunteers to re-enter the public domain as an aid of 
the civil power. He urged the deployment of the army-, 
"until some regular police shall crush disorder in the 
seed, or some regular establishment of militia shall 
supersede any pretended necessity for occasional and
-  344 -
voluntary armaments of the people" COrde to Rutland, 
November 9, 1785, in: HMC Rutland III: 2573. Given the
problems with establishing a militia, it was to be 
expected that the government would attempt to form 
county police forces to combat agrarian unrest. But 
establishing such police forces would have to be 
reconciled with the interests of the Ascendancy class 
as the local power holders. Only in a situation of 
emergency were they likely to cede power to central 
government. The agrarian unrest of the mid-1780s 
proved to be decisive for a successful government 
policy of police reform.
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XII. Hie Right boys, .and, peasant unrest in Ireland in
the late 18th century.
In the second half of the 18th century outbreaks 
of agrarian unrest were typically linked to major 
shifts in agricultural circumstances. A depression in 
agricultural prices, a series of bad harvests, a sharp 
and sudden rise in the level of rents, or new fiscal 
demands imposed by the state could instigate
collective action by the peasants CConnolly 1987: 53;
Clark/Donnelly 1983b: 26] . There were a number of
structural conditions of peasant unrest in the 18th 
century. First, Ireland experienced demographic growth 
unique in 18th century Europe. The Irish population 
expanded from less than 2.5 million in 1753 to 4.4 
million in 1791 and reached 6.8 million in 1821
[Daultrey et al. 1981: 6243. In so far as population
growth was heavily concentrated at the lower end of 
the agrarian class structure, one social consequence 
of the rapid demographic expansion was the
multiplication of the labourer and cottier classes of 
society [Clark/Donnelly 1983b: 26-73.
Another socio-economic effect was an increased 
competition for land. This competition for the
occupation of, and control over, land was also 
aggravated by the enormous changes which the Irish 
rural economy underwent after c, 1760. The enormous 
growth of English demand for agricultural products, 
for grain, beef and pastoral products, brought about 
an intensive commercialization of Irish agriculture. 
Peasants were now confronted with more exacting head 
landlords and substantial farmers who set about to 
increase rents and actively pursued the encroachments 
of dairy and beef cattle on commonage. The
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commercialization of agriculture in the second half of 
the 18th century thus constituted the other structural 
cause for peasant unrest CClark/Donnelly 1983b: 26-
30] .
A total of twenty-two out of Ireland's thirty-two 
counties were affected at least to some extent by the 
different outbreaks of agrarian unrest in the period 
1761 to 1790. But only Tipperary, Waterford and 
Kilkenny were seriously affected in each of the three 
decades [Connolly 1987: 533. Peasant unrest was most
intense and violent in those midland and southeastern 
counties "where the population was not quite as 
deprived as in the far west, and where the deeper 
penetration of commercial pressures and the higher 
value of land made farmers and landowners more
determined to resist sub-division of peasant holdings. 
Here conflicts of interest between social groups 
existed in acute forms" [Devine 1988: 1323.
Initially, the Rightboys, as the peasant 
activists called themselves in the mid-1780s,
succeeded in bridging social divisions: between
farmers and the poor of country and town and, for a 
time, also between a significant section of the
Protestant gentry and the 'lower orders' as a whole. 
Active leadership was provided by some members of the 
Protestant gentry while others encouraged the
Rightboys' activities and, as magistrates, 
disregarded their duties to actively prevent agrarian 
combinations [Donnelly 1977-78: 1273. One reason for
the involvement of members of the gentry lay in the 
political constellations of contemporary party 
politics. In County Cork, the 1783 elections had led 
to the defeat of the Independent candidate and the 
victory of Lord Shannon's proteg6. As the beneficed
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clergy was considered a cornerstone of Lord Shannon's 
'aristocratic combination', any attack on the 
Established Church was thought to wield political 
advantages for the Independent party. The Cork 
Farmers' Club had been campaigning since its 
foundation in 1775 for the commutation of tithes 
arguing that tithes inhibited the industry of the 
farmer as well as improvements to agriculture. 
Widespread opposition to the payment of tithes which 
was economically motivated could thus be joint with 
politically motivated protest [Brie 1987b: 164 ff. ;
Hewitt (ed.)1982: LXII - LXVI; Wall 1961: 6-7 on tithe 
as dividing Established Church and gentry 
representatives in the House of Commons] .
Up to the late summer and autumn of 1786 an 
alliance between this section of the gentry and the 
Rightboys could be struck because the collective 
action of the peasants was initially directed 
primarily against tithes. The agitation of peasants 
against tithes was nothing new in 18th century 
Ireland. In the early 1760s the Whiteboys in Munster, 
as the peasant activists called themselves then, had 
mobilized against tithes in general and the tithes of 
potatoes in particular. The method of collecting 
tithes had likewise been under attack. The collection 
"was generally in the hands of tithe-proctors, who 
acted as the agents of the clergy, or of tithe- 
farmers, who bought the right of collection and made 
what profit they could . . . The Whiteboys did not 
propose to abolish tithe altogether, but they 
attempted to settle the rate at which it should be 
levied" [Beckett 1981: 177; on method of collection:
Lecky II: 15 ff. ; on tithes system and problem of
tithe farming: Brie 1987b: 168-72; also Brie 1987a].
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But then, the gentry did not support the 
Whiteboys' agitation against tithes. The reason was 
simple: from 1735 to 1823 livestock and livestock
products were wholly or largely exempt from liability 
to tithes and thus the economic interests of the 
gentry were not centrally threatened [Brie 1987a: 275
ff. 3 . This situation changed, however, dramatically 
with the corn legislation of 1783-84 which stimulated 
an expansion of tillage. This shift of the gentry's 
agrarian economic interest away from pasture to 
tillage and a transfer of capital from the (linen) 
manufacturing sector to subsidized agriculture brought 
about a major conflict of economic interests between 
the clergy of the Established Church and the gentry: 
the converted land "ceased to be virtually tithe-free 
and became liable to the traditional imposts on oats, 
barley, and wheat" [Donnelly 1977-78: 153-4; Corish
1981: 131-4; Corish 1985: 143; Burns 1962: 1563:
this process [towards tillage] greatly augmented 
the amount of tithes payable on the harvest of 
1785 and promised a correspondingly large rise in 
the incomes of tithe-owners. But the rush to corn 
did more: it brought within the ranks of the
Rightboy movement farmers and even landed 
gentlemen for whom the tithe of potatoes was not 
the burning issue that it had long been for 
cottiers and labourers. After having invested in 
conversion to grain production with government 
financial encouragement, farmers were no doubt 
maddened when the proctor's charge in effect 
cancelled a substantial part of the new bounties, 
and landlords fretted, though unduly, that their 
rents thereby became less secure. As hostility 
bristled up the social ladder, it made the waging 
of war against tithes immeasurably more effective 
[Donnelly 1977-78: 153-4; cf. Burns 1962: 156:
"Since tithes rose with the value of the crop, 
landlords viewed them as taxes upon initiative 
and impediments to greater production and larger 
profits."].
The alliance between sections of the gentry and 
the Rightboys was also helped by the fact that the
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peasants remained initially preoccupied with other 
'religious' grievances in addition to tithes. Apart 
from tithes, they agitated against church rates and 
priests' dues. Church rates for the Established Church 
were opposed since they were levied on all 
parishioners, regardless of their religion, by the 
votes of Protestant vestrymen. They were meant for the 
upkeep of service and the construction or repair of 
buildings belonging to the Established Church. The 
hostility of the Rightboys towards the Catholic 
priests and bishops was symbolized in their agitation 
against the size of priests' dues. This agitation was 
caused not by economic considerations alone. Rather, 
it was the persistent overall subservience of the 
Catholic hierarchy and priests to the government and 
the corresponding enmity of the Catholic Church to 
peasant movements which infuriated the peasant
activists.
Throughout the 18th century the Catholic clergy 
constantly admonished their flock to behave in a
peaceful manner and be loyal to the government. The 
Catholic peasants were reminded of the religious 
obligation of obedience to temporal rulers whatever 
their religion. They were also reminded of the
toleration which had been granted to them by the
government and warned that any misbehaviour could 
result in a stricter enforcement of the laws against 
their religion. The Catholic Church itself struggled 
continuously for a closer incorporation into the 
state. In its endeavour to gain political and social 
acceptance, the Catholic Church had approved of the 
Test Oath C13&14 Geo III, c. 353 at the Munster synod 
in July 1775. The Test Act's provisions included a 
"promise to maintain, support, and defend . . . the
succession of the crown to his Majesty's family" as
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well as "the utter renouncing and abjuring" of the 
Stuart Pretender. It also denied both the temporal and 
deposing powers of the papacy "within this realm". In 
urging all priests to take the oath, the Catholic 
Church could not but alienate local parishes and 
village communities [Brie 1987b: 172 ff. ; Connolly
1982: chap. 63.
The opinion of the Catholic hierarchy at large 
can be found encapsulated in a circular letter which 
the Catholic bishop of Ferns, Dr. Sweetman sent out 
during the Vhiteboy disturbances in 1775. He told his 
clergy that
the detestable, lawless and unmeaning 
disturbances of the public, commonly called White 
Boys, are drawing on us, and our holy religion, 
the odium of our mild government, and the 
gentlemen in power in our country. You are hereby 
ordered to denounce and declare the aforesaid 
banditti excommunicated, by God and the holy 
Catholic Church, from your altars; and all their 
setters-on, abettors, and advocates [quoted in: 
Brady Ced.> 1953: 1743.
Almost twenty years later, during the campaign for 
Catholic relief in the 1790s, the Catholic archbishop 
of Dublin, John Thomas Troy, could claim with 
considerable justification that
The same gospel spirit of subordination and 
respect towards God, and the ministers of his 
power on earth, constantly manifested itself in 
the zealous endeavours of the Catholic nobility, 
gentry, clergy, and informed individuals of every 
description in their communion, to aid the 
government and magistrates in repelling a foreign 
enemy [i.e. France3 or preserving internal peace 
[i.e. by "suppressing White-Boys, Right-Boys, 
Defenders, and other rioters"3" [Troy 1793: 163.
As we shall see later, the archbishop's intervention 
was not concerned so much with justifying the demands 
of the Catholics for emancipation but rather with
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warning the Catholic laiety not to engage in violent 
actions to bring about Catholic relief: "None but the
seditious, or the enemies of sudordination and 
national prosperity, and of our emancipation which is 
intimately connected with it, can be pleased at your 
being concerned in any commotion" CTroy 1793: 18-193.
This attitude resulted from the correct realization 
that the Catholic Church was held responsible by the 
secular authorities for the peaceable behaviour of its 
flock. The church's awareness of this reality made for 
political antagonism between the Catholic clergy and 
peasant and middle-class activists CDonnelly 1977-78: 
168; Burns 19623.
Connolly [1982: 236-93 has rightly pointed out
that, on the local level, a Catholic priest opposing 
agrarian disturbances did not merely enforce the law 
of church and state but took sides in a conflict 
within his congregation. This was the case when tenant 
farmers on the one side and cottiers, farm labourers, 
farm servants on the other side confronted each other 
over the employment of migrant agricultural labourers 
and the cost and availability of conacre. With regard 
to the employment of farm labourers, the conflict was 
over attempts to regulate their wages, to protect them 
from dismissal and to ensure that labourers from 
outside the community were not employed at the cost of 
employment opportunities for the inhabitants of the 
area. The conflict over conacre, that is the letting 
of a piece of ground for a single season to farm 
labourers, who were dependent on it for their own and 
their families' survival, arose out of the rents 
charged for that plot of land, but also out of 
disputes over the amount of land which should be let 
in this way. In taking sides with the more wealthy 
Catholic tenant farmer against the poorer Catholic
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peasant and farm labourer, the Catholic priest helped 
to sustain the stratified structure of his 
congregation. Political circumspection was thus 
coupled with enforcing social inequality.
During the previous quarter of a century agrarian 
unrest had been directed much more clearly against 
landlords and middlemen. In the 1760s the Whiteboys 
protested against enclosures of commons and waste 
lands and against the keeping of land from tillage 
[Donnelly 1978: 343. This protest was a response to
the removal of restrictions on the import of Irish 
cattle into England in 1758/9 during Britain's 
engagement in the Seven Years War [Brie 1985: 151;
O'Donovan 1940: 109-103. Now that salted beef, pork
and butter could be exported the immediate effect was 
an extension of land under pasture and a move towards 
enclosures: beef and dairy cattle encroached on
commonage and threatened thus the livelihood of 
peasants. Furthermore, the Whiteboys also tried to 
enforce regulations governing land occupancy, 
landlord-tenant relations, wages, hearth-money, the 
cost and disposal of provisions in time of scarcity, 
roads, tolls, and the right to work [Wall 1973: 163.
Chari emont stated some of the reasons for the 
Whiteboy activities in the late 1760s very succinctly:
Exorbitant rents, low wages, want of employment 
in a country destitute of manufacture . . . where 
oxen supplied the place of men, and, by leaving 
no room for cultivation ... starved the miserable 
remnant of thinly scattered inhabitants. Farms of 
enormous extent let by their rapacious and 
indolent proprietors to monopolizing land- 
jobbers, by whom small portions of them were 
again let and relet to intermediate oppressors, 
and by them sub-divided for five times their 
value among the wretched starvers upon potatoes 
and water. Taxes yearly increasing, and, still 
more, tithes, which the Catholic, without any 
possible benefit, unwillingly pays in addition to 
his priest's money, and by whose oppressive
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assessment the despairing cultivator, instead of 
being rewarded for his industry, is taxed in 
proportion as he is industrious" [ HMC Charlemont 
I: 213.
On the basis of the objectives espoused by the 
Whiteboys in the 1760s, one can surmise that they were 
overwhelmingly drawn from the landless and the land- 
poor [Power 1987: 2703.
In the 1770s the agitation penetrated into new 
geographical areas, covering Kilkenny and south 
Tipperary as well as parts of Queen's County, Carlow, 
Wexford and Kildare. The methods, and some of the 
aims, of the Whiteboys in the 1770s can conveniently 
be deduced from the preamble of the Whiteboy Act of 
1776:
[i3t has frequently happened of late years in
different parts of this kingdom, that several 
persons calling themselves White Boys and others 
as well by night as in day time have in a 
riotous, disorderly, and tumultuous manner 
assembled together, and have abused and injured 
the persons, habitations, and properties of his 
Majesty's loyal and faithful subjects, and have 
taken and carried away their horses and arms, and 
have compelled them to surrender up, quit, and
leave their habitations, farms, and places of 
abode, and have with threats and violence imposed 
sundry oaths and solemn declarations contrary to 
law, and solicited several of his Majesty's
subjects by threats and promises to Join with 
them in such their mischievous and iniquitous
proceedings, and have also sent threatening and 
incendiary letters to several peasants to the 
great terror of his Majesty's peaceable subjects, 
and have taken upon themselves to obstruct the 
exportation of corn, grain, meat, malt, and 
flour, and to destroy or damage the same when 
intended for exportation, and have also destroyed 
mills, granaries, and storehouses provided for 
the keeping of corn ... C15&16 Geo III, c. 21, s. 
13 .
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These Whiteboy activities were widespread particularly 
in Kilkenny, but also in Waterford, Tipperary, Queen's 
County and Wexford during a period of economic 
recession and a series of bad harvests. They clearly 
showed the economic and social interests of the
peasants in re-establishing a 'moral economy'.
In the 1770s rent and eviction became a major 
concern of the Whiteboys. The reduction of the tithes 
of corn gained increasing prominence among the
Whiteboy demands. The expansion of commercial tillage 
in the south-east and the cultivation of grain was due 
to an increased demand in England but also to a system 
of bounties which had been introduced in 1758 in 
response to the neai— famine of the previous year. 
Designed to encourage more corn-growing in Ireland, 
the total sum paid in bounties between 1767 and 1769 
quadrupled from £6,100 to £25,200; by 1776 the 
subsidies had reached £60,700 [Donnelly 1983: 2993.
The increased cultivation of grain put the issue of 
tithes of corn and the struggle over the control and 
occupancy of profitable arable land, and thus the 
Issues of increased rents and eviction of defaulting 
peasants, firmly on the political agenda of the 
Whiteboys [Power 1987: 266; 271 on situation in
Tipperary]. These concerns of the Whiteboys in the 
1770s reflected a changed social composition of the 
Whiteboys towards small farmers and their sons.
But the commercialization of corn-growing also
affected social groups hitherto on the margins of 
peasant unrest. The commercialized cultivation of 
grain made the employment of migratory seasonal 
labourers (or 'spalpeens') a profitable options for 
larger farmers. These migratory labourers now competed 
with the urban journeymen weavers, who had regularly
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switched to agricultural work at harvest time for the 
high seasonal wages. These urban journeymen weavers 
could thus be recruited rather easily into the ranks 
of the activists against the spalspeens [Donnelly 
1983: 3143. Tithe proctors, exacting head landlords,
substantial tenants, and tenants who had taken evicted 
holdings and/or employed migratory workers were thus 
among the chief targets of collective violence 
[Donnelly 1977-78: 1263.
The immediate economic interests of the landlords 
were, in this respect as well, much more at stake than 
in the first twelve months of the Rightboy movement in 
1785. In Tipperary, Kilkenny, Waterford, Laois, 
Wexford, and Carlow the anxiety felt amongst the 
propertied class led to the formation of county 
associations of leading Protestant landlords with the 
resolve to "unite personally to aid and assist each 
other in suppressing these Insurrections, and in 
bringing Offenders to public Justice", as the 
Tipperary association put it. At the same time, local 
volunteer corps were raised to suppress Whiteboy 
activities. It is therefore appropriate to argue that 
the Volunteers owed their origins as much to the 
desire for a local police force as to the much grander 
notions of protecting an exposed kingdom during 
Britain's military involvement in the American 
colonies [Brie 1985: 166; Donnelly 1983: 329; Power
1987: 294; cf. Donnelly 1977/78: 187 ff. on attempts
to raise similar organisations in the winter of 
1785/863.
The agrarian protests in Ulster in 1763 and the 
early 1770s, too, were not limited to the issue of 
tithe. The activities of the 'Oakboys' in the first 
half of 1763, which were largely confined to Counties
-  356 -
Armagh, Tyrone, Monaghan, and Londonderry had only 
partly been caused by a more rigorous exaction of 
tithe by some of the local clergy. A cause for 
complaint was also the conduct of the grand juries. 
The grand juries had been empowered by a recent act to 
require the personal labour of all householders in the 
construction and repair of roads. In line with the 
intentions of the act, the grand jury of Armagh had 
approved presentments for roads, bridges, and 
buildings at their most recent assizes. This led to a 
steep Increase in the level of local taxation. In 
Armagh, the county cess, rather than opposition to 
personal labour, was the original source of
complaint. Furthermore, the peasants of Armagh and 
Londonderry believed that the act had been 
administered harshly by the grand juries and in such a 
way that only the selfish interests of the landlords 
had been served. But their agitation was unsuccessful. 
In July 1763 military re-inforcements were sent into 
the disturbed districts and the Oakboy movement was 
squashed CHMC Charlemont I: 137-42; document in:
Crawford/Trainor <eds.) 1969: 34-6; Beckett 1981: 178;
Donnelly 1981: 7, 12-3, 20-1; Lecky II: 45 ff.].
In Antrim and Down, many leases expired in the 
late 1760s and early 1770s. As a consequence of the 
commercialization of agriculture, land values had 
increased in the 1750s and 1760s and many landlords 
now expected to secure substantially Increased rents 
for those lands where the lease was up for renewal. 
The 'Steelboy' agitation started on the Donegall and 
Upton estates in south Antrim when tenants combined to 
resist the raising of rents, the demand of fines for 
the renewal of leases, the eviction of those tenants 
whose leases were not renewed, and the activities of a 
number of merchants from Belfast who were taking over
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land as middlemen "tenants. The Steel boys expressed 
their opposition by maiming cattle, destroying crops 
and burning down houses and haystacks. During 1771 and 
1772 these disturbances spread to other parts of Co. 
Antrim, to Co. Down, Co, Londonderry and parts of 
Armagh CMaguire 1979: 351-2; Beckett 1981: 178;
Donnelly 1981: 55].
There was a sectarian note to this agitation as a 
petition, which the Steelboys addressed to the Lord 
Lieutenant in 1772, shows:
We are all Protestants and Protestant Dissenters, 
and bear unfeigned loyalty to his present majesty 
and the Hanoverian succession . , . Some of us by 
refusing to pay the extravagant rent demanded by 
our land lords [!3 have been turned out, and our 
land given to papists, who will pay any rent 
[quoted in: Corish 1985: 143-43.
But religious concerns did not dominate the movement. 
Rather, the letting policies of Lord Donegal1 and his 
agents appear to have aroused the fears of many small 
tenants that they might lose their holdings or be 
reduced to the status of undertenants. The hopes of 
the undertenants, in turn, of becoming tenants of the 
estate had been disappointed by the landlord. They 
regarded middlemen "as synonymous with rackrenting and 
the confiscation of the value of their improvements 
... they were convinced that their industry and 
expenditure under the middlemen's daunting regime 
entitled them to the preference of the head landlord 
at the termination of the lease" [Donnelly 1981: 32-3; 
Maguire 1979: 374-53.
Adverse economic conditions added to the 
discontent of fearful tenants and frustrated 
undertenants. Between 1769 and 1771 three successive 
seasons of deficient crops caused a scarcity of food
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and an Increase in food prices which particularly hit 
journeymen weavers and cottier weavers in the area and 
thus added to the devastating effect of the depression 
of the London linen market in 1771-2. A crippling 
fodder famine in the winter of 1769/70 and spring 1770 
added to the economic crisis causing higher feeding 
costs and a decline in the quality of the meat of the 
half-fleshed beast at a time when the cattle producers 
were already faced with a contracting market for 
cattle products. Farmers, cattle producers, and 
consumers alike suffered severely. The introduction of 
increased rents and other changes at a time of such 
adverse economic conditions was likely to encounter 
opposition CDonnelly 1981: 44-6; Maguire 1979: 376;
Trainor/Crawford <eds.) 1969: 37-40, 42] .
But as in the case of the Oakboys the military was 
deployed in the spring of 1772 . These troops of more 
than 2,000 men successfully suppressed the insurgency 
[Donnelly 1981: 64-73. Convictions for those peasants
committed for trial, however, were difficult to attain 
as juries were often afraid of having to face 
possible revenge for convictions, or else were 
sympathetic to the cause of the Steel boys. It was 
therefore thought necessary by the authorities to try 
the Steelboys not locally but in Dublin Ccf. documents 
in: Crawford/Trainor (eds.) 1969: 45, 47-83.
In the Rightboy movement of the mid-1780s, too, 
the issue of rent and tenure of land gained prominence 
in the course of time. This broadening of the peasant 
objectives did not surprise all members of the landed 
elite. In September 1786, Lord Tyrone wrote to his 
brother, John Beresford, that
At this moment the complaints [ of the peasants]
go to the exactions of their own clergy and of
tithes. I have my doubts of the sincerity of the
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former; and I foresee infinite difficulty as to 
the latter in respect to both kingdoms, should 
Parliament take up the subject with the intention 
of substituting a new mode of paying the clergy. 
Expectations of advantage to the holders of land 
at present, and to the proprietors in future, 
have involved classes in encouraging these 
disturbances, which you could not easily conceive 
. . . there stands an arrayed body of all the 
southern inhabitants, determined, after gaining a 
victory as to tithes, in the next instance to 
regulate the letting of land, and to begin with 
the agencies and properties of absentees C in: 
Beresford Correspondence I: 308-93.
These economic concerns, which directly threatened the 
existing agrarian class structure, were firmly on the 
peasants* agenda in the second half of 1786. What Lord 
Tyrone had not contemplated was that, as a consequence 
of these new goals, the attitude of the gentry towards 
the agrarian unrest changed [Brie 1983: 116-83.
The Rightboys not only challenged the landlords' 
power to distrain for arrears but also tried to 
control rent by preventing canting. Canting
"entailed the public advertisement of farms to be let 
and the solicitation of written proposals from others 
besides the occupying tenants" [Donnelly 1977-78: 179;
Brie 1987b: 182-33. The novel perception of canting as
a grievance against which organized opposition should 
be mustered is explained by Donnelly [1977-78: 1793 as 
resulting from "the convergence of increased 
competition for land with unusually high grain prices, 
which together placed landlords in an extremely strong 
bargaining position at the termination of leases". It 
was also in this phase of the Rightboys* protest that 
the issue of the regulation of labour and of 
labourers' wages was raised [Brie 1987: 1833.
The marked shift in the attitudes and behaviour 
of the gentry towards the peasants was accompanied by
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the government's display of military force. In August 
1786 the government began to take stronger repressive
measures and dispatched General Luttrell south to
take command of the military forces in Munster. It was 
thought necessary by the Castle to make Luttrell a 
privy councillor so that he would not have to depend 
"on the timidity or negligence of county magistrates", 
as the Lord Lieutenant wrote to his Chief Secretary 
[in: Pitt Correspondence: 1573. Luttrell was by no
means unsympathetic to the social and economic
problems of the peasants in the south. In the debate 
in the House of Commons in March 1786 on a "Bill for 
the protection of the persons, houses and properties 
of rectors, vicars and curates resident in their
respective parishes", he had urged the House to find a 
method to induce the clergy "to practice more 
moderation towards the people" CPari.Reg.Ire. VI 
<1786): 4123.
The administration, too, saw clearly the 
structural causes for the agrarian 'disturbances'. 
Rutland knew that "there is ... in truth much 
oppression from the landlords to their tenantry, and 
the manner in which the tythes are collected is a real 
and substantial grievance to the poor" C in: HMC
Rutland III: 3193. There seemed to have been some
difference of opinion within the administration about 
whom to blame more for the disturbances: the clergy or 
the landlords. Rutland emphasized the importance of 
the question of the tithes, as his correspondence with 
Pitt makes clear [Pitt Correspondence: 167 ff.3. For
Orde, too, the commutation of tithes was of eminent 
political urgency [HMC Rutland III: 3143. The
Attorney-General Fitzgibbon, on the other hand, laid 
the blame firmly on extortionist landlords and
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absolved the clergy CPari.Reg.Ire. VII <1787): 57
ff. ] .
But whatever the differences within the 
administration as to the ultimate cause of the 
'disturbances', the government was unanimous in its 
belief that the peasant unrest was a "revolt against 
its authority". It had to be crushed by the army so 
that "the appearance of too much consequence in these 
disturbances" could be prevented lest "the malignant 
propensity of foreigners to interfere in our disputes" 
might be influenced C Orde to Rutland, June 25, 1786,
in: HMC Rutland III: 314]. Rutland, furthermore, was
concerned that "the principle that combinations are to 
compel measures must be exterminated out of the 
country and from the public mind" [in: Pitt
Correspondence: 1673 . This view was backed by Lord
Tyrone who wondered about "the consequences of 
yielding to clamour backed by force" and warned that 
"the lower people, you know, are quick in discernment, 
easily elated, and full of the idea of their own 
strength" [Lord Tyrone to Beresford, in: Beresford
Correspondence I: 3083. This, of course, was rather
undesirable.
There was a lull in agrarian unrest in the wake 
of General Luttrell's mission to the South. Exertions 
of the magistracy, activities of voluntary police 
associations, increasing committals of Rightboy 
activists, tougher assize sentences together with 
widespread hope in early 1787 that the reconvened 
House of Commons would examine Luttrell's rather 
favourable report on the situation in the south and 
redress Whiteboy grievances contributed to the short 
period of respite [Brie 1983: 119-203. However, the
Rightboy agitation was renewed during the winter of
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1786-7, especially in Cork and Galway. Rutland, again 
accusing the magistrates of "inactivity" and 
"inattention to their duty", opined that "nothing but 
a resolute determination in Parliament to enact 
effectual and vigorous laws, to which Government must 
give a vigorous execution, will put an absolute period 
to these disgraceful commotions" Cin: HMC Rutland III:
355] .
Orde, too, showed himself "extremely alarmed" 
about the reports he had received from judges telling 
him about "the general possession of arms, which the 
Popish poor make their great object". He suggested to 
Lord Lieutenant Rutland "the idea of keeping on foot, 
in such counties as require it, a sort of police guard 
of horse and foot, to be paid by the county" COrde to 
Rutland, November 28, 1786, in: HMC Rutland III: 3593.
In December he had worked out "an extended scheme for 
police" C HMC Rutland III: 3623. The "Bill for the
better Execution of the Law, and Preservation of the 
Peace within Counties at Large" was introduced in the 
session of 1787 and became law in May 1787 [27 Geo.
Ill, c. 40; hereafter called Magistracy Act] .
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XIII. The police reforms in Ireland In the 1780s.
A) The Magistracy and Riot Acts of 1787
The Magistracy Act of 1787 reflected the
government's concern about the state of the 
magistracy. One of the objectives of the bill, as the 
Attorney-General Fitzgibbon put it, was "to cancel the 
present commissions of the peace, thereby enabling the 
Chancellor to purge the magistracy, by directing new 
ones only to such persons as it might be supposed 
would execute them honourably, and for the benefit of 
the country" [ Pari. Reg. Ire. VII <1787): 432; cf. 27
Geo III, c. 40, s.2]. This policy of issuing new 
commissions of the peace was supplemented by the
repeal of the "Act ascertaining the Qualification of 
such Persons as shall take out Commissions of the 
Peace for Counties at Large" C 23&24 Geo III, c. 303. 
That act had stipulated that all new Justices of the 
Peace had to have estate of the clear yearly net value 
of £100 Cs.13. The abolition of the property
qualification for holding a commission of the peace 
gave the Lord Lieutenant the right to appoint 
barristers of six years standing as stipendiary
magistrates. These new assistant barristers, who were 
to draw a government salary of £300 p.a., had the duty 
to attend at general sessions as constant assistants 
to the justices [27 Geo. Ill, c. 40, ss. 15 and 163. 
The unpaid magistracy was thus supplemented by paid 
professionals. The Act also stipulated that sessions 
of the peace would be increased to eight in every year 
and that towns had to be appointed for holding such 
sessions Cs.143. The attendance of the new voluntary 
magistrates at sessions had to be recorded by the 
assize judge and reported to the Lord Lieutenant.
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The Magistracy Act gave powers to the Lord 
Lieutenant to divide counties into districts and to 
nominate and appoint chief constables for these 
districts [ss. 3 and 43. But substantial power was 
left with the local power holders. The chief 
constables should act under the direction of the JPs 
of the county [s. 43 and for them to draw their salary 
(£50 p.a) their conduct had to be certified by the JPs 
Cs.9 and 103. It was also left to the grand jury of 
each county at large at the assizes "to nominate and 
appoint sixteen proper persons, being protestants, to 
act as sub-constables within every such district" 
Cs. 43. Their conduct had also to be certified by JPs 
and the judges of assizes had the right to dismiss 
sub-constables Cs.12; their salary was £12 p. a. 
<s.ll)3. The new police was designed as a full-time 
force, "on duty by night and day, on foot or on 
horseback", to be provided with proper arms and 
accoutrements as the magistrates saw fit [s.53. The 
cost incurred by this act had to be defrayed by the 
county [s.63. The chief constable, however, and the 
assistant barristers were to be paid by government.
Notwithstanding the government's acceptance of 
the fact that it was necessary for the government to 
compromise and work with the grand juries and county 
magistrates as the local power holders, the bill was 
critically received in Parliament. For the opponents 
the bill was "dangerous to the constitution of 
Ireland" in that it set out to establish a general 
police CPari.Reg.Ire. VII (1787): 433 and 4353. Apart
from charging it with being a "police bill", 
disguising an army of soldiers under the name of 
constables CPari.Reg.Ire. VII <1787): 4493, the bill
was said to be setting out "to purge the magistracy" 
without good reason [ Pari.Reg.Ire. VII (1787): 439-
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403 . While supporters of the repeal of the property 
qualifications for JPs pointed out that wealth could 
by no means be the criterion for merit and thus the 
sole basis for a commission of the peace, the 
opposition saw the danger of "common vagrants" 
becoming magistrates [Pari.Reg.Ire. VII <1787): 459,
4613 . The strength of this opposition was, however, 
much muted. In January 1787 Parliament had discussed 
the agrarian disturbances and heavily criticized the 
magistrates for failing to suppress the 'outrages' 
CPari.Reg.Ire. VII <1787): 57-633. The opposition was
thus in a weak position to resist the Magistracy Act 
which the government could claim to emanate from 
concerns shared by the whole House.
With regard to the new institution of stipendiary 
magistrates it was argued that these professional 
magistrates would attempt to dictate to the justices 
of the peace and that "they would perhaps overawe, and 
undoubtedly disgust them" thus driving away all 
respectable men from the unpaid magistracy 
CPari.Reg.Ire. VII <1787): 4603. There was a clear
awareness that the country gentlemen would loose power 
to the professional magistrates and that the creation 
of assistant barristers was likely to lead to 
government patronage. But there was also status 
contempt for the social upstarts from the professional 
middle-class:
The bar was now the well known path to 
preferment. Men of no family, no connexion, men 
who could not trace back to their grandfathers, 
or who, if they could, would be ashamed to name 
them, would now be placed over men of respect and 
honour, who, perhaps, would be ashamed to sit in 
company with them" [ Pari. Reg, Ire. VII <1787):' 
4463 .
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Opposition in parliament was to no avail. The 
only 'concession* the government made was to confine 
the act "to such counties as occasion might warrant" 
C Pari, Reg. Ire. VII (1787): 438; cf. also the proposed
amendment limiting the geographical range of the bill, 
in: JHC XII <1786-88): 2633. Whether the government
had actually conceded this point to the opposition is 
a moot question. Orde's letter in November 1786 to 
Lord Lieutenant Rutland, cited above, seems to 
indicate that the bill was intended right from the 
beginning to be confined - as the opposition demanded 
- "merely to those counties which had manifested a 
neglect in executing the laws" CPari.Reg.Ire. VII 
<1787): 4333. But in the early stages of the drafting
of the bill, Orde and Fitzgibbon had prepared 
proposals which provided for a general police 
throughout Ireland CPalmer 1988: 111; on Orde's
'concessions': Palmer 1975: 4193.
The passing of the Magistracy Act was a major 
parliamentary success for the government. It compared 
favourably with the government's defeat in April 1786 
when a police bill had to be withdrawn. That bill had 
provided for judges of assize courts to be empowered 
to declare a county disturb, to embody a group of 
subconstables and to despatch them to the disturbed 
area. This police was intended to be a temporary force 
only, to be deployed in the counties of Cork, Kerry, 
Limerick, and Tipperary CPalmer 1973: 253; Palmer
1988: 108-9; also: Pari.Reg.Ire. VI <1786): 440-13.
But then, there was not the same widespread concern 
among the country gentlemen that the rebellious 
peasants would harm their economic and political 
interests as there would be twelve months later.
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While parliamentary opposition was rather 
unsuccessful, there was, however, sustained resistance 
to the implementation of the Magistracy Act C Palmer 
1988: 136-73. It was only because of the co-operation
of those local magnates who were attached to the 
government that the act could be put into effect in 
Munster. In Cork and in Kerry, for example, strong 
popular hostility had to be overcome with the help of 
Lord Shannon and Lord Glandore before the new police 
could be established. In September 1787, for example, 
Rutland was informed that:
from Cork the accounts are good. The Magistracy 
Bill has been carried through by means of the 
friendly and powerful exertions of Lord Shannon, 
and the very able conduct of Lord Earlsfort upon 
the Bench. An address was intended to Your Grace 
against the measure, which there is every reason 
to think will be converted into an address to 
thank you for it. In Kerry the business was 
carried through by the Prime Serjeant, with the 
assistance of Lord Glandore and others" tin: HMC
Rutland III: 4123.
Earlier in the session the government had already 
introduced a Riot Bill as a first response to a 
government sponsored resolution passed in parliament 
declaring
that some further Provisions, by Statute, are 
indispensably necessary to prevent tumultuous 
Risings and Assemblies, and for the more adequate 
and effectual Punishment of Persons guilty of 
Outrage, Riot and illegal Combination, and of 
administering and taking unlawful oaths C JHC XII 
<1786-88): 1633.
This act gave powers to the magistracy or other law 
officers to disperse, by means of proclamation, 
"twelve or more persons riotously, tumultuously and 
unlawfully assembled". If the assembled failed to 
disperse within one hour after the proclamation they 
were considered to have committed a felony which was
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punishable by death without benefit of clergy 127 Geo 
III, c. 15, ss. 1 and 23. Those persons who
administered illegal oaths were liable to
transporatation for life; those who took them without 
compulsion were to be transported for seven years. The 
unlawful seizure of arms, levying contributions by 
force and intimidation, posting or even printing
notices tending to cause riots or instigate
combinations were made capital offences.
During parliamentary discussion of the bill
CPari.Reg.Ire. VIII <1788): 179-201, 205-323 the
government made two concessions. First, it agreed to 
make the act not a permanent statute but to limit its 
duration to three years. Second, it allowed the Roman 
Catholic chapel clause to be removed. This clause had 
been a provision whereby all Catholic chapels 
suspected of use for Rightboy meetings were to be 
razed to ground and their material sold [this clause 
is reprinted in Grattan III: 285n; cf. also
Pari.Reg.Ire. VII <1787): 181-4; on concessions:
Palmer 1973: 259-60; this act, together with the
Whiteboy Act of 1776 <15&16 Geo III, c. 21), was made 
perpetual by 40 Geo III, c. 963.
Responding to peasant unrest by passing a riot 
act was a well rehearsed strategy. In 1765 an act had 
been passed C5 Geo III, c. 83 which was, above all 
else, designed to force the inhabitants of a disturbed 
area to assist the authorities in apprehending and 
convicting the peasant rebells. It was a common 
experience for the Crown not to find witnesses being 
prepared to testify against the Whiteboys - be it 
because of intimidation, bribery, or genuine sympathy 
with the rebels. The act provided for grand juries to 
be empowered to levy money in those districts in which
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a crime had been committed in order to compensate the 
victims - unless the inhabitants apprehended the 
offenders or came forward with information as to their 
identity and whereabouts. Magistrates were also 
empowered to force any person who was suspected of 
having taken an unlawful oath to give evidence. The 
Whiteboy Act of 1776 was yet another riot act which 
was passed in response to agrarian unrest. It added to
the already long list of capital felonies and allowed
magistrates to search houses and seize arms and 
ammunition of papists, or persons so reputed, not 
licenced or in trust of them by day or night. The 
strategical innovation of 1787 was the coupling of a 
new riot act with a new police and magistracy.
The Riot Act and the Magistracy Act of 1787 were 
designed to enable an effective policing of rural 
Ireland in a period of agrarian untrest. The previous 
year the government had already scored a major 
political success when it passed a police act for 
Dublin. This success was particularly impressive 
because Pitt had been defeated in his attempt to 
reform the police of London in 1785. The English
government had agreed that "a Police Bill is much 
wanted in the capital of Ireland, not much more than 
in that of Great Britain" and expressed its hope 
"that, as the capital is so much smaller .. . the plan 
will in that proportion be more easy to accomplish" 
[Sydney to Rutland, 7 January 1786, in: HMC Rutland
III: 2733.
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B) Policing Dublin in the 1780s
The Dublin Police Act of 1786 C 26 Geo III, c. 24] 
constituted Dublin, for policing purposes, as one 
"district of the metropolis", subdivided into four 
divisions [ss.l and 23. It empowered the Lord 
Lieutenant to appoint three magistrates of the city of 
Dublin to be commissioners of police and to nominate 
and appoint a resident JP for each district Css.3 and 
433. The first commissioner was to receive a salary of 
£500 p. a. , the second and third were to receive £300 
p. a.. Drawing a salary of £200 p. a., the resident JP 
was in effect a stipendiary magistrate Cs.613.
The commissioners of police were empowered to 
employ 485 ministerial officers of the peace "by night 
as by day": one principal peace officer (high
constable) for the district; one chief constable in 
each division; ten petty constables in each division 
for duty on foot or on horseback; 400 nightly watchmen 
for the district and forty constables of the nightly 
watch charged with supervising the watchmen Css.4 and 
153 . It was stipulated that the chief constables and 
the high constable could only be appointed with the 
approbation of the Lord Lieutenant Cs.43.
The commissioners and the constables appointed by 
them were empowered, on the basis of a warrant issued 
by a commissioner upon information given under oath, 
to break into houses in order to search for felons or 
stolen goods Cs.303. Furthermore, the commissioners 
and the JPs had the right to search for concealed arms 
Cs.453. It was also enacted that, "as often as any 
riot, rout, or unlawful assembly shall happen, or when 
there shall be reasonable ground to apprehend that 
there may be any riot, rout, or unlawful assembly",
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JPs and a sufficient number of constables should 
attend as the commissioners would direct [s.523. The 
Whiteboy Act of 1776 was continued for seven years, 
but the Dublin Police Act of 1777-78 was repealed 
[ss.73 and 753.
The radically new departure of the new Dublin 
Police Act can be immediately grasped if it is 
compared with the "Act for improving the police of the 
city of Dublin" of 1777-78 C 17&18 Geo III, c. 433. 
This act had reaffirmed the Corporation's 
responsibility for policing. It constituted a step 
towards centralizing the watch system by grouping the 
city's parishes into six wards. It stipulated that
the lord mayor and board of aldermen . . . shall 
from time to time nominate and appoint some of 
the aldermen ... to be aldermen of the said ward, 
and as such to have the special superintendance 
and care of and to be president or guardian of 
the police of each of the said respective wards 
. . , and every such alderman, president, or
guardian of the police in each respective ward
shall have power and authority to nominate and 
appoint some person of the common council of the 
said city, and a resident in and inhabitant of 
the said ward, to be and act in the said ward as 
assistant to the said president ...Cs.13.
This deputy had to be approved by the lord mayor and 
the board of aldermen Cs.23. The wardmote Cmoot3 court
was established as a kind of supervisory body. This
wardmote court consisted of not less than six, and not 
more than twelve inhabitants who had to be paying scot 
and lot, i.e. sharing in the financial burdens of the 
ward. This court was empowered to make or alter rules 
as to the police and the preservation of the peace. It 
had the power to appoint and remove constables! 
watchmen, or patroles. This court was to be chaired by 
the president or the deputy who had the casting vote 
Cs.43. The number of police was not fixed but left to
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the discretion of the court [Palmer 1988: 81 states
that in 1780 there were about two dozen constables and 
368 watchmen in summer and 463 in winter].
Compared to the old system of policing, the new 
Dublin Police Act could not but "strengthen the hands 
of government", as a supporter of the bill put it 
[ Pari.Reg.Ire. VI <1786): 347]. This view was shared
by the Attorney-General who was quite sure that, if 
the bill was passed into law, "it will give great 
additional influence to the crown" CPari.Reg.Ire. VI 
<1786): 366]. But this, of course, could not be in the 
interest of the opposition. They saw it as an attack 
on the constitution. The bill was seen as destroying 
the chartered rights of the city of Dublin and as 
putting down the ancient magistracy of the city: there 
would no longer be any freedom of election in the city 
of Dublin but its representatives would from now on be 
nominated by and under the letters patent of the Lord 
Lieutenant CPari.Reg.Ire. VI <1786): 337, 386, 327].
The freeman and freeholders of the city of Dublin 
claimed in a petition to parliament that this bill 
would give a most dangerous influence to the crown and 
tended to subvert public liberty. They expressed their 
fear that
the commissioners of police and other magistrates 
to carry the purposes of the bill into execution, 
holding their places at the will of the minister, 
may become dangerous instruments in his hands, 
wherewith to harrass all those persons within 
their jurisdiction who may constitutionally 
oppose any ministerial scheme [Pari.Reg.Ire. VI 
<1786): 365; cf, also the petition of the
freeholders of the county of Dublin, in: 
Pari.Reg.Ire. VI <1786): 389].
Grattan supported this line of argument. The 
government's argument that the police commissioners
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and the magistrates ought to be men in whom the crown 
may place a confidence was interpreted by him as 
meaning that "the magistrates of the city of Dublin 
ought to be men in whom the Secretary shall place a 
confidence - a confidence that they will act for him 
in a political as well as magisterial capacity - will 
be his friends in all corporate meetings, and support 
him with their votes and influence in the capital" 
CPari,Reg,Ire, VI <1786): 380], In Grattan's view
these paid commissioners, magistrates, and constables 
formed a "mercenary army, paid by the minister". 
Because of all this, he defined the bill as "a bill of 
armed patronage" CPari.Reg.Ire. VI <1786): 351, 3403.
The opposition complained that the bill invaded 
the rights of the subject in that it was a law "which 
breaks open your house for a ruffian, and deprives you 
of your right of action as for trespass against any of 
the parties concerned" [Pari.Reg.Ire. VI <1786): 381,
336; cf. s. 303. And there still was some support for 
the Volunteers left in parliament. It was argued that 
the clause empowering the commissioners and the JPs to 
search for concealed arms Cs.453 was intended "to take 
the arms out of the hands of the volunteers" 
[Pari.Reg,Ire. VI <1786): 329-30, 344-53.
But the government could not be swayed. The 
Attorney-General conceded that the search clause was 
intended to disarm the Volunteers. It was meant to 
empower the commissioners to search the houses of 
suspected and unqualified persons for concealed arms. 
Making no bones about his motivation, he submitted 
"whether this provision of the bill ought not to be 
extended to the south of Ireland, where the arms of 
the volunteers have got into the very worst hands, the 
hands of the lowest order of Roman Catholics"
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[Pari.Reg.Ire. VI <1786); 3423. This kind of
intimation gave some justification to the opposition's 
charge that this bill was only "a preliminary and 
leading step to a general police" [Pari.Reg.Ire. VI 
<1786): 3863. This suspicion was shared by the
opponents to the bill in the House of Lords who 
expressed the "fear [that] the present measure is only 
an experimental introduction to a premeditated system" 
throughout Ireland [quoted in: Palmer 1975: 418],
Charlemont was convinced that the Dublin Police Act 
was "the means of slavery" and a step by the 
government towards establishing a country-wide police 
force. It was quite clear to him that "for the
attainment of this, the disturbances of the south have 
been magnified, and, perhaps, tolerated" [ HMC 
Charlemont II: 43-44].
While the Magistracy Act of 1787 was thus
foreshadowed, the Dublin Police Act was justified on 
practical terms. "You cannot bring an offender from 
prison to trial without a military guard", the 
Attorney-General argued, "you cannot whip an offender 
through the streets without an army". Furthermore, 
"very great inconveniencies have heretofore been 
experienced, because county magistrates were not able 
to act in the city, or city magistrates in the county; 
it has therefore been thought necessary to give to 
certain magistrates a concurrent jurisdiction that 
shall run through the whole district, without which 
there can never be an effectual police" [Pari.Reg.Ire. 
VI <1786): 341], In view of this 'pragmatic'
orientation towards "the preservation of the peace, 
the safety of the citizens of Dublin, and the good of 
the community at large", as the Chief Secretary put 
it, the charges of the opposition were considered as 
petty and uninformed [Pari.Reg.Ire. VI <1786): 327].
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The salaries of the new police were calculated by Orde 
as amounting to £5916 p. a., This was thought not to 
justify the inhabitants' complaints about oppressive 
taxation [ Pari.Reg.Ire. VI <1786): 383, 365; Palmer
1973: 2283 . The bill was duly passed by the
government's supporters in parliament.
The passing of the bill was much facilitated by 
the fact that many members of the opposition were gone 
to attend the assizes in their different counties 
CPari.Reg.Ire. VI (1786): 327, 328-9, 3303. The very
same situation would occur again when the magistracy 
bill was being discussed in 1787. Both the Dublin 
Police bill and the Magistracy bill were introduced 
late in the session in a much depleted House and 
rushed through parliament; for the decision on the 
Magistracy bill the House was only one-third full 
C Palmer 1975: 418, 420, and Palmer 1988: 100, 1123.
Furthermore, the police of Dublin was indeed in need 
of reform because it was inefficient - from the point 
of view of the authorities which were concerned with 
putting down riots, routs, and tumultuous assemblies. 
The disturbances of April 1784, it was said, should 
not be allowed to happen again. It might have been 
because of the earlier reprimand of the Corporation by 
parliament for inefficiency in putting down these 
disturbances that the Corporation of the City of 
Dublin did not petition against the Dublin police bill 
C Boyle 1973: 1023. But more decisive for the
Corporation's acquiescence in the new police 
legislation was certainly the government's concession 
to pick the police commissioners and magistrates from 
the ranks of the city magistracy.
It has been argued that the municipal government 
of Dublin, which was gathered into the hands of the
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Lord Mayor and a few aldermen, was "in subservience to 
the Castle" [Maxwell 1956: 72; Palmer 1988: 80 on the
political and social composition of the Corporation]. 
However, the Corporation had indeed protested, 
although unsuccessfully, against a number of acts 
which had been passed in the years 1784-86 and which 
set out to regulate many aspects of urban life such as 
street widening and paving. In each case, "powers 
traditionally vested in the Lord Mayor and his 
Corporation were transferred to commissioners or new 
corporations, appointed and salaried by government" 
[Boyle 1973: 100; Palmer 1988: 973. It was pointed out
by the opposition in parliament that the Corporation 
had surrendered its charter, had become "a kind of 
eunachised [ ! 3 corporation", and had formed an 
unnatural alliance with the administration 
[ Pari. Reg. Ire. X (1790): 3093. But on the whole, the
Corporation was very much seen as a victim of 
government policies of which the police act was the 
most important one for "muzzling" the Corporation for 
ever, as Grattan said [ Pari. Reg. Ire. IX (1789): 4203.
In Grattan's various proposals for a police reform it 
was the Lord Mayor and the members of the Corporation 
who were to constitute the supervisory body of the new 
police force [Pari.Reg.Ire. IX (1789): 423; XI (1791):
262; XIII (1793): 4563.
To explain the police legislation it may be more 
important to turn to the structure of the Irish 
political system. It has been pointed out by Palmer 
that passage of the Irish police acts reflected the 
corrupt structure of a Parliament unrepresentative 
even of Protestant opinion. Police legislation was a 
party question:
Dublin Castle maintained a parliamentary majority
so that, barring national crises such as occurred
during the American War, the opposition was bound
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to be defeated. The distinction between the 
Castle or "court” and the "country" parties is 
clearly seen in the voting on the police bills. 
Supporters of the legislation were Tories, while 
opponents were Whigs, or, as some called 
themselves, Patriots. Members favoring the new 
police were also on record as opposing the 
Volunteers of 1778-1782, parliamentary reform in 
1783, free trade in 1785, and pension list reform 
in 1786; conversely, those voting against the 
police legislation had supported the Volunteers 
and the above reform measures. After 1787 the 
same voting patterns emerged on the question of 
tithe reform and voting rights for Catholics, the 
Tories opposing and the Whigs favoring them 
[Palmer 1975: 420-1 {Palmer 1988: 103-4; 635-6
n.783.
Policing was to remain a party question. For 
almost a decade, the Dublin police was under constant 
attack. The police did not succeed in repressing 
crimes and containing crowds. Fiscal irregularities 
and repeated police misconduct could be proven and 
added to the politically motivated resistance to the 
new police force [Palmer 1988: 121-83. The opposition
kept on making the argument that the police 
establishment had been attended with "unnecessary 
patronage, waste and dissipation" [ Pari.Reg. Ire. IX 
<1789): 3973. It was eloquently argued that "when the 
majesty of the crown blends itself with inferior 
magistracy, when it comes to operate directly upon the 
people, when it makes the petty officer look directly 
up to itself, when the hand that holds the sceptre 
catches the constable's staff, it may improve 
patronage, it may improve influence, it may increase 
power, but it will not cherish liberty" [Pari.Reg.Ire. 
X (1790): 3083 . It was also pointed out that the
expense of the police establishment was at least three 
times more than the estimate given by Orde (with an 
average of about £18, 000 p.a.) [Pari.Reg.Ire. XI
(1791): 2703. Petitions against the police were being
continuously presented to parliament [e.g.,
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Pari. Reg.Ire. VIII <1788): 248; JHC XII <1786-88):
344-5; XIII <1789-90): 90; XIV <1790-91): 54-55, 62,
119; XV <1792-4): 98-99, 134, 146], But the government
majority remained solid. It was only in 1795 that the 
principle of local control of the Dublin police was 
re-established, and for a short period only.
By 1790 the Magistracy Act, which had been 
proposed for southern and western Ireland generally, 
was in operation only in the southwestern counties of 
Tipperary, Cork, Kerry, and Kilkenny, constituting 
there a county police force of about 500 chief 
constables and subconstables CPari.Reg.Ire. X <1790): 
299; Palmer 1988: 1373. In a period of a relative lull
in agrarian unrest, and facing sustained opposition 
from the country gentlemen, the government endorsed a 
bill in 1792 which provided that a modified version of 
the Magistracy Act should come in force in all 
counties other than those in which it was already in 
operation. This "Act for regulating the Office of 
Constable, etc." t32 Geo III, c. 16; hereafter called 
'Constable act'3 made it
lawful for the grand jury of every county ... at 
the assizes thereof, to make and appoint any 
number of constables not exceeding eight, in any 
or in every barony or half-barony within such 
county, such constables to be in lieu, and in the 
place of all constables appointed or to be 
appointed by such grand juries . . . according to 
the laws now in force Cs.13.
These baronial constables were to be directed by the 
magistrates Is.23. Nothing was said about government- 
appointed chief-constables and stipendiary magistrates 
and the provision of the Magistracy Act for creating 
special police districts was absent. Control over 
these police forces was thus firmly rooted in the 
local gentry.
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Thus this act essentially reaffirmed an act of 
1773 [ 13&14 Geo III., c. 32; amended by 23&24 Geo
III., c. 42] which had given the county grand jury the 
right to appoint four, respectively eight <1783), 
subconstables as assistants to the head constable in 
every barony or half-barony. That act had constituted 
an innovation in so far as the control of the high and 
petty constables, which had hitherto been exerted by 
locally prominent individuals and feudal institutions, 
was transferred to county authorities. But this act 
had never been forcefully implemented so that in the 
1780s there were only about 600 baronial constables 
out of a possible number of over 2,500 (for Ireland's 
316 baronies) CPalmer 1988: 75-6],
But despite this transfer of control to the local 
authorities, thirteen northern and southeastern 
counties, including almost the entire province of 
Ulster, moved successfully to be exempted from the new 
police Cs.l; these counties were: Wexford, Termanagh,
Carlow, Tyrone, Donegal, Mayo, Down, Kildare, the 
King's County, Sligo, Armagh, Monaghan, and Wicklow]. 
The reason they gave was the cost this act would incur 
on the counties CPari.Reg.Ire. XII <1792): 301]. By
1796, therefore, only seven central and western
counties had established the new police [Palmer 1975: 
421] .
Let me summarize the discussion on police reforms 
in Ireland in the 1780s. I have discussed the Dublin 
Police Act of 1786, the Riot Act of 1787 and the
County Police/Magistracy Act of 1787 in the context of
the agrarian class structure and the political 
cleavage structure. Police reform was, by and large, a 
party question. The parliamentary Whig opposition was 
opposed to any kind of police reform which would give
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government control over the means of coercion by 
expropriating local power holders from their means of 
maintaining order and administering justice. But given 
widespread unrest and the confluence of the economic 
and political interests of a vast number of 
landowners, police reforms could eventually be 
implemented. However, government had still to rely on 
a close co-operation of the local power holders and 
was not in a position to establish a centralized 
control over the forces of law and order.
The 1790s would show that the newly established 
law enforcement agencies could not maintain public 
order. The struggle for Catholic emancipation and 
parliamentary reform; republicanism in the wake of the 
French Revolution; the war with France and the Irish 
Rebellion confronted the Irish government and the 
Anglo-Irish Ascendancy at large with a wave of violent 
unrest for which the various agencies of policing were 
insufficient. In the following chapter I shall analyse 
the political conflicts which resulted from the 
struggle for Catholic emancipation and parliamentary 
reform between 1790 and 1793,
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XIV. Ihfi struggle for Catholl c emancipation and
par-Li&mentary ...ref orm, 1790-93,
A) The political organization of the Protestant and 
Catholic middle class
In June 1789, the most conservative members of 
the opposition in Ireland formed a Whig Club in 
Dublin. Its political 'philosophy' centred on rather 
well-rehearsed topics: Its members were full of praise 
for the revolutions of 1688 in England and 1782 in 
Ireland; they reiterated the constitutional, de Jure, 
principle of 1782 that the parliament of Ireland was 
''the only legislature of this realm"; they expressed 
their determination that they would ever maintain, "as 
sacred and indissoluble" the connection of Ireland 
with Great Britain; and they proclaimed their 
determination to reduce "the undue influence of the 
Crown over both Houses of Parliament". In order to 
combat corruption through government, they declared to 
continue campaigning for a Pension and Place Bill and 
for a bill "for the better securing the freedom of 
election, by disqualifying revenue officers from
voting for members to sit in Parliament". They also 
intended to have "the present extravagant, ineffectual 
and unconstitutional police of the city of Dublin" 
abolished [Grattan III: 436: Resolutions and
Declarations of the Whig Club, 19 August 1789].
The Northern Whig Club, which was founded in 
February 1790 in Belfast, adhered to the same
political objectives. This Club was inaugurated under
the strong influence of the followers of Lord
Charlemont and counted amongst its members practically 
all the persons active in Ulster politics, and in the
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Volunteer movement [Rogers 1934: 201 ff.]. The Whig
declarations of intent are remarkable, not so much 
with regard to what they demand, but rather with 
regard to what they omit: There was no proposal for an 
extension of the elective franchise or even a 
mentioning of it; and there was no demand for Catholic 
relief. The Whig Clubs' demands were such that 
loyality to the Anglo-Irish Ascendancy was maintained.
But a more radical opposition was being built in 
the early 1790s [Jacob 19373, It found its radical 
manifesto in Theobald Wolfe Tone's pamphlet "An 
Argument on Behalf of the Catholics of Ireland, in 
which the Present Political State of that Country, and 
the Necessity of a Parliamentary Reform, are 
considered. Addressed to the People, and more 
Particularly to the Protestants of Ireland". The title 
of this pamphlet, which was published in September 
1791, indicates the thrust of the argument. Only a 
reformed parliament, Tone argued, could effectively 
oppose the domineering English influence over the 
government of Ireland, But parliamentary reform could 
be brought about only if an alliance between Irish 
radicals and Irish Catholics could be established 
which would strive for a joint programme of Catholic 
emancipation and parliamentary reform:
My argument is simply this: That Ireland, as
deriving her Government from another country, 
requires a strength in the people which may 
enable them, if necessary, to counteract the 
influence of that Government, should it ever be, 
as it indisputably has been, exerted to thwart 
her prosperity: that this strength may be most
constitutionally acquired, and safely and 
peaceably exerted, through the medium of a 
Parliamentary reform: and, finally, that no
reform is honourable, practicable, efficacious or 
just, which does not include as a fundamental 
principle, the extension of the elective 
franchise to the Roman Catholics ... [Tone
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1826/1: 348; cf. for the text of the whole
pamphlet: ibid,: 341-663,
Parliamentary reform; Catholic emancipation; the 
view that the Revolution of 1782 had been a "most 
bungling, imperfect business" CTone 1826/1: 3463; the
critical stance vis-A-vis Great Britain: All this
distinguished Tone's position from the Whig Clubs' 
point of view. But even Tone's radicalism was rather 
limited. Tone stood in the tradition of middle class 
opposition to commercial restrictions and to the 
dominance of the landed class in political life. In 
effect, his radicalism came down to an endeavour to 
achieve the takeover of the existing political system 
and its more fair and efficient management by a larger 
number of the propertied class. In particular, the 
limitations of Tone's radicalism were apparent in his 
scant concern with the major social question of the 
day, the state of the peasantry. In all his statements 
he remained vague as to how a republican Ireland would 
improve the peasants' lot CDunne 1982: 33-83. The
success of Tone's radical middle-class policies would 
depend on the effective organization of the radical 
elements within the Irish opposition and the forging 
of an alliance with the politically active sections 
within the Catholic population. Only on the basis of 
such a broad political alliance could it make 
political sense to challenge the distribution of power 
in Ireland and confront the Ascendancy with political 
demands.
In Belfast in early 1791, a radical group of 
Presbyterians had become disillusioned by the tameness 
of the Belfast Whig Club which seemed to them to be 
strong in conviviality and weak in political 
agitation. They were determined to establish an 
alternative reform organization. William Drennan, who
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had argued the case for parliamentary reform and 
Catholic emancipation already in November 1783 at the 
National Volunteer convention in Dublin, suggested in 
May 1791 the founding of a society "having much of the 
secrecy and somewhat of the ceremonial of Freemasonry 
. . . A benevolent conspiracy - a plot for the people - 
no Whig Club - no party title - the Brotherhood its 
name - the Rights of Men and the Greatest Happiness of 
the Greatest Number its end - its general end Real 
Independence to Ireland, and Republicanism its 
particular purpose" tin: Chart <ed.> 1931: 54; on
Drennan: Stewart 1976: 80-92].
With the active support of Tone, such a society 
was founded in Belfast in October 1791. The founder 
members of the Belfast Society of United Irishmen were 
prominent Presbyterian merchants, among them a woollen 
draper, an owner of a linen mill, a shipbroker, a 
merchant, a watchmaker, a linen draper, an apothecary, 
three tanners, and a retired army ensign CElliott 
1982: 223. How strong Tone's influence was on the
Belfast Society is evident when Tone's pamphlet is 
compared with the Society's resolutions and 
declaration of 18 October:
First, resolved, that the weight of English 
influence in the government of this country is so 
great, as to require a cordial union among all 
the people of Ireland to maintain that balance 
which is essential to the preservation of our 
liberties and the extension of our commerce. 
Second, that the sole constitutional mode by 
which this influence can be opposed is by a 
complete and radical reform of the representation 
of the people in parliament.
Third, that no reform is practicable, 
efficacious, or just, which shall not include 
Irishmen of every religious persuasion C in: HMC
Charlemont II: 1613.
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The United Irishmen added that "with a parliament thus 
reformed, everything is easy; without it, nothing can 
be done" CHMC Charlemont II: 1613.
This political programme challenged the
conservative members of the Belfast Whig Club. They 
had succeeded at the Volunteer parade in July, which 
had been celebrating the fall of the Bastille, in 
having Drennan's clause on the desirability of 
political co-operation between Protestants and
Catholics in Ireland omitted in an address to the 
French people CMcDowell 1979: 3813. This conservative
opposition had to be overcome if the radical
opposition was to have any lasting impact.
In Dublin, Tone found the way better prepared for 
the introduction of the United Irish Society. There, 
the corps of the Dublin Independent Volunteers had 
agreed unanimously to a resolution stating the 
necessity for a union of all denominations of 
Irishmen. The Independent Dublin Volunteers had also 
condemned the manoeverings of the Armagh grand jury 
which, perturbed by serious sectarian rioting in their 
county, had issued a notice deploring "the rage among 
Roman Catholics for illegally arming themselves" and 
offering a reward for the conviction of persons 
illegally carrying arms [McDowell 1979: 381-23.
The Dublin Society of United Irishmen, which was 
founded in November 1791, was thoroughly middle class. 
Among the professionals, there were twenty-six 
barristers and more than twice that number of 
attorneys; twenty-four medical men; fourteen 
booksellers and printers; half a dozen army officers, 
a schoolmaster, and a fellow of Trinity College, 
Dublin. There were over one hundred merchants, of whom
-  366 -
sixty-seven were cloth merchants; thirty-one textile 
merchants; an iron-founder; a pin-maker; tailors, 
jewellers, hatters, hosiers and butchers CMcDowell 
1940], The Dublin Society soon came to be regarded as 
the United Irishmen's principal branch. Together with 
the Belfast Society it was to influence the United 
Irish societies in Armagh, Clonmel, Gorey, Limerick, 
Lisburn, Nenagh, Sixmilewater, Templepatrick and 
Tullamore.
By autumn 1791, a first major step had thus been 
taken towards organizing the radical opposition in 
Ireland. Building an alliance with the politically 
active Catholic population had to follow to keep up 
the momentum and to create a power constellation which 
would offer a chance of achieving success CBrooke 
1987: 121-93.
During England's involvement in the American War 
of Independence the Catholics in Ireland had been 
granted some relief by the Anglo-Irish Ascendancy. The 
Catholic Relief Act of 1778 C 17&18 Geo III, c. 493 
enabled Catholics to take leases of land for 999 years 
and inherit property in the same way as Protestants. 
The Relief Act during the reform period of 1782 [21& 
22 Geo III, c. 243 allowed Catholics to acquire land, 
except in parliamentary boroughs, and thus enabled 
Catholics to become landowners and middlemen in their 
own right. In the same year Catholics were also 
permitted "to teach school" and act as guardians 
[21&22 Geo III, c. 62; McDowell 1979: 189-92 on these
acts].
These reforms had been preceded by the Quebec Act 
of 1774. This Act had set up a separate government for 
French Canada which had been ceded to Britain at the
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Peace of Paris in 1763. In order to maintain effective 
government in this region, the British government had 
conceded that the province was to be ruled by French 
civil law; that Catholics might hold office by taking 
an oath specially devised for them; and that the 
Catholic church could remain established by being 
given the power to collect tithes CCorish 1985: 137-
83. Imperial concerns were clearly diminishing the 
importance of religious considerations. Concern for 
the stability of the Empire during the American War 
also informed British politics towards Ireland. On the 
one hand, it was expected that concessions to the 
Irish Catholics would assuage their disaffection with 
their marginalized position within society and help to 
prevent them from giving support to an envisaged 
attempt by the French navy to invade Ireland. But more 
immediate military exigencies would appear to have 
been even more important.
Legal military service by Catholics of all three 
kingdoms, England, Scotland and Ireland, had been 
prohibited by an act of 1714 Cl Geo I, stat. 2, c. 
473. Until the 1750s virtually no Catholics and few 
Irish Protestants had been recruited into any British 
regiment:
But in the early stages of the Seven Years War, 
unauthorised recruiting by English regiments 
began in the southern counties and formal 
government permission was given for the 
enlistment of catholics as marines ... C In 17713 
large-scale recruitment took place in the 
provinces . . . Irishmen of whatever religion had 
formed only about 6 per cent of all non­
commissioned ranks of the British army in the 
mid-fifties, whereas on the eve of the American 
war the proportion was over 20 per cent. There 
were considerable recruiting problems in much of 
Britain by that stage and so it was to the 
periphery, to the Scottish Highlands and to parts 
of catholic Ireland, that the army was being
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forced to go to augment its numbers CDickson 
1987: 145-63.
The Catholic relief policies of the British 
government, which were developed in 1778 and onwards 
up to 1780 for Britain and Ireland, were thus designed 
as a means of promoting army recruitment at a critical 
moment in the history of the British Empire. The 
opposition to Catholic relief, particularly in 
Scotland under the leadership of Lord Gordon, drew on 
sectarian arguments and widespread resistance to the 
American War. For Lord Gordon, the Catholic relief 
proposals had "the diabolical purpose of arming the 
Papists against the Protestant Colonies in America" 
[quoted in: Donovan 1985: 1013. In Scotland, the
connection of Catholic relief with military ventures 
which were unpopular in aim and objectionable in 
conduct had disastrous consequences for the Scottish 
Catholic Relief Act [Donovan 1985: 1023. In England as
well as in Ireland, however, no opposition comparable 
in size to that in Scotland could be organized and 
Catholic relief acts were passed by Parliament.
But despite these reforms the Catholic population 
in Ireland was still suffering under severe 
discrimination at the beginning of the last decade of 
the 18th century, A report on the 'Popery Laws', 
published by the United Irishmen in 1792, summarized 
their political and social marginalization succinctly:
Such is the situation of three millions of good 
and faithful subjects in their native land ! 
Excluded from every trust, power, or emolument of 
the state, civil or military; excluded from all 
the benefits of the constitution in all its 
parts; excluded from all corporate rights, and 
immunities; expelled from grand juries, 
restrained in petit juries; excluded from every 
direction, from every trust, from every 
incorporated society, from every establishment 
occasional or fixed, instituted for public
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defence, public police, public morals, or public 
convenience; from the Bench, from the Bank, from 
the Exchange, from the University, from the 
College of Physicians ... There is no 
institution, which the wit of man has invented, 
or the progress of society produced, which 
private charity or public munificence has founded 
for the advancement of education, learning, and 
good arts, for the permanent relief of age, 
infirmity, or misfortune, for the superintendance 
of which, and all cases where common charity 
would permit, from the enjoyment of which the 
legislature has not taken care to exclude the 
Catholics of Ireland [quoted in: Plowden 1803/11: 
3773 .
This discrimination, however, had not produced 
ipsa facto a widespread and vociferous protest. The 
Catholic aristocracy and gentry was very much 
incorporated into the political and social system; the 
Catholic church leaders hoped that submission to the 
status quo would prevent the Irish administration from 
rigorously enforcing the penal laws and eventually 
improve their position; and the Catholic mercantile 
middle class had developed and prospered in a system 
which gave them some space for their economic 
activities for reasons of revenue. But politically and 
socially, the position of the Catholic middle class 
was the least entrenched. Radical opposition to the 
existing system grew out from amongst their ranks. The 
frequent professions by the Irish Roman Catholics of 
allegiance to the crown had not been mere tactics. In 
March 1774, for example, the Catholic Committee had 
passed a resolution promising to maintain, support, 
and defend the succession to the crown in George Ill's 
family and rejecting the claim "that the pope of Rome, 
or any other foreign prince, state or potentate, hath 
any temporal or civil jurisdiction, power, 
superiority, or pre-eminence, directly or indirectly 
within this realm" [Minute Book: 18]. After Spain's
declaration of war in July 1779 the Catholic Committee
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reaffirmed the "inviolable attachment" to the King and 
his government CMinute Book: 40 ff, 3 ,
But events outside Ireland stimulated renewed 
demands for full emancipation by the Irish Catholics 
in the early 1790s. At the end of 1789 the French 
national assembly decreed that French Protestants 
should enjoy all civic rights; in the United States 
religious equality was considered a corner—  stone of 
the new constitution; and although the Test and 
Corporation Acts for England were not repealed, the 
discussion at Westminster in 1789 and 1790 about the 
disabilities of the Dissenters had pushed religious 
issues very much to the forefront of political debate. 
In 1791 the English Catholic Relief Act, while still 
debarring Catholics from any share in political power, 
swept away most of the disabilities and showed that 
"Catholicism was no longer regarded a menace to 
British society" CMcDowell 1979: 394], In her imperial 
policy, too, Britain kept on disregarding religious 
issues. The Canada Act of 1791 did not contain 
religious disqualifications of any kind. The 
representative institutions which had been granted for 
Upper and Lower Canada had been balanced by powerful 
aristocratic upper chambers. And the aristocracy upon 
whom Britain relied in Lower Canada were French Roman 
Catholic seigneurs [Harlow 1952: 631].
In Ireland, the Catholic Committee became the 
main force behind the renewed agitation for
emancipation. This committee, which had played such an 
important role in the disputes over quarterage, had 
been dormant since 1783. Revived in the early 1790s in 
the renewed campaign for emancipation, the radicals
among the Catholic middle classes succeeded in
establishing control over the Committee. Within the
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Catholic Committee, the thriving and prospering 
merchant and’ professional Catholic middle class 
confronted the landed, aristocratic Catholics. With 
the success of 'trade' over 'land', these years 
marked the emergence of the Catholic urban middle 
class, and the substantial Catholic farmer, as a 
powerful political force in Ireland [McDowell 1986: 
3063 .
Among considerable sections of the middle class 
the ideas of the French Revolution found ready 
acceptance, and with increased democratic aspirations 
a determined section within the Catholic Committee 
refused to submit to the pandering to government of 
the aristocrats [Rogers 1934: 2323. The democratic
party set out to pursue a policy of outspoken 
petitioning to parliament and public representation of 
their demands. Their campaign began tamely. The 
Catholic Committee resolved in February 1791 "that 
application may be made for such relief as the wisdom 
and justice of parliament may grant" and the hope was 
expressed that the Catholics "be restored at least to 
some of the rights and privileges which have been 
wisely granted to others who dissent from the 
established church". It was also resolved that these 
goals of repeal should be pursued "in the most 
submissive and constitutional manner" [Minute Book: 
1233 .
The conflict within the Catholic Committee 
between conservative aristocratic members and the more 
radical members of middle-class background led, 
finally, to a secession of the aristocratic faction in 
December 1791. Three Catholic peers, the Catholic 
archbishop of Dublin, three baronets, a number of 
Catholic landowners, and about half a score of Dublin
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businessmen presented a petition to Lord Lieutenant 
Westmorland expressing their desire for a further 
repeal of the penal laws. But they hastened to add 
that "grateful for former concessions, we do not 
presume to point out the measure or extent, to which 
such repeal should be carried, but leave the same to 
the wisdom and discretion of the legislature" CPlowden 
1803/11, App. : 173-75; McDowell 1986: 305). This
subservience could not but enrage the democratic 
faction of the Catholic Committee and on 14 January 
1792 Lord Kenmare was condemned for having procured 
"insidious and servile addresses calculated to divide 
the catholics of Ireland, and eventually to defeat 
their first application for relief" [Minute Book: 144;
O'Flaherty 1985: 203.
This conflict within the Catholic Committee was 
certainly aggravated by status considerations of the 
aristocratic faction which considered the middle class 
democrats as an upstart group of agitators [Rogers 
1934: 2333. But the fundamental conflict stemmed from
the fear of the growth of revolutionary ideas amongst 
the Catholics due to their connection with the United 
Irish movement. There was not only the fear that the 
Irish administration would crush the movement for 
reform by coercive means; but the aristocratic faction 
also realized that they stood a much better chance of 
receiving support from sections within the English 
political elite if they did not espouse and endorse 
demands for radical political reform.
Not only had the Catholic Committee to come to 
terms with the conservative forces of Catholicism, but 
with a more radical section within the middle class as 
well. The Catholic Society of Dublin published a 
declaration in October 1791 professing its
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dissatisfaction with the constitution in a more 
forthright manner than the Catholic Committee. It 
declared that its members would "to the outmost of our 
power, endeavour, by all legal and constitutional 
means, to procure the repeal of the laws by which we 
are aggrieved, as Roman Catholics". The Roman 
Catholics "may look with envy to the subjects of an 
arbitrary monarch, and contrast that government, in 
which one great tyrant ravages the land, with the
thousand inferior despots whom at every instant they 
must encounter". It was stressed that the Catholics 
did not have any interest in interrrupting the 
tranquillity of the country and that they had "neither 
passion nor interest at variance with the order of 
things". After all, "engaged for the most part in the 
various departments of commerce, we are concerned not 
less than any other class of citizens, to cultivate 
the blessings of tranquillity" CPlowden 1803/11, App.: 
165-703. Thus, while the goals of the Catholic Society 
were thoroughly middle class, the tone was much more
aggressive than that of the Catholic Committee. The
Catholic Committee decided to dissociate itself from 
the production of the declaration, but could not
disavow or condemn its contents [Minute Book: 137-93.
When the Chief Secretary explicitly asked
representatives of the Catholic Committee for a 
disavowal at a meeting in November 1791, he was met 
with refusal. This meeting added to the sense of 
crisis which was widespread among the cabinet and its 
supporters and reaffirmed the Lord Lieutenant's view 
that "if they [the Catholics3 must have a struggle for 
their property it is better to do so in the present 
instance rather than give strength ... by concession" 
[quoted in: O'Flaherty 1985: 193.
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B) Catholic emancipation and parliamentary reform
The Catholic Committee had become obnoxious to 
government in proportion to the sympathy and contact 
which was developing between the Society of United 
Irishmen and other political reform clubs and the 
Catholics CPlowden 1803/ II: 3793. Fear of the danger
of an alliance between the politicized Dissenters and 
Catholics had made the British government impress 
upon the Irish administration the necessity for 
undertaking such measures "as may effectually 
counteract the union between the Catholics and 
Dissenters, at which the latter are evidently aiming" 
[quoted in: Lecky III: 33 >. In December 1791 the
British government pointed out to the Lord Lieutenant 
that if the Irish government demanded aid from Britain 
in an emergency situation, the public and the British 
Parliament would wish to know whether the object was 
one in which they were interested and whether the 
cause of the Irish government was just and politic. 
That would not be the case if the contention was only 
over the question whether "one description of Irishmen 
or another are to enjoy a monopoly or pre-eminence". 
The British public would not be prepared to see their 
resources expended in enabling the Irish government to 
hold the Catholics in a continued state of political 
proscription [quoted in: Harlow 1952: 6343.
In an official dispatch it was suggested to the 
Lord Lieutenant that the Catholics should be relieved 
from all disabilities connected with the practice of 
any trade or profession; the Home Secretary urged the 
repeal of all legislation which interfered with 
Catholic education, penalized intermarriage between 
Protestants and Catholics and which "made a 
distinction between protestants and papists as to the
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use of arms", and prevented Catholics from serving 
either on grand or petty juries. He also made it clear 
that the English cabinet favoured "a moderate and 
qualified [electoral] participation” of Catholics 
[quoted in: Lecky III: 38-413.
These proposals were not well received by the 
Irish administration. Westmorland, Fitzgibbon, Foster, 
Beresford and Agar, the archbishop of Cashel took 
particular issue with the proposals relating to the 
use of arms and the granting of the elective franchise 
[Lecky III: 41 ff. ; McDowell 1986: 309-103. In his
reply to Dundas on 11 January 1792, Westmorland was 
adamant that the English proposal of granting the 
franchise to the Catholics, if made to parliament, and 
by the administration, would occasion such ferment, 
both inside and outside the House of Commons, as would 
totally prevent any of the concessions wished for, and 
"it was impossible to foretell to what degree the 
House of Commons might be affected on the subject, 
should they imagine such a proposal (and so it would 
be construed) as an abandonment of the Protestant 
power, and a sacrifice of it to Catholic claims" 
[quoted in: Lecky III: 433.
At the beginning of 1792 the alliance between 
Irish radicals and those Catholics who were striving 
for emancipation had not yet reached any threatening 
proportions for the Irish administration and the 
Anglo-Irish Ascendancy at large. But there were signs 
of a quickening of moves towards a rapprochement 
between the Irish radicals and the Catholic activists. 
In Belfast the moderate opposition lost a motion which 
had proposed the repeal of the penal laws "from time 
to time, and as speedily as the circumstances of the 
country and the general welfare of the whole kingdom
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permit" [Belfast Politics 1794: 284-53. This
gradualism, which was very similar to the position of 
the aristocratic faction of the Catholic Committee, 
was not approved by the citizens of Belfast who, at a 
general meeting, demanded Catholic emancipation 
without any conditions [Rogers 1934: 244-503. In its
support of Catholic emancipation the Belfast 
townmeeting was thus expressing its continuing 
adherence to radical politics: In the early 1780s, it
had enthusiastically welcomed the Volunteers; in 1782 
it had opposed the raising of fencibles and had 
declared its support of Flood against Grattan over 
renunciation; by 1783-4 it had been spearheading the 
Ulster campaign for parliamentary reform [Crawford 
1979: 2003.
Its position on Catholic relief was welcomed, not 
only by the Roman Catholic Society of Belfast, but 
also by the Catholic Committee [Belfast Politics 1794: 
317-223. The Belfast Catholics had shown their 
positive attitude to the United Irish already on 19 
January when they paid tribute to the "true spirit of 
Christianity” which, for them, was inspiring their 
Protestant fellow-citizens [Historical Collection 
(Belfast) 1817: 3623. However, there was no unanimous
support for the reform factions. This became evident, 
for example, when the electors of Co. Antrim passed 
the motion of the Belfast moderates in February and 
added that repeal of the penal laws should not affect 
the elective franchise or endanger the Protestant 
religion of the kingdom. It became also increasingly 
clear that the Dissenting clergy on the whole was 
rather inimical to the United Irishmen [Rogers 1934: 
251-43.
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Under these circumstances the Protestant ruling 
elite was unlikely to be compelled to yield 
substantial power. In the end, the united opposition 
of the Irish administration prevailed, one more time, 
over the wishes of the British government. Some 
concessions, however, were proposed to be offered to 
the Catholics in the hope of forestalling any further 
rapprochement between them and the Irish radicals. The 
Relief Act of 1792 C 32 Geo III, c. 213 demonstrated 
the limits within which the Irish Ascendancy was 
considering concessions to the Catholics. This act
provided that Catholics might become barristers and 
attorneys; it abolished the obligation for Catholic 
schoolmasters to obtain a licence from the ordinary; 
it removed the limitation on the number of apprentices 
a Catholic might keep; and it removed the restrictions 
on intermarriage and on foreign education. But it did 
not make any constitutional concessions and did not 
give the Catholics the elective franchise.
During the parliamentary proceedings of the
relief bill the Catholic Committee specified its
demands for reform. It demanded that Catholics be 
admitted to the profession and practice of the law;
that Catholics be capable of serving as county 
magistrates; that they be entitled to be summoned and 
to serve on grand and petty juries; that they be 
granted "the right of voting in counties only for 
protestant members of parliament in such a manner 
however, as that a Roman catholic freeholder should 
not vote unless he eighther [sic] rented and 
cultivated a farm of £ 20.- per annum: in addition to
his forty shilling freehold, or else possessed a 
freehold to the amount of & 20.- a year" [Minute Book: 
1513 .
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To ingratiate themselves further with the 
Protestant ruling class, the Catholic Committee issued 
a "Declaration of the catholics of Ireland" on 17 
March 1792 in which they tried to assuage the fears of 
the Anglo-Irish Ascendancy that the political 
incorporation and participation of the Catholics would 
eventually bring about the dispossession of the land 
the Protestants had confiscated in the 17th century. 
They declared that
Ve do hereby solemnly disclaim and for ever 
renounce all interest in, and title to, all 
forfeited lands resulting from any rights of our 
ancestors, or any claim, title or interest 
therein: nor do we admit any title as a
foundation of right which is not established and
acknowledged by the laws of the realm as they now
stand. We desire further, that whenever the 
patriotism, liberality and justice of our 
countrymen, shall restore us a participation in 
the elective franchise, no catholic shall be 
permitted to vote at any election for members to 
serve in parliament, unless he shall previously 
take an oath to defend to the utmost of his 
power, the arrangement of property in this 
country as established by the different acts of 
attainder and settlement [Minute Book: 1593.
But despite the modest demands and manifest 
restraints on the part of the Catholics, parliament
rejected the calls for the parliamentary franchise by 
208 to 25 votes. One member of the conservative
Protestant elite argued during the parliamentary 
debate on the bill that "a line must be drawn 
somewhere, beyond which we must not recede"; it was 
impossible, he argued, for parliament "to grant the 
Roman Catholics what they demand, if we at all regard 
the Protestant safety" [ Pari.Reg.Ire. XI <1791): 126;
cf. debate on bill: ibid.: 123-2243.
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After their unsuccessful attempt to gain the 
parliamentary franchise in spring 1792, the Catholic 
Committee, including the secessionists of 1791 
[Plowden 1803/11, App. : 1823, engaged in an effort to
broaden its basis by mobilizing for a representative 
Catholic congress to give concerted force to Catholic 
demands. The county delegates to the congress were to 
be chosen by "electors'', "respectable persons", who 
had to be selected, in turn, in each parish at a
meeting "in a private house" . It was recommended that 
the electors should elect also "associate delegates", 
resident in Dublin, who could keep the county informed 
about the congress's proceedings [Plowden 1803/11, 
App.: 183-7: "On the manner of conducting the Election
of Delegates"].
The Protestant power holders were perturbed at 
the prospect of a representative Catholic congress. 
The grand juries of at least twenty-eight counties
declared themselves against the proposed congress 
[McDowell 1979: 407 n. 253 . The grand jury of the
county of Louth, with John Foster, the Speaker of the 
House of Commons, as its foreman, resolved that
the allowing to Roman Catholics the right of 
voting for members to serve in parliament, or 
admitting them to any participation in the
government of the kingdom, is incompatible with 
the safety of the Protestant establishment, the 
continuance of the succession to the crown in the 
illustrious House of Hanover, and must finally 
tend to shake, if not destroy our connexion with 
Great Britain [Plowden 1803/11, App.: 191; cf.
protest resolutions ibid. : 187-993 .
In its protest resolution the Corporation of 
Dublin stated what it wished to see maintained: "A
protestant ascendancy, which they defined as a 
protestant king of Ireland, a protestant hierarchy, 
protestant electors and government, the bench of
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justice, the army, the revenue, throughout all their 
branches and details, protestant, and this system 
supported by a connection with the protestant kingdom 
of Great Britain" [McDowell 1979: 4073.
Rot in all counties was there unanimous support 
among the Catholics, and the Catholic gentry in 
particular, for the election of delegates to a 
national congress. In Galway and Mayo, for example, 
the Catholic landed gentry, which were more numerous 
and influential there than in other parts of the 
country, were rather adverse to a more 'democratic* 
Catholic Committee. In the end, however, all counties 
did send delegates to the congress CMcDowell 1979: 
4083 . The 233 delegates, who convened in early 
December 1792 in Dublin, represented the bulk of the 
Catholic propertied and professional elite [O'Flaherty 
1985: 253 . They formulated complaints and demands
which were by now familiar. This time, however, these 
demands were given additional force by the more 
representative character of the Committee.
The convention decided to present a petition to 
George III without involving the Irish administration 
as an intermediary CPlowden II, App.: 215-24 for
petition3. A favourable reception in London by the 
government and a presentation to the King left the 
Roman Catholic delegation with the hope that relief 
would be forthcoming in the new parliament. For the 
Anglo-Irish ruling class, however, these developments 
were highly discomforting because they showed that 
they could not ultimately rely on British support for 
their position.
In a letter to the Lord Lieutenant in January 
1793 the English Home Secretary pressed once again
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for concessions for the Irish Catholics suggesting 
enfranchisement, jury service and admission to those 
civil offices which would not carry political power 
[McDowell 1979: 413 ff.3. Undoubtedly, the
international constellation informed the policy of the 
English cabinet: the British Government viewed the
Irish Catholics as a conservative force which was 
predisposed towards monarchical institutions. They 
were considered to be natural allies against the anti­
clerical French Revolution and, within Ireland, 
against Presbyterian republicanism. Furthermore, the 
British Government wanted to take positive steps to 
make Ireland a fruitful field for British recruitment, 
and an uninviting arena for French invasion. It might 
have also influenced the British government's policy 
that in the anticipated war with France, Britain would 
have to form a coalition with a major Catholic power 
such as Austria CMalcomsan 1978: 653.
The British emphasis on imperial Issues when 
dealing with Ireland had a long tradition and had 
already informed Pitt's commercial propositions of 
1785. It stemmed from the basic insight that "Ireland 
is too great to be unconnected with us [i.e. Britain3, 
and too near us to be dependent on a foreign state, 
and too little to be independent" [Grenville to 
Rutland, 3 December 1784, in: HMC Rutland III: 1553.
The power interests of imperial Britain dictated her 
attitudes towards the Anglo-Irish Ascendancy, not any 
notion of ethnic or social identity. For Pitt, it was 
quite clear that the Ascendancy was putting up a fight 
against full Catholic emancipation, not because they 
feared for the Protestant faith or the restoration of 
the lands to the old Catholic proprietors, but because 
they feared the loss of their political "monopoly of 
power and emoluments". Douglas, Pitt's designated
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Chief Secretary for Ireland, understood from 
conversations he had with Pitt in January 1794 that 
"his plan seems to be to let the weight of the 
Catholics, from their numbers and their increasing 
property, carry them by imperceptible steps into the 
legislature and their share of office" [in: Bickley
<ed.) 1928/1: 353.
By the end of 1792, the Anglo-Irish Ascendancy 
was thus confronted by a Catholic reform movement much 
better organized now than at the beginning of the year 
and a British Government determined to find a solution 
to the Catholic question out of imperial 
considerations. But the Irish radical opposition, too, 
had enhanced its position over the year. The Northern 
Whig Club endorsed Catholic emancipation and 
parliamentary reform in November 1792 declaring its 
support for "an honest and effectual reform in the 
representation of the people on a broad principle of 
equal justice and equal liberty to all sects and 
denominations of Irishmen" [ HMC Charlemont II: 2023.
This resolution signalled a radicalization even of the 
moderate Whig opposition, even though the Dublin Whig 
Club decided that the Catholic question should not be 
taken into consideration by its members [Rogers 1934: 
2783 .
The Belfast Volunteers, who had expressed their 
agreement with demands for reform and Catholic 
emancipation already in July 1792 [Belfast Politics 
1794: 328-423, issued an outspoken address to the
Volunteers of Ireland in December 1792 fully endorsing 
radical politics:
We have always, when called on, given our 
assistance to the magistracy of our country, in 
the due execution of the laws. In a word, we 
esteem it proper that citizens should know the 
use of arms, and we consider that country in the
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best state of defence, when the people are 
strong. The same force which was ready to defend 
the country against the attempts of foreign 
force, we hope, will be ever found equally ready 
to assert domestic quiet, and the common rights 
of all the people of Ireland ... it is the 
unalienable right of all the people of Ireland to 
carry arms . . . an effectual and adequate reform 
in the representation of the people in 
parliament, is our only object, in the pursuit of 
which object we shall never slacken our efforts. 
If bad advisers, or weak and wicked men, shall 
force the people into extremity, on them let all 
the miseries fall of civil convulsion [Historical 
Collections (Belfast) 1817: 392].
With its emphasis on the duty of the armed 
citizen, this resolution defiantly recalled the 
position of the Volunteers during the American War of 
Independence. Furthermore, it constituted a challenge 
to government in that it was justifying, if ever so 
subtly, "civil convulsion". And government was well 
advised to take this challenge of the Volunteers 
seriously as the Volunteers had been increasing in 
numbers during the summer with many new corps 
espousing liberal principles and winning over many 
Volunteers in the older companies, which so far had 
always inclined to conservative views and cautious 
action [Rogers 1934: 2753.
The radicalization of politics, in Belfast, at 
any rate, could also be seen in the foundation of a 
new club, the 'Irish Jacobins' in December 1792. 
Whereas the Volunteers kept themselves guarded with 
regard to a forthright endorsement of violent action 
for bringing about change, the Jacobins declared much 
more blatantly that in order to bring about reform "we 
will individually and collectively exert every means 
in our power" [Historical Collections (Belfast) 1817: 
388-9; emphasis added; McSkimmin 1849: 22-33. Whereas 
the Belfast United Irishmen were apparently dominated
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by a mercantile 61ite, the highest ranks within the 
Irish Jacobins seem to have been occupied by skilled 
artisans. But it has been suggested that it would be 
wrong to describe the Irish Jacobins as a working- 
class radical club independent of the socially 
superior United Irishmen: "Rather, they were an
auxiliary group, perhaps encouraged to take a more 
radical stand to test the waters of public opinion 
while the United Irishmen remained rather circumspect 
in their rhetoric as they awaited the outcome of the 
catholic campaign for final repeal of the penal laws" 
CCurtin 1985: 472-3].
The inhabitants of Belfast declared at a general 
meeting that they did not wish for a revolution; but 
they hastened to point out to the government that 
revolutions occurred when lack of reform drove the 
nation to despair. And such reform had to take place 
"whenever the united voice of the people shall call 
for it". Thanking the Volunteers for their
contribution to political life in Ireland, they 
expressed their hope that "should a contest for
liberty ever become necessary, (which God avert) we 
trust you will rescue her [ Ireland] from internal 
oppression" [Belfast Politics 1794: 105-7].
The general meeting of the inhabitants of Belfast 
also proposed an Ulster (provincial) convention of the 
Volunteers [Belfast Politics 1794: 106]. This
convention took place on the 15th and 16th of February 
1793. "The meeting", as a correspondent wrote to
Drennan, "was rather led by aristocracy, but the
people's spirit was infused into the resolutions" [in: 
Chart (ed.) 1931: 136]. The convention disapproved of
republican forms of government "as not applicable to 
this kingdom"; it declared that all boroughs should be
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disenfranchised and "representation established on a 
fair and rational principle, by extending the 
franchise equally to persons of every religious 
persuasion, by frequent elections and by a 
distribution of representatives proportioned to the 
population and wealth of the country"; and it 
expressed disapproval of the proposed formation of the 
militia [quoted in: McDowell 1986: 327; McDowell 1979: 
428; Rogers 1934: 294-9],
There had been a discussion within the Dublin
Society of United Irishmen whether there should be any 
property qualification attached to the franchise.
Drennan had proposed that "persons not property must 
be the rule of representation; not land, but lives; 
not money but men". Another United Irishman, Malachy 
O'Connor, however, had argued that "the house of
commons should speak the sense of that portion of all 
the people, where common sense, wisdom, and virtue, 
are most abundantly found. This portion of the people 
consists of the middle ranks of society. The electors 
then of the house of commons should be, the middle 
rank of society". He therefore suggested a £ 10
freehold or other property qualifications. But the 
committee which was set up to draw up plans for 
parliamentary reform decided by a small majority of 
eleven to nine votes to reject property qualifications 
[McDowell <ed.> 1942: 45, 563.
In this situation of increased pressure on the 
Anglo-Irish Ascendancy, the administration devised a 
policy of concession and compulsion. A tentative step 
towards "a full participation of all the advantages 
now held exclusively by the Protestants" [in: Bickley
<ed. > 1928/1: 363 was the Catholic relief bill which
the Chief Secretary was ordered to introduce in the
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House of Commons on 4 February 1793 C 33 Geo III, c.
21] . It was proposed in the bill that the Catholics
were to be granted the parliamentary franchise, thus 
restoring to them the rights of voting in 
parliamentary elections on equal terms with the 
Protestants. The Catholics had been deprived of this 
right since 1728 Cl Geo II, c. 9, s. 8; Simms 1960/61; 
Malcomson 1978; 693. This right was granted by 144 to
72 votes. It was also provided that Catholics might 
hold offices under the crown. But there remained 
exceptions; they could not become judges in the 
superior courts, law officers, king's counsel, 
generals on the staff, and privy councillors. However, 
the Catholics could now also become members of 
corporations. All this was granted without demanding 
from the Catholics that they took the oath of
abjuration; taking the oath of allegiance to the King 
was deemed sufficient.
Furthermore, the Catholics were permitted to
enter and take degrees in the University of Dublin. It 
was also provided that Catholics could keep arms on 
the same terms as Protestants if they possessed a 
freehold with a £ 100 or £ 1,000 of personal property. 
If they were £ 10 freeholders or possessed £ 100 worth 
of personal property [this was amended in the House of 
Lords to £ 3003 they might keep arms if they took the 
oath of allegiance and filed affidavits as to their 
property. But their was one concession which was not 
being made; Catholics were still not admitted to 
parliament. A motion to admit them to the membership 
in the Commons was defeated by 163 to 69 votes 
[Pari.Keg.Ire. XIII <1793); 253-53.
One reason for the support of the bill by the 
majority in the House of Commons was certainly the
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recognition "that the concessions proposed by the
British Government would be less damaging to the
Ascendancy than a situation in which the Catholics
continued to regard the Irish Parliament as their
enemy and the British Government as their only friend"
CMalcomson 1978: 354]. Furthermore, the Protestant
ruling class was obviously concerned to achieve at 
least a certain degree of content and unity in a 
period of emergency Cafter all, Great Britain was at 
war with France since February 1), There was a clear 
understanding that concessions to the Catholic
reformers would forestall an even closer alliance
between them and the radical reform party. The 
acceptance of the proposed measures of relief by the
Catholic Committee was an undoubted victory for the
government, in as much as it deprived the radical 
reformers of the main inducement they had held out to 
the Catholics [Rogers 1934: 308; McDowell 1986: 318],
The granting of the parliamentary franchise to 
the Roman Catholics produced an unintended result in 
those parts of the country where Protestants and
Catholics were not unevenly divided. In their petition 
to George III, the Catholics had pointed out that
it continually happens ... that multitudes of the 
Catholic tenantry in divers [!3 counties in this 
kingdom are, at the expiration of their leases, 
expelled from their tenements and farms to make 
room for Protestant freeholders, who, by their 
votes, may contribute to the weight and 
importance of their landlords ... [Plowden 
1803/11, App.: 2183.
With the 1793 Relief Act, the religion of his tenantry 
became immaterial to the landlord. The Protestant
farmer found himself now in a potentially fierce
competition with Catholic farmers for vacant farms 
without being able anymore of drawing an advantage out
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of a political monopoly CFalkiner 1902: 49-503. I will 
discuss later how this competition precipitated the 
conflicts between Defenders and the Orange Orders in 
Ulster and thus contributed to yet another area of 
instability.
The government also decided to placate the
moderate Whig opposition. In the parliamentary session 
of 1793, the whole system of revenue was 
revolutionized. The old hereditary revenue was
abolished and the old distinction between it and the 
additional duties ceased to exist: from now on,, the
whole revenue was to form a consolidated fund. A fixed 
civil list was granted to the King which was never to 
be more than £ 145,000, exclusive of the pension list. 
It was enacted that the whole amount of pensions 
should be gradually reduced to £ 80,000 per annum. To 
achieve this, no single pension of more than £ 1,200 a 
year was to be granted except to members of the Royal 
Family, or on an address from both Houses of
Parliament. When the pension list had been reduced to 
the amount of £ 80,000, an additional £ 80,000 per 
annum should be granted with the civil list of £ 
145,000, making in all £ 225,000 p.a., which should go 
to the payment of all expenses of the civil list, 
including pensions [33 Geo III, c. 34; O'Brien 1918: 
3333 . For the first time, Irish finances had, 
theoretically, been put under the control of the Irish 
Parliament.
A Place Act excluded from the House of Commons 
persons holding a group of specified offices,
pensioners during pleasure and any person holding a 
place created after the passing of this act. It also 
provided that all members who accepted offices already 
in existence were to vacate their seats, although they
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might seek re-election, and every member of 
parliament, before taking his seat, was to swear that 
he did not hold any pension or office which might 
incapacitate him from sitting C33 Geo III, c. 413,
A Barren Land Act [33 Geo III, c. 253, which 
provided that barren land brought into cultivation 
should be exempted from tithe for seven years; a 
Hearth-tax Act [33 Geo III c. 143, which exempted 
occupiers of a house with only one hearth from hearth- 
tax; a Libel Act [33 Geo III, c. 433, which provided 
that juries in libel cases might bring in a general 
verdict upon the whole matter at issue, instead of 
being confined to the questions of publication and of 
meaning; and the East India Act [33 Geo III, c. 313, 
which gave Ireland the right to participate in the 
East India trade: All these acts constituted
concessions of the government to the Whig opposition 
in Ireland [Lecky III: 182-7; McDowell 1979: 435-63.
C) The repressive policies of the Irish government in 
1793
This policy of concession was accompanied by a 
policy of repression directed against the radical 
opposition. This policy began with the government 
issuing a declaration on March 11 which, in effect, 
suppressed the obnoxious Belfast Volunteers 
[declaration quoted in: Belfast Politics 1794: 139-
403 . The magistrates and peace officers of Belfast 
were charged with the duty of dissolving the Volunteer 
corps and the Commander of the troops in Ulster 
received orders to assist the civil power with all the 
force at his disposal [Rogers 1934: 3113. The Belfast
Volunteers succumbed.
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The Dublin Volunteers were not stirred by this 
repressive government policy and volunteered to hand 
over their cannon and arms to government. They had 
already demonstrated at the Ulster Volunteer 
convention in February that they were unreliable 
allies of radical opposition and rather responsive to 
Charlemont's moderate policies [Rogers 1934: 2903. The 
parliamentary Whig opposition at large kept quiet 
because there was the prospect for them to see long- 
demanded reforms enacted in parliament. The Catholics, 
too, were disinclined to commit themselves in 
expectation of the promised relief act. And the 
declaration of war by France on Great Britain on 
February 1 together with the imputed excesses of the 
Revolution in Europe had rather heightened the 
public's distrust of any opposition to constituted 
authority [Rogers 1934: 311-123.
A Gunpowder Act [33 Geo III, c. 23 made it an 
offence to import or transport arms or ammunition 
without a licence. The Convention Act [33 Geo III, c. 
293, which became law in August 1793, prohibited 
assemblies purporting to represent the people under 
the pretence of preparing or presenting petitions to 
the King or parliament. Declaring assemblies appointed 
to represent "the people of the realm", or any section 
of the public, to be unlawful, it deprived the 
opposition of its principle instrument with which it 
had tried to exercise pressure on parliament since the 
American War of Independence [KcDowell 1986: 3313.
The mainstay of the repressive policy was the 
formation of a militia force [33 Geo III, c. 223. The 
government considered it "essential to the safety and 
protection of this realm and its constitution" that "a 
respectable military force under the command of
officers possessing landed property within this 
kingdom" was established C 33 Geo III, c. 22, s. 13. 
But forming the militia had not been a policy 
objective for which the government had been striving 
out of its own volition. In May 1790, the Lord 
Lieutenant had expressed very eloquently the dilemma 
which a militia force would pose for the government:
The establishment of a militia in Ireland seems 
attended with unsurmountable difficulties; if it 
could be raised, would be burthensome CsicD and 
oppressive to a great degree, especially 
considering the disproportion of Protestants and 
Catholics. Considering the militia with a view to 
the government of England, the militia would form 
a military body of the inhabitants of the 
country, who, upon any disagreement between 
England and Ireland, would certainly be actuated 
by the popular opinion. The strength of the 
militia would form an argument against the 
necessity of so large a military force, and would 
probably, in the end, cause a reduction of the 
military establishment. It would change the power 
of the sword, lex ultima regum, from the English 
army to the gentlemen of the country ... Upon one 
idea only I think the subject can be considered 
... the danger that the volunteering spirit 
should be renewed, and whether that spirit might 
not be counteracted by this establishment C in: 
HMC Fortescue I: 5833.
To form a militia would thus lead to yielding 
considerable power over the means of coercion to the 
local gentry which was rather undesirable from the 
point of view of the Irish administration. If, 
however, armed citizens were roaming the country as 
Volunteers, then yielding power and co-operating with 
the local aristocracy and gentry would be the lesser 
of two evils.
Confronted with the political and social 
turbulence in Ireland, Westmorland and the 
administration gradually changed their opinion. In 
November 1792 Westmorland maintained that it seemed
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"possible to form a militia that may tend very much to 
strengthen the hands of government and enable his 
majesty whenever occasion requires to employ elsewhere 
his British forces". He was aware, however, that the 
formation of a militia was "a question of great nicety 
and difficulty and I should hesitate somewhat more on 
the subject if I were not apprehensive that a general 
arming of volunteers . . . was about to be renewed" 
[quoted in: McAnally 1949: 9-10],
Disturbances during the winter of 1792-3 did 
indeed lead to a revival of the old Volunteer corps. 
Serious disturbances over grain prices broke out in 
County Cork and County Vaterford. As the Irish 
administration failed to deal with these disturbances 
in an effective way, the Volunteers were revived in 
the form of local police forces. The resurgence of the 
Volunteers in the North appears to have primarily been 
the result of the sectarian character of the 
disturbances, especially noticeable in Louth, Cavan 
and Monaghan. There, Volunteer corps were revived to 
counteract Catholic associations [Bartlett 1988: 195-
63. The internal threat to 'good government' posed by 
these Volunteer corps, which were beyond the control 
of the Castle authorities, and the external threat
to the imperial order by France changed the parameter 
for the Irish administration. Aware of the voluntary 
arming that had taken place during the American Var of 
Independence, the militia was thought of by government 
as a timely and useful measure to prevent this from 
happening again in the anticipated confrontation with 
France.
A week after the proclamation which had 
effectively suppressed the Volunteers in Ulster in 
March 1793, the Chief Secretary wrote to the British 
government that he looked upon the militia
as the most useful measure both to England and
Ireland that ever has been adopted, and if I am
not extremely mistaken, it will operate 
effectually to the suppression of volunteering, 
to the civilisation of the people, and to the 
extinction of the means which the agitators of 
the country have repeatedly availed themselves of 
to disturb the peace ... I am happy to add that 
there is every appearance of the restoration of 
peace in Ireland [quoted in: Lecky III: 1793.
The Militia Act passed parliament without much 
debate [Pari.Reg.Ire. XIII <1793): 384-91, 417-8, 426- 
7, 442-33 . It provided that each county or city of
county was to raise a regiment. Considerably 
influenced by the codified English militia act of 
1786, it was stipulated that it should be decided by 
ballot who was to serve in the militia. Each county 
and county borough was given a figure for the numbers 
of men it had to provide. The counties were divided
into subdivisions and parish constables were to draw
up lists of all eligible men within these areas. A 
final list was to be drawn up after appeals had been 
heard and exemptions been made. The ballot would then 
commence and continue until the 'quota' for that 
subdivision was reached. Substitutes were allowed and 
so too were volunteers. It would seem that to a large 
degree the militia ranks were eventually filled by 
recruits who had volunteered for service [McAnally 
1949: 29-303.
The Lord Lieutenant was to appoint the 
lieutenant-colonel commandant of each regiment; the 
commandant, in turn, nominated officers, subject to 
the Lord Lieutenant's approval. Property
qualifications applied for the commissioned officers. 
It was laid down that the militia should receive four 
weeks' training in peacetime, but in times of 
emergency it could be embodied permanently. There was
a firm guarantee that the militia would not be sent 
abroad. Roman Catholics, now allowed to carry arms by 
the Catholic Relief Act, were not barred from serving 
in the militia CMcAnally 1949; McDowell 1979: 491-2;
Ferguson 1981: 145 ff. ] .
This force of 15,971 men in thirty-eight 
regiments became largely absorbed into civil duties. 
Dispersed throughout the country on a county basis 
with each militia corps serving outside its own 
county, the militia, initially, was a quasi-police 
force, policing the countryside and protecting 
magistrates [McAnally 1949: 278 -903. In 1798, the
militia would support the army in putting down the 
Rebellion.
It has been said of the militia that it was "in 
conception, and probably quite largely in reality, 
mainly a peasant force officered by country gentry". 
As the Volunteers were mostly middle class "it was 
therefore antecedently improbable that many ex­
volunteers would be found in the militia; the middle 
class being even more disinclined to leave its own 
home place, and its business association, than the 
peasant class. The militia was definitely a new 
departure. The volunteer organizations faded out of 
sight [McAnally 1949: 603.
Resistance to the implementation of the militia 
act was widespread and militia disturbances 
accompanied the setting up of the militia corps in 
most counties. The opposition to the formation of the 
militia appears to have been stirred primarily by the 
fear of overseas service of the militia corps and by 
the compulsory element which was introduced into 
recruiting as a consequence of balloting [Lecky III:
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2163 . Within the province of Leinster, Co. Wexford, 
Co. Meath, and the Carlow, Kilkenny, Queen*s County 
triangle were the areas most affected by militia 
disturbances. Co. Louth, where John Foster was the 
commander of the militia, was generally quiet, and so 
too was Dublin, city and county. In the province of 
Munster, Kerry and Limerick were the most disturbed 
areas, but there was also some trouble in Tipperary 
and Clare. The counties of Sligo, Roscommon and Mayo 
in the province of Connacht witnessed the most serious 
resistance to the militia. Ulster was the least 
disturbed of the four provinces, but there, too, some 
resistance to the militia took place. The most serious 
of these acts of resistance occured in Co. Down where 
there was trouble at Rathfriland and Killinchy, and a 
full-scale riot at Castlereagh. The relative 
peacefulness in Ulster was explained by Westmorland by 
pointing to the activities of General Whyte’s troops 
which had violently repressed radicalism a few months 
before the militia crisis: "The north having been
lately dragooned remains in sullen silence" [quoted 
in: Bartlett 1988: 211; Bartlett 1988: 200-12 also the 
source on the regional militia riots].
Responding to these disturbances, the government 
encouraged voluntary enlistments and made some 
provision for the families of those who were drawn by 
ballot [33 Geo III, c, 283. It also gave public 
assurances that there would be no overseas service for 
the militia. But sending in the troops to quell the 
disturbances was the government's main response. In 
these riots, which flared up in May and had run their 
course by August, as many as 230 lives had been lost 
throughout Ireland. This compares to around fifty 
deaths which resulted from, or were attributable to,
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agrarian disturbances in Ireland between 1760 and 1790 
[Bartlett 1988: 193, 212].
The violence shown in these disturbances by both 
rioters and the troops has been explained as a 
consequence of the 'end to moral economy' [Bartlett
1988: 214-83. The Catholic Relief Act of 1793 is the
cornerstone of this argument. Bartlett points out that 
in the minds of the Catholic peasantry the Relief Act 
had been linked to hopes of social reform: "They [the
Catholics] have been taught that the elective
franchise will improve their condition and they
connect with it the non-payment of rents, tythes and 
taxes, the only objects of their consideration", 
Westmorland wrote to Dundas in November 1792 [quoted 
in: Bartlett 1988: 215, n. 1143. But instead of social 
reform, the Relief act was accompanied by a Militia 
Act. It was thus understandable that the anti-militia 
riots should soon throw up the historic peasant 
grievances of tithes and taxes, but also of priestly 
dues and food prices. It was rumoured that the
formation of the militia was the price the middle 
class Catholics in the Catholic Committee were 
prepared to pay for their relief act and that the 
Catholic priests had agreed to help implement the 
Militia Act. The Catholic Relief Act had thus 
disorientated and effectively split the Catholic 
community [Bartlett 1988: 215-63.
Protestant morale and self-confidence, on the 
other hand, had been shattered in recent months as a 
result of the actions of Pitt's government with regard 
to Catholic relief in 1792 and 1793. Suspicion, hatred 
and fear of the Catholic masses succeeded this loss of 
self-confidence and the Protestant resignedly accepted 
the gulf between the Catholics and the Ascendancy :
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"Not only liad the peasantry been apparently abandoned 
by their Catholic betters, so too they had been 
actually abandoned by their Protestant superiors" 
[Bartlett 1988: 2163.
It is possible to describe the constellation of 
interests in the summer of 1793 without falling back 
on the the analytical concept of 'moral economy'. I 
have argued in this chapter that the formation of the 
Society of United Irishmen in 1791 reflected the 
radicalization of Protestant middle-class opposition 
to the status quo. Demanding parliamentary reform, and 
in particular a reform of the electoral system, and 
advocating the political and social equality of 
<middle-class> Catholics, the aims of the middle-class 
United Irish went well beyond those of the majority of 
parliamentary Whig opposition which was, and intended 
to remain, part of the Anglo-Irish Ascendancy. The 
revival of the Catholic Committee and its take-over by 
the leaders of the Catholic middle-class similarly 
indicated a radicalization of Catholic demands. But as 
this radicalization was taking place and was leading 
to an ever closer, if uneasy, co-operation between 
radical Protestant reformers and the politically 
organized Catholic middle-class, the Anglo-Irish 
Ascendancy closed ranks and became ever more 
entrenched.
Mainly under pressure from Britain, whose policy 
towards the Irish Catholics was increasingly 
determined by imperial considerations in view of 
pending military conflicts with France, some sort of 
Catholic relief, giving Catholics the right to vote in 
parliamentary elections, was conceded by an unwilling 
and unsympathetic Ascendancy. But concessions to the 
parliamentary Whig opposition were exchanged by the
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government for connivance of the Whigs in a repressive 
law-and-order policy. Hot only did government 
virtually suppress the Volunteers, it also established 
a militia force in 1793 in a situation of internal 
political and social turbulence and of war with 
France. Beware of the general arming of volunteers in 
the American War of Independence, government did not 
want to risk another humiliating and politically 
detrimental dependence on troops it could not control.
By the summer of 1793, the moderate Whig 
opposition had achieved some of its objectives for 
which they had been agitating for a long time. 
Concerned about the connection between Great Britain 
and Ireland, a period of war was not the time for them 
- after *1782* - to mobilize against British, and
imperial, interests. And in any case, should the war 
with France drag on, there would very likely be some 
form of realignment or even coalition between the 
English Tories and Whigs (as there had been during the 
American war), with beneficial repercussions for the 
Irish Whigs, The Catholic middle class, too, had been 
rather successful over the last few years. Although 
still debarred from sitting in parliament, the 
Catholic middle class had gained a slice of political 
power, not through violent commotion, but, as they saw 
it, astute political manoeuvres.
There was no reason for either of these social 
groups to form an alliance with the political losers. 
None of the grievances under which the peasants 
suffered had been solved, and neither had the 
parliamentary and constitutional reform, for which the 
radical opposition had fought, materialized. And 
because of all this, the government had won as well: 
it had succeeded in splitting the opposition to its
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policies without making any concessions which would 
have struck at the heart of the power structure which 
favoured the Anglo-Irish Ascendancy. With the Whig 
party thus even more strongly drawn into the 
Ascendancy, and the Catholic middle class partially 
incorporated into the political system for the first 
time, there was no danger that a show of force on the 
part of the government would have any < immediate) 
negative repercussion. Rather the reverse: it would
reassure the ruling elite that it still had the power 
and capability of dealing with unruly elements. In any 
case, the war with France made it imperative for the 
administration to maintain 'good government' and 
public order in Ireland and gave more than ample 
Justification for meting out rough treatment for those 
bent on being troublesome.
The newly formed militia corps, however, did not 
ensure internal tranquillity. As a matter of fact, the 
militia contributed to a restructuring of the conflict 
constellations of Irish society and their 
organizational forms. In particular, the embodiment of 
the Irish militia was instrumental to the spread of 
' Defenderism'. To understand the formation of the 
secret society of the 'Defenders', whose members were 
mainly Catholics, it is necessary to survey the 
agrarian class structure of Ulster in the second half 
of the 18th century.
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XV. His beginnings of Defenderism and Orange ism in
Ulster.
Under the scheme for the plantation of the 
escheated lands in Ulster in the early 17th century, 
landlords had been granted extensive powers under 
royal patents. They were given the control over local 
government and were permitted, as the owners of the 
lands, to pursue a flexible policy as to the leasing 
of their holdings. The conditions in their patents 
required the landlords to build stone or brick houses 
with fortified enclosures and to keep arms for their 
defence. This meant that they had to invest large sums 
of capital, not only in order to develop the 
potentials of their land and to realize the value of 
their estates, but also in order to conform with the 
stipulations of their patents. As they themselves did 
very often not command the required capital, they were 
compelled to lease land for rent to tenants. 
Initially, however, only one group of colonizing 
landlords, the 'servitors' (those men, normally 
soldiers, who had served the crown in Ireland), were 
permitted to take native Irish tenants, whereas the 
other group, the 'undertakers', were required to bring 
over English or Scottish settlers. But as the 
'undertakers' found it difficult to obtain British 
colonists the Crown could be persuaded in the late 
1620s to permit them to lease land to the Irish in 
terms similar to those enjoyed by the British 
settlers.
The small scale of immigration from Britain 
together with the impecuniosity of landlords during 
the seventeenth century gave prospective tenants a 
very strong position from which to negotiate leases.
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With economic conditions in many areas remaining 
largely adverse as late as 1750, the tenants in Ulster 
gained long leases on good terms, established the 
right to sell their lease to another person without 
undue interference from the landlord, and had the 
justice of their claim accepted that they were 
entitled to renewal of the lease at its expiry on 
offering to pay the current value of the farm in 
increased rent CCrawford 1975: 6-12; Crawford 1978:
194-6; Crawford 1979: 186; Crawford 1983: 63; Roebuck
1988: 84-5; Beckett 1981: 45-63.
From mid-century onwards the relationship between 
landlords and tenants was transformed throughout 
Ulster. One reason for this change lay in the increase 
in population. Between 1753 and 1791 the population of 
Ulster doubled from some 600,000 or 700,000 to more 
than 1,400,000 CDaultrey et al. 1981: 6243. The
increasing demographic pressure on land resources in 
conjunction with the overall upturn in the economy, 
which has already been described at the beginning of 
this discussion of the Irish case, brought about a 
steep rise in the value of land and a rapid upward 
movement in rent levels CClark/Donnelly 1983c: 144;
Kirkham 1988: 100; Gibbon 1972: 143-73► In order to
realize the favourable potentials of the demographic 
and economic constellations for increasing their 
income from rent, the landlords typically resorted to 
a policy of setting land directly to original sub­
tenants and of the general rise in rents as soon as an 
old lease had expired. It has already been discussed 
that the Steelboy disturbances of the early 1770s 
reflected the struggle between one 'improving' 
landlord and his tenants and sub-tenants over attempts 
to realize the increase in the value of the land. 
Nowhere were the changes in the agrarian class
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structure more momentous, however, than in the linen 
triangle between Belfast/Lisburn, Dungannon and Newry 
[Crawford 1971: 117-443.
As a result of the Cattle Acts of the 1660s and 
the removal of duties on Irish linens in 1696, the 
domestic linen industry was well established before 
the turn of the century. In the 18th century the linen 
industry was Ulster's main source of prosperity. In 
the improving economic climate after 1740 many tenants 
on long leases realized that there was more profit in 
sub-letting land for small farms to weavers than in 
farming. So lucrative became the domestic linen 
industry that Ulster experienced an overall decline in 
agriculture in the second half of the 18th century. 
One consequence of the dominance of the linen industry 
was the evolution of a society of small tenant 
farmers. The income available from yarn and cloth 
production enabled families to maintain themselves on 
smaller holdings. The opportunities which the linen 
industry provided for young people to set up and 
maintain homes of their own stimulated the subdivision 
of holdings. And so did the expansion of the linen 
industry which enabled many independent weavers to 
take in cottiers in order to put out work to them 
[Crawford 1979: 188; Kirkham 1988: 1003.
Furthermore, the letting policy of the landlords 
gradually destroyed the substantial farmer class:
In the districts where the domestic industry of 
weaving fine linens was spreading through the 
countryside, landlords were jealous of the 
profits made by many farmers in subletting 
holdings to weavers on short leases. Whenever 
these leases fell due for renewal, landlords 
insisted on renewing to the farmers only the 
holdings they actually occupied and on letting 
the properties that the farmers had sublet, 
directly to the weavers who lived on them. This 
measure destroyed the farming class in these
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districts, and the weavers' holdings continued to 
subdivide so that by the end of the century the 
average size of holdings in County Armagh was 
little more than five acres ... C Crawford 1983: 
63; Crawford 1975: 12-43.
The displacement of the substantial farmers and
middlemen made it imperative for the landlord and his 
agent to deal directly with their numerous tenantry. 
As it proved to be administratively impossible for the 
landlords to ensure that all tenants adhered strictly 
to the stipulations of their leases, the new leasing 
policy typically led to an increase in the tenants' 
room for manoeuvre CCrawford 1975: 15; Crawford 1983:
633 . In their function as social brokers, the
middlemen had contributed to the cohesion of social 
life in the countryside [Cullen 1981: 1043. The
economic decline of the middlemen and the substantial 
farmers, therefore, also brought a decline in the 
efficiency of this traditional kind of social control.
The changes in the organization of linen 
manufacture added to the weakening of traditional 
mechanisms of social control. In the course of the 
18th century, a significant section of the weavers in 
the 'linen triangle' lost their economic independence 
and underwent a process of proletarianization:
Earlier in the century weavers had ordinarily 
been independent entrepreneurs, buying yarn and 
selling cloth in the open market Con their own 
account3, By the 1760s, however, weavers 
increasingly found themselves dependent upon 
wealthier drapers, who would issue yarn to a 
weaver unable to buy it on his own account and 
would then pay for the resulting cloth by the 
piece. As the weaver was drawn into this system, 
he lost his independence and became an employee 
even though his home might continue to be his 
workplace [Miller 1983: 157; Gill 1925: 2-3, 144-
60; Gibbon 1972: 148-93.
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It has been estimated that 35 per cent out of a total 
of 35,000 weavers in Ulster in 1770 were producing 
within such a relationship of economic dependency, 
whereas in 1784 this number had increased to 40 per 
cent out of a total of 40,000 weavers [Gill 1925: 
1623. The landed elite could exercise little social 
control over these rural weavers who had become
virtual employees in a wage system [Miller 1988: 90-
13 .
County Armagh was roughly divided into three main 
settlement areas with Presbyterians (or 'Scots*)
being sandwiched between Anglicans (or 'English') in 
the north of the county and Catholics (or 'Irish') in 
the south. But nearly everywhere in Co. Armagh, 
Catholics were at least a substantial minority. But 
prior to the 1740s, Catholics had refrained from 
commercial linen weaving; by the 1780s, however, they 
were definitely engaged in weaving, though probably 
seldom as employers [Miller 1983: 160-13. The Catholic
Relief Acts of 1778 and 1782, which permitted
Catholics to purchase and hold leases on land on an 
equal footing with Protestants, increased the ability 
of Catholics to compete for land with the Protestant 
weavers. The fear of the Protestant lower class that 
the intrusion of Catholics into all branches of the 
linen industry and their competition for land would 
threaten their interests was heightened by the policy 
of some radical Volunteer corps which opened their 
ranks to Catholics in order to combat the loss of 
political momentum they had been experiencing since 
1784 [Stewart 1977: 130; Senior 1966: 6-73,
It was in these conditions that Protestant 
weavers banded together in groups, which were to be 
called the 'Peep o' Day Boys', and began daybreak
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raids on the homes of Catholics in order to prevent 
the accumulation of arms amongst the Catholic
peasantry. These activities can also be understood as 
attempts on the side of the Protestant weavers to 
block the creation of a free and unrestricted labour 
market which was thought to undermine a structure of 
social inequality from which they had hitherto
benefited CGibbon 1972: 150-13. In response to these
attacks Catholic bands were formed which called
themselves 'Defenders'. Among their members were
weavers* labourers, and tenant farmers who were also 
involved in some kind of domestic industry. In a later 
phase, when Defenderism was spreading beyond Armagh, 
it appealed strongly to radical urban artisans and 
petty shopkeepers thus shedding some of its initially 
exclusively rural associations. But Defenderism always 
remained committed to the idea of forming a secret 
organization which was to be based on masonic-like 
practices, and the movement was bound together in 
lodges by rituals, oaths and catechisms CBeames 1975: 
504; Elliott 1982: 18-20, 40-1; Senior 1966: 8-9, 12;
Garvin 1981: 27-31; Curtin 1985: 4783.
As Miller C1983: 170-81, 1873 argues, in the
first three or four years of the troubles landlords 
seem to have generally sympathized with Catholic 
victims of the Peep o' Day Boys, advising them to 
purchase weapons or even lending arms to Catholics 
[also: Senior 1966: 93. In view of the decrease in the 
effectiveness of the traditional means of social 
control, landlords resorted to a strategy of 
incorporating Protestant agitators into the Volunteer 
corps. By 1790 this strategy had by and large 
succeeded in disciplining the Protestant Peep o' Day 
Boys. The Catholics, meanwhile, "were confirmed in the
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belief that the Protestant rabble was being 
deliberately set upon them" CMiller 1983: 1743.
This conflict pattern, which resulted initially 
from the gentry's particular strategy of gaining 
control over the Protestant lower class, was 
consolidated by a shift in the attitude of landlords 
towards the Catholics. More and more, violent 
incidents were arising, not so much out of public 
brawls or faction fights which were considered as 
politically harmless forms of recreation, but out of 
demonstrations:
A successful Catholic attack upon a Volunteer 
procession or other Protestant parade would 
betoken Catholic ascendancy in the territory in 
question. Many landlords believed that Catholics 
were entitled to the quiet enjoyment of their 
lives and possessions, but few could contemplate 
with equanimity a challenge to the proposition 
that all of Ireland was Protestant territory. For 
upon this proposition their moral claim to their 
own landed possessions rested [Miller 1983: 1753.
The economic conflict, which was structured along 
sectarian lines, thus increasingly took on the form of 
a political confrontation between the Protestant 
Ascendancy, which was represented in the Volunteers as 
the local police force, and the Catholic Defenders.
The Defenders, then, had their origins in the 
socio-economic conflict between the Protestant and the 
Catholic lower class that materialized in County 
Armagh in the 1780s in the form of sectarian feuding. 
By 1795, however, Defenderism had spread to at least 
thirteen other counties. The formation of the militia 
in 1793 played a crucial part in spreading 
Defenderism. It has been argued that the anti-militia 
riots, and their bloody suppression, helped create an 
anti-state ethos on which Defenderism could feed
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[Bartlett 1985a: 3753. In those counties where they
were already organized the Defenders took an active 
role in the riots. By May 1793, their movement had 
also spread into riot-torn areas like Sligo and 
Leitrim [Elliott 1982: 453, But supporters and members 
of the secret society of the Defenders became also 
enrolled in the new militia corps:
The militia was organised mostly on a county 
basis and its rank and file consisted largely of 
the catholic rural poor, precisely the sort of 
people who appear to have found Defenderism 
appealing. There can be no doubt that many 
Defenders were ballotted into a number of militia 
regiments and, since regiments generally were not 
permitted to serve in the counties where they 
were raised, some regiments, as they travelled 
around the country, became agents for the 
diffusion of Defenderism into new, 'uninfected' 
areas [Bartlett 1985a: 3753.
The organization of the Irish militia, therefore, 
was instrumental to spreading Defenderism [ MacNeven 
1807: 120-13. Furthermore, however, the Defenders
succeeded in attracting widespread rural support 
outside of Ulster in consequence of the fact that they 
did not limit their goals to narrowly sectarian 
issues. Their aims were extremely diverse. They
normally reflected the grievances of the different 
localities into which the movement penetrated. Among 
their general aims, which they pursued in every
district, were the regulation of tithes and the 
opposition to tithe proctors or tithe farmers. They 
sought the reduction of hearth-money and rents and 
they agitated against the price of conacre land and 
the level of labourers' wages. They also attacked the 
high level of priests' fees. With regard to these
goals, the Defenders stood in the tradition of earlier 
agrarian protest: "But unlike the programmes of
previous agrarian societies, that of the Defenders 
also included vague plans to assist a French invasion,
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bring about an Irish rebellion and secure a 
redistribution of' Protestant estates among the 
Catholics" CElliott 1978: 417; Bartlett 1985a: 3763,
In the northern part of the province of Connacht 
and in County Meath, for example, the Defenders gained 
support from peasants who had been adversely affected 
by the embargo on grain exports from Irish ports 
shortly after the commencement of war with France. A 
switch to the production of beef brought huge 
increases in the value of that land which was suitable 
for extensive grazing. This development gave an 
incentive to reducing the area of land available for 
tillage and to raising the prices of potato ground and 
conacre to much higher levels. In 1795 the agitation 
for relief of economic hardship through either the
raising of wages or the lowering of rents helped the 
spread of Defenderism in County Meath [Hogan 1976: 42- 
3; Kerrane 1971: 55-68; McDowell 1986: 346-73.
In this region, conflict was fierce. The houghing 
of cattle and the raiding of houses for arms seem to 
have been widespread in Co. Leitrim and Roscommon in 
April 1795. Even more alarming to the authorities must 
have been the killing of eleven revenue officers by
Defenders in Leitrim in the same month. In May, the
army killed about thirty Defenders in Co. Roscommon 
and between seventy or eighty Defenders in Co. 
Westmeath. In Castlerea in Co. Mayo, where "the
Defenders had establish'd a democracy ... and its laws 
were submitted to", the army under its Commander Lord 
Carhampton behaved in a ruthless way: "The army has
scour'd a great tract of country in the night and 
taken out of their beds all suspected persons. Lord C. 
ordered the soldiers always to fire upon those who 
assembled in arms; and that all lurking strangers
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should be apprehended as vagrants and sent to sea" 
[[governmental document in: Bartlett 1985a: 382-3; cf.
also: Moore Diary I: 2713. This highly irregular
method of sending unconvicted prisoners to sea was 
meant to overcome the difficulties in getting 
convictions for captured Defenders through normal 
legal processes, It has been estimated that more than 
a thousand men were dispatched to the tenders through 
these procedures [Lecky III: 420; MacNeven 1807: 112
speaks of “nearly 1300"].
But in the province of Connacht, support for the 
Defenders was not solely based on economic grievances. 
In September 1795 a pitched battled between Peep O' 
Day Boys and Defenders took place at a crossroad near 
Loughgall, in north Armagh, 'the Battle of the 
Diamond' . In this affray between some 300 Catholics 
and a smaller group of Protestants, the Defenders were 
completely routed with thirty Catholics being killed. 
After this battle the victorious Protestants set up an 
Orange Society, and began to organize themselves in 
Orange lodges to protect their own immediate interests 
and to maintain the Protestant Ascendancy. During the 
next few months several thousand Catholics from 
Armagh, Tyrone, Down and Fermanagh were persecuted and 
driven from their homes [MacNeven 1807: 114-5; Tohall
1958; Beckett 1981: 257; Elliott 1982: 72; Bartlett
1985a: 375; McDowell 1986: 347; Senior 1973: 36-453.
"Acts of the greatest outrage and barbarity" were 
committed by the Protestants with the connivance of 
the local magistrates, as the Lord Lieutenant, Camden, 
noted in January 1796 [quoted in: Lecky III: 4343.
Lord Gosford, the governor of Co. Armagh, claimed in 
December 1795 that the "merciless persecution" of 
Catholics by "lawless [Protestant] banditti" which
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aimed at "confiscation of all [Catholic] property, and 
immediate banishment" did not meet with determined 
resistance by the local law-enforcement agencies: "The 
spirit of impartial justice . . . has for a time 
disappeared in this county, and the supineness of the 
magistracy of this county is a topic of conversation 
in every corner of the kingdom" [quoted in: P.P. HC
1835 C377], XV: 229-30], Such was the involvement of
the officers of the peace in the atrocities that 
government considered it necessary in spring 1796 to 
pass an act indemnifying ex post facto the behaviour 
of the Protestant law officers [cf. following section 
on "Enforcing 'law and order', 1795-98"]. As many of 
the persecuted Catholics took refuge in Connacht, they 
initially mobilized for the cause of the Defenders by 
relating their experience.
By 1795, then, Defenderism had become a national 
movement. In most areas, in which it had emerged, 
Defenderism championed the interests of the Catholic 
farmers and small-holders against the clergy. In 
Armagh, the Defender movement opposed Protestant 
peasants; outside of Ulster, it threatened landlord 
interests and, in the South, it opposed tithe- 
proctors; and by infiltrating the predominantly 
Catholic militia and by espousing revolutionary goals 
it challenged the authority of the Irish government 
and the supremacy of the Protestant ascendancy at 
large [Senior 1966: 21; Senior 1973: 36-7; Rud6 1978:
37] .
Carhampton's exertion in Connacht and the 
persecution of Catholics in Armagh contributed 
powerfully to the alliance between Defenders and 
United Irishmen. It was to the Armagh persecutions 
that, in retrospect, the United Irishmen attributed
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the Increase in supporters after 1795 [MacNeven 1807: 
115-20; MacNevin 1846: 287; Castlereagh Memoirs I:
356-7; Elliott 1978: 424; Elliott 1982: 72-4; Curtin
1985: 484-63 . Qrangeism added repression by-
Protestants, who were not constrained by the gentry, 
to that handed out by official government forces: "By
the end of 1795, the Defenders were confronted with a 
government ruthlessly bending the law in order to deal 
with agrarian outrages and by newly-organized bands of 
protestant loyalists receiving sympathetic support 
from some members of the gentry. The Armagh outrages 
thoroughly demonstrated Defender vulnerability to this 
twin assault. It is small wonder, then, that the 
Defenders began to look for allies in their struggle" 
[Curtin 1985: 486], An alliance with the United
Irishmen thus became a possibility.
The United Irish had gone underground after the 
Dublin police had suppressed their organization in May 
1794. Since then, Irish political radicalism had been 
in disarray. The Gunpowder Act, the Convention Act, 
and the suppression of the Volunteers early in 1793 
had destroyed their means of bringing their political 
ideas to bear effectively on parliament. The 
connivance of the Whig opposition in parliament with 
this repressive legislation had further weakened the 
links between parliamentary and extra-parliamentary 
opposition to the upholders of the status quo. This 
legislation had been passed in a situation of war 
which had given conservatives a cause to rally round 
and offered an opportunity for moderate reformers to 
reconsider their activities and even abstain from 
further agitation out of national loyality. 
Furthermore, the cause of the radical reform movement 
had been weakened by the legal campaign of the British 
and Irish authorities against conspicuous radicals all
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over the British Isles. In the first half of 1794, 
sufficient convictions were secured by the Irish 
government to undermine the organization and the 
confidence of the Irish radicals.
When in February 1795 Earl Fitzwilliam, a 
supporter of the Portland Whigs, was dismissed as Lord 
Lieutenant after only a few weeks in office, leaving 
Ireland finally in March, the government had made it 
clear that there were to be no further concessions to 
the Catholics. Proposals to allow Catholics to sit in 
parliament were defeated in the House of Commons by 
155 to 84 votes. Irish Catholics and political 
reformers had then realized that reform by 
conventional and legal methods was impossible under 
the existing system. A revolutionary overthrow of this 
system became thus ever more the objective of the 
radicals. To bring this revolutionary transformation 
about, the United Irishmen attempted to harness to 
their purpose the agrarian discontent which was 
associated with Defenderism. Such an alliance was also 
considered imperative in order to convince the French 
government that it could play that role in Ireland 
which Britain had played in the civil war in the 
Vend6e: as a foreign power in support of insurgency
against established authority [McDowell 1979: 438-9;
McCracken 1973b: 62; Curtin 1985: 466-8; Elliott 1978: 
422-3; Elliott 1982: 67-71, 96, and chap. 3; Bolton
1966: 15-203.
As the co-operation between United Irishmen and 
Defenders took shape, so Orangeism gathered strength. 
At first, government was unwilling to support moves by 
Protestants towards establishing "loyal associations" 
which, it was proposed, should be made up of 
Orangemen, The Lord Lieutenant, Camden, maintained
-  433 -
that such associations would be construed into 
Protestant combinations, supported by government, 
against the Roman Catholics [Senior 1966: 41-73. The
government saw quite clearly that "the irritating 
conduct of the Orangemen in keeping up persecuting 
against the Catholics" was used by the radical 
opposition for gaining new recruits [Senior 1966: 45,
48-93 . But the rise of the Orange Order could not be 
stopped or contained, and as disaffection spread, 
government could not afford to forego the support of 
the Orange Lodges. In summer 1796, the Orange Order 
numbered perhaps several thousand organized into about 
ninety lodges. They operated under the cautiously- 
exercised authority of a minority of Ulster landowners 
and magistrates who were strongly opposed to any 
concessions towards the Catholics. In summer 1797, 
however, the Orange lodges had gained a recognized 
position in Ulster, enjoying the open support of a 
powerful section of the gentry. At that time, they 
were accepted as allies by the government. This was 
the case particularly with Orange lodges which were 
under the direct influence of the gentry. With the 
founding of a gentlemen's Orange lodge in Dublin in 
June 1797 a first step was taken towards the creation 
of a national movement. High offices in the Orange 
movement were henceforth to be filled by the 
"gentleman class". To work in co-operation with 
Orangemen which were being led by members of the 
Protestant gentry was, by and large acceptable, for a 
government that saw itself under siege [Senior 1966: 
51; 75-9, 903.
Orangeism owed its progress to the continued 
unrest which was kept up by the Defenders in alliance 
with the United Irishmen. By August 1796, disturbances 
were widespread in the counties of Antrim, Derry, Down
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and Tyrone, but disaffection, yet less violent, had 
also appeared in Sligo, Roscommon, Leitrim, Westmeath, 
Meath, Kildare, Dublin, Longford, Fermanagh and Louth 
CStoddart 1972: 613. Popular disaffection had also
experienced a boost by the attempt of a French 
invasion fleet to land in Ireland in December 1796. 
Though a most bungled exercise, which was not co­
ordinated with the United Irishmen and which, in the 
end, came to nothing because of disagreement among the 
French commanding officers and because of bad weather, 
it boosted the radicals' morale by convincing them 
that France would support an Irish uprising [Elliott 
1982: 109-233.
Such was the unrest in the north in March 1797 
that government instructed General Lake to disarm the 
province. Pelham informed Lake that in pursuit of this 
goal he was empowered to act, if need be, without 
legal authorization by the local magistracy:
His Excellency ... authorizes you to employ Force 
against any Persons assembled in Arms, not
legally authorized so to be, to dispense all
tumultuous Assemblies of Persons though they may 
not be in Arms, without waiting for the Sanction 
and Assistance of the Civil Authority, if in your 
Opinion the Peace of the Realm or the Safety of 
His Majesty's faithful Subjects may be endangered 
by waiting for such Authority [ JHC (Appendix 
1798), app. DCCCLVI3.
No 'rule of law', then, for Ulster. Worse, the army
considered this order to give the troops full
discretionary power to wage a 'total war* against the 
Catholic population. The proclamation of martial law 
on 17 May 1797 'legalized' this situation [JHC 
(Appendix 1798), app* DCCCLVII3. One commanding 
officer informed Lake that
I have arranged a plan to scour a district full 
of unregistered arms, and this I do, not so much 
with a hope to succeed to any extent, and to
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increase the animosity between Orangemen and the 
United Irish. Upon that animosity depends the 
safety of the centre counties of the North. Were 
the Orangemen disarmed or put down, or were they 
coalesced with the other party, the whole of 
Ulster would be as bad as Antrim and Down [quoted 
in: Senior 1966: 673 .
The techniques of the army for securing arms <in 
the possession of the Catholics) were merciless: 
house-burning, enforcing of free quarters for the 
troops, which were billeted on suspected persons, and 
requisitioning of provisions until all arms in the 
area were surrendered, in addition to other terror 
measures such as flogging, allowed the army to collect 
6,200 serviceable and 4,400 unserviceable guns within 
four months [McDowell 1979: 575-82; Kee 1972: 86-8,
973 . Furthermore, under the protection of the 
military, the (Protestant) juries at the autumn 
assizes felt little restraint in convicting those 
disaffected who had been committed for trial [ HMC 
Charlemont II: 3063. Though government succeeded in
suppressing unrest in the North by deploying brutal 
force, the repressive campaign in Ulster helped to 
mobilize support for the radical movement in much the 
same way as the Armagh persecutions had done [Elliott 
1982: 127-303.
Unrest in Ireland did not abate. In May 1798 
disaffection turned into rebellion. The government and 
the Anglo-Irish Ascendancy did not go into this power 
struggle unprepared. Over the last few years, the 
government had introduced a variety of measures which 
were designed to maintain public order. It is these 
law-and-order policies and their political and fiscal 
repercussions that I will now discuss.
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XVI. Enforcing 'law and order*. 1795-98.
In the years of heightened internal and external 
conflict after the declaration of war in 1793, 
maintaining public order proved to be a challenging 
task for the government. The establishment of a 
militia force, which was designed to quell unrest, 
added, initially at least, to internal disaffection. 
To secure the prevailing of the British interest in 
Ireland and the dominance of the Anglo-Irish 
Ascendancy, major changes in the machinery for 
maintaining law and order were implemented during the 
war years.
In 1795 a new Police Act for Dublin restored 
local control of the police forces C 35 Geo III, c. 
363 . In line with the 1786 Police Act Dublin continued 
to constitute one district for policing purposes. This 
district was subdivided into two divisions, one north 
and the other south of the Liffey. One "superintendant 
magistrate" was to be in charge of policing in the 
district as a whole, and each division was to be 
headed by a "divisional justice". The act provided for 
these three magistrates to be chosen from amongst the 
aldermen of the Corporation. They were to be nominated 
by the lord mayor and the aldermen of the Corporation 
and elected by the members of the Common Council. 
After their election these magistrates were to be 
presented to the Lord Lieutenant and the Privy Council 
for approbation Css. 1-53.
The "superintendant magistrate" was empowered to 
appoint a number of police officers. The district as a 
whole was to be superintended by one high constable 
who was to be responsible to the superintendent
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magistrate only. Each division was to be headed by one 
"chief peace-officer" who was to control twenty-five 
petty constables. This Corporation police of fifty- 
three police officers plus the three magistrates and 
their secretaries and clerks were to be paid by a 
special government fund. The salaries of the police 
establishment were fixed at an upper limit of £3,900 
p.a. [ss. 14, 213.
This new police force was to coexist with the 
individual watch of the nineteen parishes in Dublin. 
The act stipulated that church wardens and 
parishioners of each parish should appoint nine 
directors of the parish watch. These directors of the 
watch together with the church wardens were requested 
to appoint two constables and two sub-constables for 
each parish. In addition to the seventy-six parish 
constables the act provided for a total of not less 
than five-hundred watchmen to be employed by the 
parish authorities. All these police officers were to 
be under the command of the directors of the watch. 
But it was also enacted that "the whole watch of the 
metropolis are to be considered but as one body for 
the protection of each and every part thereof . . . the 
said parish constables, sub-constables, and watchmen, 
shall in all things lawful, pay entire obedience to 
the lord mayor, or any justice of the peace within 
said district ..." Cs. 72; cf. ss. 59-613. This meant, 
that the operation of each parish police force was not 
restricted to any particular area and that in a case 
of emergency the parish police could be deployed 
anywhere within the district. Given this stipulation 
it is appropriate to say that this police act 
established a Dublin police force of 632 men, 
including the commanding officers <but excluding their 
administrative staff). Compared to the provisions of
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the 1785 Dublin Police Act, the number of police 
officers had therefore been raised by 140.
This new act incorporated proposals which the 
Whig opposition had already suggested in 1789. 
Grattan's plan of police in April 1789 provided for a 
locally controlled and unarmed police force. He had 
suggested that each parish would have its own watch 
consisting of constables and watchmen under the 
command of one chief or head constable who, in turn,
would operate under the control of the lord mayor. A
city alderman and an elected committee of parish 
ratepayers would regulate the parish police force, and 
the overall control of the various forces would lie 
with the City Corporation CPari.Reg.Ire. IX <1789): 
4233 . In March 1791, Grattan formally introduced his 
police bill suggesting a force of 700 men in winter 
and 500 men in summer, this being in addition to the 
forty petty constables who had been introduced by the 
1786 Dublin Police Act. He had also proposed to 
establish two police offices, one on each side of the 
River Liffey, At these offices, the city aldermen
should preside by rotation. He suggested to "leave the 
watch or city guard under the direction of the 
parishioners, and the whole under the direction of the 
lord mayor" [ Pari.Reg.Ire. XI <1791): 2663. Grattan's
bill was defeated by 135 to 87. In June 1793 Grattan 
again introduced his police bill. He proposed a police 
force of "550 men on an average of the year round" and 
suggested that the appointment of the magistrates who 
had the responsibility of superintending the police 
force should be vested in the City Corporation
CPari.Reg.Ire. XIII <1793): 455-73. Once again, this
bill was defeated by 86 to 30. One opponent argued 
that the bill, if passed, was set to establish "a 
democracy in the city, by divesting the Crown of that
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wholesome controul C ! 3 which it at present possessed 
over the city". It was argued that "it was highly 
dangerous ... to suffer the democracy to acquire an 
excessive preponderance in a large city; it always led 
to ... republican government". And in order to prove 
the validity of this argument, this M. P. hastened to 
draw the attention of the House "to the present state 
of Paris resulting from the same cause" [Pari.Reg.Ire. 
XIII (1793): 454-53.
But police reform had been in the offing since 
the radicalization of socio-economic and political 
conflicts in the winter of 1792-3. In January 1793 the 
Lord Lieutenant wrote to the British government that 
"it may seem advisable to give Cgovernment3 supporters 
some popular ground to stand upon, in order to keep 
the government on its present basis, and accordingly 
it might be expedient to yield or at least modify some 
of the bills which had been proposed by opposition, 
such as a Place Bill, a diminution of Pension Bill, 
the Police Bill and the Responsibility Bill" [quoted 
in: Boyle 1973: 336-7; cf. also: Pari.Reg.Ire. XIII
(1793): 4613. The prospect of success of police reform 
improved when in July 1794 the Portland Whigs entered 
into a wartime coalition with Pitt [McDowell 1979: 
445-63. It was during the short-lived administration 
of the Whig Earl Fitzwilliam that Grattan introduced 
his Dublin Police Bill which formed the basis of the 
government's own bill which it tabled a few weeks 
later.
It seems reasonable to assume that the government 
conceded a reform of the police in order to reward the 
supportive attitude of the Whigs towards the war 
efforts against France. Furthermore, after the defeat 
of Grattan's Catholic emancipation bill on 4 May, a
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concession on police reform might have prevented an 
alliance between the parliamentary and extra- 
parliamentary opposition. But in any case, vesting 
power in the City Corporation had different 
implications now than it would have had earlier. As 
Grattan pointed out during the debate on Catholic 
emancipation, the Corporation of Dublin had been the 
only corporation to submit a petition against Catholic 
emancipation. It would seem that during the 
turbulences of the early 1790s the City Corporation 
and the guilds had become a stronghold of Protestant 
conservatism [Lecky III: 343, 673. Not any longer the
focal point for city liberalism, the Corporation could 
now be trusted with policing Dublin [Palmer 1988: 130-
3; Boyle 1973: 336-403.
Set against this act, which apparently lessened 
government control of the metropolitan police, there 
were other measures which manifestly increased the 
government's central power of maintaining public 
order. Faced with the continued unrest across the 
country in 1796, the Irish government introduced 
legislation which was designed to strengthen its 
capacity to maintain public order. Manifestly in order 
not to discourage the zealous efforts of the loyal 
upholders of public order, government saw fit to have 
an Indemnity Act passed by Parliament [36 GeD III, c. 
63 . This act stated that in their endeavour to "check 
insurrection and maintain the peace", magistrates and 
other persons had since January 1795 committed acts 
"not justifiable by law" [s. 13. However, as their 
intentions had been so commendable, the act provided 
that any proceedings brought against them for such 
acts should be void. This measure was complemented at 
the beginning of the new parliamentary season in the 
autumn by the suspension of the Habeas Corpus Act [37
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Geo III, c. 13. Any person who was suspected of
treasonable activities could now be detained by 
warrant signed by either the Lord Lieutenant or the 
Chief Secretary.
Whereas the Indemnity Act in fact legitimated
unlawful action, if only it had been committed for the 
•public good', the Insurrection Act, passed in March 
1796, gave the law-enforcement agencies new powers so 
that what had hitherto been illegal was now
transformed into a statutory right C 36 Geo III, c.
203 . The act enabled the Lord Lieutenant and the Privy 
Council, at the request of the justices of the peace, 
to proclaim counties or particular districts within 
counties as in a state of disturbance Is. 163. In 
proclaimed districts, a curfew was imposed and the 
inhabitants were forbidden to be out of their houses 
from one hour after sunset until sunrise Is. 173. The 
magistrates were empowered to search all houses during 
those hours, to ascertain whether the occupants were 
present, or whether arms were concealed [s. 203.
Justices of the peace were entitled to demand the 
surrender even of those arms that had been registered 
under the act [s. 293. The magistrates in proclaimed
district were now empowered to do by law what had 
already been done previously in defiance of the law - 
to send people of "idle and disorderly" character to 
the fleet without trial [s. 183. Those men who were
out of house during the curfew, those who could not 
give a satisfactory account of their purpose, those 
who could not prove that they had lawful means of 
livelihood, and those who had voluntarily ta3sen a 
"seditious oath" - they all could now legally be sent 
away upon sentence by two magistrates without the 
benefit of legal representation Css. 20-223. In 
November 1796, Antrim, Down, Tyrone, Derry and Armagh
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were placed under the Insurrection Act. In 1797 and 
1798, extensive use was made of this act. Between the 
beginning of May 1797 and the close of the year, 
districts in ten counties in the south and the west 
were proclaimed as being in a state of disturbance; in 
May 1798 six whole counties were proclaimed (Cork, 
Dublin, Kilkenny, King's, Tipperary and Wexford)
[Elliott 1982: 108; McDowell 1979: 5553.
The powers of the Lord Lieutenant were further 
strengthened by yet another act which referred back to 
the County Police Act of 1787. As some counties had 
obviously been reluctant to engage as many constables 
as were required by that act, the Lord Lieutenant was 
empowered by this new act to enforce the proper 
manning of a police force. If he was informed that the 
grand Jury of a county divided into districts had 
neglected to appoint the obligatory number of 
constables, the Lord Lieutenant was entitled to choose 
such officers himself. If the grand jury declined to 
defray the expenses, then the Judges of the assizes 
were obliged to tax the county for the money required 
[36 Geo III, c. 25, ss. 66, 673.
But maintaining law and order was not just an 
issue of passing laws. There had to be a sufficient 
number of men on whom the Irish government could rely 
to enforce the laws and quell any unrest. To ensure 
law-enforcement it was thought necessary to augment 
the army and the militia. Table XVI.1 below gives the 
nominal and (estimates of the) effective strength of 
both army and militia for 1793 to 1799.
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Table XVI 
militia,
. 1 Nominal and 
1793-1799
effect1ve strength of army and
Army Militia
Year Hominal (Home) Effective nominal Effective
1793 20.232 (17.000) 15.971 (x)
16.906
1794 7.000- 17.050 14.000(a)
8.000
1795 21.660 (x) 17.069 (b)
22.699 17.162 (c)
1796 22.698 (19.512) 15.000(d) 22.698 16.000(d)
18.183 (e)
1797 40.901 (27.667 20.201(f) 22.698 21.590(f)
+10.000)
1798 32.854 (29.620) 22.500(g) 26.634 22.000(g)
1799 26.890
Sources', for nominal army strength and nominal number of troops 
to remain in Ireland: 1793: 33 Geo III, c, 16; 1796: 36 Geo III, c. 
14; 1797: 37 Geo III, c. 3; 1798: 38 Geo III, c. 5; the act in 1797 
stipulated that 10.000 men should be stationed in either Great 
Britain or Ireland and should therefore not be sent overseas; 
for nominal militia strength: 1793(x): 33 Geo III, c. 22; 1795(x): 
35 Geo III, c. 8 [these figures exclude officers]; 1793: JHC XV 
(1792-4), app. CCCXCVIII; 1794: JHC (1792-4), app. DI; 1795: JHC 
XVI (1795-6), app. LXXXVIII; 1796: JHC XVI (1795-6), app. CCXCIV; 
1797: JHC XVII (1796-7), app. XCIV; 1798: JHC (Appendix 1798), 
app. CCCLII; 1799: JHC XVIII (1799), app. XXXIII f.;
(a) = Foster Correspondence, 16;
(b) = JHC XVI (1795-6), app. LXXXVIII;
(c) = JHC XVII (1796-7), app. CLXXXVIII;
(d) = Fortescue 1915: 518;
(e) = JHC XVII (1796-7), app. CLXXXVIII ff.;
(f) = Moore Diary I: 270;
(g) = Hayes-McCoy 1959: 16.
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It is notoriously difficult to ascertain correct 
figures for the number of military personnel before 
the 19th century. The figures on effective strength, 
in particular, should be treated as not more than 
(more or less) educated guesses. For the year of the
Irish rebellion, it has been estimated that, at the
outbreak of the rising in spring 1798, the Irish 
military establishment provided for a nominal total of 
57,343 troops. According to one account, this military 
force consisted of 12,411 regulars <6,219 cavalry and
6,192 infantry); 16,963 fencibles <2,263 cavalry and
14,700 infantry), 26,794 militia (infantry), 514 
German Cavalry and 661 invalids CHayes-McCoy 1959: 16-
73 . These figures give only the nominal strength of 
the military forces. But even with regard to only the 
•paper' strength the figures which can be found in the 
literature are ambiguous. Griffin [ 1968: 1613, for
example, gives a nominal strength of 46,600 in 1798, 
whereas Bartlett C1985b: 1153 gives the nominal
strength of the front-line defence force as amounting 
to about 45,000 in 1798.
According to one estimate, the effective strength 
of the military establishment in 1798 was "at the 
most 13,000 regular and fencible infantry, 8,000 
regular and fencible cavalry and about 22,000 
militiamen. These figures, together with about 1,500 
Royal Artillerymen and Royal Irish Artillerymen, would 
give a total of 44,500 for all categories and all 
ranks, but the real total may have been somewhat 
smaller" CHayes-McCoy 1959: 163. This calculation
roughly conforms with a contemporary account. John 
Moore, who was a member of General Abercromby's staff, 
estimated the strength of the military force in 
December 1797 as follows: 5,805 regular and fencible
cavalry, 12,796 infantry (of which 10,993 were English
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and Scottish fencible infantry); 21,590 militiamen and
1.500 artillery which amounts to a force of 41,791 men 
[Moore Diary I; 270]. Griffin [1958: 151-2] calculates
that the effective strength of the army was 
approximately 40,000 men. But both Hayes-McCoy and 
Griffin calculate that the effective field force was 
little more than 30,000 men. Bartlett [ 1985b: 115-5]
estimates that the effective front-line defence force 
consisted of about 35,000 men. He argues that the 
Irish militia accounted for about sixty per cent of 
these troops <21,000 militiamen), whereas regular 
troops formed only a small portion of about fifteen 
per cent <5250 troops). The balance was made up by 
English and Scottish fencibles and militia <8750 men). 
McDowell [1979: 512-3] states that the armed forces
which the Irish government had at its disposal early 
in 1798 comprised 7,200 regulars <4,500 cavalry and
2.500 infantry), 3,800 fencibles <2,000 cavalry and 
1,800 infantry), and 25,000 militia, thus constituting 
a force of 35,000 men. In March 1799, the Irish 
administration estimated that the British troops 
serving in Ireland amounted to 15,000 men [Chief 
Secretary Castlereagh to Pitt in: Castlereagh Memoirs 
II: 245; the size of the British troops in Ireland
should be related to the strength of the army in Great 
Britain. In 1798 the British force had a size of 
48,509 men and in 1799 it rose to 52,051 men: cf.
Clode 1859/1: 399].
In addition to the troops mentioned so far, in 
1798 the Irish government could avail itself of the 
support of the Irish Yeomanry which had been 
established in the autumn of 1795 [37 Geo III, c. 2].- 
According to an estimate by the Lord Lieutenant, about
20,000 men had been enrolled into the corps by the 
autumn of 1795 [Senior 1955: 50]. By January 1797 a
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yeomanry force of more than 24,000 men had been raised 
CCamden in: London Gazette 1797: 43-4], At the
outbreak of the rebellion in May 1798 the yeomanry had 
been augmented to the size of about 35,000 men and by 
June 1798 there were 40,000 men in 540 corps CPalmer 
1988: 140; Moore Diaries I: 270; McDowell 1979: 559,
613; Dickson 1987: 189; Hayes-McCoy 1959: 16; for the
financial year 1798-9 parliament had authorized 
payment for yeomanry corps consisting of 37,539 men: 
JHC (Appendix 1798), app. cccliii] . If we add the 
yeomanry to the military force which was, at least 
formally, under the ultimate command of the Irish 
administration, it can thus be assumed that between
65,000 to 70,000 men could be deployed by government 
to suppress the rising in 1798 CMcDowell 1979: 613
gives the grand total as approximating 76,000 men].
The yeomanry corps were to play a major part in 
the suppression of the Irish rebellion. They had been 
founded when in the summer of 1796 Camden, the Lord 
Lieutenant, saw himself confronted with the task of 
containing the Orangemen in the North and the 
Defenders in the Vest of the country. As there was, 
according to the Lord Lieutenant, not much confidence 
in the loyalty of some of the militia regiments and in 
the competence of the commanding officers, he had been 
"called upon by almost all those whom we usually 
consult to establish some corps on the model of our 
Yeomanry Cavalry and Infantry in England", as Camden 
wrote in July 1796 [quoted in: Senior 1966: 463.
But it was clear to the Lord Lieutenant that the 
formation of yeomanry corps would create a situation 
which the Dublin administration had wanted to avoid 
ever since the formation of the Volunteers: it would
change the 'power of the sword' from the army to the
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gentry of the country. "I do not like to resort to 
Yeomanry Cavalry or infantry or armed associations if 
I can help it", Camden wrote to London. But he could 
not help it. Confronted with the possibility of a 
French invasion fleet landing in Ireland, Camden 
realized very clearly that "the Army must be withdrawn 
from many of its present quarters and must be drawn 
together to act in larger units than it has lately
done". While the army's function of policing the 
countryside made it necessary to disperse the troops, 
its military function of defending Ireland against 
foreign enemies made it imperative to concentrate the 
troops in those areas most likely to be threatened 
with invasion. Faced with this structural dilemma, and 
well aware of it, Camden finally considered it
"absolutely necessary to resort to the measures of 
arming the yeomanry under commissions from the Crown" 
Call quotes in: Morton 1967-8: 633.
The yeomanry corps were to be commanded by gentry 
officers under commissions by the Crown and they were 
to be manned by volunteers. For the duration of active 
service, the cost of the corps was to be defrayed by
government. Regular army commanders were given a
supervisory role over the yeomanry corps, but the 
local magistrates and gentry retained wide 
discretionary powers over their corps. The corps were 
meant to remain in their own localities, but, as a 
matter of fact, the yeomanry corps were not restricted 
in their range of action and the cavalry yeomanry did 
indeed operate away. Though Catholics who had first 
taken the Oath of Allegiance were not legally barred 
from joining the corps, the yeomanry was, by and 
large, a Protestant force, with practically all of the 
original Catholic yeomen having been weeded out prior
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to the rebellion of 1798 [Dickson 1987: 189; Hogan
1976: 96-7; Hayes-McCoy 1959: 203.
From the start the yeomanry was under the
influence of the Orange Order. The United Irish 
directed their efforts towards discouraging enlistment 
into the new corps: "This not only left the field free 
to Orangemen, but added to their prestige by seeming 
to confirm their assertion that they had government 
support" [Senior 1966: 573. In this way the formation
of the yeomanry exacerbated the socio-political and 
sectarian conflict between the United Irish and the
Defenders on the one side and the Orangemen on the
other. The intensification of this conflict was rooted 
in the very logic of this measure:
By permitting the gentry to raise a force of 
part-time soldiers ... the government
unintentionally provided the means of creating a 
national Orange movement. The yeomanry could not 
be recruited without the cooperation of the lower 
class protestant, and the Orange lodges were to 
be both an agency for employing the energies of 
the protestant peasants and a means of keeping 
them under some degree of gentry control [Senior 
1966: 503 .
The government was much pleased with the
performance of the yeomanry corps during and after the 
French invasion threat at Bantry Bay in County Cork in
December 1796: "From the armed Yeomanry, Government
derived the most honourable Assistance. Noblemen and 
Gentlemen of the first Property vied in exerting 
themselves at the Head of their Corps. Much of the 
Express and Escort Duty was performed by them. In 
Cork, Limerick and Galway, they took [on3 the Duty of 
the Garrison", Camden reported to London in January 
1797. Camden singled out the yeomanry corps in Dublin 
for particular praise: They "have been formed of the
most respectable Barristers, Attornies, Merchants,
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Gentlemen and Citizens , , . their Zeal in mounting 
Guards C is] so useful, that I was enabled greatly to 
reduce the Garrison with perfect Safety to the Town. 
The members of Yeomanry fully appointed and 
disciplined in Dublin exceed Two Thousand. Above Four 
Hundred of whom are Horse. The whole Number of Corps 
approved by Government amount to Four Hundred and 
Forty, exclusive of the Dublin Corps. The gros Number 
is nearly Twenty-five Thousand" [both quotes in: 
London Gazette 1797: 43-44]. In January 1797,
Fitzgibbon, too, praised the exertions of the yeomanry 
corps in the South "which have in every instance 
displayed the greatest alacity in tendering their 
services". But Fitzgibbon hastened to add that the 
internal situation remained tense:
In the northern province I am sorry to say a very 
different spirit prevails. The people of that 
district have not only refused to come forward in 
defence of the country but have openly avowed 
their satisfaction at the arrival of their French 
allies and betrayed the strongest symptoms of 
insurrection. And we are now obliged to keep ten 
thousand of the best troops in the kingdom in 
that district for the sole purpose of keeping 
down rebellion there tin: McDowell <ed.) 1951/2:
304] .
One year later, during the Irish rebellion, the 
yeomanry corps would 'distinguish' themselves as the 
most reckless and violent force on the side of the 
government. But before I shall address the question of 
the enforcing of 'law and order' in 1798, I want to 
discuss briefly the financial cost incurred by the 
government for maintaining these forces of 'law and 
order'. As table XVI.2 shows these costs were 
considerable.
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Table XVI, 2 Expenditure in £ for the army and navy, 
the militia and the yeomanry for the years 1793 to 
1300.
Year Army Militia Yeomanry
1793-4 745.828 400.851
1794-5 1,553.562 461.706
1795-6 1,855.562 500.904
1796-7 2,032.130 473.604
1797-8 3,401.760 614.256 461.538
1798-9 3,865.530 717.093 271,560
1799-1800 4,596.762 718.265 634.601
Subtotal
Total 18,050.941
3,886.679 
87.427 (x> 
3,974.106 1,367.699
Sources', for army: cf. table XVII.3 in chapter
XVII; for militia and yeomanry: cf. Tables of Supply in:
JHC XV (1792-4) - JHC XVIII (1799).
A few comments are warranted to set these figures 
into a wider context. For this purpose the reader may 
want to consult also tables XVII. 3 - 5 in chapter
XVII. Let us first consider the military expenditure. 
A look at the total military and naval net expenditure 
between 1793 and 1800 shows very clearly the impact of 
the war and internal unrest. During the decade of 
external peace between 1782 and 1793, the sum 
expended annually on the military amounted on an 
average to £ 585,000. If the military expenditure
during the seven years 1793-4 to 1799-1800 had been at 
this same rate, it would have amounted for the whole 
period to £ 4,095,000. Actually, however, it amounted 
to £ 18,050,941. The transformation which the war
caused can be shown with the help of a number of data. 
In the financial year 1792-3, i.e. before the 
declaration of war in February 1793, civil expenditure
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had exceeded military expenditure even if only by a 
small margin <45.2% to 45.1% of total net 
expenditure). In the following year already 63.3% of 
the total net revenue was spent for military and naval 
purposes. When in 1794-5 total expenditure increased 
by 59% over the previous year, military expenditure 
showed an increase of 108% compared to an increase of 
8% of the civil expenditure. Between 1796-7 and 1797-8 
there was a steep increase in the percentage of the 
total net revenue which was being spent on the 
military, rising from 119.3% to 166.1%, only to be 
exceeded in 1798-9 by 180.2%. These developments are 
also reflected in the ratio of military expenditure 
plus debt charges to civil expenditure: this ratio
rose steadily from 1.3 in 1793-4 to 5.7 in 1799-1800, 
Jumping by 1.9 between 1796-7 (3.7) and 1797-8 (5.6).
When we compare these public accounts figures 
with those for the period of the American War of 
Independence, the impact of war and internal unrest on 
the state budget in the 1790s can also be grasped. 
During the American War the ratio of military 
expenditure plus debt charges to civil expenditure was 
highest in 1778-9 with 3. 1 and lowest in 1776-7 when 
military expenditure plus debt charges were 2,1 times 
the sum spent on civil expenditure. In the financial 
year 1778-9, military expenditure constituted 98.5 per 
cent of total net revenue, falling back over the next 
two years to 94.3 per cent and 85 per cent 
respectively. Whereas on average three-quarters of 
total net revenue was spent on the military during the 
American War of Independence, on average almost one 
and a third of total net revenue was laid out for the 
military after 1793.
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Between 1793 and 1800 parliament authorized 
militia payments of a total of *3,886,679. This total 
of *3,886,679 amounted to 29.5 per cent of the net 
revenue or 14.3 per cent of the net expenditure of the 
Irish state between 1793-4 and 1799-1800 Ccf. tables
XVII.3 - 5 in chapter XVII]. But the counties, too, 
had to provide money for militia purposes. The Militia 
Act of 1793 [33 Geo III, c. 22] and the militia
augmentation act of 1795 [33 Geo III, c. 8] contained 
clauses which required counties that failed to enlist 
their statutory quota of militiamen to pay a fine for 
every man short. The 1795 act fixed the county 
liability at * 10 per man. The revised militia-
families act of 1795 [35 Geo III, c. 2] also imposed 
financial burdens on the counties. This act was 
designed to provide maintenance for the dependents of 
militiamen who moved with these recruits from their 
native county [McAnally 1949: 74-5, 266-71; Dickson
1983: 51-2]. Between 1795 and early 1799, the counties
spent * 87,427 in accordance with the stipulations of 
these militia acts [cf. JHC XVIII (1799), app. ccvii 
ff. ] .
Since we possess a set of data on the county cess 
of nineteen counties from 1786 onwards, it is possible 
to calculate how much of their revenue these counties 
spent on the militia. Out of a total revenue of *
630,536 for the (calendar) years 1795, 1796, 1797 and
1798, these nineteen counties spent *41,798, or 6.6 
per cent of their total revenue, on the militia. But
there were huge differences between the counties. 
County Kerry, for example, spent 17.7 per cent of the 
county cess on the militia, whereas Co. Down and Co. 
Wicklow, on the other hand, spent only 2.2 per cent 
[in: P.P.H.C. 1845, XXII [672], part IV, p. 178 (for
county cess); JHC XVIII (1799), app. cvii ff, (for
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militia expenses); these nineteen counties account for 
48 per cent of the militia expenditure of all 
counties]. The militia expenditure of the counties has 
to be added to the expenditure which was authorized by 
parliament to arrive at a rough estimate of the total 
militia expenses. It would thus seem that the cost of 
the militia between 1793 and 1800 amounted to a total 
minimum of £ 3,974,106. To arrive at the actual total, 
it would be necessary to add the militia expenditure 
of those thirteen counties for which no data are 
available.
The yeomanry, too, proved to be expensive. 
Though the cost of the yeomanry amounted to a total of 
£1,367,699 for three years, the yeomanry was cheaper 
than the militia for which parliament had voted £ 
2,049,614 for the same period. Since the yeomanry was 
almost twice the size of the militia, and could also 
be expected to be more loyal to the Irish government 
because of its religious complexion and the influence 
of the Orange Orders in its corps, spending money on 
the yeomanry was a 'sound* investment. The expenditure 
for the militia and the yeomanry in the financial 
years 1797-8 to 1799-1800 amounted to almost a quarter 
of the total military expenditure for these years.
But there were more expenses to be met for 
maintaining public order after 1793. These law-and- 
order measures had to be paid for through the civil 
account [for the following data: P.P. H. C. 1868-9,
XXXV C3663, part I, pp. 331-55]. To start with, the 
Irish government had to provide money for the county 
police forces and the Dublin police. Between 1792-3 
and 1796-7, the government spent on average £ 4,965 on 
the police, with the highest amount of £ 6,849 in 
1796-7. The following year, however, 2.6 times as much
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was spent on the police forces <£ 18,013). In the 
following two years, a total of £ 29,275 was spent on 
the police. The secret service, too, had to be 
financed. Between 1796-7 and 1799-1800, £ 32,891 were
officially set aside for the secret service, while 
almost half of this amount <£ 15,226) was being spent 
in 1798-1799.
The judiciary, too, incurred increased expenses. 
With an increasing number of people committed for 
trial, law expenses for criminal prosecution as well 
as the additional salaries of the judges had to be
met. In 1793-4, £ 11,076 had been spent for "criminal
causes" C JHC XV <1792-4), Table of Supply]. In the 
following two years, "law expenses and criminal 
prosecution" cost £ 29,362. From 1796-7 onwards, the 
judicial system became ever more expensive. "Law 
expenses and criminal prosecution" plus "judges' 
additional salaries" rose from £ 34,672 in 1796-7 to £ 
41,607 in 1797-8 and reached their highest point in
1798-9 with £ 42,515, falling back to £ 41,724 in
1799-1800. Finally, transportation of convicted 
persons was another item which had to be financed, 
although the overall cost seems to have been fairly 
small. Between 1792-3 and 1799-1800, the Irish 
government spent £ 40,932 on transporting prisoners to 
the colonies.
If we calculate these civil expenses for 
maintaining law and order as annual totals, we arrive 
at the following amounts, with the figures in brackets 
giving the percentage of these expenses of the total 
net civil expenditure of the respective years: 1793-4:
£ 18,985 (2.8%); 1794-5: £ 17,336 <2.3%); 1795-6: £
24,545 <3.5%); 1796-7: £ 52,643 <8%); 1797-8: £ 69,920
<9.8%); 1798-9: £ 80,396 <9.1%); and 1799-1800:
- 455 -
& 70,703 (6.9%). Though the total sums are fairly
small compared to the total civil expenditure, the 
increase in the relative importance of these items 
from 1796-7 onwards reflects the burgeoning internal 
power struggle and unrest. When we add the expenses 
incurred by the army, the militia, the yeomanry, the 
police, the secret service and the judiciary between 
1796 and 1800, we see that these costs amounted to 89 
per cent of total expenditure. The expenses for 
maintaining ' law-and-order' and defence of £, 
18,034.645 were twice as much as the total net revenue 
of & 8,950.655.
B) The rebellion of 1798
When rebellion broke out in May 1798 one of the 
main questions for the government was whether the 
money it had spent on public order policies had given 
it reliable and effective forces of law and order. In 
August 1794, Foster, the Speaker of the House of 
Commons, had come to the conclusion that "Our army is 
wretched bad . . . mostly raw recruits and many raw 
officers; our artillery the same, and not sufficient 
ordnance to defend even one strong post" C Foster 
Correspondence: 143 . In February 1798, the new
Commander— in-Chief, Abercromby, issued a 'General 
Order', which, though undoubtedly expressing a correct 
assessment of the condition of the military forces in 
Ireland, was to cost him his position: "The very
disgraceful frequency of courts-martial and the many 
complaints of irregularities in the conduct of the 
troops in this kingdom have too unfortunately proved 
the army to be in a state of licentiousness which must 
render it formidable to everyone but the enemy" 
[quoted in: Fortescue 1915: 5733.
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The regular regiments in Ireland were in a 
particularly bad state as British demand for men for 
the campaigns in the West Indies had drained the best 
men and very nearly every regular regiment from 
Ireland. The troops which remained in Ireland 
comprised chiefly Fencible Infantry, a few old 
regiments of Cavalry, and a few recently created corps 
of Dragoons, both Regular and Fencible CFortescue 
1915: 5183. The condition of the troops in Ireland was 
worsened by the fact that many recruits, although 
recruited in England, were Irish. Irish labourers, who 
had migrated to England, were attracted to the army by 
the bounty money which was offered for enlistment; and 
"those who joined in England were drawn from the 
classes most effected by the revolutionaries" [Senior 
1956: 543. This situation was further aggravated by
the policing function which the army had to perform. 
As this task made the dispersal of small military 
units across the country inevitable, under the 
prevailing weak communication network this 
constellation was likely to weaken the military 
command structure. Given the Irish government's 
determination to confront any nationwide conspiracy of 
urban and rural rebels, as long as there was not a 
sufficient number of 'civil' police forces the 
military had to remain in the contradictory position 
of a force charged with the task of both maintaining 
internal order and defending Ireland against foreign 
invaders.
Furthermore, in 1797, during the campaign for 
disarming Ulster, the policing function of the army 
led to a blurring of the distinction between civil and 
military authority - the army command being empowered 
to act as they saw fit without waiting for 
authorization from local magistrates. This unchecked
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power allowed for a high degree of undeterred army 
outrages, to which Abercromby referred in his 'General 
Order'. But in a situation of heightened unrest, large 
sections of the Anglo-Irish Ascendancy exerted 
"relentless political pressure for a policy of 
counter— terror which the military command embraced (or 
yielded to>" [Bartlett 1985b: 120], John Moore, who
commanded troops in the south and who shared 
Abercromby's sentiments, complained that "those who 
have the government of the country seem to have no 
plan or system but that of terrifying the common 
people" [in: Moore Diaries I: 288; 283-4, 287],
Much of the indiscipline in the army was due to 
the license for using terrorist measures in order to 
subdue rebellion. Such was the conduct of the troops 
in the early summer of 1798, that the new Lord 
Lieutenant, Cornwallis, attempted "to soften the 
ferocity of our troops, which I am afraid, in the 
Irish corps at least, is not confined to private 
soldiers" [in: Cornwallis Correspondence II: 3553. One 
reason for this concern was the realization that the 
behaviour of some of the troops alienated even those 
parts of the population which were not well-disposed 
towards the rebels and which had to bear the brunt of 
military atrocities. In a 'General Order' in August 
1798, Cornwallis instructed his officers "to assist 
him in putting a stop to the licentious conduct of the 
troops, and in saving the wretched inhabitants from 
being robbed, and in the most shocking manner 
illtreated by those to whom they had a right to look 
for safety and protection" [in: Cornwallis
Correspondence II: 3953.
But the army did not have a monopoly on 
committing atrocities. Cornwallis complained in the 
summer of 1798 about
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the numberless murders that are hourly committed 
by our people without any process or examination 
whatever. The yeomanry are in the style of the 
Loyalists in America, only much more numerous and 
powerful, and a thousand times more ferocious. 
These men have saved the country, but they now 
take the lead in rapine and murder. The Irish
militia, with few officers, and those chiefly of 
the worst kind, follow closely on the heels of 
the yeomanry in murder and every kind of 
atrocity, and the Fencibles take a share, 
although much behind the others. The feeble 
outrages, burnings, and murders which are still 
committed by the Rebels, serve to keep up the 
sanguinary disposition on our side C in: 
Cornwallis Correspondence II: 3693.
The sectarian composition of the yeomanry may 
explain why the Lord Lieutenant could consider them as 
the most savage force in Ireland. As an almost
exclusively Catholic force, the militia, however, 
though being infiltrated by Orangemen, counted a 
considerable number of United Irishmen and Defenders
among its ranks CSenior 1966: 54-73. Cornwallis, the
professional soldier, instead of accounting for the 
militia behaviour by reference to either sectarian or 
political motivations, emphasized the organizational 
aspect. He maintained that '*their total want of all 
idea of discipline and subordination" resulted "from 
their being dispersed in small detachments over the 
whole face of the country" [in: Cornwalis
Correspondence III: 763. Normal discipline may have
been rather unstable in the first place because 
Protestant officers who were drawn from the gentry
commanded Catholic peasants. The breakdown of 
discipline was further facilitated by "want of
preparation, guerilla nature of fighting, transport 
difficulties, march fatigues, absence of supply 
arrangements, Cand3 general improvisation of attack 
and defence arrangements" CMacAnally 1949: 1273.
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Furthermore, in Cornwallis's view, which was 
quintessentially paternalistic, the militia outrages 
could also be attributed to a lack of "officers or 
non-commissioned officers who are capable of taking 
care of them [i.e. the militiamen]" [in: Cornwallis
Correspondence III: 763 . The lack of qualified
officers, however, was intrinsically linked to the 
power structure of Irish society. As Moore understood 
very clearly, "like everything else in this country, 
the giving of regiments was made an instrument of 
influence with the colonels, and they made their 
appointments to serve electioneering purposes. Every 
sort of abuse has been tolerated . . . The officers are 
in general profligate and idle, serving for their 
emolument, but neither from a sense of duty nor of 
military distinction". Moore also pointed out that the 
time of enlistment with most of the militiamen had 
lately expired which meant that "the advantage of four 
years' discipline is lost" while new recruits were 
being incorporated into the militia [in: Moore Diaries 
I: 273-43.
Notwithstanding the widespread indiscipline 
within the government forces of law and order, the 
rebellion of 1798-9 was squashed. Indiscipline within 
the forces of law and order did not turn into 
disaffection. The Anglo-Irish Ascendancy survived the 
republican and peasant attack on their dominance by 
the use of sheer force. But it was not force alone 
that secured the victory of the government and the 
Anglo-Irish Ascendancy. By the time rebellion broke 
out, the organization of the radicals had already been 
severely damaged. The disarming of Ulster by Lake in 
1797 had caused the collapse of the United Irish 
organisation in the north. The raids of the Orangemen 
and the arrest of many of the experienced and
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respected leaders of the United Irish had made the 
republican radicals incapable of serious action. This 
situation was exacerbated by the need for tightened 
security within the United Irishmen's organization in 
the wake of General Lake's campaign in Ulster. This 
meant, in effect, that the flow of information between 
the leadership and the lower committees was severely 
cut which led to a lack of communication between the 
upper and lower levels of the Society. When in March 
1798 police raided the meeting of the Leinster 
directory of the United Irish in Dublin, acting upon a 
piece of information provided by an informant from 
within the radicals' organization, the United Irishmen 
were dealt another blow [Senior 1966: 100; Elliott
1982: 132, 172; McDowell 1979: 604].
But decisive action was also prevented by the 
United Irishmen's conviction that for a rebellion to 
be successful it would have to be precipitated by a 
French invasion of Ireland, or should at least 
coincide with it. After the defeats of Austria in 
Italy in 1797 and the Peace of Campo Formio between 
Austria and France in October 1797, which left Britain 
totally isolated, there was some justification for 
expecting French support and for postponing the 
uprising. But when the French were concentrating so 
much of their military power in Egypt in May 1798, it 
must have become obvious to the United Irish that not 
much foreign support for their rebellion would be 
forthcoming. Having embarked on their Mediterranean 
campaign, the French could spare only small 
expeditionary forces in support of the rebels. In 
August 1798 General Humbert landed near Killala in 
County Mayo with a force of about 1,000. Having 
defeated government troops at Castlebar in County 
Mayo, Humbert marched through Connacht, only to
- 461 -
surrender to Cornwallis's much stronger troops at 
Ballinamuck in County Longford, Little support by the 
western peasantry accompanied the French troops on 
their march.
Military repression, lack of efficient 
organization, belated and only half-hearted support of 
the rebels by the French go a long way to explaining 
the suppression of the rebellion. But the character of 
the rebellion itself contributed to its defeat.
Rebellion broke out, not in the Forth where the 
government's policy had stifled opposition, but in the 
South. In the eastern counties of Wexford and Wicklow 
in the province of Leinster the rebellion was 
particularly fierce and sustained. Wexford and Wicklow 
were the most successful Protestant settlements 
outside Ulster. Wicklow had the largest proportion of 
Protestants of any county outside Ulster; in Wexford, 
whose Protestant population was next largest to 
Wicklow's, Protestant presence was heavily 
concentrated in the northern areas adjacent to 
Wicklow. In the 1780s and 1790s Wexford which had been 
an independent county swung to the side of the
government. After the 1790 and 1797 general elections 
fourteen of the eighteen parliamentary seats in the
county were won by supporters of the government. 
Politically, however, the county was polarized: the
strongly anti-Catholic Ascendancy landlords in the
north confronted a strong liberal party which enjoyed 
Catholic support in the south. Such was the power of 
the Protestant landlords in the north that not a 
single Catholic, it was alleged, had been admitted to 
the Volunteer corps in 1782; and in the 1790s efforts 
to oust Catholics from the yeomanry were successful. 
Furthermore, the election of the parliamentary 
candidates of the Protestant party in 1797 was
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achieved only after the votes of the Catholic 
freeholders had been successfully challenged. The 
Catholics of Wexford, on the other hand, were by no 
means badly politically organized. They had strongly 
influenced the Catholic Committee in the 1780s and 
they managed in 1795 to collect 22,251 signatories to 
an address in support of Lord Fitzwilliam CCullen 
1981: 211, 217; Cullen 1985: 98, 103, 104; Whelan
1987: 66].
Political polarization was aggravated by economic 
competition. In Wicklow and in the north of Wexford, 
the Protestants held a higher proportion of farmland 
than their proportion of the population suggested. In 
Wexford Protestants were strongly established in the 
countryside in both the farming and labouring classes. 
Whereas north of the River Slaney middlemen and large- 
scale farmers were Protestants, west of the Slaney the 
principle tenants were never uniformly Protestant. On 
the whole, however, Catholics were better represented 
among the smallholders than among larger farmers. When 
the middleman system was breaking down by the end of 
the century, with large farms being replaced by direct 
lettings to sub-tenants, Protestants were more
directly threatened than Catholics. Economic 
competition among Catholics and Protestants to hold or 
rent land could easily be exacerbated by mobilization 
along sectarian lines given the political structure of 
the county [Cullen 1981: 211, 213, 230-2, 252-33.
With Orangeism moving south, and acquiring social 
prestige and political clout due to increasing gentry 
support, the fear of being subjected to Orange
reprisals led many Catholics to joining the United
Irish movement. But as the rebellion in the south took 
on a predominantly Catholic character, sympathy for
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the republican cause was waning in the north. In 
Ulster religious fears pushed many Presbyterian United 
Irishmen into Orange lodges as the only recognizable 
organization for the exclusive preservation of 
Protestant lives and property. The influx of Catholics 
into the movement, on the other hand, strengthened the 
impact of Defenderism on the rebellion CElliott 1982: 
197; Elliott 1978: 426-7; Senior 1966: 82-4, 100], The
social-revolutionary aims of the Defenders, linked as 
they were with the tradition of agrarian unrest, 
frightened off many members of the Presbyterian 
middle-class who had initially sympathized with the 
United Irish ideals of political and social equality 
for the Catholics.
The developments in the south thus reinforced 
trends which had already set in almost two years 
earlier, the desertion of middle-class supporters from 
the republican cause:
the republican movement rested on an unstable 
foundation of conflicting aspirations. Defenders 
demanded a major transfer of land from the 
ascendancy to themselves. Many presbyterians had 
millenial expectations of government by God's 
elect, a body which would hardly include Roman 
Catholics. Middle-class radicals, in true 
bourgeois revolutionary fashion, sought the 
sanctity of life, liberty and property under a 
government rationalised to suit their 
entrepreneurial need and political aspirations. 
Lower-class radicals Con the other hand] hinted 
at a certain levelling of wealth and property ,.. 
the aim of United Irish activists [since the 
middle of 1795] to enlist the lower orders by 
every possible means served to drive moderate 
middle-class radicals from the movement [Curtin 
1985: 490-1],
Cleavages within the radical movement along class and 
sectarian lines, therefore, weakened its impact on the 
power structure in Ireland. These internal fissures 
contributed to the crushing defeat the rebels suffered
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at the hands of the military forces. The Anglo-Irish 
Ascendancy survived the republican attack on its 
power. But less than two years later, the political 
independence of the Ascendancy was abolished when 
Ireland became a part of the United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Ireland.
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XVII. Appendix; Public Income and expenditure in
Ireland in the late 18th century.
The aim of this brief chapter is to demonstrate 
that public finance in Ireland in the late 18th 
century was dominated by the task of defending 
militarily the territory of Ireland against foreign 
powers and of maintaining 'law-and-order' internally. 
In particular, this discussion is meant to complement 
the arguments concerning public expenditure on law- 
enforcement measures which have been made in the 
previous chapter. Tables XVII.3 - 6 at the end of this 
chapter form the statistical backbone of the following 
analysis.
The winning of constitutional independence by the 
Anglo-Irish Ascendancy from Great Britain was 
reflected in the state budget. To start with, there 
was a 57 per cent rise in total expenditure in 1782-3 
over the previous year. Military expenditure in that 
year rose by 22 per cent while civil expenditure 
rocketed with an increase of 147 per cent. In the 
eleven financial years after constitutional 
independence had been achieved only about half of 
total net revenue was spent on the military. In the 
financial years 1783-4, 1787-8, 1791-2, and 1792-3,
civil expenditure exceeded military expenditure if 
only by small margins. Calculated in percentage of the 
total net revenue, civil expenditure in 1783-4 was 3.7 
per cent above military expenditure, in 1787-8 it was 
3.2 per cent above, falling back to 2.3 per cent and 
0. 1 per cent above military expenditure in the 
following two years.
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This was a new and unique situation. In the 
previous decades, civil expenditure had only amounted 
to about a third or a half of the sum laid out for the 
military. This new fact is also reflected in the ratio 
of military expenses plus debt charges to civil 
expenditure. It is assumed in this calculation that 
debts had been encumbered as a result of increased 
military expenditure. For the aforementioned years, 
this ratio was 1.2 and in the period between 1782-3 
and 1792-3, the ratio does not exceed 1.8. Only twice 
in the previous decades had this ratio been below 2.0: 
in 1759 <1.8) and in 1769 (1.9).
Public income in the years 1782-3 to 1792-3 did 
not exceed £, 1.4 million annually. Customs duties and 
excise on alcohol, sugar, tea, and tobacco then 
accounted for three-fifths of the Irish government's 
total revenue. Table XVII.1 below gives the trends in 
the receipts from customs and import excise and from 
inland excise. They shed some light on the economic 
buoyancy after 1785 and the increasing importance of 
inland excise for state revenue:
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Table XVII. 1 Government receipts from customs and 
Import excise and inland excise
Customs and Inland Inland Excise
Import Excise Excise as a percentage of
Year (100 = t 792,216) (100 = £ 205,382) Customs and Import
Excise
1782-3 100 100 28.2
1783-4 123 78 17.9
1784-5 123 80 18.4
1785-6 125 173 39.0
1786-7 118 162 38.8
1787-8 132 175 37.4
1788-9 119 216 51.0
1789-90 121 222 51.6
1790-1 124 258 58.6
1791-2 119 244 57,6
1792-3 109 233 60.3
Source: P.P. HC 1895, XXXXVI, table III, p. 370
The 'take-off' of inland excise in 1785 was mainly due
to the new malt duty which was introduced that year.
Increased receipts from tobacco accounts for the rise 
in revenue from inland excise in 1788-9. Dickson 
[1983: 41-21 aptly summarizes the financial situation
after 1782:
The buoancy of the economy [after 1785) insured a 
rising tax yield . . . This improved budgetary
situation provided the financial base that 
allowed greatly increased parliamentary 
expenditure for public works as well as grants
and subsidies to manufacturers and promoters. 
Revenue from customs and import excise remained 
ahead of that from inland excise, but . . . the 
difference was diminishing, together they 
eclipsed the contribution of assessed taxes 
(i.e., hearth money, the carriage tax, quit 
rents, and so on).
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During these eleven financial years, the national debt 
remained almost stationary as the accounts were almost 
balanced. War and internal unrest in the 1790s, 
however, radically transformed the public accounts.
In the financial year 1799-1800, total net 
revenue was 2.5 times the size of that in 1793-4. 
Expenditure, however, was more than four times as 
large as in 1793-4. Whereas civil expenditure was Just 
about fifty per cent above the level of 1793-4, 
military expenditure at the end of the century was 
more than six times the amount spent in 1793-4. To 
increase revenue, an eclectic range of taxes had been 
imposed or increased during the war years in the 
1790s: a small export tax of cattle and hogs; import
duties on carpets, timber, slates as well as hops and 
salt; higher duties on cotton, wine, spirits, and tea; 
an increased hearth tax on houses with six hearths and 
upwards, and a window tax on houses with more than 
four windows; increased stamp duties; and taxes on 
paper, cards, carriages, menservants, armorial 
bearings, hats and leather. Though Pitt proposed an 
income tax for Ireland in 1799, it was not pressed out 
of fear that it might strengthen opposition to the 
planned union between Britain and Ireland [McDowell 
1979: 496-9; on income tax: Castlereagh Memoirs II:
270-3].
But these revenue-enhancing measures were by no 
means sufficient to meet the increased demands. Income 
from hearth tax, for example, effectively decreased by 
more than a third of the amount raised in 1794-5, 
when, beginning in 1795, all households in single­
hearth dwellings, which constituted at least 85 per 
cent of total habitations, were excused from the tax 
for political reasons CDickson 1983: 40; P.P. H.C.
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1895, XXXVI: 3703. The most Important changes in this
period were implemented in the budget of 1797, when 
substantially heavier salt duties were imposed and the 
subsidies on the inland and coastal carriage of grain 
to Dublin was withdrawn. It was hoped that this 
withdrawal would save the exchequer about & 80,000, a 
sum close to the expected yield of the new salt duties 
[Dickson 1983: 483.
The overall tax structure, however, remained 
intact. Between the financial years 1793-4 and 1799- 
1800, customs and excise (which in the available 
statistical accounts includes quit rents and other 
revenue from Crown lands as well as all the taxes 
under the management of excise) contributed on average 
93.3 per cent to the total tax revenue and on average 
73.6 per cent to the total net revenue with the main 
amount of non-tax revenue coming from lotteries. This
compares with 93.2 per cent and 73.7 per cent
respectively for the period between 1786-7 and 1792-3 
[P.P. H.C. 1895, XXXVI: 3693. One other constant
factor in the tax system during the 1780s and 1790s
was the importance of revenue from alcohol (including 
malt). The size of the inland excise in the second 
half of the 1780s was predominantly determined by the 
malt duty introduced in 1785. This source of revenue 
(alcohol including malt) formed upwards of one-third 
of total income for the rest of the century [P.P. H.C. 
1895, XXXVI: 3703. To give an overall impression of
the tax burden in the 1780s and 1790s, it may be 
useful to give both the trend of total tax revenue in 
the state accounts and the trend of county cess in the 
nineteen counties and counties of cities for which we 
have data:
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Table XVII, 2 Trend of state 
cess in Ireland, 1766-1800
tax revenue and county
Year Tax Revenue County Cess 
<100 = t 998,520) <100 = t 102,192)
1786-7 100 100
1787-8 106 108
1788-9 98 117
1789-90 103 123
1790-1 108 130
1791-2 105 132
1792-3 108 137
1793-4 95 133
1794-5 120 142
1795-6 122 146
1796-7 138 162
1797-8 148 148
1798-9 169 161
1799-1800 256 175
Source: P.P. H.C. 1895, XXXVI : 369 for tax revenue ;
P.P. H.C. 1845, XXII: 178 for county cess.
The county rate had already been considerably
increased in the late 1780s and early 1790s, whereas 
the growth of state tax revenue set in with the
financial year 1794-5 after it had fallen below the 
level of 1786-7 the previous year. In the years of
internal unrest, tax revenue finally 'took off*. Vith 
regard to the overall tax burden, it has been pointed 
out in the literature that, for most families, the 
total taxes - indirect, direct, and local - could 
rarely have amounted to more than a few per cent of 
the value of gross household production:
Taxes of all kinds together took less than tithe, 
much less than rent. Yet there are several
reasons why such bald assertions may understate 
the real weight of the tax burden. First, every 
tax rise necessitated an Increased outlay of cash
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for those affected, and this in an environment 
where, for laboring households at least, cash 
income and cash transactions were extremely 
limited ... Second, there was often an invisible 
supplementary impost attached to locally
collected tax. Illicit fees and gratuities were 
sought by revenue officials and petty constables 
Lastly, with specific regard to cess, the 
archaic mode of applotting the county rate meant 
that the burden was unevenly distributed between 
areas of old and new settlement, both within 
plowlands and between one piowland and another 
[Dickson 1983: 523,
It is, therefore, difficult to gauge the impact of
taxation on the population in Ireland. But it should 
be noted, in any case, that tax revenue could not fill 
the gap between income and expenditure after 1793. 
This gap was met by loans which added about & 23
millions to the Irish national debt [McDowell 1979: 
4983 .
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Table XVII. 3 State expenditure for Ireland 1770 
- 1300 <in £ at current prices>
Year Debt
Charges
Civil
Expenditure
Military & Haval 
Expenditure
Total 
Expenditu
1770-1 4.662 211.395 572.489 808.546
1771-2 26.198 207.366 504.227 737.791
1772-3 31.226 235.131 540.714 807.071
1773-4 32.834 171.681 467.608 672.123
1774-5 42.964 283.371 585.205 911.540
1775-6 48.530 195.740 489,522 733.792
1776-7 54.695 326.295 625.823 1,006.813
1777-8 57.453 234.488 449.735 741.676
1778-9 75.027 214.879 583.439 873.345
1779-80 77.260 231.344 524.880 833.484
1780-1 95.449 290.654 629.163 1,015.266
1781-2 100.538 236.758 500.212 837.508
1782-3 120.830 583.766 609.131 1,313.727
1783-4 127.210 526.074 488.985 1,142.269
1784-5 130.335 376.292 502.157 1,008.784
1785-6 144.023 428.231 606.591 1,178.845
1786-7 139.682 467.853 569.974 1,177.509
1787-8 147.763 621.096 580.857 1,349.716
1788-9 143.248 520.737 571.036 1,235.021
1789-90 140.578 556.534 598.771 1,295,883
1790-1 129.327 582.512 672.248 1,384.087
1791-2 133.173 647.277 615.500 1,395.950
1792-3 132.587 616.255 614.546 1,363.388
1793-4 146.507 688.534 745.828 1,580.869
1794-5 214.425 740.879 1,553.562 2,508.866
1795-6 244.978 702.586 1,855.369 2,802.933
1796-7 408.286 661.137 2,032.130 3,101.553
1797-8 622.693 715.775 3,401.760 4,740.228
1798-9 763.577 879.581 3,865.530 5,508.688
1799-
1800 1,232.532 1,025.510 4,596.762 6,854.804
Sources: Public Income and Expenditure of Great Britain and Ireland, 1688 - 
1869
[= Parliamentary Papers 1868-69 <366), vol. 35, pp. 292 ff.; Financial 
Relations Commission 1895/96 [Parliamentary Papers C.-7720-1. & C.-8262],
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TABLE XVII. 4 State expenditures for Ireland in 
percentage of total net revenue 1770 - 1800 (net 
revenue in British pounds at current prices>
Year Net Revenue 
(in f)
Military & Naval 
Expenditure
Civil
Expenditure
Debt
Charges
1770-1 707.996 80.9 31.3 0.7
1771-2 659.714 76.4 31.4 4.0
1772-3 718.536 75.3 32.7 4.3
1773-4 662.666 70.6 25.9 5.0
1774-5 721.053 81.2 39.3 6.0
1775-6 714.285 68.6 27.4 6.8
1776-7 876.934 71.4 37.2 6.2
1777-8 658.339 68.3 35.6 8.7
1778-9 592.191 98.5 36.3 12.7
1779-80 556,414 94.3 41.6 13.9
1780-1 739.850 85.0 39.3 12.9
1781-2 764.375 65.4 31.0 13.2
1782-3 1,106.505 55.1 52.8 10.9
1783-4 1,013.869 48.2 51.9 12.6
1784-5 881.064 57.0 42.7 14.8
1785-6 1,127.918 53.8 38.0 12.8
1786-7 1,228.484 46.4 38.1 11.4
1787-8 1,260.282 46.1 49.3 11.7
1788-9 1,233.411 45.3 42.2 11.6
1789-90 1,381,281 43.4 40.3 10.2
1790-1 1,313.477 51.2 44.4 9.9
1791-2 1,368.414 45.0 47.3 9.7
1792-3 1,363.800 45.1 45.2 9.7
1793-4 1,178.872 63.3 58.4 12.4
1794-5 1,475.216 105.3 50.2 14.5
1795-6 1,551.593 119.6 45.3 15.8
1796-7 1,703.109 119.3 38.8 24.0
1797-8 2,084.069 166.1 34.4 29.9
1798-9
1799-
2,145.719 180.2 41.0 35.6
1800 3,017.758 152.3 34.0 40.8
1800-1 2,204.163 125.1 42.2 52.0
Source: P.P. HC 1869 (366), vol. 35: 292 ff.
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Table XVII.5 Distribution of state expenditure for Ireland 
<in percentage of total expenditure1770 - 1600
Year Debt
Charges
Civil
Expenditure
Military & Naval 
Expenditure
Total
Expenditure
1770-1 0.6 26.1 70.8 808.546
1771-2 3.6 28.1 68 J3 737.791
1772-3 3.9 29.1 67.0 807.071
1773-4 4.9 25.5 69.6 672.123
1774-5 4.7 31.1 64.2 911.540
1775-6 6.6 26.7 66.7 733.792
1776-7 5.4 32,4 62.2 1,006.813
1777-8 7.8 31.6 60.6 741.676
1778-9 8.6 24.6 66.8 873.345
1779-80 9.3 27.7 63.0 833.484
1780-1 9.1 28.6 62.0 1,015.266
1781-2 12.0 28.3 59.7 837.508
1782-3 9.2 44.4 46.4 1,313.727
1783-4 11.1 46.1 42,8 1,142.269
1784-5 12.9 37.3 49.8 1,008.784
1785-6 12.2 36.3 51.5 1,178.845
1786-7 11.9 39.7 48.4 1,177.509
1787-8 11.0 46.0 43.0 1,349,716
1788-9 11.6 42.2 46.2 1,235.021
1789-90 10.9 42.9 46.2 1,295.883
1790-1 9.3 42.1 48.6 1,384.087
1791-2 9.5 46.4 44.1 1,395.950
1792-3 9.7 45.2 45.1 1,363.388
1793-4 9.3 43.5 47.2 1,580.869
1794-5 8.6 29.5 61.9 2,508.866
1795-6 8.7 25.1 66.2 2,802.933
1796-7 13.2 21.3 65.5 3,101.533
1797-8 13.1 15.1 71.8 4,740,228
1798-9 13.8 16.0 70.2 5,508.688
1799
1800 18.0 14.9 67.1 6,854.804
Sources: Public Income and Expenditure [= Parliamentary Papers 1869 
(366), vol. 35, pp. 292 ff.]
Table XVII.6 Ratios of military expenditure to 
civil expenditure and ratios of military 
expenditure plus debt servicing to civil 
expenditure, 1770 - 1600
Year military: civil military + debt: civil
expenditure expenditure
1770-1 2.7 2,7
1771-2 2.4 2.6
1772-3 2,3 2.4
1773-4 2.7 2.9
1774-5 2.1 2.2
1775-6 2.5 2.7
1776-7 1.9 2.1
1777-8 1.9 2.2
1778-9 2.7 3.1
1779-80 2.3 2.6
1780-1 2.2 2.5
1781-2 2.1 2.5
1782-3 1.1 1.3
1783-4 0.9 1.2
1784-5 1.3 1.7
1785-6 1.4 1.8
1786-7 1.2 1.5
1787-8 0.9 1.2
1788-9 1.1 1.4
1789-90 1.1 1.3
1790-1 1.2 1.4
1791-2 0.9 1.2
1792-3 1.0 1.2
1793-4 1.1 1.3
1794-5 2.1 2.4
1795-6 2.6 3.0
1796-7 3.1 3.7
1797-8 4.8 5.6
1798-9 4.4 5.3
1799-
1800 4.5 5.7
Source: P.P. HC 1869 (366), vol. 35: 292 ff.

Conclusion*
The state, police and public order in 
absolutist Austria and constitutional Ireland:
A summary
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XVIII. IUfi state, police and public order in
absolutist Austria and constitutional Ireland: A
p^iiTmnary.
In this concluding chapter I do not intend to add 
new factual layers to the historical narrative in the 
two preceding case studies. Rather I recapitulate the 
major points developed in the historical accounts of 
each country focusing on the impact of geopolitics on 
the internal power structure in general, and the 
relationship between central state and local power 
holders in particular.
The Habsburg Empire was a geopolitically-led 
military-fiscal state. As Dickson C1987] has shown for 
the period between 1740 to 1780, and as I have argued 
for the period after 1780, the state budget was 
dominated by expenditure for the military 
establishment, both in peacetime and during the wars, 
[also: Mann 1986a: 4873. Preparing for wars and
conducting them was the main business of the state. 
Finding ways for raising the financial means necessary 
for the military enterprise was the main occupation of 
the monarchical rulers and their staff.
In order to create economic growth, which was to 
be utilized for achieving and retaining 'Great Power' 
status, the state strove to 'police' its population. 
The monitoring and surveillance of the population and 
the support for the commercialization of the economy, 
both through peasant policies and the mercantilistic 
support of nascent industries, formed part of this 
effort to increase the economic wealth of the state. 
But as most of the economic wealth was created in the 
agrarian economy, the financial needs of the state
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could only be satisfied on a regular basis if part of 
the agrarian surplus could be transferred into the 
coffers of the state.
The agrarian economy, however, was predominantly 
structured by the manorial system of domination and 
production. The aristocratic (and clerical) landlords 
controlled the use of economic resources and 
appropriated the agrarian surplus through the exercise 
of extra-economic coercion in the form of judicial and 
police powers. On the basis of their property rights 
over the lands which the peasants farmed, and often 
over the peasants themselves, could the manorial lords 
block the direct access of the state to the agrarian 
producers and thus prevent the state from imposing a 
tax 'at source*. Thus, unless the landlords cooperated 
voluntarily with the monarchical rulers, the rulers 
had to engage in a power struggle with the aim of 
undermining the patrimonial authority of the manorial 
lords and breaking their hold over local government.
To achieve this aim, the rulers had to establish 
an immediate relationship with the peasants, cutting 
out the landlords as mediators. But this strategy 
would have to be pursued with two considerations 
clearly in mind. First, dislodging the aristocracy 
from their entrenched local power position could under 
no circumstances be allowed to lead to a breakdown of 
authority which would result in agrarian unrest. After 
all, the state had no independent means of maintaining 
order on the local level, but had to rely on the 
manorial lords to provide this function. Second, 
agrarian production could not be allowed to suffer as 
this would undermine the fiscal interests of the 
state.
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But in their struggle with the patrimonial 
landlords the rulers faced yet more problems. In so 
far as the property rights of the patrimonial lords 
were founded on the same principles that legalized the 
monarchical rulers' own position as manorial lords, it 
was impossible for them to undermine the power 
position of the landlords on the local level by 
reformulating the legal framework without undermining 
their own position at the same time. Furthermore, such 
a policy of legal reform would only have been 
considered legitimate if it had been formulated with 
the consent of the aristocracy. But even if the state 
had attempted to overrule these property rights, it 
did not have the infrastructural means which would 
have allowed it to appropriate the agrarian surplus 
without the involvement of the local landholders.
Yet the power of the landlords was not confined 
to the local level. Their political and economic power 
on the local level allowed them to wield power on the 
'national' level as well. Organized as Estates, they 
dominated the jurisdiction and the military and fiscal 
administration in the provinces. They had the right to 
vote for the tax <Contribution) earmarked for the 
maintenance of the army, to collect this direct tax 
themselves, and were responsible, by and large, for 
mustering the military forces. The core activity of 
the state, warmaking, could therefore only be 
performed with the consent and the involvement of the 
aristocracy, which dominated the Estates. As long as 
the state lacked the infrastructural powers to perform 
by itself the administrative functions which were 
undertaken by the Estates, the undermining of the 
manorial lords' political and economic power on the 
local and 'national' level was self-defeating as it 
would have left the state weaker in both military and
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financial terms. But for a state which wanted to 
reduce its dependence on these civil society groups 
the goal had to be to weaken them as the holders of 
power in local government and as Indispensable 
participants in 'national* government.
Geopolitical conflicts in the 18th century 
created the opportunity for the monarchical ruler to 
embark on a course of fundamental reform of the state. 
Following the series of serious defeats inflicted on 
Austria by the Turks during the 1730s and by Prussia 
during the 1740s and in the Seven Years Var, the 
Estates 'agreed' to cede primarily fiscal 
infrastructural powers to the central Habsburg state 
to protect them from greater Powers to the East and 
Southeast. Instead of approving annually of the 
ruler's tax demands the Estates were now compelled to 
agree to tax demands for a period of ten years. Fiscal 
administration was taken out of the hands of the 
officials of the Estates and placed in the hands of 
the ruler's staff. As a consequence of the reforms 
under Maria Theresia, the power of the Estates as a 
political body was restricted to their judicial 
responsibility in the law courts of the provinces.
The introduction of the 'circle offices' enabled 
central government to impose some sort of state 
supervision over the local landlords concerning their 
handling of the political and judicial administration 
of their manors. By infringing upon the landlords' 
patrimonial judicial authority, these 'circle offices' 
were designed as the local arm of central government. 
They should establish a direct link between the state 
and its subjects in their function as an agency to 
which the peasantry could turn in a case of conflict 
with their manorial lords. In so far as the 'circle
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offices' were also charged with monitoring the 
implementation of the 'police' legislation, and the 
compliance with it by both the manorial lords and the 
peasant subjects, they also performed the function of 
a law enforcement agency.
Until the introduction of these 'circle offices', 
central government had had no 'policing' functions on 
the local government level. As I have shown, the 
'policing' powers of the landlords constituted an 
indispensable means of exercising their domination 
over their peasant subjects. Granting those powers to 
the state would therefore have considerably weakened 
the landlords dominant position. Furthermore, there
was no public order problem on the local level that 
would have needed permanent and institutionalized 
state involvement. Despite a plethora of patrimonial 
judicial authorities and their sometimes competing 
legal claims, the manorial lords and their agents were 
well capable by themselves of maintaining that degree 
of public order that was necessary for the maintenance 
of their political, economic and social position. In 
those cases where the forces of the manorial lords
were insufficient to quell local disturbances and 
peasant unrest, troops would be dispatched. There had 
thus been no compelling reason for the manorial lords 
to cede these policing powers to the state.
As a consequence of this situation, the police
reforms, which the state pursued since the early 16th 
century, were implemented in that political space
where the authority of monarchical government was not 
principally disputed by the aristocracy. As I have 
shown, the ideological justification for the state's 
policing activities was based on the notion of 
'policey' and its appellation to the ruler to
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Influence and shape social life In order to create and 
maintain 'good order*. This ideology, which 
legitimated interventionist state policies, together 
with the material economic interests of the state led 
to policing activities by the state which were not 
primarily geared towards preventing 'crime'. Rather, 
policing was aimed at the surveillance and 
disciplining of the people so that they would not 
create 'bad government and disorder' but rather 
contribute to the public welfare and economic well­
being of the country as defined by the state. Since 
'policing' was aimed at penetrating civil society by 
shaping the activities and behaviour of civil society 
groups, it constituted an attempt to increase the 
infrastructural powers of the state.
This increase in the policing powers of the 
central state was facilitated by the fact that state 
police forces did p»erform a real service for the 
aristocratic power holders. The social crisis of the 
17th century, which had been caused by the military 
devastations and the concomitant economic collapse, 
found one expression in the increasing number of 
people roaming the countryside. These 'vagrants' were 
moving, so to speak, in the interstices of the network 
of patrimonial judicial authorities. As no single 
patrimonial authority could ultimately be held 
responsible for 'policing* these people, the state 
could take over the monitoring of their movements.
The establishment of a secret police force under 
Joseph II constituted yet another step in the state's 
endeavour to penetrate civil society. It reflects well 
the double-edged quality of the police: a police force 
not only increases the infrastructural powers of the 
state but also, potentially, its despotic powers.
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However, in the case of Joseph II* s secret police, 
this despotic potential was seriously curtailed, not 
so much by the active opposition of civil society 
groups, but by the fragmented structure of the state 
bureaucracy. We have seen that a permanent struggle 
was waged within the state apparatus over the exercise 
of control over the police forces. The conflict 
between central and provincial state agencies over 
policing authority was complemented by conflicts over 
competence within the central state agencies. The 
factionalized and fragmented structure of the state 
apparatus which was reflected in these conflicts 
became even more apparent when the secret police was 
charged with monitoring even state officials.
The introduction of 'circle offices' and the 
increasing control over police forces constituted two 
attempts by the state to undermine the political power 
position of the patrimonial authorities. These 
measures were supplemented in the 1780s by a peasant 
policy and attempts at tax reform which were intended 
to undermine the manorial lords' economic power. I 
have shown that, by and large, the peasant policy 
under Joseph II favoured the commercialization of the 
agrarian economy. By supporting the rise of new 
industries within the traditional agrarian economy and 
by abolishing serfdom, the absolutist state helped to 
bring about economic advance as well as the victory of 
new social relations over old ones. The peasant 
policies accelerated a trend towards a gradual 
transformation of the traditional relationship between 
lord and serf into a contractual relationship based on 
wage labour. For the peasant, the abolition of serfdom 
contributed to the process of the gradual 
'emancipation' from his traditional bonds. 'Liberated' 
from the soil which he had tilled and which had
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provided him and his family with the basic means of 
subsistence he now had to enter a new type of economic 
relationship. He was set free to enter and produce a 
new relationship of dependence as a wage labourer. For 
the manorial lords, the freedom of movement granted to 
the peasants further weakened their domination over 
their subjects. This domination had already been
curtailed by the legal reforms which tied the exercise 
of patrimonial judicial rights to the possession of a 
legal qualification to be certified by the state. For 
the state, the peasant policies promised economic
growth. But as the peasant was now further removed 
from the domination of the manorial lord, these 
policies also made it possible to conceive of the 
peasant, not as the subject of a manorial lord, but as 
the subject of the state.
The attempts by Joseph II to reform the tax 
system must be seen in the context of a situation in 
which the state had already succeeded in whittling 
away some of the important power resources of the 
manorial lords. The creating of a new system of
taxation aimed, in effect, at restructuring the
political and economic relationship between lord and 
peasant. Tax revenue could only be increased 
significantly by transferring a larger amount of 
peasant income into the coffers of the state. But if 
this transfer was not to lead to the economic ruin of 
the peasantry, and hence to the destruction of the 
economic basis of the tax system, the obligations of 
the peasantry towards their landlords had to be 
reduced in line with the increased tax demands. Hence, 
the introduction of a new system of taxation 
constituted, in effect, a political struggle between 
ruler and manorial lords over the ground rent. 
Attempts to impose taxes on the aristocracy would
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inevitably lead to the same confrontation. They were
in a position to shift their own tax burdens onto
their subjects. Only by erecting regulative safeguards
could the state attempt to prevent the landlords from
recovering their tax payments to the state by imposing
greater demands on their peasants. In any case, in so
far as a new system of taxation affected both power
and purse of the lords, it was likely to meet with
their determined opposition.
In chapter V. B. I have given a detailed account 
of the opposition to the tax reform. As a result of 
its infrastructural weakness, the state had no staff 
that was either large enough or well-trained enough to 
carry out all the necessary tasks of resurveying and 
reassessing the land. Thus, from the very beginning of 
this reform measure, the government had to rely on the 
manpower and 'expertise' of the manorial lords and
their officials, that is, on the co-operation of that 
social group which was likely to suffer from the
reforms. In my discussion of this policy I have paid 
particular attention to the collusion between high 
state officials, provincial government officials and 
local aristocracy in their attempt to block this 
reform policy. This fact should make us conscious of 
the danger of distorting the actual structure of the 
state when using the concept of 'central state*. 
Perhaps it would be more apposite to think of the 
'central state' as a highly fragmented and 
factionalized cluster of state agencies which formed 
temporary alliances with each other according to their 
respective organizational interests and entered into 
alliances with civil society groups when they share 
the same objectives. To the extent that all high 
government officials were also manorial lords, their 
economic interest in maintaining the old order was in
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accord with the manorial lords who remained outside 
government. On this basis, it was possible for a 
'grand coalition' to be formed against the monarchical 
ruler. When the discontent of the peasants with the 
tax reform added to the opposition to the policy, the 
monarchical ruler's position became untenable and the 
tax and urbarial decree was revoked,
I have argued that the power struggle in the 
Austrian lands of the Habsburg monarchy over the tax 
reform and its resolution must be placed within the 
context of the political conflicts in the Austrian 
Netherlands and Hungary, To the degree that they 
threatened the survival of the monarchy as a political 
unit, they made a compromise between ruler and 
aristocracy in the hereditary lands of the monarchy 
imperative. The concurrent conflicts in Hungary and 
the Austrian Netherlands came to a head while the 
monarchy was embroiled in a military confrontation 
with the Ottoman Empire. This geopolitical involvement 
prevented central government from quelling each 
respective resistance by the use of military force. 
But while geopolitical constellations were initially 
beneficial to the forces opposing the government, 
changes in the geopolitical relations after the 
conclusion of the Turkish war in a peace settlement 
also helped to restore Imperial authority.
But this restoration could only be achieved by 
reinstating the traditional aristocratic elite in 
their privileged position within the state. In the 
Austrian Netherlands this rappr&chement between 
monarchical ruler and Estates was precipitated by the 
break-up of the opposition movement along class and 
political lines. It became evident that the interests 
of the aristocracy in reestablishing their traditional
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rights could not be reconciled with the revolutionary 
democratic demands of hitherto politically 
disenfranchised bourgeois groups. Once the bourgeois 
opposition was split over the issue of political 
representation, it was possible for monarch and 
aristocracy to unite and marginalize the politically 
discontented middle class. In the case of Hungary, the 
threat of peasant unrest and the political concessions 
offered by the ruler drove the aristocracy finally 
back into an alliance with the monarchy.
The conciliatory policy of the monarchical ruler 
towards the aristocracy since the late 1780s must be 
related to the problems which central government faced 
due to the geopolitical constellation: the
mobilization of an army of sufficient size for the 
military confrontation with the Ottoman Empire and the 
provision of financial means to support it. Since 
1789, events in France added to these concerns. The 
ideas of the French Revolution potentially undermined 
the ideological legitimacy of the traditional power 
structure and made it thus imperative for monarchical 
ruler and aristocratic power holders to close ranks. 
This incentive to a close co-operation between the 
traditional power holders was compounded by the 
external military threat to the internal order as a 
result of the wars with revolutionary France. This 
military challenge also exacerbated the fiscal and 
'manpower* problems of the government. Given the still 
powerful position of the aristocracy within the 
agrarian society on the local level, further attempts 
to stifle its power would have resulted in a serious 
weakening of the international standing of the 
monarchy. For the following two decades, faced with a 
geopolitically-induced fiscal crisis, which ultimately 
led to state bankruptcy in 1811, the monarchy did not
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pursue any further a policy of marginalizing the 
aristocracy.
Such was the need for internal stability in the 
early 1790s that Leopold II even reformed the secret 
police to assuage liberal bourgeois discontent with 
this 'despotic' force. But with increasing unrest in 
the wake of the French Revolution and the 
revolutionary wars, police reforms were introduced 
under Francis II with the objective of clamping down 
on any unruly elements in society. With the end of 
state-inspired and state-directed reform policies came 
the dismissal of Josephinian officials. This move 
estranged the reform-minded civil servants from the 
regime. They founded, or joined, Jacobin organizations 
in the Habsburg monarchy. Disillusioned with the 
chances of fai— ranging social and economic reforms 
within the old order, these Jacobin groups were now 
espousing a programme of fundamental change aiming at 
the overthrow of the regime. This challenge to the 
established order in a situation in which the state 
was involved in a military confrontation was taken by 
the government as a pretext for pushing through police 
reforms. Through these reforms a far-flung, yet 
centralized system of (secret) police was established 
which remained in force until the revolutionary 
turmoil of 1848.
Turning to my second case study, I have shown in 
the previous chapter that in Ireland, too, public 
finance was dominated by the task of defending 
militarily the country against foreign powers. 
Geopolitics thus found a reflection in the state 
budget in Ireland, too. As in the case of the Austrian 
Empire, geopolitics was constitutive of the political 
and social cleavage structure of this country. Ireland
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was a colonial dependency for much of the 18th 
century. The structure of the Irish economy was 
profoundly influenced by political and legislative 
action taken in England. Economic dependence was 
maintained by a highly developed system of political 
and legislative subordination. Without an
understanding of this geopolitical position of 
subordination, the political and social structure of 
Ireland cannot be understood. Furthermore, 
geopolitical relations of violence between imperial 
Great Britain and other states also affected Ireland.
In Ireland in the 18th century, the economically 
dominant class was also the ruling class. The Anglo- 
Irish (Anglican) Ascendancy as the ruling class 
constituted itself in and through parliament as the 
'political nation'. This centralized, 'national' 
formation of the ruling class was caused by the fact 
that it was numerically too small and too scattered in 
residence to govern individually or in small groups. 
Furthermore, the tensions and conflicts between 
landlord and peasant subjects, which typically 
resulted from different economic (and political) 
interests, were aggravated by differences in religion, 
language, and habit. In this situation the Ascendancy 
"bound themselves together on national rather than 
parish, county or even regional lines. Their primary 
identification was with their own order spread thinly 
across the entire country, not with a particular place 
or neighbourhood. Their common ground was Dublin" 
CMacDonagh 1981: 3163.
In contrast to the situation in the Habsburg 
Empire, the vast majority of the members of this 
ruling class cooperated, by and large, with the Irish 
government. There were a number of reason for this co­
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operation. To start with, Ireland was a Protestant 
kingdom in which a Protestant minority ruled a 
Catholic majority. As Protestant rulers, both 
government and the ascendancy class had to maintain 
their domination in the face of a Catholic majority of 
subjects. They shared an interest in keeping the 
Catholic majority in a position of subordination. I 
have discussed how a plethora of 'penal laws' 
prevented the Catholics from acquiring the economic 
means which would have enabled and entitled them to 
political participation. Throughout the 18th century, 
Catholics were excluded from membership of the House 
of Commons, and between 1728 and 1793 Catholics and 
those married to Catholics could not vote at 
parliamentary elections. The test clause of the 
'Popery Act' of 1704 in effect excluded the Roman 
Catholics also from taking offices in the state, 
municipal corporations and the army. This virtual 
exclusion was due to the stipulation in the act that 
holders of public office were obliged to take the 
sacrament according to the usage of the Church of 
Ireland.
This clause also virtually excluded the
Protestant Dissenters from office. Their political 
marginalization was reinforced by the fact that only a 
small number of them were prosperous enough to qualify 
as forty-shilling freeholders. The majority of 
Dissenters was thus barred from participating in 
county elections. But the Protestant middle class, 
too, was politically marginalized, though not
disenfranchised: a majority of seats in the Irish
parliament was controlled by a small number of 
political magnates and the government, too, directly 
controlled seats. Under these circumstances, the
electoral significance of the Protestant middle class
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was rather minute. As can be seen, religion was 
closely intertwined with politics: differing
denominational affiliations translated into different 
political privileges and economic advantages. This 
constellation helped the formation of social and 
political networks along religious lines. But the 
cooperation between Ascendancy and government was 
based more broadly than simply on religious 
identification.
For the landlords, the formation of patron- 
client-relations was one means of maintaining (their) 
order on the local level. For such a relationship to 
be established, the landlords had to be in a position 
to dispense favours. The most effective means of 
upholding his domination was for the landlord to offer 
places in the administration of local government to 
his supporters. For those places which were under the 
control of the Dublin government he had to make sure 
that he was given the right to place his own men. The 
build-up of a large following of dependent clients 
which would help him to keep ' order' locally and to 
exert political influence nationally was thus 
premissed on him having entered a patron-client- 
relationship with central government in turn. But this 
local clientalism proved sometimes insufficient for 
dealing with unrest. In the case of serious peasant 
unrest, the landlords had to rely on the army to quell 
the disturbances. In this case, too, the landlords 
needed the government's cooperation.
Government's cooperation with the landlords was 
forthcoming because they ensured that kind of local 
government that was necessary for upholding the 
established order and for which central government was 
infrastructurally too weak. But as long as the local
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power holders were reigned in by their dependence on 
government patronage, there was no danger of central 
government losing complete control over local 
government. Another structural reason for the 
government's cooperation with the Ascendancy was the 
fact that parliament was the institution through which 
the Ascendancy organized itself as a political force . 
In order to assert its authority, the Irish
government had to attempt to gain some hold over
parliamentary affairs. Local power holders who
controlled the seat(s) in their constituency became
thus an electoral interest. Government had to woo them 
to gain their support in parliament.
Only once did this essential co-operation between 
government and Ascendancy break down temporarily. This 
happened over the issue of colonial dependency and the 
demands for parliamentary reform and economic 
independence. I have shown that political agitation 
over Ireland's colonial status led also to political 
conflict in the form of republicanism among sections 
of the radicalized middle class and Catholic peasants 
in the last decade of the 18th century. In both 
instances, these conflicts were linked with political 
demands for electoral reform. As membership of the 
'political nation' was determined by class and 
religious affiliations, the struggle for political 
participation was also fought over the issue whether 
electoral reform should follow class lines <e.g. 
empowering all members of the middle class) and 
whether all denominations should be enfranchised <e.g. 
all members of the middle class irrespective for their 
religious affiliations). The political cleavages along 
class and religious lines gave thus rise to the major 
political conflicts in the late 18th century in 
Ireland.
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But the economic structure, too, caused 
conflicts. Irish agrarian society had a highly 
differentiated structure. The landowning class was 
predominantly Protestant. For most of the 18th 
century, their Catholic tenants could only hold leases 
of not more than thirty-one years, their Protestant 
tenants, however, could become freeholders. Thus, in 
this area, too, religious affilitation led to 
different entitlements. We have also seen how the 
economic conditions at the beginning of the 18th 
century favoured the leasing-out of large plots of 
land to tenant farmers. In some areas of the country, 
these substantial lease-holding tenants sublet tracts 
of their land to undertenants. They became 'middlemen' 
between the head landlord and their own undertenants. 
In addition to the groups of head landlords, 
substantial tenants, middlemen and undertenants, there 
were the cottiers and (migrant) farm labourers who 
found themselves at the bottom of this hierarchically 
structured agrarian society.
Whenever an agrarian economy is structured by 
lease-hold arrangements, there is likely to be 
conflict between the landlord and his tenants over the 
level of rent and the duration and renewal of the 
lease when it expires. This is particularly the case 
when the conditions under which the lease agreement 
was concluded no longer prevail, I have shown how the 
commercialization and the growth of the agrarian 
economy in the second half of the 18th century 
transformed the agrarian social relationships. One 
major change, which caused considerable conflict, was 
the challenge of the middleman system. The middleman 
tenant had taken land at low rents and on long leases 
and had been subletting tracts of lands on higher 
rents and shorter tenures to undertenants. He was
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therefore in a much better position than the head 
landlord to appropriate more speedily the economic 
profits which the rise in farm income created in form 
of an increase in rent when the undertenant's lease 
expired. To fully participate in the economic upswing, 
the landlord had to cut out the middleman by leasing 
land directly to the undertenant when the middleman's 
lease expired. On the other hand, economic growth now 
enabled many more small tenants than before to stock a 
farm and pay (a higher) rent directly to the head 
landlord.
The commercialization of Irish agriculture also 
led to peasants now being confronted with more 
exacting head landlords and substantial farmers who 
set about to increase rents and actively pursued the 
encroachment of commanage. This increase in economic 
expropriation was coupled with an increased 
competition for land as a consequence of rapid 
demographic growth. Both these factors contributed to 
an intensification of peasant unrest in the second 
half of the 18th century. But demographic growth and 
commercialization together with a restructuring of the 
domestic linen industry in Ulster formed the 
structural conditions within which a conflict between 
Protestant and Catholic labourers in the countryside 
could develop.
Economic conflicts also existed in the commercial 
sector. Here, too, the denominational factor was 
important. The most important economic provisions of 
the restrictive 'penal laws' of the 18th century aimed 
at preventing the continuance and/or formation of a 
Catholic landowning class. As a consequence, many 
Catholics were driven into trade as the only career 
left open to them - once entry into the professional
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occupations had been almost (or, in the case of the 
legal profession, totally) made impossible. The laws 
thus contributed to the formation of a small Catholic 
commercial middle class. It was against these 
competing Catholic traders and merchants that the 
Protestant commercial middle class tried to mobilize 
politically.
I have analysed how this conflict structure in 
Ireland in the late 18th century was affected by the 
social and political mobilization of parts of the 
population along the class and religious cleavages. 
But I have also shown that geopolitical conflicts had 
a major impact on this complex conflict 
constellations.
I have traced the effect of the American War of 
Independence on the political conflict constellation 
in Ireland. This geopolitical conflict between Great 
Britain and the American colonies precipitated a 
change in the power structure of Ireland. After the 
withdrawal of troops from Ireland for combat in the 
American colonies it became evident that the
government was infrastructurally too weak to police 
the country and protect it against a French invasion. 
The formation of a militia had to be ruled out for 
three reasons. First, the state did not have the 
financial resources to sustain such a force. Second, 
in the southern parts of the country it would have 
been necessary to arm the Catholics. This was 
constitutionally not possible and also considered to 
be politically inadvisable. Third, in the north the 
"lower ranks of the people" would have to be recruited 
into the militia. They were the very people whom the 
government held responsible for the internal unrest in 
the first place. Considerations of class and religion
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together with fiscal reasons thus made the formation 
of a government-led militia force impossible.
In this situation, the private companies of 
Protestant 'Volunteers' took it upon themselves to 
preserve "the peace and good order" and defend the 
borders. The government found itself now in a very 
real dilemma. On the one hand, the Volunteers did 
perform tasks in the maintenance of public order and 
the defence of the borders which were beyond the 
infrastructural capacity of the state. But, on the 
other hand, the Volunteers formed companies of armed 
men which were beyond the sphere of government 
influence. Neither did the government have the means 
of suppressing the Volunteers, nor could it dispense 
with the services they rendered. It was in this 
situation of acknowledged strength of the Volunteers 
and evident weakness of the government that sections 
within the Ascendancy and supporting groups outside 
the ruling class exerted pressure on the governments 
in Ireland and Britain to agree to trade concessions 
and constitutional reform. As a result, the Ascendancy 
succeeded in achieving legislative independence and a 
reduction in economic dependence without having to 
grant 'disenfranchised' groups membership of the 
'political nation'.
After the winning of trade concessions and the 
constitutional reforms of 1782, there was a political 
split within that section of the Ascendancy that had 
mobilized for legislative independence and trade 
concessions. There was controversy over two issues. 
First, admittance to the 'political nation': now that
parliamentary independence had been won, how should 
parliament be reformed and, in particular, should the 
electoral law be changed ? The majority within the
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Ascendancy did not endorse a reform which would have 
reduced their own power as borough-owners or the power 
of the borough-owners who were their sponsors by 
extending constituency boundaries and lowering the 
property qualifications for voters. Since the 
supporters of electoral reform did not want to 
enfranchise the <middle-class) Catholics, they could 
not weaken the opposition by mobilizing support across 
denominational lines. The Volunteers were the second 
controversial issue. Was it still politically 
opportune to allow the Volunteers to continue with 
their political mobilization ? The majority of the 
Ascendancy considered parliament the only legitimate 
place in which political debate and confrontation 
should take place. This attempt at excluding extra- 
parliamentary groups from legitimate political 
discourse and active political participation was 
fostered by the realization that the newly recruited 
"volunteers without property" could not be expected to 
secure the political and economic interests of the 
dominant class.
With political support of the Volunteers waning, 
the government tried to reestablish some control over 
the exercise of the use of force. But forming a 
militia would have encountered the same difficulties 
as previously. The government could make some advance 
towards a control over the means of legitimate 
coercion only when the peasant unrest in the second 
half of the 1780s made the maintenance of public order 
in the countryside and the cooperation between 
government and landlords in order to quell these 
agarian disturbances a major issue. In this situation 
the government attempted to gain some control over the 
local magistracy and the local police. But the reform 
of the county police was premissed on the realization
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that it was necessary for the government to compromise 
and work with the grand juries and the county 
magistrates as the local power holders in the 
countryside. These local power holders accepted 
government's involvement in local policing because the 
public order problem could not any longer be solved 
with local forces alone.
But it became apparent in the 1790s, that even 
the reformed law-and-order forces were insufficient to 
control the political and social unrest in the last 
decade of the century. The struggle for Catholic 
emancipation and parliamentary reform intensified 
between 1789 and 1793, Political opposition to the 
status quo was organized in a number of extra- 
parliamentary groups. Radical opposition of sections 
of the Protestant middle class was organized in the 
Society of the United Irishmen. Their commitment to 
electoral reform, Catholic emancipation and 
republicanism distinguished their programme from that 
of the Whig Clubs. It was clear to them that their 
radical middle class policies would depend on the 
effective organization of the radical elements within 
the Irish opposition and the forging of an alliance 
with the politically active sections of the Catholic 
population.
Once the Catholic middle class had ousted the
landed, aristocratic Catholics from the leadership of 
the Catholic Committee, contacts were established
between the radical Protestant opposition and the 
Committee to unite the opposition to the ruling
regime, though the commitment to republicanism was a 
bone of contention. When the Volunteers were re­
entering the polical fray, with some companies
supporting radical goals, the government was
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confronted with an opposition which was united and 
organized as never before. To the degree that both 
government and Ascendancy refused to give in to their 
political demands, this unity was further 
strengthened.
In this situation the English government 
intervened out of imperial consideration. The English 
government viewed the Irish Catholics as an 
essentially conservative force which was predisposed 
towards monarchical institutions. They were considered 
to be natural allies against the anti-clerical French 
Revolution and, within Ireland, against Presbyterian 
republicanism. Furthermore, the British government 
wanted to take positive steps to make Ireland a 
fruitful field for military recruitment and an 
uninviting arena for French invasion. It therefore 
recommended some form of Catholic relief.
Faced with the pressure exerted by the British 
government and by the internal opposition, and 
realizing the need of maintaining internal order in a 
situation of war with France, the government and the 
Ascendancy finally conceded the parliamentary 
franchise to the Catholics and also enacted some of 
the reforms demanded by the Vhig opposition. As in the 
case of the constitutional reforms in 1782, the 
reforms in 1793 were caused by a confluence of a 
threat to the internal order from without in the form 
of a French invasion and from within in the form of a 
broadly based political opposition of the Protestant 
and Catholic middle class. These concessions secured 
the position of the Irish government and the 
Ascendancy by the summer of 1793: they had split the
opposition to their policies without making 
concessions which would have struck at the heart of
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the power structure that favoured the ruling class. As 
a result of government concession, but also because 
of the war with France, the Whig party was again 
firmly realigned with the majority of the ruling 
class, For the first time, the Catholic middle class 
was partially incorporated into the political system.
The policy of concession was complemented by a 
policy of repression. With the connivance of the Whigs 
the government virtually suppressed the Volunteers 
and, finally, succeeded in forming a militia. As a 
result of the policy of repression, the Society of 
United Irishmen turned revolutionary after its 
suppression by government in 1794. But now that large 
sections of the middle class opposition had gone over 
to the side of the government, the United Irish forged 
an alliance with the Catholic Defenders. The raids of 
the Protestant Orange Order against Catholic peasants, 
government's connivance in their unlawful activities 
as well as government's brutal conduct in the campaign 
for disarming Ulster in 1797 contributed to the co­
operation of the Defenders with the United Irish, But 
to the degree that co-operation between United
Irishmen and Defenders took shape, so Orangeism 
gathered strength. By 1797 Orangemen were accepted by 
government as allies in its fight to maintain order. 
This cooption of the Orangemen was in line with the 
government's strategy to form as broad an alliance 
amongst the various non-revolutionary sections in 
society as possible. After all, the military defence 
of the realm against the French did not allow
government to commit all its forces to the quelling of 
the internal threat. Hence, it had to rely on the
military support of 'civil society groups'. The 
formation of yeomanry corps, over which the government 
had hardly any control, showed yet again that the
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government had to concede power over the legitimate 
use of violence to the gentry in order to maintain 
order.
Badly organized, undisciplined and poorly co­
ordinated in their activities, the army, the militia, 
and the yeomanry managed nevertheless to crush the 
rebellion. One reason was the sheer brutality with 
which these ' law-and-order' agencies went about their 
business. But the causes of the failure of the 
rebellion are more deep-seated. As a consequence of 
the government's repressive policy since 1794, the 
organizational structure of the revolutionary United 
Irishmen was extremely ineffective and French support, 
on which the rebels had set their hopes, did not 
materialize in the expected manner. But more decisive 
for the government's victory were the internal 
fissures along class and sectarian lines within the 
United Irish movement. To the degree to which the 
rebellion in the South took on a sectarian character 
as a result of the influence of the Defenders, 
Protestant supporters in the North withdrew their 
support from the United Irishmen. As the Defenders 
stood in the tradition of violent agrarian protest and 
shared its economic aspirations, which included the 
repossession of land confiscated by the Protestants 
and an attack on property more generally, middle-class 
Protestants had also good economic reasons to go over 
to the side of the established order.
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Now that the evidence has been presented and 
reviewed, I can return to the question left open in 
the first chapter and conclude the thesis by stating 
in greater detail the rationale of my methodology. In 
this thesis I started from the assumptions that an 
analysis of attempts by central governments to 
establish a monopoly of violence through the formation 
of state police forces sheds light on one major aspect 
of state formation. It was my contention that attempts 
to establish a monopolistic command over the means of 
coercion are likely to be contested by those (groups 
of) individuals who are either expropriated from the 
means of violence they hitherto possessed or excluded 
from the group of people who are to gain control over 
these means. I argued that the conflict over the 
appropriation and the exercise of the means of 
violence is likely to be extremely fierce in 
societies, such as those of pre-industrial Europe, in 
which the appropriation of the economic surplus is 
closely linked with extra-economic coercion. Any 
attempt to undermine the (economic and political) 
position of the economically dominant class by 
expropriating it from the means of coercion is likely 
to encounter strong resistance.
This hypothesis about the essentially contested 
character of the development of police powers led to 
the identification of the social relationship between 
"ruler" and "local power holders" as the unit of 
analysis in my comparative studies. In order to gain 
an analytical handle on the historical varieties of 
this relationship in pre-industrial Europe, I accepted 
as heuristically useful Michael Mann's ideal-typical 
classification of absolutist and constitutional regime 
types. In an absolutist regime, the relationship 
between ruler and local power holders tends to be
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conflictual; the despotic claims of central government 
are high, but it does not possess enough 
infrastructural power to penetrate civil society and 
co-ordinate it according to its despotic designs. In a 
constitutional regime, the relationship between ruler 
and local power holders tends to be co-operative; 
despotic claims of central government vis-&-vis the 
local power holders is low, but the penetration and 
co-ordination of civil society is higher than in the 
absolutist regime type, as central government 
substitutes the lack of state-controlled
infrastructural power with a co-operative relationship 
with the elite groups in civil society.
Mann's classification (as Max Weber's typology in 
his sociology of domination in Economy and Society> , 
is constructed by focusing on the interaction of elite 
groups and neglecting the social relationships of the 
ruled amongst themselves and with these elite groups. 
This focus is justified in so far as the struggle 
between the centrality of royal authority and the 
locality of the landlord class is a major feature of 
recorded history. It was precisely the lack of 
infrastructural power which made it necessary for the 
ruler to delegate authority to local power holders. 
This delegation entailed the risk of the 
decentralization of political authority. However, the 
local landlord class established and enforced power 
relationships with the agrarian peasant producers. The 
struggle between central ruler and local power holders 
was centrally concerned with retaining control over 
these peasant producers on the side of the landlords 
and undermining this local power base on the side of 
the central ruler. Typically, the central ruler 
attempted to turn the peasant producers from subjects 
of a manorial lord into subjects of the state
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('citizens'); the local power holders, in turn, 
attempted to retain control over their power base by 
securing their role as intermediaries between the 
state and their subjects. The relationships between 
ruler and local power holders were thus not
constituted in a self-contained social space. They 
were embedded in the overall power and conflict 
structure of society. Whether the tendency towards a 
conflictual or co-operative relationship between ruler 
and local power holders materialized in reality was 
co-determined by the patterns of social relationship 
between the rulers and the ruled as well as those 
among the ruled.
This assumption led to the following 
specification of my research problem. I wanted to 
analyse the relationship between central ruler and 
local power holders in pre-industrial Europe. My two 
selected cases should belong to the absolutist and the 
constitutional regime types respectively. In each 
case, the relationship between ruler and local power 
holders should be discussed by concentrating on 
attempts by the state to establish state police 
forces. It was my contention that both the attempts to 
appropriate the means of violence and the form and 
outcome of the struggle over the monopolization of the 
use of the means of violence were intricately linked 
to the overall power and conflict structure of 
society. It was therefore not sufficient to analyse 
only the relationships between ruler and civil society 
elites. The relationship between state and elites with 
the ruled (and 'policed') had to be discussed as far 
as it had an impact on the relationship (and struggle) 
between ruler and local power holders.
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These theoretical considerations had a direct 
bearing on my research design. Accepting the
heuristical usefulness of Mann's classification, I 
surmised that it might be 11 luminating to contrast 
processes of the development of police forces in a 
country that could be classified as an absolutist 
regime with those in a country classified as a 
constitutional regime. In order to make this 
contrasting comparison as extreme as possible, I chose 
'Imperial' Austria as my case study of the absolutist 
type and 'colonial' Ireland as my case study of the 
constitutional type. My aim was to grasp the 
peculiarities of each case and to establish what was 
particular about each particular historical experience 
through a contrasting comparison. I used the
comparative method as a way of illuminating the 
special features or particularities of the individual 
societies I examined - surmising that each may look 
different in the light of the other.
I did not use the comparative method as a way of 
generating and/or testing theories or models "that are 
either of potentially universal application or at 
least readily transferable to a number of social 
situations other than those being directly examined" 
[Fredrickson 1980: 4593. I did not write a study which 
could have justifiably been given the title : "The
Formation of Police Forces in Pre-Industrial Europe: 
An Application of Theory to the Austrian and Irish
State ", Such a title in the tradition of Neil
Smelser's "Social Change in the Industrial Revolution: 
An Application of Theory to the British Cotton 
Industry " would have been inappropriate because I do 
not have any 'empty theoretical boxes', for example 
derived from Giddens's or Foucault's theories of 
modernity and surveillance/social control, which I
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would want to fill with empirical evidence, "thus 
confirming or disproving the theory’s utility for 
interpreting history" CBonnell 1980: 1623. Nor did I
write a thesis with the title: "Social Origins of the
Police State. Ruler and Local Power Holders in the 
Making of the Modern World ", I did not follow 
Barrington Moore who used the comparative approach as 
"a step toward specifying configurations favorable and 
unfavorable to the establishment of modern Western 
democracy" [Moore 1966: XIV3 . That is to say, I did
not test alternative explanatory hypotheses to 
establish the conditions under which attempts to form 
state police forces are (or are not) successful: I did
not use "historical comparisons to test the validity 
of existing theoretical hypotheses and to develop new 
causal generalizations to replace invalidated ones" 
[Skocpol/Somers 1980: 1823.
It cannot be the task of these concluding remarks 
to ascertain whether such alternative research designs 
and alternative applications of the comparative method 
would yield methodologically and empirically sound 
results. Rather, I want to state briefly the reasons 
why I used the comparative approach to highlight the 
particular features of each individual case. I start 
from the ontological assumption that each particular 
state, or each particular aggregate of clusters of 
social relationships, is a complex and unique 
sociohistorical configuration. Though social
scientists analyse each configuration with general 
concepts, it can be a legitimate task for them to 
interpret the particularity of each case. Comparative 
studies of macropolitical and macrosocial
constellations can help to increase the 'visibility' 
of one configuration by contrasting it with another. I 
fully subscribe to Reinhard Bendix's methodological 
position:
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Comparative analysis should sharpen our 
understanding of the contexts in which more 
detailed causal inferences can be drawn. Without 
a knowledge of contexts, causal inference may 
pretend to a level of generality to which it is 
not entitled. On the other hand, comparative 
studies should not attempt to replace causal 
analysis, because they can only deal with a few 
cases and cannot easily isolate the variables (as 
causal analysis must) CBendix 1978: 153.
It is important to be clear about what this position 
entails. This argument does not deny that the logic of 
causal analysis implies a counter-factual case or a 
'control' case, and that, therefore, comparison is an 
integral part of this logic. Rather, it is an argument 
against the assumption that a comparative analysis, 
for example by applying J.St. Mill's method of 
agreement and/or method of difference, could 
conclusively establish a list of causal factors which 
could account for the occurrence or non-occurrence of 
social phenomena. Causal attribution is based on 
(explicit or implicit) theorizing, not method. For 
example, Barrington Moore's disinclination to consider 
the position of the countries he analyses within the 
international system as a possible causal factor for 
the formation of democratic, fascist or communist 
regimes has to be discussed, not on the basis of his 
method, but on the basis of his theoretical 
orientation which is essentially 'society-centred'. 
Again, his neglect of cultural factors is not 
intrinsically methodologically founded, but is due to 
his theory which has a clear 'materialist' bias.
Furthermore, for a causal attribution on the 
basis of comparative studies to be convincing the 
social scientist has to be able to isolate 
'variables', categorize them as 'dependent' or 
'independent' and, above all, keep them constant
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across the analysed cases. This demands a degree of
analytical rigour which, at least as far as
macrostructures are concerned, entails the risk of
downgrading historical variations in each case. Bendix
argues against a research strategy which is based on 
ceteris paribus assumptions; he favours an approach 
which allows for variability and diversity of context. 
I share this preference. Pragmatically, I could not 
see how in my case studies, which focused on the 
overall power and conflict structure in Austria and 
Ireland, such an isolation, categorization and 
standardization of 'variables' could have been 
achieved. I therefore opted for a research strategy 
which aimed to preserve the historical integrity of 
each case as a whole rather than engage in its 
analytical breakdown into clusters of variables.
This research design did not, however, result in 
the construction of historical narratives which were 
limited to telling the stories of how police powers 
were developed in Austria and Ireland. At the very 
least, these 'narratives' were organized around a 
causal hypothesis which was already identified in the 
title of this study: "Geopolitics and internal power
structures". This hypothesis holds that geopolitics 
has a determining impact on the overall pattern of 
group conflict in society; in particular, the effects 
of geopolitical relations of violence have the 
potential for restructuring the relationship between 
ruler and local power holders.
This hypothesis was derived, initially, from a 
reading of literature on state formation in Western 
Europe. To put it differently: the perusal of
sociological studies on state formation resulted in 
identifying the possible impact of geopolitics on
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internal power structures as the orienting question of 
my empirical research on the development of police 
powers. It seemed to me that Charles Tilly addressed 
this question most forcefully in his historical and 
sociological analyses of state formation:
War and preparation for war involved rulers in 
extracting the means of war from others who held 
essential resources - men, arms, supplies, or 
money to buy them - and who were reluctant to 
surrender them without strong pressure or 
compensation. Vithin limits set by the demands 
and rewards of other states, extraction and 
struggle over the means of war created the 
central organizational structures of states. The 
organization of major social classes within a 
state's territory, and their relations to the 
state, significantly affected the strategies 
rulers employed to extract resources, the 
resistance they met, the struggle that resulted, 
the sorts of durable organizations that 
extraction and struggle laid down, and therefore 
the efficiency of resource extraction CTilly 
1990: 153.
For Tilly, then, state formation is an essentially 
contested process in that it involves a power struggle 
over the appropriation of the means of waging war and 
over the extraction of resources more generally; and 
it is the geopolitical setting which provides an 
important context and formative influence for this 
power struggle. But at the same time, Tilly maintains 
that the organization of antagonistic collective 
actors has to be analysed in order to understand 
adequately the different forms of state making.
As the purpose of my review of the literature was 
thus the identification of a sociologically 
significant orienting question about the distribution 
of power <chances> within societies, and not the 
development of a theory of geopolitics, I did not 
consider it necessary to engage in a more 
comprehensive discussion of related arguments on
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geopolitics and power structures. Rather, having 
identified my broad themes, i.e., <1> attempts by the
state to establish a monopolistic command over the 
means of internal coercion, and (2) the impact of 
geopolitics on this process of monopolization, I then 
turned to my two case studies. When analysing the 
historical evidence in the Austrian case, I could show 
that geopolitics did indeed have a major impact on the 
power structure of Austrian society. Encouraged by 
this result, I then proceeded with applying this 
hypothesis to the Irish case. In both cases I 
demonstrated how geopolitics restructured conflict 
constellations. But I did not test alternative causal 
hypotheses. What were the main results of my 
contrasting comparisons on the impact of geopolitics 
on the internal power structures ?
The impact of geopolitics on the relationship 
between central government and local power holders was 
initially different in each country. In the Austrian 
lands of the Habsburg Empire, the local power holders 
ceded fiscal-military infrastructural powers to the 
central state to protect them from Prussia and the 
Ottoman Empire. A fierce struggle between central 
state and local power holders over the degree of the 
state's infrastructural penetration of 'civil society' 
ensued because the local power holders still 
controlled sufficient political and economic power 
resources in their locality. By and large, they were 
still capable of maintaining their manorial system of 
domination without the help of the state, The gradual 
commercialization of the agrarian economy did not yet 
fundamentally change the patron-client-relationship 
between landlord and peasant.
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oIn Ireland, in contrast, it was not an external 
threat which determined the relationship between
central state and local power holders. It was the
internal threat to the maintenance of (their) order 
and their domination which made the local power
holders cede infrastructural (police) powers to the 
state. Confronted with violent agrarian unrest and the 
political mobilization of the middle class, the 
economically and politically dominant class cooperated 
with central government to secure the survival of
their privileged position. The government,
infrastructurally too weak to contain demands for
political' and economic reforms and combat disorder
with forces under its own control, had to coalesce
with the Ascendancy to retain control over the 
population.
But geopolitics did shape the power structure of 
Irish society. The American Var of Independence and 
the wars with revolutionary France restricted the 
government's room for manoeuvre vis-^-vis the 
Ascendancy. These geopolitical conflicts were also 
the setting in which the political mobilization of the 
(reformist and republican-revolutionary) middle class 
and the radicalization of Catholic peasants took 
place. It was because of these developments and the
ensuing 'disorder' that the Ascendancy retained its 
close cooperation with central government.
In the Habsburg Empire, the revolutionary threat 
and the wars with revolutionary France, too, initiated 
a close cooperation between central state and local 
power holders. The break-down of (and the break-away 
from) imperial authority in the two 'provinces' in the 
periphery of the Empire, the Austrian Netherlands and 
Hungary, could be reversed once the central government
- 514 -
had made concessions to the local power holders in 
order to keep the Empire together during the 
geopolitical conflict with France, But the willingness 
of these power holders to be content with the 
concessions was partially caused by their realization 
that their own position, too, might be challenged by 
revolutionary forces. It was the ideological and 
political challenge of the French Revolution and the 
Austrian Jacobins which made central government and 
local power holders close ranks. It was the 
geopolitical and military threat of revolutionary 
France which reinforced this cooperation.
It is now possible in this context to summarize 
the causes of the development of police powers that I 
identified in my historical case studies, (1) I 
identified a "statist" cause whereby the central 
government/state elite sought to increase its powers 
vis-A-vis all social groups/classes in its territory. 
In Ireland, the central government initially embarked 
on the policy of police formation in order to secure 
Ireland's status as a colonial dependency. In Austria, 
dynastic reasons which were closely entwined with 
prestige aspirations of 'Great Power' status made
central government embark on a course of 'policing'. 
In the Irish case, central government sought the co­
operation of the main section of the Ascendancy class. 
In Austria, police reforms were set in motion without 
regard for the threat it posed to the local power 
holders. (2) I also identified a "class" cause whereby 
the state maintained property and regulated good 
order, principally between the classes. I have shown 
for both the Austrian and the Irish case how peasant 
and urban revolts as well as the political 
mobilization of politically disenfranchised social
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groups had a major impact on the attitudes of both 
state elite and propertied classes to police powers.
In the case of Ireland, a compromise on policing 
between central government and the oppositional forces 
within the Ascendancy class was reached in the mid- 
1790s when geopolitical pressure coupled with internal 
unrest threatened the power position of the privileged 
groups. In Austria, geopolitical pressure and internal 
unrest did not result so much in a compromise on 
policing, but rather in the acquiescence of the local 
power holders in the state-led police reforms of 
Francis II. As can be seen in both cases, as soon as 
the power position of the dominant groups in society 
was challenged by either geopolitical pressure or 
internal unrest, a closer co-operation between central 
government and local power holders ensued which 
allowed changes in the policing of society.
To sum up, I have shown in my two cases how, at 
critical conjunctures, the effects of geopolitical 
relations of violence between states transformed the 
internal conflict constellations of Austria and 
Ireland, and the relationship between central 
government and local power holders in particular. I 
have argued that in order to understand the power 
structure and political change in 'absolutist' Austria 
and 'constitutional' Ireland in the 18th century, it 
is imperative to analyse the interaction between 
class, political, regional/colonial, and ideological 
power groupings and economic, political, ideological 
and geopolitical interests. I have thus advocated an 
explanatory strategy that combines 'society-centred' 
and 'state-centred' arguments regarding political 
structural change.
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In this thesis I do not make any claims which go 
beyond my two case studies. In particular, I do not 
claim that my studies have materially contributed to a 
sociological theory of macrostructural change which 
would centre on the interaction I have just 
summarized. I do suggest, however, that with the 
importance of this interaction having been 
demonstrated in two 'extreme' cases, there is now 
added plausibility, beyond prima facie evidence, for 
looking out for such an interaction in comparable 
cases. In order to adequately understand the conflict 
constellation of societies, it was necessary in the 
two examined cases to analyse the effects of 
geopolitical relations of violence on internal power 
structures. Without.such an approach that combines an 
'internal' and 'external' perspective and that accepts 
that societies are not self-contained entities but are 
highly 'permeable' to 'extraneous' forces, I would not 
have been able to give an adequate account of 'The 
state, police and public order in Austria and Ireland 
in the late 18th century' .
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